Key information
Request reference number: MGLA270325-2810
Date of response:
Summary of request
I would like to make a Freedom of Information request to the London Resilience Forum, please let me know if I need to direct this elsewhere.
Under the Freedom of Information Act 2000, I request the following information:
Please provide details of the London Resilience Partnership's current contingency plans for responding to a nuclear attack on London. This should include any available guidance on protective measures for civilians, emergency response coordination, and post-attack recovery strategies.
If specific documents exist (e.g., plans, manuals, or policy papers), I would like copies or, where full disclosure is not possible, summaries of these plans. Please limit the scope to information current as of March 2025.
If any details must be exempt for security reasons, please send redacted versions or summaries where applicable.
Response
Further to our email of 28 April, please find attached the information we hold within the scope of your request.
We have redacted a limited amount of information under sections 24, 31, 38 of the Act. We also redacted personal data under Section 40(2) of the FOI Act.
Throughout, names of members of staff are exempt from disclosure under s.40 (Personal information) of the Freedom of Information Act. This information would identify specific employees and as such constitutes as personal data which is defined by Article 4(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to mean any information relating to an identified or identifiable living individual. It is considered that disclosure of this information would contravene the first data protection principle under Article 5(1) of GDPR which states that Personal data must be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject.
Section 6 of the London Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear explosives CBRN(e) Framework document falls within the scope of your request and contains information which refers to specific organisational capabilities related to nuclear response: details of specialist response, the resources/support available. This content is withheld from disclosure under Section 24(1), Section 31(1)(a) and Section 38(1)(b) of the FOIA.
Previous terrorist attacks in London, Paris and across Europe highlight the heightened risk to the public at high profile areas and major cities such as London. We note the ICO has acknowledged the link between national security, counter terrorism activities and potential acts of terrorism.
Section 38(1)(b) of the Act is duly engaged because of the risk to public safety in releasing information which could be used by those intent on committing harmful acts against the public and the UK; and/or those taking advantage of incidents to further harm the public and the UK:
(1) Information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to-
(a) endanger the physical or mental health of any individual, or
(b) endanger the safety of any individual.
(2) The duty to confirm or deny does not arise if, or to the extent that, compliance with section 1(1)(a) would, or would be likely to, have either of the effects mentioned in subsection (1).
The provisions of section 24(1) and Section 31(1(a) of the Act are also engaged.
Section 24(1) allows a public authority not to disclose information if it considers releasing the information would make the UK or its citizens more vulnerable to a national security threat.
The GLA notes the relevance of the following paragraphs from the ICO’s guidance on section 24 of the Act:
- Safeguarding national security also includes protecting potential targets even if there is no evidence that an attack is imminent.
- We also recognise that terrorists can be highly motivated and may go to great lengths to gather intelligence. This means there may be grounds for withholding seemingly harmless information on the basis that it may assist terrorists when pieced together with other information they may obtain.
Section 31(1)(a) covers all aspects of the prevention and detection of crime and can apply to information on general policies and methods adopted by public authorities. Section 31(1)(a) of the Act is engaged because the release of this information would, or would be likely to, prejudice the prevention or detection of crime.
Public interest test
Under the FoIA the ‘public interest’ is not the same as what might be of interest to the public. In balancing the public interest in disclosure, we consider the greater good or benefit to the community if the information is released or not. The ‘right to know’ must be balanced against the need to enable effective government and to serve the best interests of the public.
Considerations favouring disclosure:
- There is a clear public interest in the release of information that helps demonstrate the work of public bodies involved in emergency planning.
- To help facilitate this understanding, there is a justifiable public interest in placing into the public domain information that would allow the public to assess the nature of the discussions that take place, the advice that is given and the way it is presented.
- Transparency of these decision-making processes will generate confidence in the integrity of the procedures involved.
Considerations favouring non-disclosure:
- Conversely the disclosure of this same information would increase the risk of harm to the public and the authorities’ ability to prevent or react to such harm if it were made public and seen by those intent on causing harm.
- It is not in the public interest to release information that could be directly used to harm or plan harm to the public.
- The information withheld from disclosure is not key to understanding the remainder of the information that we have disclosed.
We have determined that safeguarding national security interests, avoiding prejudice to policing operations to prevent and detect crime, and protecting the safety of the public is of paramount importance.
The public interest favours maintaining the exemption provisions of s.24(1), s.31(1)(a), s.38(1)(b) in relation the withheld information.
Related documents
Redacted- London CBRN(e) Framework v4.0
Redacted- London Coordination of Scientific and Technical Advice Protocol V4
Redacted- Recovery coordination framework v3
Redacted- Strategic Coordination Protocol V9.1