REDACTED VERSION

London Strategic Coordination Protocol

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London Resilience Partnership Strategic Coordination Protocol

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London Resilience Unit

The London Resilience Unit is part of the Greater London Authority. We deliver and coordinate resilience services on behalf of the London Resilience Partnership and London Local Authorities.

Version Control		
Version	**Date**	**Change (owner)**
9.0	Jan 2024	Full review for submission to LRPB (MPS, LRG and SCP Working Group)
9.0	Mar 2024	Published following sign off at London Resilience Forum. Interim version subject to change to mention of London Resilience Group following merger with the City Operations Unit at the Greater London Authority.
9.1	May 2024	Republished following merger of London Resilience Group with the City Operations Unit at the Greater London Authority. References to London Resilience Group changed to London Resilience Unit.

If you are responding to an incident – go directly to <u>Section 3 – Action Checklist</u>.

Contents

Part 1 – Strategic Response Arrangements

Part 1 highlights the key information within the Strategic Coordination Protocol for use by relevant officers to inform their response activity. Further guidance, supplementary and reference information is contained in Part 2.

1.   Definition

Definition / Purpose

This protocol describes the escalating strategic coordination arrangements for a multi-agency response to an emergency or major incident in London. The protocol may also be used as the basis for the coordination of other incidents such as public order operations and major events. It is complimentary to the Tactical Coordination Protocol, which details the pan-London tactical coordination arrangements, and the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Major Incident Procedure Manual, which provides general guidance to responders and describes the roles and responsibilities of each of the emergency services and other responders at a Major Incident. It should be used in order to facilitate an efficient, effective and coordinated joint response to incidents of varying levels of severity and scale.

Trigger Levels

The principles and core functions of this protocol are deliberately flexible. They are neither prescribed or subject to specific tipping points or trigger criteria, as decisions will be taken based upon the scale and nature of the incident, public perception and/or reaction, impact and consequences, alongside any other contributing factors relevant at the time.

Audience

This Protocol is intended for the nominated representatives of organisations across the London Resilience Partnership, who are tasked with managing the strategic response to major incidents for their respective organisations. It is also aimed at civil contingencies, resilience and emergency planning personnel and other advisors who may provide advice to strategic level representatives during emergencies or major incidents.

2.   Health Inequalities & Equity

The unequal risk and impact of incidents have the potential to exacerbate existing health inequalities and cause new disparities across communities in London. Equity of preparedness and response must be considered at all levels, in all responding organisations and within all communities in London.

Regional and local coordination meetings during a response should assess and review equity from the perspective of all the diverse London populations. Depending on the incident, and related initial assessments, it may be appropriate to establish a specific health inequalities sub-group, under the SCG and alongside the other regional sub-groups, to focus on this priority and provide advice and guidance to the London response.

A golden thread of health inequalities identification and mitigation should run throughout preparedness and response. All sub-groups, as appropriate, should regularly consider the equity dimension of their work and feed this into an overall picture for health equity implications. Equality Impact Assessments (EIA) should be considered by all sub-groups, and any equity impacts that are identified should be escalated to the SCG, or other appropriate partners, for attention.

3.   Action Checklist

3.1   Period from initial response to initial SCG meeting

The below provides details on the actions to take in preparation for the first Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) meeting. Some of these actions will also be applicable to the setting up of a London Resilience Partnership Meeting.

No.	Action	Owner	Date / time completed
1	Notify the London Resilience Group (LRU) to consider the need for strategic coordination arrangements. See Section 4.	Raising organisation	
2	Ensure M/ETHANE report has been shared with relevant partners. Including LRU, upon notification of incident (LRU can support with dissemination).	Lead responder	
3	Contact the lead responder organisation (the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) by default) to undertake a joint assessment of the situation. Where necessary this assessment should be undertaken in conjunction with the organisation raising the incident (and others as appropriate) via a tripartite call.	London Resilience Unit	
4	Determine the necessary partnership coordination arrangements in consultation with LRU and other relevant organisation(s).	Lead responder	
5	If a SCG meeting is not convened; consider other options e.g. Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG), Partnership Call, Partnership messaging.	London Resilience Unit / Lead responder	
	If a SCG meeting is convened; appoint an appropriate, suitably trained SCG Chair.	Lead responder	
6	Determine the invitation list for the SCG meeting, in consultation with LRU. The invitation list is to be kept under review for each subsequent SCG meeting.	Lead responder	
7	Agree secretariat arrangements including notification of organisations invited to the SCG meeting.	London Resilience Unit / Lead responder	
8	Notify relevant partnership organisations of the SCG arrangements and ask for confirmation of participation in the initial SCG meeting. *Note: Notification for an SCG should follow, and is not intended to replace, operational and tactical level notifications.*	London Resilience Unit / Lead responder	
9	Send a notification to all partnership organisations for information only.	London Resilience Unit	

Initial response to first SCG meeting

10	If not invited to the first or subsequent SCG meetings, request attendance where it is believed to be required. See Annex F.	Partnership organisations	
11	Establish an incident on the London Situational Awareness System (LSAS) and invite partnership organisations to contribute to a Common Operating Picture (COP).	London Resilience Unit / Lead responder	
12	Agree SCG agenda and Draft Strategy to be circulated to SCG attendees.	London Resilience Unit / Lead responder	
Hold initial SCG meeting or teleconference. Decision Log must be started.			
13	Consider and identify relevant SCG sub-groups during first SCG meeting, activating as appropriate.	SCG Chair / attendees	
14	Circulate SCG actions and decisions (either full or redacted, as appropriate) to all organisations involved in the incident response, or that may have a genuine need to know.	London Resilience Unit / Lead responder	
15	Disseminate strategy and actions set by the SCG to appropriate tactical staff, including to the pan-London TCG where this has been established.	Lead responder / other relevant organisations	

3.2 Ongoing response

These issues may be considered at the initial or subsequent SCG meetings depending on the circumstances of the incident.

No.	Action	Owner	Date / time completed
1	Activate relevant sub-groups and cells to coordinate all aspects of the incident and maintain strong reporting lines with each sub-group / cell. This includes consideration for setting up the Recovery Coordinating Group.	SCG	
2	Review which organisation is best suited to chair further SCGs depending on type of incident.	SCG	
3	Review which partnership organisations should be involved in further SCG meetings. See Section 7.2 and Annex F.	SCG / Lead responder / London Resilience Unit	
4	If applicable – ensure that NHS England – London lead on casualty figures information.	SCG	
5	If applicable – ensure the Coroner leads on fatality figures (disseminated via / in conjunction with the lead police service for the incident).	SCG	
6	Consider community engagement and key messages for those affected, businesses and wider public – consider activation of the London Resilience Communications Group (LRCG).	SCG / LRCG	
7	Ensure key information is shared with all relevant partner organisations via email, LSAS and other means as required.	London Resilience Unit / Lead responder	
8	Record and track actions and decisions, reporting progress to SCG meetings as appropriate.	London Resilience Unit / Lead responder / Partnership Organisations as required	
9	Anticipate and manage issues around business continuity management, health, safety and general welfare of all responders; this includes the members of the SCG and their support staff. These issues should be considered in terms of personnel welfare and continued resilience of command and coordination functions.	SCG	

| 10 | Monitor the implementation and successful delivery of [strategic objectives](). | SCG | |
| 11 | Monitor and record [financial expenditure]() committed on behalf of the SCG | TBC by the SCG Chair | |

Ongoing response

3.3 Handover / Stand-down

No.	Action	Owner	Date / time completed
1	Engage with all sub-groups to ensure they have achieved their aim and objectives, and / or clarify how any outstanding work will be coordinated. Include timeframes for completion.	SCG Chair / Sub-Group Chairs	
2	Ensure that a formal handover agreement is in place between the SCG and RCG.	SCG / RCG Chairs	
3	Collect initial learning points during the final SCG and arrange for a hot debrief to take place within 7 days of the incident.	SCG Chair	
4	Where an incident response is concluded without handover to the Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG), issue a formal stand-down message to the London Resilience Partnership.	London Resilience Unit / Lead responder	

Handover / Stand-down

4. Activation and Notification Process

4.1 Activation

To activate the arrangements set out in this protocol, partners should notify the London Resilience Unit as set out in the Partnership Contacts Directory.

Should LRU or a Partnership organisation need to contact the MPS to share information about a significant event or situation that does not obviously merit the activation of this protocol, they can phone a dedicated number (REDACTED) to make contact with a relevant senior officer of the MPS 24/7. Other organisations such as the City of London Police (CoLP) and the British Transport Police (BTP) have similar procedures for events or situations that relate to their jurisdictions. Emergency contact details for this are in the Partnership Contacts Directory.

If necessary, the MPS, CoLP or BTP will then ensure that the LRU are informed of the incident so a tri-partite call can take place to make a decision on whether invoking the strategic coordination arrangements are required for the event/situation. If required, LRU will invoke the arrangements as described in this protocol.

4.2 Sharing of M/ETHANE reports

The lead organisation must ensure that the M/ETHANE report has been shared with relevant partners upon notification of an incident.

The sharing of a M/ETHANE report will typically happen between operational and tactical commanders and control rooms. It must also be shared by the declaring agency with the London Resilience Unit who can support the onward dissemination to the wider partnership via email and / or using LSAS. Updates to the initial M/ETHANE report should be shared in the same way.

Further information regarding the sharing of M/ETHANE reports is contained within the separate M/ETHANE Report Protocol.

4.3 Notification of the London Resilience Partnership

Notification of the wider London Resilience Partnership will be coordinated through the London Resilience Unit. The wording of the notification message will be agreed by the lead responder and the London Resilience Unit and shared at a time mutually agreed dependent upon the pace of the response.

4.4 Tripartite Calls

A tripartite call enables the London Resilience Partnership to decide how an incident will be coordinated, including if it is necessary to activate a Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG). It takes place between the declaring agency, the MPS and the London Resilience Unit (other agencies may be invited by exception).

The purpose of the call is solely to agree the level of required coordination and the lead agency. It is not in itself part of the coordination structure, only a means for activating the wider response.

For relevant incidents including declared major incidents, a tactical level tri-service phone call will have already taken place between emergency service control rooms via ESICTRL. Discussions may also take place between other responding organisations depending on the nature of the incident.

5. Response and Coordination

The notification and sharing of information between London Resilience partners does not in itself mean a multi-agency coordinated response is automatically necessary. Experience shows that on the majority of occasions the sharing of information will be the only action required.

5.1 Levels of Coordination

The levels of coordination are as follows:

- **Level 1** Monitor the situation and share information with selected partners
- **Level 2** Partnership meeting for briefing and information sharing
- **Level 3** Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) teleconference or meeting

5.1.1 Level 1

Monitoring the situation and sharing written information with the partnership. Organisations may need to take action within their own organisations in response, but no collective Partnership action is required.

The sharing of information and provision of updates is facilitated through the London Resilience Unit (LRU) via email and / or the use of the London Situation Awareness System (LSAS).

5.1.2 Level 2

Partnership meeting

Partnership meetings provide an opportunity to share information with Partnership organisations where there is no immediate need to implement a multi-agency coordinated response but where information may support responders to coordinate their own organisational response and plan resourcing requirements.

The meetings are predominantly a mechanism for briefing and information sharing and are not expected to be directive or action orientated. They may be chaired by a lead organisation or by the London Resilience Unit.

There may be occasions when organisations within the Partnership chair a Gold Partnership Meeting in response to pre-planned public events which show potential to cause significant disruption to the people or infrastructure of London and may, therefore, require coordinated strategic awareness. In these circumstances the chair should ensure LRU (on behalf of the Partnership) and any other relevant partner organisations (e.g. the London Local Authority Gold (LLAG)) are invited dependent upon the nature of the event.

5.1.3 Level 3

Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG)

A Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) is convened when an incident or potential incident requires full multi-agency coordination. The convening of a SCG will also trigger additional actions and potential wider structures as set out in Sections 7-9.

Figure 1: Full multi-agency coordination and information sharing structure: COBR, ResCG, SCG, example SCG sub-groups, TCG and Local Strategic Partnership Group (not all groups will be stood up for every incident)

6. Partnership Meetings

6.1 Full Partnership Meetings

Partnership Meetings are for briefing and information sharing between partnership organisations only, they are not intended to be action orientated (with the exception of procedural actions). Their purpose is to:

- Achieve shared situational awareness across the Partnership, including the latest information from lead agency(ies) for the situation, and the preparedness or response actions taken by other partners

- Provide partners with the information required to inform their own preparedness and / or response arrangements

- Confirm procedural actions (e.g. distribution of further information, request for partners to amplify public information / communications)

Dependent on the circumstances, it may be that only a standalone Partnership Meeting is required. Alternatively, multiple meetings may be convened if there is a continued need to keep partners updated on an ongoing and changing situation.

If at any point it is determined that partnership coordination is required, a Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) or Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) should be convened.

A template Partnership Meeting Agenda is provided in Annex E.

6.1.1 Partnership Meeting Chair

Partnership Meetings will be chaired by the London Resilience Unit by default. Where there is a lead response organisation better suited to chairing the meeting, this will be arranged between that organisation and the London Resilience Unit.

6.1.2 Partnership Meeting Membership

By their nature, Partnership Meetings should be inclusive rather than exclusive to enable full shared situational awareness across the Partnership.

There is a standing invite list for Partnership Meetings which is reflective of that which is used for a Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG), further information is provided in Section 7.2 and the list detailed in Annex F. However, notification of a scheduled Partnership Meeting will be shared with the full Partnership, enabling those who are not on the invite list to request to join the meeting if they think they should also be in attendance.

6.2 Selected Partners Meetings

There may be instances where an incident only impacts a selected number of partners, or is confined to a particular sector, and it is therefore not considered beneficial to bring together the whole partnership. In these circumstances a Selected Partners Meeting may be convened.

The aim of a Selected Partners Meeting is similar to that of a Full Partnership Meeting; to ensure shared situational awareness. They may also be used to gain a better understanding of the situation at hand before agreeing on wider coordination arrangements.

When convening a Selected Partners Meeting careful consideration should be made regarding which Partners are invited to attend and whether there are any risks associated with not inviting a wider group of partners.

Additionally, when Selected Partners Meetings are taking place, there should be continued consideration to share information more widely i.e. via updates to the full Partnership.

7.   Establishing a Strategic Coordinating Group

Where strategic multi-agency direction is required to deal with a rapid onset emergency or in preparation for a rising tide event, the response may include establishing a Strategic Coordinating Group.

Some incidents may be of such short duration that there is limited scope for strategic coordination as the situation will be dealt with through the tactical and operational response structures.

A SCG can form at the request of any partner organisation and is not reliant on a Blue-lights (Emergency Services) activation. It is responsible for determining the strategic aim, objectives and priorities for the incident on behalf of London. The SCG will continue to meet throughout the response phase as long as there is a requirement, or until the group hands over to a Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG) or stands down.

7.1   SCG Chair

The SCG should be chaired by the most appropriate agency, depending on the nature of the incident. The SCG may initially be chaired by the MPS, but this may subsequently be handed over to the most appropriate agency, depending on the nature of the incident. Where there is uncertainty about the most appropriate agency, the MPS will chair as default. A cadre of officers from partnership organisations will be available to fulfil the role of SCG chair.

The SCG chair should act as an impartial chair and, where possible, their organisation or sector represented separately on the SCG. Although, whilst this is best practice, this can be difficult to achieve. For example, in response to a spontaneous incident that occurs in unsocial hours, organisations may not be able to immediately resource both roles. In addition, having multiple qualified or appropriate level representatives at an SCG can negatively impact depth and resilience of command for the lead organisation when responding to protracted incidents.

The chair of the SCG is required to provide leadership for the partnership response and must think beyond their own organisational aims and culture. They do not command the assets of other organisations; their role is to convene the necessary partner agencies in order to deliver a holistic and thorough response to an incident. They exert influence and achieve consensus without constitutional authority – this may require strong leadership ability.

It is important to note that the SCG is not a legal entity in itself and does not have the legal power to direct members. The Group will however, in general terms, accept direction set by the Chair.

7.2   SCG Membership

The guiding principle of the membership of the SCG is one of inclusion rather than exclusion. The suggested membership of a full SCG is illustrated the Figure 2 below and a standing invite list is provided is Annex F.

Any SCG sub-groups (see Section 9) will feed into the SCG via a nominated representative (e.g. the sub-group chair) or through the most appropriate SCG member organisation (e.g. the Humanitarian Assistance Group will feed in via the Local Authority representative / LLAG).

The Business, Faith, Transport and Voluntary sectors will ordinarily each attend via a single representative (ordinarily the chair of the associated cell / sub-group) who will act as a conduit between the wider partners within that sector and the SCG. However, for some incidents where individual organisations within a sector are significantly impacted it may be more appropriate for those individual organisations to directly attend.

With 33 local authorities in London it is impractical for all local authorities to be directly represented on the SCG during a pan-London incident therefore representation will be via one nominated London Local Authority Gold (LLAG). The LLAG will represent the collective interests of local authorities across London rather than those of their individual organisation. Where an incident impacts just one or two boroughs directly, the Council Gold(s) for these boroughs will also join the

SCG – they will represent their individual organisations whilst LLAG will consider any wider pan-London issues / impacts.

The chair of the SCG, in consultation with the members, should initially define and then periodically review the composition and chair of the group. This is to ensure that the right partner organisations and expertise are represented throughout the lifecycle of the group.

Representatives at the SCG should have the level of knowledge, expertise and authority to identify and commit the resources of their respective agency.


Figure 2: Composition of a complete Strategic Coordinating Group with common sub-groups

7.3   SCG Scheduling

When scheduling any SCG meeting consideration should be given for timing the meeting to ensure it achieves the most benefit. This includes considering the timing of other meetings (individual agency gold groups, SCG sub-groups etc.) which the SCG may require updates from. Additionally, where practicable, the timings of SCGs outside of London should be considered (if they are taking place) to avoid conflict and to enable partners who work across multiple LRF areas to attend. Consideration should also be giving to ensuring that there is enough time between meetings to allow for meaningful action to take place.

Where there are national response arrangements in place there will likely also be a requirement for the SCG to report into COBR therefore all SCG meetings should be scheduled with this in mind and to allow sufficient time for this reporting to take place.

7.3.1 The First SCG Meeting

There is no defined timescale for setting up the first SCG as this will vary depending on the incident. Additionally, other mechanisms (e.g. tripartite calls, blue light meetings, TCGs) will likely need to take place beforehand to ensure a fully informed SCG. It is expected that one of these tiers of emergency coordination will have been activated within the first 2 hours.

For a fast paced, no notice incident it is likely that there will be a keenness for the first SCG meeting to take place as soon as practically possible however a short notice SCG may reduce the availability of representatives from across the partnership therefore there should always be

consideration given for the need to meet quickly versus the need to have full collective multi-agency coordination.

7.4 SCG Agenda

A standard draft SCG agenda is provided in Annex D, this can be amended by the SCG chair as appropriate and may change over time as the response evolves.

An additional draft agenda for the first SCG meeting is also provided in Annex C. Particularly when responding to spontaneous, fast paced incidents it is anticipated that the initial SCG will predominantly focus on ensuring shared situational awareness and agreeing joint multi-agency priorities. A full SCG meeting agenda would therefore not be required and should be reserved for subsequent meetings when wider coordination structures have been / are being put in place.

7.5 Secretariat Function

The secretariat support for SCG meetings will be provided jointly by the lead response organisation and the LRU. The lead response organisation and LRU will jointly consider staffing requirements to fulfil SCG secretariat functions.

Actions and decisions will be circulated to meeting attendees as soon as possible following the SCG. Minutes will be taken however these will be circulated in slower time unless it is determined there is a specific need to share them within a specified timescale. Once signed off, the SCG minutes will be shared directly with meeting attendees and uploaded to the incident area on the London Situational Awareness System (LSAS) this ensures they remain accessible to all partners.

7.6 Meeting Locations

In a no notice incident it is likely that the initial SCG will be held virtually to allow partners to convene in quick time. A decision will then be taken as to whether the coordination should continue virtually or whether there is benefit in partners coming together in person.

It is likely that SCGs could continue virtually in the majority of situations however there are some circumstances which may specifically require / benefit from in person coordination for example in Counter Terrorism or protracted incidents.

Where coordination moves to in person, there should remain consideration for providing dial in options for those who cannot attend in person and partners should be reminded of the benefits in allowing them to do so i.e. this enables attendance from partners who cover multiple LRF areas and therefore may be required to join multiple SCGs. Additionally, the host should ensure, insofar as possible, that the facilities enable those who join virtually to fully participate in the meeting e.g. they are able to hear all conversation in the room.

7.6.1 Virtual / Hybrid Meeting Etiquette

To ensure effective running of virtual or hybrid SCG meetings, the following standard approach should be taken:

- Virtual meetings will be set up to ensure that attendees are held in the lobby until admitted by the meeting organiser.

- All those attending virtually will be asked to provide their name and organisation in the meeting chat so that the Chair is aware of who is on the call.

- Anybody who dials in via phone will be asked to identify themselves and will potentially be removed from the meeting if they do not.

- Meetings will not be recorded, by default – full meeting minutes will be written regardless of whether the meeting is in person, virtual or hybrid.
  Where the Chair believes there is a need to record a meeting, they should provide clear reasoning and seek approval from SCG members.

7.6.2 Strategic Coordination Centre

Dependent on the nature of the incident (i.e. whether it is protracted or there are sensitivities surrounding the circumstances), there may be benefit in establishing a Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC) to provide a single location for SCG agencies to work from and provide their core functions in response to the incident.

Annex I provides details on the purpose, activation and considerations when establishing a SCC although this information is not intended to be prescriptive. The location of, and associated operating procedures for, a SCC should be decided at the time to ensure that they best suit the needs of the incident.

8. Impact Analysis and Draft Strategy

Using situational information, including information received from the initial METHANE report, and information recorded via the COP through LSAS, an impact analysis should be developed. An impact analysis is the process of assessing the impacts of the emergency across a range of factors and may be done at the organisational or regional level. A template impact assessment for recovery can be found in the Recovery Coordination Framework. Factors that should be considered are:

- **Health:** Direct (fatalities, injuries, disrupted staff access) and indirect (strain on physical and mental health services, disrupted BAU services)

- **Social and welfare:** Evacuation, service disruption, community tension, reduction in public trust and confidence, public disorder

- **Environmental:** pollution of land, water or air, damage to plants or animals

- **Economic:** National, London, local - direct and indirect e.g. financial markets

- **Political:** Central Government, GLA, Mayor's Office, local authorities

- **Media:** Mainstream and social media profile and public communications

- **Organisational:** Implications for critical services of partner organisations, reduction in trust of responding agencies

- **Legal** considerations

- **Ethical** considerations

- **Equity and Inclusion:** considerations of any community or groups who may be disproportionality impacted by the incident

Having considered the initial situational information and impacts of the incident, a joint strategy should be agreed by partners. In determining any strategy, consideration should be given to:

- The desired **end-state**. This involves clarifying what a successful resolution of the emergency should look like. What do you want to have achieved?

- The **ways** in which this should be achieved, and the **resources** required to bring it about.

By setting a joint strategy, leaders can ensure that subordinates and partners are working towards a common goal. This needs a consensus and acceptance across the range of contributing partner organisations.

The strategic aim should look beyond the immediate demands of the response and embrace the longer-term priorities of restoring essential services and helping to facilitate the recovery of affected communities. The strategy should be continuously reviewed to ensure that it remains appropriate.

An example SCG partnership strategy is provided below. Further examples of strategies for specific incidents can be found in Annex G.

Strategic Aim

The London Resilience Partnership will work together* to coordinate an effective response to, and recovery from the [incident type] for London's communities and businesses.

Strategic Objectives

- *Save and protect life*

- *Relieve suffering and provide humanitarian assistance*

- *Consider any disproportionately impacted communities and ensure an equitable response for all*

- *Provide conditions for a safe and secure London*

- *Work collaboratively and share information with multi-agency partners for the benefit of London*

- *Ensure the response does not exacerbate inequalities or disproportionally impact the diverse communities of London, but instead considers equity throughout*

- *Inform and reassure the public through communication and engagement*

- *Minimise disruption to infrastructure, transport services, communities, businesses, and impacts on the environment*

- *Facilitate recovery; the restoration of infrastructure, transport services, communities, businesses, the environment, and the return to normal or a new normality (identifying opportunities to improve)*

- *Manage resourcing to meet response needs and to maintain essential public services*

- *Continuously debrief, learn lessons and improve through incident response(s)*

This strategy will remain valid until it is revised by the SCG or until handover from response to recovery coordination.

*It is expected that all those responder organisations involved will work together in a directed and coordinated fashion to achieve the strategic aim and objectives.

9. SCG Sub-Groups and other groups to be considered

Sub-groups and cells which may sit alongside the Strategic Coordinating Group are set out below. Not all groups will be stood up for every incident, additionally, this list is not exhaustive, further sub-groups not listed below may be developed based on the situation and requirements at the time.

Some of the sub-groups listed below may, in turn, have their own sub-groups – details on these are provided in the corresponding Framework.

As well as linking in directly with the SCG, the Chair of each sub-group should consider whether there is also a requirement for direct liaison with other sub-groups to support their work.

Some sub-groups may span both response and recovery – upon transition to recovery these sub-groups should consider whether there is a need to review their structure, work and strategy.

All current London Resilience Partnership Frameworks can be accessed via ResilienceDirect.

Sub Group	Purpose	Lead
Cyber Technical Advice Cell (CTAC)	A CTAC should be formed following identification of a sudden-onset (no-notice) or rising-tide (intelligence-led) cyber emergency or significant cyber incident. The purpose of the CTAC is to provide timely, coordinated, and actionable advice to the SCG during the response to an emergency with a cyber element. The particular needs of an SCG set up in response to a specific cyber incident will be agreed and requested from the CTAC at the first SCG meeting. Therefore, the purpose of the CTAC and the needs that it must aim to fulfil may evolve over the course of the response in the event that an incident spans more than one SCG meeting. See Cyber Incident Response Framework.	Lead agreed by SCG depending on nature of incident
Evacuation and Shelter Coordinating Group (ESCG)	The ESCG will provide central, multi-agency coordination in the event of an incident requiring mass evacuation and/or shelter. The purpose of the ECSG is to provide a single point of multi-agency coordination at a tactical level. See Mass Evacuation and Shelter Framework.	Police and Local Authorities co-chair
Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG)	The HASG aim is to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered in an effective manner that meets the needs of those affected by emergencies at the borough or pan-London level, depending on the scale of the incident. This group will determine the direction of the humanitarian response, deploy key capabilities, coordinate and monitor the activities of the responders	Local Authorities

	and ensure that mechanisms for sharing information are in place. Where a Mass Fatalities Coordination Group (MFCG) has been established there should be direct liaison between the HASG and MFCG to coordinate support to people who have been bereaved. As there will be a significant overlap between the work of the HASG and the Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG) there may be a need to review the structure of the HASG at the transition from response to recovery. See Humanitarian Assistance Framework.	
Local Strategic Partnership Groups (LSPG)	LSPGs may be formed at the borough level where deemed to be required by local organisations to provide a mechanism for strategic level engagement and information sharing. This may include local political engagement. There will be no formal coordination or information sharing link between an LSPG and the Forward Command Point or Tactical Coordinating Group. Multi-agency information sharing should occur between the London SCG and borough level LSPGs, but this is not a line of multi-agency coordination.	As appropriate dependent on the incident
London Drought Group (LDG)	The LDG will be convened to ensure a shared understanding regarding drought risks & impacts and to provide a forum for Partners to agree appropriate triggers for escalating London's response to an ongoing drought. The Group will also be responsible for identifying areas / sectors at risk of wider impacts of drought and associated drought measures. The LDG may form in isolation if a SCG has not been convened. See Drought Response Framework.	Water Companies / Environment Agency
London Resilience Communication Group (LRCG)	The London Resilience Communication Group (LRCG) brings together communication team representatives from resilience partnership organisations to support the SCG with coordinated communications in response to incidents and events impacting London.	Metropolitan Police Service

	The Chair of the LRCG, or a nominated deputy, attends the SCG to ensure alignment of communications with the overall strategy. See [London Resilience Communication Group Framework]().	
London Transport Cell	The Transport Cell will provide single cell representation from the Transport Sector to the SCG, where appropriate. Circumstances may require additional agencies to attend the SCG in addition to the Transport Cell representative. The Transport Cell enables shared situational awareness, enhances communications and interoperability in the sector and will provide a collective position on impacts and risks to the Transport Sector at the SCG. The Transport Cell may be activated at the request of the SCG Chair or at the request of a standing member of the Transport Cell to the TfL Silver Commander. The Transport Cell may be co-located at the Network Management Control Centre (Southwark) or conduct business virtually.	Transport for London
Mass Casualty Response Structures	The [London Mass Casualty Framework]() does not include the requirement for a Mass Casualty sub-group to be established - roles and responsibilities defined in the framework should be carried out alongside incident specific support groups that are activated, reporting via NHS England – London into the wider strategic coordination structures. The Framework is intended to be scalable, providing strategic direction for a range of scenarios and up to 2000 casualties. Following the declaration of one or more Major Incidents the decision to activate the London Mass Casualty Framework will likely be made by NHS England – London in consultation with London Ambulance Service (LAS) and other key partners e.g. LFB, Police services, local authorities.	NHS England – London
Mass Fatality Coordination Group (MFCG)	The Mass Fatality Coordination Group is a multi-agency group which sets the strategy for body recovery and identification during an incident where the number of fatalities is greater than normal local arrangements can manage. This function may also be used in response to an incident overseas which calls for the	Coroner

	identification and repatriation of large numbers of UK Nationals. See Mass Fatality Framework.	
Mortality Management Group (MMG)	The MMG coordinates the management of excess deaths at the regional level, commissioning service delivery and implementing necessary contingency options as appropriate. It will provide a tactical and strategic response in dealing with high levels of deaths across the capital, particularly on matters that involve coordinated joint working across the organisations with both private and public stakeholders, as well as monitoring and increasing capacity and resources. See Excess Deaths Framework.	Local Authorities
Multi-Agency Information Cell (MAIC)	Emergency responder organisations should support tactical and strategic coordinating groups, when they are activated, by managing information and forming a common operating picture. This capability is known in national doctrine as a multi-agency information cell (MAIC). A core function of the MAIC is to produce the common operating picture that will inform and support the SCG, TCG and other responders. The MAIC may come together in either a physical, co-located form, or virtually. It should be able to source, access, analyse, display and disseminate situational information, drawing on information and expertise from many sources. Both co-located and virtual arrangements for a MAIC should make use of a wide range of information systems to support shared situational awareness, such as the London Situational Awareness System (LSAS), other data sources or social media. A MAIC will not need to be established at the start of every incident involving a TCG and SCG, but the multi-agency response to complex and/or protracted incidents should be supported with a MAIC. The LSAS provides for the production of a Common Operating Picture (COP) through the contribution of information from partner organisations. This provides the core functionality of a virtual MAIC. For more complex and/or protracted incidents the SCG	Lead response organisation with support from LRU

	may activate a physical or virtual MAIC to lead on situational awareness.	
Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG)	Initially, during the response phase, a RCG will sit as a sub-group of the SCG. Once the response phase of the emergency has passed, primacy for dealing with the consequences of the incident will pass to the RCG. This transfer of responsibility is a formal process and should be fully documented within the minutes of the SCG and relevant decision logs. The London Recovery Coordination Framework contains considerations for a coordinated, multi-agency approach to the development and subsequent implementation of a strategy aimed at rebuilding, restoring and addressing the needs of the affected community following an incident.	Local Authorities
Response Coordinating Group (ResCG)	DLUHC Resilience & Emergencies Division (RED) may convene a multi-SCG ResCG where an incident affects a number of neighbouring areas and multiple SCGs have been activated which would benefit from coordination or enhanced support. The ResCG will bring together appropriate representatives from local SCGs (e.g. the SCG Chair or Chief of Staff) where activated, or relevant organisations if an SCG has not been activated. The role of the ResCG may vary depending on the nature of the emergency, but is likely to cover: • Developing shared understanding of the situation, providing early warning of emerging challenges • Assessing the emergency's actual and/or potential impact • Facilitating mutual aid arrangements between SCG responders if required • Ensuring effective flow of communication between local and national levels, to ensure that the national input is coordinated with the local effort • Coordinating a coherent and consistent public message Identifying any issues which cannot be resolved at local level and need to be raised at national level.	DLUHC

Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)	Scientific and technical advice and expertise is available from individual agencies through the existing channels however, in complex situations or incidents it may be necessary to provide a single, accurate source of information to inform strategic decision making. This is provided through the formation of a Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC). A STAC can only be activated at the request of the SCG Chair or at the request of UKHSA London's Regional / Deputy Regional Director. See London Coordination of Scientific and Technical Advice Protocol.	UK Health Security Agency
and Air Quality Cell (AQC)	An Air Quality Cell (AQC) will be convened where an air pollution incident poses a threat of significant harm to the environment or public health. The AQC will undertake an ongoing public health risk assessment throughout the acute phase of a relevant incident. The AQCs core members are the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA), Environment Agency (EA) and Met Office (MO) who have duty officers available on a 24/7/365 response basis. The establishment of the AQC is a joint decision between these agencies. The AQC will provide advice directly to a Strategic Coordination Group (SCG) when convened, or through the STAC when a STAC has been established to support an SCG.	UK Health Security Agency / Environment Agency / Met Office
Site Management Cell	Where the complexity of the incident dictates, it is recommended that a multi-agency group of relevant specialists may convene to consider structural integrity and site management matters outside of SCG meetings. In the first instance this may be covered by tactical coordination meetings, but could be a separate subgroup if required. The Site Management Cell may also support the RCG if required. See Structural Collapse, Site Management and Clearance Framework.	Local Authority

Tactical Coordinating Group (pan-London)	For an incident where pan-London strategic coordination is in place, there will be a requirement for pan-London tactical coordination to interpret strategic direction, develop tactical plans and coordinate activities and assets. The pan-London Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) will inform and support the strategic decision-making process and should be attended by tactical decision makers from the emergency services and relevant partner organisations. See Tactical Coordination Protocol.	Emergency Services

10. Resources and Support Available

Resource / Support	Description	Provider(s)
SCG resources and secretariat support		
SCG meeting facilities	During the first 24-36 hours following the activation of an SCG, the MPS will use a dedicated command facility for the physical location of an SCG, and this includes teleconferencing facilities. Other organisations may alternatively provide a meeting location and facilities. Remote working and other virtual options can also be used. MPS facilities or other facilities provided by the City of London Police (CoLP) may be used for incidents in the City of London.	Metropolitan Police Service
Secretariat Support	The secretariat support for SCG meetings will be provided jointly by the lead response organisation and the LRU. The LRU is able to provide support including but not limited to: • Information gathering, sharing, and the production of the COP via LSAS. • Notification and alerts to the London Resilience Partnership. • Administrative arrangements for meetings and teleconferences (e.g. invitations, preparation of paperwork, record of actions, decisions and minutes). • Minutes for SCG meetings will, as a minimum, provide actions and decisions with rationale where stated in the meeting. • An initial record of actions and decisions may be circulated with pertinent situational information. A fuller set of minutes will follow later for sign off and be retained for future information and audit purposes. • Each responding organisation is responsible for the provision of their own logging capabilities. Where practicable the LRU may deploy staff to the primary strategic coordination / command location of the lead response organisation to enhance liaison and collaboration on the support functions required to facilitate and coordinate the activities of the SCG. LRU will primarily provide the secretariat for the SCG, not for sub-groups which should be conducted by relevant lead organisations. The lead response organisation and LRU will jointly consider staffing requirements to fulfil SCG secretariat functions.	London Resilience Unit / Lead Agency

Emergency Alerts	Emergency Alerts are part of a public information system that the UK Government has developed to alert the public about emergencies that represent a severe threat to life, they use cell broadcast technology to transmit or 'push' messages to mobile phones that are connected to a mobile phone tower. If lives are at risk during an emergency, the risk covers a defined geographical area and there is a need for people to take specific urgent action then Emergency Alerts can be used to get immediate notifications to people within that area. Requests to send Emergency Alerts should be made directly to the Cabinet Office via the agreed protocol.	Cabinet Office
Debriefing	The College of Policing provide a National Structured Debrief Course to train staff to enable conscious analysis of decision-making processes used in emergency response, evaluating experiences in order to inform future actions. There are a number of staff trained in debriefing within Partnership organisations (including the MPS and LRU), who can be called upon to lead impartial debriefing sessions. Further information on debriefing is provided in Section 18.	College of Policing
SCG Peer Review	The SCG / SCG Chair may find it useful to seek out the support of another LRF area to offer a SCG Peer Review – this may include reviewing SCG decisions, actions and processes during the response as well as listening in to SCG calls to get an understanding of the incident and the current actions / issues. Ideally the nominated Peer will have previous experience in a similar incident so that they are well placed to provide assurance and offer challenge as / when required. Peer reviews will likely be most beneficial during more prolonged responses and can either be sought through existing local links or the DLUHC Government Liaison Officer should be approached to request their support in identifying the most suitable Peer.	Other LRFs / via DLUHC RED
Information Sharing / Shared Situational Awareness		
London Situational Awareness System (LSAS) and Common Operating Picture (COP)	LSAS is a secure web based multi-agency data sharing tool. LSAS can be used to generate a COP based on information submitted by emergency response organisations and other members of the London Resilience Partnership. The LSAS COP includes details of partner organisation strategies, situation and response assessments, and forward look / horizon scans. It should be used alongside other means of sharing information to support situational awareness.	London Resilience Unit

	Whilst the COP can be used in all phases of an incident, consideration should be made for what information is readily available and whether the collation of a COP for the first SCG is achievable. However, where time permits, partners will be asked to provide updates ahead of the first SCG. Further updates will be expected from partners throughout the response, including in advance of subsequent SCGs – reporting requirements will be shared by LRU.	
London Situational Awareness Team (LSAT)	The London Situational Awareness Team (LSAT) provides a 24-hour horizon-scanning and situation-monitoring function. The service is provided predominantly from open-source monitoring, complemented by reporting and communications with emergency services, transport partners and central government. When aware of a potential or developing situation LSAT can provide We Are Aware alerts and Incident Reports to selected partners. These alerts and reports can be used in addition to (but should not be used instead of) standard incident alerting notification procedures. Should a need be identified, LSAT can also provide bespoke reporting if capacity at the time allows. In case of a major incident LSAT is responsible for supporting the Mayor's Gold Cell and Mayoral involvement in COBR.	Greater London Authority (GLA)
Safety and Security Communications to Businesses	The Cross-sector Safety & Security Communications (CSSC) Project was set up to improve safety and security communications to London businesses during an incident. CSSC London operates a partnership-based framework to communicate with businesses in and around London, helping them address safety, security, resilience and emergency prepared issues. CSSC has two mechanisms for facilitating two-way communication between public authorities and the private sector; an email cascade system and a 'bridge call' system where direct, verbal updates can be given from public authority partners to a limited number of Industry Sector Leads (key representatives of industry groups). A small project team is responsible for the day-to-day development of the project and stand up as a 'Hub' to facilitate exchange and dissemination of information in an incident. The flow of information is designed to be two-way, so real-time information can be fed back by businesses into the Hub to pass on to the authorities. The CSSC Hub can be activated by the police directly, or by other partners through the LRU.	Cross-Sector Safety and Security Communications (CSSC)
Other		
Community cohesion	There are resources in place, both at the borough and regional level in order to monitor and respond to community level tensions and support cohesion. At the borough level, London Local Authority Prevent Coordinators have access to intelligence and links to community groups. At the regional level, London Prevent Network Pan London Assessments are created to provide a picture of	MPS and Local Authorities, Home Office, City of London and City of London Police

	community tensions and cohesion activity, and can be used to focus support efforts. This is shared between the police, London Local Authorities and the Home Office. There are a number of roles and departments contributing to furthering and monitoring community cohesion in the MPS and regionally. These include, within the Professionalism Command, the Crime Prevention, Diversity and Inclusion and Community Engagement Team, the Communities Engagement Team (CET) and Prevent resources in the Counter Terrorism Command and local officers and staff in Frontline Policing (Neighbourhood, Faith and Partnership and Prevention officers and Schools and Youth Engagement officers). In addition, the hate crime team offers insight on hate crime affecting a range of communities. Community sentiment and tension indicators are collated from a range of sources, including social media sentiment analysis, assessed and actioned as appropriate. Community Impact Assessments may be produced, and this information is available for a range of briefing documents which are shared with partners in London and regionally. Engagement is considered at a central strategic level, a business group level and at an event/incident. There are a range of networks (including independent advisory groups, community reference groups and faith groups) and stakeholders whose advice is drawn on in each category. In response to an incident or ongoing period of increased (or potentially increased) tension, a Bronze Engagement role will be in place within the police operational command structure. This role ensures that we are engaging at the right time with the right communities in the right way and that insight gained is listened to, shared and actioned. That role works with communication teams on appropriate proactive and reactive communication and engagement mechanisms ensuring a wide reach and opportunities for communities to provide feedback. A specific gold advisory cell may also be put in place to advise the Gold Commander.	
Coordination of financial donations	The National Emergencies Trust can launch a public appeal to raise funds for people and communities impacted by a major incident. It will activate if it's Board determines an incident to be 'of national significance', there is sufficient public support, and there is a relatively high humanitarian impact. The National Emergencies Trust will provide the infrastructure to collect public donations, and work with local and national media, broadcasters, corporates, central government, and the GLA to ensure that there is clear communication to the public on how they can support the response. Funds raised will be allocated to partner charities to support individuals with their physical and psychological injuries, hardship and bereavement support. If an incident does not meet the National Emergencies Trust's threshold for activation, it can still advise other organisations on the effective coordination and distribution of financial donations.	National Emergencies Trust

	The London Emergencies Trust (LET) distributes funds raised through public appeals (for bodies including the British Red Cross, and through the National Emergencies Trust) to people affected by a major incident in London – in previous incidents this has included making gifts to survivors who were hospitalised, and to the next of kin of the deceased. Gifts distributed by LET are at the discretion of the Trustees of the charity, and will also depend on the amount of money donated.	London Emergencies Trust
Emergency Coordination of Scientific Advice (ECOSA) and STAC	ECOSA is a mechanism developed to provide the necessary scientific advice to first-line responders during the earliest stages of the response to an incident while more formal scientific advisory systems are being set up. It exists to ensure that responders do not receive conflicting advice from different sources and consists of three main agencies providing advice – UKHSA for more general health matters, the Defence Science and Technology Laboratories (DSTL) for chemical and biological events, and the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) for radiological and nuclear events. ECOSA has in part been created to fulfil the requirement for the provision of immediate, coordinated and effective scientific advice to the Police, Fire and Rescue Service, Ambulance Service and public health responders across the UK at a CBRNE terrorist incident. The ECOSA team may also provide immediate, coordinated and effective scientific advice in the event of a HAZMAT incident. This scientific advice will be provided up until the time a STAC is formed wherein it will then stand down and the STAC will take primacy. The role of the STAC is to ensure timely coordinated scientific, technical, environmental and public health advice to the SCG during the response to an emergency (see also Section 9).	UKHSA
Faith and Belief Network	London's Faith and Belief Network is not an organisation but describes activity by a number of organisations to promote community resilience and to help Londoners to be prepared. It consists of a number of umbrella organisations as well as local faith/belief communities, often centred on places of worship and ceremony of which there are hundreds per borough. There are also chaplaincies, faith-based refugee centres, mental health drop-ins, food banks, faith based schools, colleges and universities and a plethora of community activities and services to the general public run by faith and belief organisations. Many organisations within the faith and belief network in work with the local public sector like local authorities, NHS, local police and so on for the better of the community. The London Resilience Forum's Faith and Belief Sector Panel brings together an advisory group to support the chair who is a member of the LRF. Specific operational cells may be set up at need. The Panel works with others to bring together a contact group to share information and listen to issues which may be arising locally. The Panel helps the wider Partnership to understand the faith and belief sector and the services and support it provides to the community, which in an incident may be either needed or disrupted. It	London Resilience Forum's Faith and Belief Sector Panel

	works with the Partnership to ensure the specific needs which arise from the faith or belief of individuals are met in times of crisis. It is normally also involved in humanitarian assistance in the recovery phase.	
London Communities Emergencies Partnership (LCEP)	LCEP is a partnership of voluntary and community organisations in London. LCEP will mobilise the partnership in an emergency, to support coordinated action and facilitate the two-way flow of information between statutory responders, voluntary and faith sector actors, funders, and the wider community. In an emergency, LCEP will form a representative LCEP Response Team. This will be led by the LCEP Partnership Manager, and will be the first point of contact for the SCG/TCG/LRF in an emergency. Depending on the nature of the emergency, the make-up of the LCEP response team will change, drawing on the broad representation, expertise, and experience across the partnership. The LCEP Response Team will largely consist of the following roles/responsibilities: • Specialist knowledge of the incident and people affected • Community knowledge of the geography • Volunteer mobilisation • Engagement and information sharing skills • Specialists in emergency response Please refer to the voluntary sector capabilities document for further information.	London Communities Emergencies Partnership (LCEP)
London Local Authority Gold (LLAG)	Any disruptive incident occurring in London will by default occur within a, or across multiple, local authorities. Therefore, it is vital that the London Local Authority Gold is notified at an early stage. A London Local Authority Chief Executive is pre-nominated as LLAG. LLAG is empowered to represent and give undertaking(s) on behalf of London's 32 Boroughs and the City of London Corporation. It is important to note that the executive empowerment of LLAG is in strict accordance with the Local Authority Gold Resolution, otherwise LLAG can only act in an advisory capacity to the SCG. The LLAG will also give early consideration to the wider recovery management issues and when appropriate recommend to the SCG Chair that, if not already convened, an RCG is established.	Local Authorities

Mayor's Advisory Group (MAG)	In the event of an emergency the GLA and Mayor of London have key response roles. The GLA is a category one responder and the GLA Gold will sit on the SCG and participate fully in the multi-agency response, heading up and leading the GLA's emergency response arrangements. The Mayor of London, supported by the GLA, acts as the 'voice of London' in order to provide clear information and guidance. In an emergency the Mayor may call a Mayor's Advisory Group (MAG), which enables a strategic, high-level briefing for the Mayor from the key relevant partners, depending on the incident at hand. The purpose of the MAG is to brief the Mayor on the impact to London and Londoners to whom they are accountable, and provide assurance to the Mayor about the coordinated multiagency response. In most cases representatives at a MAG will include Commissioners and Executives rather than Gold Commanders. The MAG is not an additional coordination mechanism or sub-group under these strategic coordination arrangements and it does not report into the SCG, nor does the SCG report into the MAG. It also does not receive actions from the SCG or report into COBR. It should be seen as a strategic briefing mechanism for the Mayor from agencies on the impact to the capital and what the response is. It is not part of the central coordination mechanism and multiagency structure outlined in the Strategic Coordination Protocol. In some incidents, the Mayor may attend COBR meetings in addition to calling a MAG.	Greater London Authority (GLA)
Military Assistance	In the event of a situation that may require military assistance, the Joint Regional Liaison Officers (JRLOs) at Headquarters London District (LONDIST) should be engaged as soon as possible in the strategic coordination process. Initially, any request or potential request for Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) will be discussed with a JRLO who will provide advice, discuss available options and also begin the planning process, if needed. Defence can assist with a range of situations including but not limited to natural disasters, assisting in severe weather situations, network failure or disruption, animal disease outbreaks or public health epidemics, public service related industrial disputes that affect safety or security, transport disruption, and criminal or terrorist activity. In response to MACA requests, the Armed Forces may assist with five main functions: command and control; liaison; specialist advice and capability; general and non-specialist support; and education, training and mentoring. Requests for military assistance for explosive ordnance disposal and search are made directly by the civil police or the Maritime and Coastguard Agency. The provision of MACA is governed by 4 principles: 1. there is a definite need to act and the tasks are clearly defined; 2. other options, including mutual aid and commercial alternatives, have been discounted; 3. either the civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one; or 4. the civil authority has all or	London District via London Joint Regional Liaison Officers (JRLOs)

	some capability, but it may not be available immediately, or to the required scale, and the urgency of the task requires rapid external support from the MOD. MACA is not guaranteed, and when military support is provided the civil authorities normally have to pay for it, in line with HM Treasury rules. The three charging levels are: full costs; marginal costs; and zero costs. There are zero costs for the deployment of Military Liaison Officers or Military Assessment Teams, or when there is an imminent threat to life.	
Victims of Terrorism Unit (VTU)	The VTU has been established to coordinate, at a HM Government level, support to citizens affected by terrorist attacks affecting British Citizens at home or overseas. The VTU web pages on GOV.UK contain information on where to seek advice and assistance following a terrorist attack. It also provides details of official helplines and support services available to victims, survivors, witnesses, family members, and all those affected. Where the VTU responds to an incident, it is necessary for the work of the VTU to be closely coordinated with the work of the Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG).	HM Government

11. Stand Down

Stand down will occur when there is no longer deemed to be a need for multi-agency strategic coordination in response to an incident. This may be because the perceived risk has decreased / passed, the response is being handled at a local level and strategic oversight is no longer required or there has been a formal handover to recovery. It is likely that the decision to stand down strategic coordination arrangements will be made within a SCG meeting however, where this is not the case, SCG members should be fully sighted of the decision to ensure they have the opportunity to raise any concerns.

Upon stand down of a response, a formal stand down message will be circulated to the SCG members and the full London Resilience Partnership. This message will include;

- details of any remaining ongoing activity (e.g. local level activity)
- details of any recovery arrangements – whether a Recovery Coordinating Group is meeting and any relevant details
- confirmation of triggers for reconvening (if applicable)

11.1 Handover to Recovery

When the response phase is drawing to a close, the Chairs of the SCG and RCG should discuss transferring primacy and the Chair of the overall partnership coordination. Once agreed, the coordination of strategic activity is passed to the RCG. If necessary, sub-groups of the SCG will continue to operate but will change in reporting to the RCG.

The criteria for assessing when the handover can take place from response to recovery should be agreed between the Chair of the SCG, London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) and the RCG Chair. This may be phased depending on the incident e.g. if a number of disparate sites were affected which are released to the recovery group over a period of time.

Further details on considerations when deciding when to move to recovery are included in the Recovery Coordination Framework.

Upon agreement of handover a [Response to Recovery Handover Form](#) should be completed.

Part 2 – Guidance and Supplementary Information

12. Pan-London Tactical Coordination – Guidance

In the initial stages of an incident, first responders are responsible for tactics. Once the scale and nature of an incident is known, responding agencies will establish internal command structures and appoint a Tactical Commander for their organisation.

Tactical commanders are responsible for implementing strategic direction, where strategic level command is in place, and developing and coordinating single agency tactical plans. A TCG can operate without an SCG, but may require one to form depending on the nature and scale of the incident.

A fundamental part of the role of the tactical commander is to protect life, property, and the environment by ensuring that rapid and effective actions that save lives and reduce harm are implemented through a Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG).

The location of Tactical commanders may vary between agencies, but they should be located where they can most effectively undertake their responsibilities and should remain detached from the immediate response activities.

A TCG may be convened where multi-agency coordination would be beneficial or required in order to support tactical commanders in:

- Interpreting the strategy and strategic direction set by the SCG
- Developing tactical level plans to deliver multi-agency activity
- Co-ordinating activities and assets between all agencies to respond to the demands of the incident
- Resolving multi-agency issues that have been escalated as they could not be resolved at the operational level
- Resolving issues in relation to multi-agency working at a tactical level
- Identifying multi-agency issues that cannot be resolved at the tactical level and require escalation to the SCG
- Making recommendations to the SCG

(see the Tactical Coordination Protocol for further information).

13. The Coordination of an Incident On-Scene

The commanders of responding agencies who are on-scene are located at, or close to, the scene of a major incident at an agreed location known as the Forward Command Point (FCP).

Multi-agency meetings of on-scene commanders (On-Scene Coordination Meetings) are attended by the on-scene incident commanders as appointed by each emergency service and partner organisation. The composition of this group may include tactical advisors, tactical commanders, operational commanders and liaison officers (e.g. Local Authority Liaison Officer) depending on individual organisations internal command structures and whether they exercise tactical command at the scene or from a remote location / control room.

The London Fire Brigade tactical commander will be located where they can maintain effective tactical command of their operations, invariably they will be in attendance at or close to the incident scene.

The Metropolitan Police Service may initially have their tactical commander at the scene but for large or protracted incidents that role will become located remote from scene at an MPS dedicated command facility.

The London Ambulance Service tactical commander will be located remote from scene at the LAS Specialist Operations Centre where they can maintain effective tactical command of their on-scene and wider operations including casualty distribution.

HM Coastguard Tactical Coordination will be carried out from one of their Coastguard Operating Centres. HM Coastguard may appoint an On-Scene Coordinator to work on their behalf.

Regardless of the designation given to roles of on-scene commanders by individual organisations, meetings at the FCP should be attended by the senior decision maker located at the scene for each organisation. This meeting may include tactical commanders but should not be confused with a pan-London TCG meeting.

Commanders at the FCP may appoint multi-agency sub-groups of operational commanders assigned to coordinate specific functions, tasks or geographical locations.

14. Public Communications

This is a core function of the SCG. In fact, significant levels of media interest may be reason in itself for the activation of such a group.

Given the primacy of the media in the shaping of public perception, it is vital that public information strategies and content reflect, reinforce and (if necessary) defend the strategic aim.

In functional terms:

- Use any or all forms of media to get the required messages to the public including the business community, so that they know what is happening, what responders are doing and what they should do in the interests of their own safety (including utilising CSSC messaging)

- Manage expectations on the part of the public as to what responders will be able to do for them and when

- Identify and articulate the 'lines to take'; these represent the core message(s) that all partner organisations need to reflect and cohere with in their collective and separate interaction with the media

- Prepare and approve the content of key press releases and other major public announcements

- Hold press conferences and public meetings as appropriate, mindful of the different information needs of different groups and communities

- Ensure that what is being said in all forms of the media is monitored and, where appropriate, responded to credibly and robustly

- Make pro-active use of all forms of media wherever possible, to lead and shape the public debate. Social media is crucial here and central; it should not be regarded as an "optional extra" in a communication strategy.

In the event of an emergency the Mayor of London has a key response role in providing clear information and guidance to the public. The role of the Mayor is to support the operational response to an emergency in London by providing a unified statement – a 'voice' for London. It will be the Mayor's role to provide regional information and reassurance throughout the duration of the response and into the initial stages of the recovery phase – this role is complementary to, and in support of, local responders and operational spokespeople. In addition to press briefings, the Mayor may use social media such as X (@MayorofLondon) to communicate key information and reassurance messages.

14.1 London Resilience Communication Group (LRCG)

The London Resilience Communications Group (LRCG) brings together communications leads from different organisations to ensure a coordinated communications response to an incident and will often form as a sub-group in support of the SCG.

The LRCG are included as a standing invitee for the SCG (and Partnership Meetings) and will be represented by one nominated member to ensure they remain linked in with the ongoing response and maintain awareness of the SCG's communications needs. In a no-notice, fast paced incident the LRCG will be represented by MPS Communications in the first instance, this may move to another organisation for subsequent SCGs if an alternative lead agency for communications has been identified.

15. Financial Management

The need for financial management is self-evident, and essentially represents the extension of good governance into emergency management. An appropriate audit trail will support attempts to recover funds after the emergency.

Bellwin is a scheme of emergency financial assistance to help local authorities meet immediate uninsurable costs they incur when dealing with the aftermath of an emergency in their area. The costs covered typically include provision of rest centres; evacuating people from dangerous structures and works to make them safe; temporary accommodation (Bed and Breakfast); the clearing of debris from highways, pavements and footpaths. Under the normal rules of the scheme each local authority for whom a scheme is activated can claim for eligible costs above a threshold (set at 0.2% of its calculated annual revenue budget). Following the review of the scheme in 2015 grant is now paid at 100% above threshold (previously it was limited to 85%).

A local authority is as defined by statute. This includes Counties, Districts, unitary authorities, Police Authorities (and Police and Crime Commissioners), Fire Authorities (including Combined Fire Authorities) and National Park Authorities.

We would generally not expect Bellwin to cover:

- Costs which are normally insurable, whether by the authority or any other party

- Longer term, permanent repairs

- The normal wages and salaries of the authority's regular employees, whether diverted from their normal work or otherwise

- The standing costs of the authority's plant and equipment.

Authorities must notify the Bellwin team at the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities of their likely intention to seek Bellwin within a month of the incident by letter, email or telephone.

15.1 Expenditure incurred by the SCG

Individual responder organisations will record their own expenditure in relation to an incident. In addition, the SCG should maintain oversight of any multi-agency expenditure, or expenditure by one organisation on behalf of two or more SCG members.

In the event that organisations agree to incur expenditure on behalf of other organisations, recharging mechanisms should be confirmed between those organisations on a case by case basis. A record of agreements must be kept and costs must be monitored and reviewed, especially during protracted incidents. The SCG should have sight of spend, as well as inter-agency requests for support and resources.

16. Data Sharing Agreement for People Affected by an Emergency

Sharing information between partner organisations in an emergency is vital to the provision of coordinated and seamless humanitarian assistance services to support people affected.

The London Resilience Partnership 'Data Sharing Agreement (DSA) for People Affected by an Emergency' documents how the parties to the Agreement will share personal data about people

affected by an emergency with organisations that have a responsibility to undertake safeguarding actions and/or offer or provide support services to those people, such as humanitarian assistance.

People affected can include survivors, family and friends of those missing, killed or survivors, witnesses and affected communities. Sharing data can help to meet the requirements of statutory legislation, government guidance, London Resilience Partnership Frameworks such as the Humanitarian Assistance Framework, and local organisational arrangements.

Data to be shared may include personal information (e.g. name and contact details), how the person is thought to have been affected (e.g. injured survivor), and special category data (e.g. known vulnerability or medical need).

The Agreement documents the legal basis and arrangements for sharing information. It does not provide for the methods of physically storing or sharing information between organisations. Organisations may have different electronic methods for storing and sharing information securely. Parties to the Agreement should get advice from their organisation's information security or IT teams on secure methods of sharing data, and document these in the organisation's process documents and any multi-agency processes they may have in place.

17. Central Government, National Level Support and Assets

17.1 Central Government, National Level Support and National Assets

Most emergencies in the United Kingdom are handled at a local level with no direct involvement by Central Government. However, where the scale or complexity of an incident is such that some degree of central government coordination or support becomes necessary, a designated lead government department (LGD), or where appropriate, a devolved administration department, will be made responsible for the overall management of the Central Government response to the incident.

17.2 What is the role of Government in an emergency?

Government strategic objectives in an emergency are to:

- Protect human life, and as far as possible, property and the environment.

- Support the continuity of everyday activity

- Uphold the rule of law and the democratic process.

This is set out in the UK Concept of Operations ("CONOPS", updated 2013), which stems from the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act. There are three broad levels for engagement at departmental level. They are as follows:

Level 1 – The lead department minister runs the crisis response from their premises using their own emergency facilities as appropriate. The National Security Secretariat COBR Unit in the Cabinet Office advises as and when necessary.

Level 2 – The issue is coordinated from the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) by the lead government department.

- Terrorism always starts at this level with Home Office in the lead, whilst National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office are responsible for the activation of COBR and, if required, separate and dedicated crisis facilities.

- Other emergencies where the LGD determines that the crisis response may require the deployment of wider government resources. The COBR Unit provides support on impact management and recovery issues.

Level 3 – The Prime Minister or nominated Secretary of State leads in the event of a catastrophic incident requiring the involvement of central government from the outset to deliver an effective response, or where emergency powers are invoked. COBR and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat coordinate, rather than the LGD.

17.3 Role of the Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED) within the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC)

RED supports communities across England to be prepared for all types of incidents and supports them in response and recovery. This is achieved by supporting Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) to develop plans and by providing expertise and liaison during and after emergencies.

RED has three key objectives that support local resilience:

1. Enable resilient localities
2. Ensure preparedness for high impact or wide area emergencies
3. Provide government support when emergencies do occur.

RED Government Liaison Officers attend SCGs during emergency responses in order to:

- provide situational awareness of the incident and response, through the RED Operations Centre, to senior officials and Ministers, Other Government Departments (OGDs), Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) and COBR

- provide advice and guidance to the SCG and individual responder organisations, ensure mutual aid is sourced where required, and assess what help and support government should provide

- support local strategic leads attending COBR to give clear updates to Ministers.

17.3.1 Response Coordinating Group (ResCG)

Most emergencies are dealt with at a local level through SCGs. A Response Coordinating Group (ResCG) may be convened when:

- local response may be / has been overwhelmed

- an emergency affects multiple SCGs and information sharing, coordination or enhanced support would be beneficial.

There is no set ResCG role – it will depend on the emergency. The role may include:

- assessing and sharing info on the emergency's actual and / or potential impacts

- ensuring effective flow of comms across local and national organisations to ensure coordinated response

- reviewing the response and any assistance needed / offered, incl. facilitating mutual aid and providing national support, if necessary

- coordinating a consistent public message.

There are multiple routes to calling a ResCG:

- DLUHC request on its own initiative

- Local responders request (e.g. SCG)

- Lead Government Department and Cabinet Office.

ResCGs bring together relevant organisations to manage the potential / live emergency.

- SCG Chair and key partners (if SCG stood up);

- LRF Chairs (if no SCG);

- Local Authority Gold

- DLUHC will invite relevant experts e.g. OSCT experts for CT incidents.

Other background information:

- A SCG is not needed to call a ResCG.

- No set duration, but intended to be very quick.

- ResCGs are by teleconference

- Chaired by DLUHC RED

- RED will generally facilitate, not direct local coordination

- DLUHC run the ad hoc secretariat function, by issuing calling notice, including agenda and papers, where applicable

- If there are concurrent emergencies across England, COBR may be used to establish a national picture.

17.4 National coordination of emergency services assets

17.4.1 Fire & Rescue Authorities and the National Coordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF)

Fire & Rescue Authorities can draw on mutual assistance under Sections 13 & 16 of the Fire & Rescue Services Act 2004. These arrangements ensure continuity of service provision across authority boundaries.

The National Coordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF) supports:

- everyday assistance and collaboration between FRSs on the occasions that specialist national resilience capabilities can support the resolution of an incident

- FRSs to be provided with specialist assistance where an incident warrants it and it is available from elsewhere, or additional resources where the resolution of an incident is, or is likely to be, beyond a service's own resources

- coordination of the combined FRS response to relevant incidents, and when required, the integration of that coordination with that of other first responders, for example police, ambulance and the military, at any geographical scale.

17.4.2 National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC)

The National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC) helps to ensure policing is better prepared to deal with wide scale disorder or mobilisation of police assets.

NPoCC maintains an oversight of national capacity and capability of specialist policing roles and assesses these in relation to the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR) and National Policing Requirement (NPR). NPoCC helps effectively coordinate these resources to support forces during large scale events and operations and in times of civil emergency.

NPoCC also has a key role to play in providing assurance to government that the British Police Service has the ability to deal with the SPR threats. This is done through formal reporting and representation at COBR.

UK Disaster Victim Identification (UK DVI) also falls within the NPoCC structure. This is the UK police response to disasters relating to mass fatalities in the UK and abroad. NPoCC also works with other national coordination centres which have responsibility for mobilising specialist resources for example, the Counter Terrorism Coordination Centre (CTCC) and the Police National CBRN Centre.

To help facilitate mobilisation NPoCC works with nine Regional Information and Coordination Centres (RICCs) each of which has a mandate to communicate and coordinate across their region in order to identify and deploy mutual aid resources from forces within their region.

In London, the RICC is 24/7 and based within the Met. It coordinates resources across the Region thus MPS, CoLP and BTP. The MPS, BTP and CoLP share resources often outside the mutual aid structures and do not charge each other for those resources. A request to another region would lead to a cost implication for the force receiving those resources.

17.4.3 National Ambulance Coordination Centre (NACC)

The NACC coordinates the national ambulance response to an incident.

In the event of an incident of significant scale to require more than normal ambulance service provision in one or more NHS Ambulance Trusts, NHS England or The Association of Ambulance Chief Executives may ask for the NACC to be opened.

The NACC will;

- Collate, assess and disseminate data regarding NHS Ambulance providers in the UK and their ability to provide mutual aid.

- Coordinate any national response and allocation of mutual aid between NHS Ambulance Trusts.

- Protect, manage and sustain national ambulance critical infrastructure and capabilities.

18. Debriefing and Identification of Learning

18.1 London Resilience Partnership Debrief Policy

Following any response, consideration should always be given to the need to capture learning to inform capability development and future responses – this can be carried out via a formal debrief session or through an online learning capture as set out in the London Resilience Partnership Debrief Policy.

To ensure that all learning is effectively captured, the usual order of debriefs will be as follows:

1. Individual agency debriefs
2. Multi-agency Tactical debrief (where appropriate)
3. Multi-agency Strategic debrief

The holistic lessons process is designed to ensure that all lessons impacting the London Resilience Partnership Strategy are identified and embedded into the culture of the Partnership. It is therefore important to ensure that all learning is collated and considered against Partnership documentation and activity. The lead for this will be the London Resilience Learning & Implementation Review Group (LIRG) on behalf of the London Resilience Programme Board, but this is a priority for the whole Partnership, in order to enable London to be a resilient city.

All debriefs will be subject to disclosure rules and any investigations may dictate timings of debriefing procedures.

18.2 Debriefing during an incident

There may be some circumstances, particularly during protracted incidents, where there is a need to capture learning while the response is still ongoing – learning / debriefing should remain an agenda item on SCG meetings to ensure that any relevant learning is proactively captures. Additionally, where a response has distinct phases (for example during a pandemic of multiple waves), consideration should be given for holding a debrief following each phase to ensure that this can inform future response phases as well as longer term capability review and development.

18.3 Quick-time debriefing

There may be circumstances where it is deemed necessary to hold a debrief within quicker timescales than set out in the LRP Debrief Policy, particularly where it is expected that there may be a subsequent response to a very similar incident within the near future e.g. significant industrial action. In these circumstances the final SCG should include consideration for holding a final wash-up / hot debrief meeting the next working day, or as soon as possible thereafter.

Annex A: Glossary

The following key definitions are referred to in this protocol:

Rising Tide Emergency (JESIP definition)

An event or situation with a lead-in time of days, weeks or even months e.g. infectious diseases, flooding or pre-planned event, the final impact of which may not be apparent in advance.

Disruptive Incident

A disruptive incident is any hazard or threat that could cause significant disruption or harm to either Category 1 or 2 responders and impact on London. This includes incidents that may sit below the declaration of a major incident. There are established criteria for the emergency services declaring a major incident for a rapid on-set emergency requiring joint emergency services response e.g. serious fire, train crash, building collapse.

Harm refers to the type and extent of injury or damage and may include: physical harm including loss of life; psychological harm; economic harm; and harm to the community. It may also include organisational harm, such as the effect on an organisation's reputation.

Major Incident (JESIP definition)

An event or situation with a range of serious consequences which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agency.

- "Emergency responder agency" describes all category one and two responders as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004).

- A major incident is beyond the scope of business-as-usual operations, and is likely to involve serious harm, damage, disruption or risk to human life or welfare, essential services, the environment or national security.

- A major incident may involve a single-agency response, although it is more likely to require a multi-agency response, which may be in the form of multi-agency support to a lead responder.

- The severity of the consequences associated with a major incident are likely to constrain or complicate the ability of responders to resource and manage the incident, although a major incident is unlikely to affect all responders equally.

- The decision to declare a major incident will always be a judgement made in a specific local and operational context, and there are no precise and universal thresholds or triggers.

Declaring a 'major incident' triggers a predetermined response from some emergency service and other responder organisations. It takes time for operational structures, resources and protocols to be put in place. Declaring that a major incident is in progress as soon as possible means these arrangements can be put in place as quickly as possible.

London Resilience Partnership Guidance Documents

London Resilience Partnership guidance documents have been created and approved by the London Resilience Forum (LRF) to provide frameworks for partner organisations to work to in response to specific incidents. All frameworks can be accessed on ResilienceDirect.

Annex B: METHANE Protocol

London Resilience Partnership Protocol for sharing METHANE reports to inform strategic level situational awareness

1. Overview

When a Major Incident is declared, the London Resilience Unit (LRU) should receive the METHANE report, ideally via email but if not possible, then by phone. LRU will then put the METHANE message on the London Situational Awareness System (LSAS) and send it via email to the London Resilience Partnership Incident Distribution List, to enable all London responder organisations to access the information. LRU will revise LSAS and email versions when they receive updated METHANE reports.

The initial METHANE may be shared with LRU via the tri-partite call (between the lead response organisation, MPS and LRU) upon activation of London's strategic co-ordination arrangements.

The default process is to share all METHANE reports with the London Resilience Partnership when a Major Incident is declared however, if a decision is made not to share the METHANE (i.e. because imminent stand-down is expected), this should be agreed between the London Resilience Unit and the lead responder with the decision and rationale clearly documented.

The purpose of this protocol and LRU's role is to share METHANE reports to inform strategic level situational awareness. LRU is not involved in sharing reports at an operational or tactical level or between control rooms. It is assumed that the METHANE report will already have been shared between relevant control rooms and partnership organisations prior to being shared with LRU.

2. Process

1. An emergency service or other responder should provide the METHANE report to the LRU Duty Manager for the purpose of sharing it with the London Resilience Partnership (regardless of whether or not an SCG or TCG has been scheduled.

   a) The report will ideally be provided via email to the London Resilience Unit. If not available electronically, it may be provided verbally over the phone and then written down by LRU prior to sharing further. LRU will check the written version with the lead response organisation prior to sharing if required to check the details.

   b) Where sent via email, the lead responder must page or call the LRU Duty Manager to make them aware of the email unless they have already been made aware to expect to receive it.

   c) The provenance including the organisation (or group if agreed by a multi-agency group) responsible for the report and the time the report was produced should be provided.

2. LRU should add the METHANE report to the London Situational Awareness System (LSAS), with the timestamp of when it was produced (if known) or when it was shared with LRU. LRU should also email a copy to the London Resilience Partnership Incident Distribution List.

3. Updated or complimentary METHANE reports should be sent to LRU following the process above. LRU will then update LSAS and email versions.

3. Further Information

- **Multiple Reports:** It is possible LRU will receive multiple reports from more than one emergency service. These are likely to be the same or very similar. If so, LRU should share the latest version they receive.

- Security Considerations: The lead response organisation should decide if the METHANE report should not be shared outside of a specific group of organisations due to security considerations (e.g. in a CT incident). Where required, LRU can limit distribution to a specific group of organisations on LSAS and via email.

- Level of Detail: The lead response organisation should decide the level of detail to include in the METHANE report e.g. they may wish to redact the exact location, access and egress routes to avoid people attending these locations without prior agreement.

- Cross-border Incidents: Each emergency service should share METHANE reports with counterparts outside of London in the event of a cross border incident making use of existing structures and communications channels.

- London Fire Brigade: As a fall-back action, the London Fire Brigade Operational Resilience London Resilience Duty Officer should contact the LRU Duty Manager to ensure this protocol is being followed and the METHANE report has been provided to LRU Duty Manager.

4. Status of this document

- Initial protocol published December 2020, reviewed December 2023.

- Each emergency service will implement internal procedures to share METHANE as per this protocol where procedures are not already in place.

- LRU request that all other relevant London Resilience Partnership organisations (i.e. those who may produce a METHANE report) implement suitable internal procedures to arrange for METHANE reports to be shared with the London Resilience Unit.

- This protocol has been developed in consultation with the following organisations:
  - o British Transport Police
  - o City of London Police
  - o Metropolitan Police Service
  - o London Ambulance Service
  - o London Fire Brigade
  - o HM Coastguard
  - o London Resilience Unit

Annex C: Template SCG Agenda – Initial SCG

SCG AGENDA

Incident / Event:

Date:

Time:

Meeting Location:

Chair:

1. **Any Urgent Business**

2. **Introductions** (Including roles of representatives (who they are representing) and identification of any key partners / organisations who are missing)

3. **Situation Brief**

    a) Briefing by LRU on current situation

    b) Common Operating Picture (COP) review (if available)

4. **Key Issues and Strategic Decisions**

    a) Set strategic aim and objectives

    b) Consider potential disproportionate impacts

    c) Agree response options and tasking

5. **Public Communications (London Resilience Communication Group)**

    a) Emergency alerts

    b) Briefing on media coverage

    c) Communication and media strategy, including key messages and specific audiences (e.g. those impacted, and general messaging across partnership, public and business)

6. **Agree SCG Sub-Groups Required**

7. **Reporting Rhythm** (including arrangements for outside of business hours, and any central government reporting requirements)

8. **SCG Membership Review**

9. **Resilience of Command, Handovers, and Staff Welfare**

10. **Any Other Business**

    a) Date / time of next meeting

11. **Confirmation of actions / decisions**

Annex D: Template Full SCG Agenda

SCG AGENDA

Incident / Event:

Date:

Time:

Meeting Location:

Chair:

1. **Any Urgent Business**

2. **Introductions** (Including roles of representatives (who they are representing) and identification of any key partners / organisations who are missing)

    a) Actions from previous meeting

3. **Situation Brief**

    a) Briefing by LRU on current situation

    b) Common Operating Picture (COP) review and additional points from partner organisations (to include community and business impacts)

    c) TCG, sub-groups and organisational updates

4. **Key Issues and Strategic Decisions**

    a) Review strategic aim and objectives

    b) Agree response options and tasking

    c) Investigation – update (if applicable)

    d) Review, prioritise and monitor the implementation of strategic objectives

    e) Recovery coordination

5. **Public Communications (London Resilience Communication Group)**

    a) Emergency alerts

    b) Briefing on media coverage

    c) Communication and media strategy, including key messages and specific audiences (e.g. those impacted, and general messaging across partnership, public and business)

6. **Consideration for disproportionate impacts and Equality Impact Assessments**

7. **Report from SCG Sub-Groups**

    a) Recovery Coordinating Group (LLAG / RCG Chair)

    b) Others if activated e.g. HASG, STAC, MFCG

8. **Reporting Rhythm** (including arrangements for outside of business hours, and any central government reporting requirements)

9. **SCG Membership Review**

10. **Resilience of Command, Handovers, and Staff Welfare**

11. **Organisational Learning / Debrief of Events So Far** (if final SCG meeting, consider scheduling hot debrief meeting for the following day)

12. **Handover to Recovery** (when appropriate)

13. **Any Other Business**

    a) Date / time of next meeting

14. **Confirmation of actions / decisions**

Annex E: Partnership Meeting Agenda

PARTNERSHIP CALL AGENDA

Incident / Event:

Date:

Time:

Meeting Location:

Chair:

1.   **Any urgent business**

2.   **Situation brief**

3.   **Agency updates by exception**

4.   **Issues, priorities and actions**

5.   **Public communications and engagement**

6.   **Next meeting if required**

7.   **Any other business**

Annex F: SCG Standing Invitation List

This is the list of expected partners that LRU and MPS (Bronze Emergency Preparedness) will use to advise the SCG Chair of who should be invited to a SCG, depending on the nature of each incident. Fundamental to the success of any incident response is that the designated SCG Chair understands that they represent the interests of the entire partnership, rather than from an organisational response point of view.

Standing Invitation List*

- British Transport Police
- City of London Police
- Department for Levelling Up, Housing & Communities (DLUHC) – Government Liaison Officer (GLO)
- Environment Agency
- Greater London Authority
- HM Coastguard
- London Ambulance Service
- London Communities Emergencies Partnership (LCEP)
- London Fire Brigade
- London Local Authority Gold (LLAG)
- London Resilience Communications Group (LRCG)
- London Resilience Unit
- Met Office
- Metropolitan Police Service
- Military – Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO)
- NHS England – London
- Transport for London
- UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA)

Other sectors and organisations not included in the above list will only be invited to an initial SCG if their input is specifically pertinent to the incident although they may request to participate in an SCG if there is a need for them to do so.

Certain incidents will require additional organisations or sectors to be invited. These may include:

- Business Sector
- Council Gold(s) for impacted Borough (for incidents impacting one or two boroughs)
- Faith Sector
- Government Departments
- Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
- Neighbouring SCGs
- Royal Parks

- Transport operators / Transport Sector Cell representative

- Utility companies (electricity, gas, telecoms, water)

- Voluntary Sector

This list is not exhaustive, and invitations should be considered in terms of organisations relevant to the incident and the strategic response. Collaboration is crucial to the achievement of multi-agency objectives and restoration of services. Notification of a scheduled SCG will be sent to the full London Resilience Partnership to enable those not included on the invitation list to request to attend if they feel there is a need to do so – the final decision of who to include in SCG meetings sits with the SCG Chair.

Annex G: Examples of multi-agency strategy

All strategic objectives must be disseminated to the tactical and operational levels, and the SCG should monitor progress and implementation of actions to achieve the objectives.

GENERIC SCENARIO / STANDARD TEMPLATE STRATEGY

Strategic Aim: The London Resilience Partnership will work together* to coordinate an effective response to, and recovery from the [incident type] for London's communities and businesses.

Strategic Objectives

- To save and protect life

- To relieve suffering and provide humanitarian assistance

- To consider any disproportionately impacted communities and ensure an equitable response for all

- To provide conditions for a safe and secure London

- To work collaboratively and share information with multi-agency partners for the benefit of London

- To inform and reassure the public through communication and engagement

- To minimise disruption to infrastructure, transport services, communities, businesses, and impacts on the environment

- To facilitate recovery; the restoration of infrastructure, transport services, communities, businesses, the environment, and the return to normal or a new normality (identifying opportunities to improve)

- To manage resourcing to meet response needs and to maintain essential public services

- To continuously debrief, learn lessons and improve throughout incident response(s).

This strategy shall remain valid until it is revised by the SCG or until handover from response to recovery coordination.

*It is expected that all those responder organisations involved will work together in a directed and coordinated fashion to achieve the strategic aim and objectives.

SCENARIO: SEVERE STORMS OVER A 24HR PERIOD, MAJOR WIND DAMAGE, AND SURFACE WATER FLOODING, SEVERE DISRUPTION TO TRANSPORT AND UTILITIES.

Strategic Aim: To work together to coordinate an effective emergency response, to preserve life, to minimise the impact on London communities and business, and aid the return to normality.

Strategic Objectives:

- To save and protect life

- To protect property and key infrastructure

- To relieve suffering and provide humanitarian assistance

- To protect and restore essential services

- To maintain the health and safety of responders

- To protect the natural environment

- To restore public transport and utilities

- To provide information to the community to aid self-help

- To facilitate recovery and the return to a new normality.

SCENARIO: LARGE FIRE AT RECYCLING DEPOT IN WEST LONDON. SMOKE PLUME IS DISRUPTING AVIATION FROM HEATHROW AIRPORT AND THE DEPOT IS ADJACENT TO A SITE OF SPECIAL SCIENTIFIC INTEREST

Strategic Aim: To resolve the incident expediently, protect the community, the environment, and facilitate recovery and the return to normality.

Strategic Objectives:

- To save and protect life

- To protect property and key infrastructure

- To protect the health, safety and welfare of responders

- To minimise the impact on the environment

- To minimise the impact on business and the community, and restore transport services

- To provide information to the affected communities and businesses

- To support the return to normality.

SCENARIO: MARAUDING TERRORIST ATTACK WITH MASS FATALITIES, MULTI-SITED ACROSS LONDON

Strategic Aim: To support the Partnership MTA response, to preserve life, to minimise the impact on London's community, and facilitate recovery and the return to normality.

Strategic Objectives:

- To save and protect life

- To implement the agreed joint operational plan for an MTA incident.

- To maximise the safety of responders

- To facilitate investigations and inquiries (preserve evidence)

- To maintain continuity of essential service provision

- To provide information to London's communities and businesses

- To facilitate recovery and the return to normality.

SCENARIO: CYBER INCIDENT

Strategic Objectives for a Cyber Emergency or Significant Incident:

- To protect human life and, as far as possible, property, and the environment

- To understand the scope of the incident, the impact on London's services, and communities

- To ensure the continuity or hasten restoration of critical information communication and technology services to maintain a safe and secure London

- To minimise disruption to London's critical infrastructure and public services

- To maintain the continuity of emergency response capability and essential public services

- To provide clear and consistent information to the public regarding the incident including actions they should take to ensure their digital safety and security

- To facilitate recovery and the early and demonstrable return to normality.

SCENARIO: SEVERE FLOODING INCIDENT

Strategic Objectives for a Flooding Incident:

- To proactively evacuate vulnerable locations

- To protect infrastructure to mitigate secondary consequences

- To develop a coordinated media strategy prior to impacts being observed

- To provide information on the likely level of disruption to travel and other services

- To identify mutual aid to help with rest centres, evacuation, erecting temporary defences, managing traffic disruption, dealing with injuries and rescue etc.

SCENARIO: STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE OF BUILDINGS

Strategic Aim: To ensure an effective emergency response, to preserve life, to minimise the impact on London's community and to aid the return to normality.

Strategic Objectives

- To ensure the safe rescue of trapped and injured persons

- To facilitate the criminal and other investigations

- To facilitate the recovery of fatalities and human remains (London Mass Fatality Framework)

- To facilitate the safe operation and management of the site, with due regard to the environment

- To facilitate the recovery and sensitive management of personal effects

- To facilitate the recovery process and restoration of normality

- To maintain, so far as possible, normal services at an appropriate level.

SCENARIO: PANDEMIC OUTBREAK OF NOVEL VIRUS

The overall strategy for the management of a pandemic is to minimise, where possible;

- The health impact of a pandemic

- The impact of a pandemic on society and the economy, and to instil and maintain trust and confidence.

SCENARIO: CBRN(e) INCIDENT

- To save life and reduce harm

- To mitigate and minimise the impact of contaminants on people and the environment

- To implement the Joint Operational Plan for a CBRN(e) incident

- To make the scene safe and secure to protect the wider community, facilitate investigations, gather information and intelligence, and preserve evidence

- To facilitate wider consequence management (including survivor and humanitarian assistance, remote casualty management, and associated economic impacts)

- To ensure the delivery of a timely, effective, and cohesive communications strategy

- To inform the public and businesses, and maintain public confidence

- To restore and maintain continuity of essential service provisions

- To steer towards recovery and the return to a new normality

- To protect the health, safety and welfare of responders

SCENARIO: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE INCIDENT

Strategic Objectives:

Support and care for all those affected will be provided by:

- To provide appropriate support at an early stage through emergency centres and outreach to reduce future suffering and distress

- To apply the principles of psychological first aid during the response phase of the incident

- To respect every individual's rights to privacy and dignity, empowering people to regain control as soon as they are ready

- To enable voluntary sector and faith responders to provide support to individuals and families in a way that enhances community resilience.

SCENARIO: TERRORISM INCIDENT

Strategic Aim: To work together to coordinate an effective emergency response to save and protect life, preserve evidence, minimise the impact on London's communities, and facilitate recovery.

Strategic Objectives:

- To save and protect life and limb, and minimise injuries

- To maximise the safety of responders

- To make the scene safe and secure to protect the wider community, facilitate investigations, gather information and intelligence, and preserve evidence

- To maintain continuity of essential service provision

- To provide information to London's communities and businesses

- To facilitate recovery and the return to normality

- To facilitate wider consequence management (including survivor and humanitarian assistance, remote casualty management, and associated economic impacts).

Annex H: Terrorism Incident Management Considerations

Introduction

This annex covers the implications of and considerations for partner agencies during a terrorist incident and the potential implications of Government Security Classification (GSC) levels on the work of SCGs.

Implications of Terrorist Incidents on SCG

It is important to note that terrorist incidents may require special measures, some of which will be situationally dependant. Whilst the information picture is being created and collated, information may be restricted to a very specific audience. This helps to ensure the protection of information that is crucial to certain police activities, preventing the circulation of misinformation, and preserving police tactics that could be disrupted when information is widely shared. The SCG Chair will make efforts to ensure that the right people are represented and informed, and that while perhaps initially meetings, or parts of meetings, are restricted as strategy and tactics are discussed, as soon as possible, further organisations will be invited to participate in meetings.

Levels of classifications

There are three Government Security Classification levels;

        i)   OFFICIAL (includes OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE subset)

        ii)   SECRET

        iii)   TOP SECRET

An SCG and the information relating to an SCG (COP, minutes, actions and decisions etc.) will usually be at OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE. This level is defined as information that could have more damaging consequences if it were lost, stolen or published in the media. This level includes pre-planned policing, security operations and events.

At the higher end of the spectrum, the loss, theft or publication of Secret or Top Secret information would have a severe to critical impact.

In some instances, for example a Marauding Terror Attack (MTA) or CBRN event, a SCG may be required to work to Secret or Top Secret handling and operating procedures.

Practical considerations; areas of implication

Agencies must recognise the implications of the handling and operating methods for Secret and Top Secret working, as these may fall outside of the realm of business as usual operating procedures. Secret and Top Secret information and documents are subject to conditions in the following areas:

        i)   Access

        ii)   Remote Working

        iii)   Storage – Physical and Electronic

        iv)   Movement – Physical and Electronic

        v)   Disclosure

        vi)   Disposal

Considerations for SCG members

While the following information is not exhaustive, it documents some of the most immediate and severe impacts the handling and operating methods might have on an SCG and its members.

- The Police will lead on all communications related to Terrorist incidents, coordinating with partners as required.

- Secret or Top Secret meetings will have to be held in person and on site, and there is unlikely to be any remote dial in or conferencing allowed.

- SCG members should be prepared to attend meetings in absence of any laptop or telephony devices and resort to pen and paper working (although taking written notes of the meeting may also be prohibited).

- Agencies should understand that their IT and email systems may not qualify as a secure method of internal or external communication.

Some people may require security clearance, but this is not always practical or achievable and information may need to be shared on a 'need to know' basis.

Annex I: Strategic Coordination Centre

Introduction

This annex details the considerations for and requirements of a Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC). It also provides practical information for the formation and management of a SCC in its early stages.

Purpose

A SCC co-locates personnel or members of staff from agencies who may be required to provide support functions to their relevant Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) representatives. It provides a single location where SCG agencies can work to provide their core functions in response to a specific emergency

The formation of a SCC helps to ensure that interaction between agencies can be established and maintained throughout the response to an incident.

Activation

SCC arrangements can be triggered by a joint decision made at the SCG following a request from any participating member.

Once activated, it will initially be the responsibility of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and London Resilience Unit to set up and maintain an SCC.

Location

While it is ideal for the lead agency to provide the facilities, there are recognisable difficulties for most agencies to supply this, especially in the event of a short or no notice incident. As a result, during the first 24-36 hours following the activation of a SCC, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) will allocate suitable working space and facilities. The City of London Police may host an SCC in an alternative location, or may use the designated MPS location. Similarly, other organisations leading the response where the MPS is not leading by default, or where the chair of the SCG is from another organisation, may utilise their own facilities to host the SCC.

Initial Considerations

✓ The facilities provided by the MPS are not extensive, and only key members of staff from responders participating in the SCG should be requested to assist at the SCC.

✓ Non-MPS personnel will be required to provide photo identification to access the SCC and will need to be escorted around the building by MPS personnel.

✓ Facilities will include access to standard 3 pin power sockets, secure Wi-Fi (Government Wi-Fi), offices with mobile phone reception, a Wi-Fi printer, land line phones with conference calling capabilities and a Resilient Satellite Network (RSN) phone for use in times of telecommunications failures.

✓ It is recommended that the decision to convene a SCC is made as soon as it is evident one will be required as it may take time to establish a staffed and operational SCC.

✓ It is important to remember that the provision of MPS facilities will come at a price, displacing business as usual activities, some of which may be relevant to the ongoing incident response for which an SCC has been convened.

Ongoing considerations and responsibility

- Due to the requirement of having all non-MPS personnel escorted around the premises, hosting a SCC at the MPS facility is very resource intensive and presents the opportunity for delays.

- Some incidents may require a prolonged multi-agency response, and it is possible that the SCC will still be a necessary support function at the point overall command is passed to a Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG).

- For these reasons, it will be the responsibility for the lead response organisation to source and provide a suitable alternative premises that the SCC can be transferred to following the initial 24-36 hour period. In the event of handover from the SCG to RCG, it will be the responsibility of the London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) and/or lead local authority for recovery to provide suitable alternative premises for the SCC.

Annex J: Response to Recovery Handover Form

[insert name and date of incident]

Handover from London Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) to [insert London or name of Local Authority] Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG)

1. **Date and time of handover**

   1.1. The handover from [insert name and organisation] as the London SCG Chair to [insert name and organisation] as the Recovery Coordinating Group Chair was agreed by both parties and by all members of the London SCG teleconference held at [insert time and date]. The handover took effect from the close of that meeting at [insert time].

   1.2. This document provides a formal record of the handover process and confirmation of the agreement that formal handover criteria have been met.

2. **The SCG Chair should confirm the following prior to handover.**

   2.1. The emergency is contained and there is no significant risk of resurgence.

   2.2. Public safety measures are in place and working effectively.

   2.3. The Recovery Coordinating Group is firmly established.

   2.4. The [insert name of Local Authority] strategic coordination arrangements are functioning effectively and have the necessary resources, communications and media coordination support.

   2.5. Individual SCG member organisation involved in the response phase are functioning effectively with adequate resources, communications and management of outstanding issues.

   2.6. The nominated person is able to accept the position of Chair of the Recovery Coordinating Group.

3. **The RCG Chair should confirm the following prior to handover.**

   3.1. There is no known further risk to life in relation to this specific emergency.

   3.2. The circumstances dictate it more appropriate for command and control to rest with a Local Authority in that the phase is clearly now one of recovery.

   3.3. There are no serious public order or crime prevention issues which impact on the overall strategic coordination of the recovery phase.

   3.4. The emergency services and partner organisations are operating at a level which does not necessitate an SCG to coordinate and facilitate their activity.

   3.5. There are no known scenarios which may require the reinstatement of the SCG in relation to this emergency in the foreseeable future.

   3.6. [insert name and organisation of RCG Chair] is satisfied that [insert name of Local Authority to lead on Recovery] has in place the infrastructure and processes to take over coordination from the Chair of the SCG.

4. Incident specific considerations

4.1. [insert incident specific considerations]

4.2. *E.g. At the time of handover police cordons remain in place around areas of the incident scene where forensic investigation is continuing. It is expected to be necessary to maintain these cordons for a period of days. A plan is in place for the phased reduction of cordons and to ensure that reopening areas to the public is managed in a coordinated way between the MPS, [insert name of Local Authority] and Transport for London. This managed approach will take into account of the following factors prior to opening areas to the public:*

4.2.1. *Security of unoccupied / unsecured premises within the cordons.*

4.2.2. *Repairs to damaged street furniture and road infrastructure.*

4.2.3. *Clean-up of the area, street cleaning and presentation issues.*

4.2.4. *Communications with business representatives and residents of premises within the cordons.*

4.2.5. *Reinstatement of public transport and other public services affected by the cordons.*

5. Declaration of acceptance of handover criteria

The handover criteria as set out in this document has been met to my satisfaction.

[insert signature]   [insert signature]

Date: [insert]   Date: [insert]

[Insert name], SCG Chair   [Insert name], RCG Chair

[Insert organisation]   [Insert organisation]

Annex K: Increase to Critical Framework

Available as a separate document on ResilienceDirect.

LONDON RESILIENCE

REDACTED VERSION