• Reference: 2022/0790
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 24 February 2022

The documentation you sent in response to Question 2021/2355 clearly shows that, in June 2019, TfL’s Chief Safety Officer Lilli Matson was the ‘owner’ of the change process that created the SHE Directorate she was appointed to in September 2019. This was after, as you stated in your response to question 2019/21052, "an internal recruitment process [that] took place to assess the suitability of potential candidates against the requirements for the role. The successful candidate went through a rigorous two-stage process and was appointed after demonstrating those requirements”. Can you provide (a) a copy of the TfL policy that permits...

• Reference: 2022/0789
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 24 February 2022

In your response to question 2021/4057 you state: “London (TfL) does not require the bus operating companies to share copies of their risk assessments covering activities within their garage environments. This includes any that were created or updated as a result of Covid-19.” After the deaths of at least 58 bus drivers from Covid-19 since March 2020 and over half that shameful number after the first Lockdown, how can you honestly state that TfL ‘left no stone unturned’ to protect bus drivers from Covid19?

• Reference: 2022/0788
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 24 February 2022

Please provide me with the data I requested in question 2021/4897.

• Reference: 2022/0787
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 24 February 2022

In your response to question 2021/4899 you state “all bus routes have access to a toilet as a minimum at one end of the route”. Can you confirm that these particular toilets are open 24-7 to all bus drivers? Please provide me with a list of those bus routes that only have a toilet at one end of the route.

• Reference: 2022/0786
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 24 February 2022

Further to your partial response to question 2021/4901, please provide me with a list of bus routes which are deemed “Priority 3”, by which I mean “routes with a round trip greater than 150 minutes with a toilet provision only at one end”.

• Reference: 2022/0785
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 24 February 2022

Your response to question 2021/4905 did not answer my question. TfL’s 18 February 2011 Research “Identifying Solutions to Pedal Confusion in Buses” identified 17 solutions to pedal confusion. How many of these 17 solutions were implemented by TfL and when?

• Reference: 2022/0784
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 24 February 2022

What design features does TfL require on electric buses that can ensure the bus driver is (a) audibly and visually aware of the how fast the bus accelerating (b) not accelerating too quickly (c) capable of controlling the bus safely to a stop if the accelerator has been fully engaged (d) not provided with more power or acceleration than is required to operate safely on busy London streets? Do you accept that—without these safety features designed into the bus at the present time, that they are neither complying with TfL’s much-touted Bus Safety Standard nor your Vision Zero Policy?

• Reference: 2022/0783
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 24 February 2022

TfL’s 2 December 2021 discussion about the death of Melissa Burr in August 2021, after being struck by an electric bus operated by Go Ahead, suggests that TfL thinks that this incident might have resulted from Pedal Confusion (https://youtu.be/b58hR-kUGJ8), a theory that has also been reported by the Evening Standard (https://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/deadly-bus-crash-victoria-london…). Since electric vehicle motors have maximum force potential when the accelerator pedal is depressed and there is no reason why the accelerator needs to located on the floor on an electric vehicle, taking into account TfL’s Bus Safety Standard and your much-touted Vision Zero Policy, why didn’t TfL totally...

• Reference: 2022/0782
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 24 February 2022

Following up on your non-response to Question 2017/0045, TfL’s 2018 Bus Safety Standard published in 2018 states, “The design of bus pedals is controlled by regulation”. Was TfL involved in the design decision to place the iBus activator on the floor? Can you provide me with the relevant regulatory decision that allowed the iBus activator to be a foot stud?

• Reference: 2022/0781
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 24 February 2022

For the period May 2010 to present, are you aware of any pedal confusion collision incidents that resulted from a bus driver responding to an iBus Controller by activating the foot stud while the bus was in motion?