

LONDON RESILIENCE PARTNERSHIP

London Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear explosives CBRN(e) Framework

London Resilience Partnership CBRN(e) Framework

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LONDON RESILIENCE GROUP

The London Resilience Group is jointly funded and governed by the Greater London Authority, London Local Authorities and London Fire Commissioner. We are hosted by the London Fire Brigade. Our work, and that of the London Resilience Partnership, is overseen by the London Resilience Forum.

Version Control		
Version	Date	Change (owner)
V2.0	September 2015	General review
V3.0	June 2019	<p>Full review undertaken:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General administrative and formatting updates • Document separated into a strategic summary and associated guidance to improve utility • Document cross-checked against frameworks from other Local Resilience Forums (LRFs), national guidance as well as lessons and recommendations REDACTED • Feedback invited and incorporated from the Metropolitan Police Service CBRN(e) Strategic Working Group and the London Fire Brigade CBRN(e) Working Group • Targeted consultations with Counter-Terrorism Policing, the National CBRN Centre, the Home Office and other specialists • Draft tabled at the Sub Regional Resilience Forum (SRRF) workshops and final comments incorporated from the wider London Resilience Partnership as appropriate • Final draft presented to London Resilience Programme Board (LRPB) on 22 May and final version to the LRF on 20 June 2019 • REDACTED
V3.1	April 2023	<p>Full review undertaken:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General administrative and formatting updates • Document separated into Part 1 – Capability Framework and Part 2 – Associated Guidance • Updated to reflect organisational changes • Updated to reflect changes in Initial Operational Response (IOR) / Joint Organisational Learning (JOL) • Updated to reflect Recognise, Assess, React (RAR) and Consciousness, Respirations, Eyes, Secretions, Skin (CRESS)
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Part 1 – Capability Framework

Part 1 of this document highlights the key information from the Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear explosives (CBRN(e)) Framework. It should be used alongside the London Strategic Coordination Protocol.

1. Definition

1.1 Definition/ Purpose

This Framework relates to London’s response to a CBRN(e) incident. It outlines the structures that govern the strategic multi-agency response and offers a proportionate range of options to inform decision-making in this context.

A suspected or actual CBRN(e) incident is treated as deliberate whether through terrorism, hostile state action, or criminality. The sensitivities and protocols associated with such apply.

1.2 Planning Assumption

This document is informed by the London Risk Register, London Planning Assumptions, National Security Risk Assessment and National Resilience Security Planning Assumptions.

The impacts of a CBRN(e) incident would depend on a range of factors including the type and quantity of CBRN(e) materials used. The incident may be significant, not only as a result of materials but impact on the infrastructure, geographical locations and iconic sites that are unique to London. Considerable resources that would be required for coordination, response, and recovery. Details on the planning assumptions are protectively marked and available on [Resilience Direct](#).

1.3 Audience

This Framework is intended for the nominated representatives of organisations across the London Resilience Partnership, who are tasked with managing the response to a CBRN(e) incident for their respective organisations. It is also aimed at civil contingencies, resilience and emergency planning personnel and other advisors who may require insight to the CBRN(e) capability.

2. Action Checklist

Complete	Action	Section
	Activate the plan	Section 3 – Activation Process
	Determine the structure of the response and which sub-groups will be required.	Section 4 – Structure and sub-groups
	Assess the immediate / short term implications	Section 5 – Short, Medium and Longer Term considerations
	Assess the medium term considerations	Section 5 – Short, Medium and Longer Term considerations
	Consider the longer term implications	Section 5 – Short, Medium and Longer Term considerations
	Determine the resources and support available	Section 6 – Resources and Support Available
	Set strategy	Section 7 – Draft Strategy
	Refer to the guidance document for further information	n/a

3. Activation Process

This Framework may be activated for both sudden-onset or rising-tide CBRN(e) incidents.

3.1 Sudden-onset (no-notice) activation

A Commander for an incident can trigger a CBRN(e) incident and activate a response, but only the Police Senior National Coordinator can declare an incident terrorism when the intent of the offender is known. This can occur during or after the “response phase” is completed. A Strategic Commander can activate this framework with notification shared during a tri-partite call, tri-service call, or Strategic Coordination Group (SCG) or shared to Tactical Commanders during a Tactical Coordination Group (TCG) meeting prior to the SCG.

Note: REDACTED

Rising tide (or intelligence led) activation


When a CBRN(e) incident is suspected the tri-service call (including all three Police Services, London Fire Brigade and London Ambulance Service) would be automatically triggered to notify the appropriate CBRN(e) Commanders. CBRN(e) may only be confirmed once the symptomology has developed to a stage at which the materials can be determined. There could also be a build-up of cases and it may take a while for the full impact to be realised.

Note: The Police Counter-Terrorism Commander and Strategic CBRN(e) Commander are different roles and should be kept separate as far as possible.

4. Coordination Structure and Sub-Groups

4.1 Structure of the response

This is tailored for London and does not cover structures that may be activated nationally.



4.2 Strategic Coordinating Group

Once a CBRN(e) incident is declared, Partnership arrangements will be activated according to the London Strategic Coordination Protocol and the LESLP Major Incident Procedure Manual. The SCG will convene to set the strategy and direction for the response, chaired by the Police.

Representation from both National Counter-Terrorism Policing HQ and the National CBRN(e) Centre should be considered depending on the circumstances of the incident. Central Government will establish a Civil Contingencies Committee (commonly referred to as COBR) and will require a Government Liaison Team to participate in the SCG and/or be co-located at the Strategic Coordination Centre. Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC), would provide a Government Liaison Officer (GLO) and the Home Office a Crisis Management Adviser (CMA). The CMA will be security cleared to the level of Developed Vetting and will have access to secure communications.

4.3 Scientific and Technical Advice

Scientific and technical advice is available from a wide range of individual agencies through the normal channels. However, in an incident or in complex emergency situations it may be necessary to provide a single, accurate source of information to inform strategic decision making. Early arrangements for providing this advice may take the form of:

- Provision of advice to Emergency Services via the Early Alerting Protocol with UKHSA.
- Provision of advice to the Tactical Coordination Group (prior to establishment of SCG)
- Coordination of scientific and health protection advice from UKHSA into the Tactical Coordination Group (and key partners coordinated via UKHSA) accessed through the UKHSA London EPRR Duty Officer.
- Provision of advice to Emergency Services in London via ECOSA.

Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)

In the event of the activation of the Strategic Coordination Protocol, the Strategic Coordination Group, or the Regional Director of UKHSA may request the formation of a Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC). The early arrangements listed in 1.1 above will be stood down and merged into the STAC upon activation of the STAC. Coordinating an emergency response at the strategic level often requires expert advice on a range of health security (including wider health matters), environmental, scientific, and technical issues in order to deal effectively with the immediate and longer-term consequences.

The STAC membership can be made up from any number of subject matter experts representing their individual agency or organisation from across the London Resilience Partnership. The STAC would be expected to advise on issues such as the impact on the health of the population, public safety, environmental protection, and sampling and monitoring of any contaminants. This is done through the completion of a STAC Situation Report, which aims to:

- Pool available information and arrive, as far as possible, at a common view on the scientific and technical merits of different courses of action.
- Agree any divergence from agreed arrangements for providing science and technical input.
- Provide a common brief to the technical lead from each agency represented in the cell on the extent of the evidence base available, and how the situation might develop, what this means, and the likely effects of various mitigation strategies.
- Agree with the SCG Chair on the advice to be given to the public on the health aspects of the incident and advice on actions to protect the public, including the consequences of any evacuation or containment policies.

The STAC will continue the provision of advice into the recovery phase of an incident liaising with the Recovery Coordination Group (RCG). Further details of the establishment and provision of STAC can be found in the London Coordination of Scientific and Technical Advice Protocol v4.0.

The role of ECOSA

ECOSA (Emergency Coordination of Scientific Advice) is a mechanism developed to provide the necessary scientific advice to first-line responders during the earliest stages of the response to an incident while more formal scientific advisory systems are being set up. It exists to ensure that responders do not receive conflicting advice from different sources, and consists of three main agencies providing advice – UKHSA for more general health matters, the Defence Science and Technology Laboratories (DSTL) for chemical and biological events, and the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) for radiological and nuclear events.

ECOSA has in part been created to fulfil the requirement for the provision of immediate, coordinated and effective scientific advice to the Police, Fire and Rescue Service, Ambulance Service and public health responders across the UK at a CBRN(e) terrorist incident. The ECOSA team may also provide immediate, coordinated and effective scientific advice in the event of a HAZMAT incident.

This scientific advice will be provided up until the time a STAC is formed wherein it will then stand down and the STAC will take primacy. This will include the appointed STAC Chair attending the final meeting of ECOSA or having an appropriate handover before ECOSA is stood down.

ECOSA will only remain active until either STACs or SAGE have activated. Where STACs activate first, ECOSA will handover to STACs. Where SAGE and STACs activate at the same time, ECOSA will simultaneously handover to both groups

The role of SAGE

SAGE (Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies) can only be activated by COBR (Cabinet Office Briefing Room) in support of collective cross-government responses to and/or recoveries from level 2 or 3 emergencies (see Annex D of the Enhanced SAGE Guidance).

Whether SAGE is needed should be considered when COBR is first activated and reviewed throughout the emergency. It is possible that scientific and technical advice will be required in some but not all phases of response and recovery.

The main distinction between STAC and SAGE is that STAC provides wider consequence management related to the incident and the locality, while SAGE provides national level advice to the Cabinet Office emergency committee.

Further details of the principles of STAC and SAGE interaction and the full scope of SAGE can be on Gov.UK (['Enhanced SAGE Guidance'](#), published October 2012).

4.4 Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG)

The purpose of the HASG is to determine the direction of the Humanitarian Assistance response; those activities aimed at addressing the needs of people affected and the provision of psychosocial support in the short, medium, and long term. It includes support to survivors, defined as any person who has been involved in a CBRN(e) incident and no longer presents a cross contamination risk.

In a CBRN(e) context human impacts may be both complex and protracted, and the psychological effects on individuals and communities may be severe. The survivors of a CBRN(e) incident are likely to have been through a traumatic experience. Those who do not require hospital treatment will need to be directed to a Survivor Reception Centre, where they can be met by the Police and other services for support. Survivors should be supported according to the arrangements of individual organisations and as per the London Humanitarian Assistance Framework.

4.5 Mass Fatalities Coordinating Group (MFCG)

The Coroner has a statutory duty to oversee the processes that involve identifying bodies or remains including those that have been or are contaminated. Following decontamination there may still be contamination risks associated, for example, with internal organs of the body. Precautions

such as specialist protective equipment and procedures apply from transportation through to mortuary arrangements, storage, and burial. There are pathologists trained in CBRN(e).

This process will be managed by the Mass Fatalities Steering Group, as per the London Mass Fatalities Framework, under the authority of the Coroner. The Home Office has produced guidance on the safe handling of contaminated fatalities in the event of a CBRN(e) incident.

4.6 London Resilience Communication Group (LRCG)

The LRCG is chaired by the Metropolitan Police Service. LRCG has Press Officer representation from all Category One responders. In a CBRN(e) incident it is likely additional organisational representation would be agreed, such as representation from national communication groups, in order to set a cohesive public communications and media strategy. Membership includes the Greater London Authority as, in a major emergency, the Mayor of London may also deliver public messages as the voice of London. Key messaging regarding any deployment of assets (including military assets) should come through the communication group.

4.7 Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG)

The TCG will convene to translate strategy into operations with reference to the pre-determined tactical options and considerations available. The CBRN(e) Tactical Commanders of each agency will work together to coordinate the delivery of the tactical plan and manage associated resources.

4.8 Sub-groups to be considered

Sub-Group	Purpose
Communications Group	Ensure appropriate and consistent communications
Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group	Facilitate psychosocial support to those affected
Mass Casualties Coordinating Group	Coordinate the management of casualties
Mass Fatalities Coordinating Group	Coordinate the processes for managing fatalities
Recovery Coordinating Group	Plan for and influence wider longer-term outcomes
Scientific and Technical Advice Cell	Provide relevant subject matter expertise
Tactical Coordinating Group	Translate strategy into tactics and operations

London Resilience partnership response frameworks and plans to consider include:

Response Framework
Humanitarian Assistance Framework
Recovery Coordination Framework
Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations
Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Multi-agency External Emergency Plans
London Coordination of Scientific and Technical Advice Protocol
London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESPL) Major Incident Principles
Excess Deaths Framework
Mass Casualty Framework
Mass Evacuation and Shelter Framework
Mass Fatality Framework

5. Short, Medium and Long-Term Considerations

The table below serves as a reference tool that is subject to the scale, impact, and complexity of the incident. It is non-exhaustive and wider factors may need to be considered. A CBRN(e) response is not linear, rather multiple activities will need to take place simultaneously or at different stages. Therefore, it is inherently dynamic and some of these considerations may also overlap operational, tactical, and strategic levels. All are underpinned by the needs of people which includes psychological and emotional impacts, that are paramount in response and recovery.

Phase	Frontline operational responders	Tactical Responders	Strategic Responders
Impact / immediate post impact: first few hours	Initial Operational Response (IOR) and Specialist Operational Response (SOR) Threat and hazard assessment Scene management	Tactical command, control and coordination structures Resource management and capabilities versus capacity Identification of strategic and tactical holding areas	Strategic and tactical parameters Balance between investigation and multi-agency consequence management
Following hours / first few days	Rescue and recovery Triage, treatment, and transportation Decontamination of persons Environmental protection Evacuation and shelter Survivor Reception Centres, Rest Centres and Humanitarian Assistance (including access to services)	Contamination risks Any impact on water supply and other utility services Intelligence and/or evidential gathering opportunities Warning and Informing Public reassurance Coordination and distribution of medical counter measures Logistics –the displacement of people, places, food, transport Major transport hubs and the London Underground network Casualty bureau	International/national media Communications and press strategy – tailored messaging considering both mainstream and social media National reporting Political Sensitivities, Operational Reset and Readiness. Impact on infrastructure Critical National Infrastructure (including those with International consequences) Protective security measures and any impacts on Royal and Diplomatic Protection Threats to strategically significant locations and events Impacts on health resources (ambulance, acute emergency department and wider NHS pressures. Impacts of the deployment of the Counter-Terrorism infrastructure

Medium term	Decontamination of buildings and the environment Preservation of evidence Contaminated waste disposal	Contact tracing Animals and wildlife	Recovery planning Political sensitivities and international relations Economic and financial implications Monitoring and managing community tensions
Longer term	Health and wellbeing	Community involvement and engagement	Legislation and policies Public health impacts and long-term monitoring Wider consequences Consider Environmental Monitoring

6. Resources and Support Available

Resources and support can be requested from across the London Resilience Partnership through the strategic coordination structures.

Specialist advice will be required as soon as possible. CBRN(e) advice should be sought from those who understand the unique and enhanced capabilities within London. The National CBRN(e) Centre may also be able to make an advisor available as appropriate and necessary.

Resource / Support	Description
Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) – Specialist Response Team	AWE is managed for the Ministry of Defence (MoD) through a contractor operated arrangement. AWE’s Specialist Response Team (SRT) provides the authoritative scientific advice and support to the Police on Radiological and Nuclear incidents. REDACTED
British Transport Police (BTP)	BTP has a number of officers trained and equipped as CBRN(e) responders. A number are on duty 24/7 to provide an immediate response to an incident, supporting the Metropolitan and City of London Police within the MPS geographical region. A number of officers are trained to Strategic, Tactical and Operational command levels. CBRN(e) Tactical Advisors are available for contact 24/7 for incident affecting/ occurring on the railway. REDACTED
City of London Police (CoLP)	CoLP has a number of staff trained and equipped as CBRN(e) responders to respond to an actual, or suspected CBRN(e) incident within the City and will assist the MPS and BTP. REDACTED
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra)	Defra will be the Lead Government Department for coordinating the recovery from a CBRN incident. Note: Defra’s Emergencies Team have responsibilities for CBRN and do not cover the explosion (e) element. The Defra Emergencies Team (formerly the Government Decontamination Service) provide advice and guidance to the responsible authorities on the decontamination of buildings, infrastructure and open environments exposed to CBRN materials. Defra also maintains a framework of specialist commercial decontamination and waste management suppliers, that can be called upon at short notice to provide rapid assistance to responsible authorities. They will help plan, advise on decontamination operations, and can be contracted by responsible authorities to carry out decontamination/remediation works. REDACTED
Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) – Specialist Response Team	DSTL is an executive agency of the MoD and provides a Chemical, Biological response and Electronic Counter-Measures (ECM/E) response. The Chemical and Biological response provides authoritative scientific advice from Senior Scientific Advisors and cross-hotline capability from the Specialist Response Team to support the Police in planning, response and recovery. REDACTED
Department for Transport (DfT):	Ensuring the safe and effective transport of dangerous goods. The Land Transport Security Division (LTSD) look after Counter-Terrorism

<p>Dangerous Goods Division</p>	<p>Policy for Railway and Underground, and light rail networks and the DfT Transport Security Resilience and Response (TSRR) coordinate incident response at a Counter-Terrorism policy level.</p>
<p>Environment Agency (EA)</p>	<p>The EA will make an assessment as to whether it's safe or necessary for officers to attend a CBRN(e) incident. EA staff will not enter the hot or warm zone.</p> <p>The EA can provide environmental advice and guidance (likely remotely via telephone or at strategic/tactical command centres) identifying drainage systems, abstraction points or watercourses that could be impacted and identifying appropriate run off disposal routes in consultation with the relevant utility company.</p> <p>The EA can support a STAC if convened and chair an Air Quality cell, working with UKHSA and the Met Office if necessary. The EA can also provide advice around the disposal of contaminated waste in the recovery phase.</p>
<p>Fire and Rescue Service CBRN(e) National Resilience</p>	<p>CBRN(e) National Resilience is governed by the National Fire Chief's Council. Its role is to develop and provide national guidance to the UK Fire Service in responding to CBRN(e) incidents.</p> <p>REDACTED</p>
<p>Home Office</p>	<p>The Home Office will coordinate and lead the cross government response to a CBRN(e) event providing access to National assets if required by the SCG. REDACTED</p>
<p>Local Authority and London Local Authority Gold (LLAG)</p>	<p>The affected Local Authority will set up its Borough Emergency Control Centre (BECC) and provide a Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO) as appropriate and where it is safe to do.</p> <p>Local Authorities would also consider the provision of specialist staff and contractors such as those involved in public health/protection, dangerous structures, environmental health, and highways as well as any actual or potential rises in community tensions.</p> <p>REDACTED</p>
<p>London Ambulance Service (LAS)</p>	<p>LAS Strategic Command will initially function from LAS HQ and subsequently engage with the SCG. REDACTED</p>
<p>London Fire Brigade (LFB)</p>	<p>All frontline responses can support IOR. The Rapid Response Team (RRT) provide a highly specialised response to CBRN(e) and Hazardous Material incidents utilising Detection, Identification, Monitoring equipment and support delivery of Mass Decontamination.</p> <p>REDACTED</p>
<p>London Resilience Group (LRG)</p>	<p>LRG will be notified of the incident by partners. REDACTED Any multi-agency reporting requirements from London partners to Central Government will be facilitated by LRG.</p>
<p>Met Office</p>	<p>In the event of a CBRN(e) incident the Met Office would support DSTL in providing plume modelling to emergency responders. Prior to the incident being confirmed as terrorism emergency responders may contact the Met Office Environment Monitoring and Response Centre (EMARC) for advice and they will be provided with Chemical Meteorology (CHEMET) as requested.</p>

<p>Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)</p>	<p>The Police will provide Strategic, Tactical and Operational Commanders. Tactical may be deployed to the Special Operations Room or the Forward Command Post as necessary. These commanders will be trained or will have access to CBRN(e) advice through SO15's Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Unit which provides 24/7 access to Counter-CBRN(e) advice and capability.</p> <p>The Police will also provide a chair for, and representation at the SCG. REDACTED</p>
<p>Ministry of Defence (MoD): Directorate of Counter Terrorism and UK Operations</p>	<p>Under the Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA) arrangements, the Technical Response Force (TRF) operates in support of UK Counter Terrorism operations. REDACTED</p> <p>The TRF is comprised of two core elements and one supporting component, these are Military (core), Scientific (core) and Emergency Services (support). REDACTED</p>
<p>National Health Service (NHS) England (London)</p>	<p>The NHS will strategically coordinate the health response across the region by establishing the NHS command and control arrangements. This includes the opening of their Incident Coordination Centre and providing strategic representation at the SCG. Information will be provided to NHS Trusts and Integrated Care Boards (ICBs) in London when required. Information in relation to numbers and types of casualties presenting to acute and/or community providers will be collated and provided to the NHS national team.</p> <p>It should be noted that in a CBRN(e) incident casualties may leave the scene and present to NHS sites including primary care inside and outside of London. The NHS England (London) will ensure that advice from UKHSA relating to decontamination needs, antidotes and prophylaxis treatments is coordinated and made available to the NHS. NHS England will coordinate the provision of health mutual aid, including cross border support, via regional and ICB teams. NHS England (London) also coordinate the request for, and distribution of, clinical countermeasures across London. REDACTED</p>
<p>National Network of Laboratories (NNL)</p>	<p>The NNL, established by the Home Office, provides an increased analytical capability for the identification of suspect Chemical or Biological agents to support UK Police forces (24/7). It can generally provide a clinical identification of material within 24-48hours.</p>
<p>National CBRN Centre (NCBRNC): Operations Centre</p>	<p>NCBRNC is part of National Counter Terrorism Policing, Protect and Prepare. REDACTED</p>
<p>UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA)</p>	<p>UKHSA is an executive agency of the Department of Health and is responsible for protecting every member of every community from the impact of infectious diseases, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents and other health threats. UKHSA lead the communications response on public health issues in an incident and on the provision of scientific and technical advice at all levels.</p> <p>If deemed necessary, UKHSA will activate a relevant incident response. The London Regional Response Centre and any National Response Centres will be activated to support these activities. UKHSA will lead on the production of public health advice, guidance, and messaging to the public. UKHSA would lead on public health risk</p>

	mitigation measures including contact tracing, the process of identifying persons who may have been exposed to a contaminant and the subsequent collection of information about these contacts.
Transport for London (TfL)	Transport for London will fulfil their obligations as a category 2 responder and will work with the emergency services to respond to the incident by making operational adjustments to its services, providing technical knowledge, and facilitating safe access where applicable. REDACTED

7. Considerations for Strategy

7.1 Draft Strategic Aim and Objectives

To work together to coordinate an effective emergency response to save and protect life, preserve evidence, minimise the impact on London's communities, and facilitate recovery.

- To save life and reduce harm
- To mitigate and minimise the impact of contaminants on people and the environment
- To implement the Joint Operational Plan for a CBRN(e) incident
- To make the scene safe and secure to protect the wider community, facilitate investigations, gather information and intelligence, and preserve evidence
- To facilitate wider consequence management (including survivor and humanitarian assistance, remote casualty management, and associated economic impacts)
- To ensure the delivery of a timely, effective, and cohesive communications strategy
- To inform the public and businesses, and maintain public confidence
- To restore and maintain continuity of essential service provisions
- To steer towards recovery and the return to a new normality

7.2 Strategic Coordinating Group Considerations

- In situations where information security becomes paramount, a working protocol must be agreed with all partners so there is a clear understanding of levels of security, communication channels, and what can or cannot be shared.
- Organisations should consider their security clearance policies and arrangements for all staff that may be required to participate in the response to CBRN(e) incidents.
- It may be important to align SCG meetings with intelligence briefings, crime-scene, and investigation progress reports as well as updates from all activated sub-groups.
- The properties of the CBRN(e) material (e.g. persistency and mobility) may change the consequences of the incident and the response of/demands upon the SCG.
- The SCG should consider the impact of its strategy on any cross contamination and spread.
- CBRN(e) incidents are likely to be protracted. This requires the SCG to consider long-term planning and build in resilience to regional response arrangements.
- The SCG needs to determine the effect (i.e. desired end state) it wants to achieve, which will subsequently inform any national assets that could be deployed.

Part 2 – Capability Guidance

8. Defining a CBRN(e) incident

8.1 Definition

CBRN(e) is the abbreviation commonly used to describe the malicious use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological Nuclear and/or explosive materials or weapons. It is the actual or threatened dispersal of CBRN(e) material either on their own or in combination with each other. A CBRN(e) incident is normally declared as a result of intelligence or a set of circumstances that give suspicion that the release is a deliberate act that may involve criminal, malicious or murderous intent (e.g. terrorism, hostile state action, or other criminal acts).

A Hazardous Material (HazMat) incident is the accidental release of such material due to human error, natural or technological reasons. While the cause is different, the consequence management for this is similar and therefore this framework should be considered as all encompassing. HazMat incidents may be complemented by London's Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) and Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPPIR) off-site plans.

In order to formally declare a hazardous substance incident as a CBRN(e) attack two elements need to be present:

- The existence of a hazardous substance.
- The deliberate release of that substance with ideological motivation or intent.

Whilst the distinction between accidental and intentional release of CBRN(e) material is significant from a Counter Terrorism investigative perspective, the impact this has on the Initial Operational Response (IOR) is minimal as the operational priority will remain saving lives.

It is important to be aware that any offender(s) may still be present, and responders should be aware of the possibility of secondary attacks, but they must do everything they can to save life and reduce harm to the public. Early information sharing with the Counter Terrorism community and partners will maximise the response to incidents and support future investigations.

8.2 Initial actions

The initial actions taken following a hazardous substance incident have a significant effect on the outcome for all involved. The following principles are taken from the IOR Incidents Suspected to involve Hazardous Substances or CBRN Materials. and must be embedded across the emergency REDACTED

8.3 Descriptors of CBRN(e) Elements

8.3.1 Chemical

A chemical release would involve some form of chemical agent and a method of dissemination, REDACTED . Poisoning or injury caused by chemical substances, including traditional (military) chemical warfare agents, harmful industrial or household chemicals is possible.

8.3.2 Biological

A biological release may involve the dispersal of bacteria, a virus or toxins REDACTED . The effects of a biological incident may not be immediately apparent as an exposed victim may not present visible symptoms for some period of time post exposure.

8.3.3 Radiological

A radiological incident involves the spread of, or exposure to, radioactive material through a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) or an unshielded source. This renders the contaminated area potentially hazardous to health until a decontamination process is undertaken.

8.3.4 Nuclear

A nuclear device is a type of weapon that results in life-threatening thermal or blast effects upon detonation. REDACTED

8.3.5 Explosives

Explosives may be used as a means of dissemination of the above materials or as an additional method of attack. Although there are multiple methods of dissemination.

9. Further available guidance

This section offers guidance relating to a CBRN(e) It is intended to complement the preceding CBRN(e) Strategic Summary.

This guidance should be considered alongside the following resources as appropriate.

9.1 National Documentation

- Home Office Operational Response Framework 2022
- Strategic Framework for the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response by the Emergency Services (England and Wales) 2022
- National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA)
- [Initial Operational Response to Incidents Suspected to Involve Hazardous Substances or CBRN Materials \(January 2023\)](#)
- [Responding to a CBRN\(e\) Event: Joint Operating Procedures for Emergency Services](#)
- [National Operational Guidance \(NOG\)](#)
- [JESIP Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework and App](#)
- National CBRN(e) Centre Portal on [Resilience Direct](#)
- Remove, Remove, Remove

9.2 Local or Organisational Plans

- Agency Specific Plans and Procedures

10. Operational overview

The Metropolitan Police Service will have overall responsibility for terrorist incidents and resources deployed in pursuance of Police mutual aid will act under its control. REDACTED

The first responders will work together to save life, in line with the Initial Operational Response (IOR) Procedures for a CBRN(e) incident. Each agency is responsible for their own risk assessment, communicated with partners to provide a joint understanding of risk. This further informs multi-agency decision-making in line with the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles as well as the tactical options and considerations to achieve a safe response.

The response will progress to follow established procedures as per the Specialist Operational Response (SOR). REDACTED

10.1 Counter terrorism

Any CBRN(e) scene is a crime scene and must be treated as such. REDACTED.

10.2 Detection, Identification and Monitoring (DIM)

The Police services and London Fire Brigade have specialist Detection, Identification and Monitoring teams that can be deployed to undertake the initial analytical process to determine the substance. This is subject to the type and persistency of the substance, and it is possible that samples may need to be taken for laboratory tests before the substance can be verified. Definitive information about the nature of CBRN(e) materials may take time to confirm. The lead agency providing this information will depend on incident circumstances and the associated strategy. Note that the DIM capability forms just one part of a wider scene assessment approach.

10.3 Decontamination of Persons

While the Police are responsible for the control of people in the cordon, the National Health Service are responsible for overseeing the management of those people who are contaminated, potentially contaminated or who are in fear of having been contaminated. The prompt evacuation (removal of casualties from the scene of contamination), disrobing (undressing is a critical step in reducing exposure to CBRN(e) materials and decontamination of those affected is crucial to save life and reduce impacts. There are three types of decontamination as outlined below.

10.3.1 Initial Decontamination

The use of an immediately available method of decontamination that should be performed on all disrobed casualties as a priority by any of the emergency services on-scene. Dry decontamination should be considered the default process primarily for chemical incidents and is the process of blotting and patting exposed skin with the use of dry absorbent material. However, if the substance is caustic in nature (burning or irritating the skin) water should be used as the first line decontamination process continuing until burning or irritation ceases. It is recognised by all agencies that this may carry risk of exposure too cold for certain groups (e.g. children, the elderly, and the injured). Irrespective of which agency commences decontamination, the process should fall under the clinical control of the London Ambulance Service and National Health Service as soon as practicable to ensure the safe management of casualties.

10.3.2 Mass Decontamination

The procedure to decontaminate people when the NHS, or the London Ambulance Service on its behalf, has identified to the London Fire Brigade that the number requiring decontamination has overwhelmed, or threatens to overwhelm NHS capacity. The incident may require the London Fire Brigade to initiate mass decontamination procedures prior to the arrival of the London Ambulance Service and National Health Service or in circumstances where their resources are not immediately available. It will be important to establish triage arrangements, involving both London Ambulance Service and London Fire Brigade personnel as soon as possible.

10.3.3 Clinical Decontamination

The medical procedure to treat patients affected by or contaminated with CBRN(e) materials. The prioritisation of casualties prior to decontamination requires the input of the London Ambulance Service and specialist National Health Service staff. The process will be carried out by trained staff in Powered Respiratory Protection Suits (PRPS) or other appropriate PPE and patients will be triaged according to clinical need.

Note 1: Due care must be taken to maintain the privacy and dignity of individuals. The process requires the removal of all clothing and belongings prior to decontamination. The provision of separate facilities for males and females is important, as is respect towards beliefs and values. Decontamination requires a high-level of compliance and consideration should also be given to language barriers and the needs of those with disabilities.

Note 2: Advice on the decontamination of buildings and infrastructure is provided by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs CBRN Emergencies Team.

11. Recovery

11.1 Transition to recovery

Recovery planning should commence as soon as possible in order to inform the response. At a suitable point, and once the core elements of the response have concluded, the SCG chair will formally handover primacy to the Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG) chair. There is no fixed point of transition, and this decision will be taken based on the circumstances of the incident.

Local Authorities will lead the recovery process referring to the arrangements detailed within the [Recovery Coordination Framework](#). Depending on the type, location, scale and impact of the incident Local Authorities may also lead any clean-up of the affected areas.

Recovery in the aftermath of a CBRN(e) incident may take months or even years. The approach to recovery may need to address the enduring human, physical, environmental, social and economic consequences. It may also need to include the ongoing collation of evidence, site cleaning, as well as impacts on public health and communities. Support from the private sector, voluntary organisations and the wider community may be necessary. The London Communities Emergency Partnership (LCEP) is a resource and structure available to support recovery. LCEP offer a single and dependable entry point to London's voluntary and community sector, both in advance of and in the event of an emergency.

12. Training and Exercising

12.1 Organisational responsibilities

Each organisation is responsible for ensuring they have a clear understanding of their role and the associated policies and procedures. It is expected that this will include specific roles and an appropriate level of knowledge of multi-agency arrangements at a local and regional level. The London CT Prepare Board has oversight of the CT Training and exercising to be delivered at all levels on an ongoing basis and should include:

- The delivery of a multi-agency exercise programme
- The training and exercising of a cadre of CBRN(e) Strategic Commanders, Tactical Advisors and National Inter-Agency Liaison Offers (NILO's)

12.2 The role of the London Resilience Partnership

The London Resilience Partnership will support a consistent approach towards strategic multi-agency understanding through Partnership wide briefings. Additionally, the London Resilience Partnership Training & Exercising Group will seek out opportunities for further exercising of the capability (or elements of it) based on need as highlighted by the CBRN(e) Working Group.

Annex 1 - Acronyms

AWE	Atomic Weapons Establishment
BECC	Borough Emergency Control Centre
CBRN(e)	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and explosives
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Room, shorthand for the Civil Contingencies Committee
COMAH	Control of Major Accidents Hazards
CT	Counter Terrorism
CTSIO	Counter-Terrorism Senior Investigating Officer
DfT	Department for Transport
DIM	Detection, Identification and Monitoring
DLUHC	Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities
DSTL	Defence Science and Technology Laboratories
DVI	Disaster Victim Identification
EA	Environment Agency
ECOSA	Emergency Coordination of Scientific Advice
EMARC	Environment Monitoring and Response Centre
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
HALO	Humanitarian Assistance Lead Officer
HART	Hazardous Area Response Team
HASG	Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group
HAZMAT	Hazardous Material, dangerous substances
IOR	Initial Operational Response
JESIP	Joint Emergency Service Interoperability Protocol
JOL	Joint Organisational Learning
LALO	Local Authority Liaison Officer
LESLP	London Emergency Services Liaison Panel
LCEP	London Communities Emergencies Partnership
LLACC	London Local Authority Coordination Centre
LLAG	London Local Authority Gold
LRAG	London Risk Advisory Group
LRCG	London Resilience Communications Group
LRF	London Resilience Forum
LRG	London Resilience Group
LRP	London Resilience Partnership
LTSD	Land Transport Security Division
MACA	Military Assistance to Civil Authorities
MFCG	Mass Fatalities Coordinating Group
MOD	Ministry of Defence

NCBRNC	National CBRN Centre
NCAF	National Coordination Advisory Framework
NHS	National Health Service
NILO	National Inter-Agency Liaison Offers
NCTP	National Counter-Terrorism Policing
NNL	National Network of Laboratories
NOG	National Operational Guidance
PRPS	Powered Respiratory Protection Suits
RAR	Recognise, Assess, React
RCG	Recovery Coordination Group
RDD	Radiological Dispersion Device
REPPPIR	Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations
RPA	Radiation Protection Advisor
RRT	Rapid Response Team
RVP	Rendezvous Point
SAGE	Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies
SCG	Strategic Coordination Group
SHA	Strategic Holding Area
SIM	Senior Identification Manager
SIO	Senior Investigating Officer
SOR	Specialist Operational Response
SRU	Specialist Response Unit
STAC	Scientific and Technical Advice Cell
TCG	Tactical Coordination Group
TfL	Transport for London
TRF	Technical Response Force
TSRR	Transport Security Resilience and Response
UKHSA	UK Health Security Agency

Annex 2 - Glossary of Terms

Term	Summary Information
CBRN(e)	A Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and explosives incident treated as deliberate whether through terrorism, hostile state action, or criminality.
Critical National Infrastructure	Facilities, systems, sites, information, people, networks, and processes, necessary for a country to function and upon which daily life depends
London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Major Incident Principles	Provides information about the London Resilience Partnership’s approach to a generic major incident, and additional capabilities needed to respond to specific incidents. It is designed to assist practitioners in the planning, training, and exercising stages of preparing for emergencies and to provide a reference document for use during incidents.
London LA Command and Control (LLACC)	Operated on the local authorities’ behalf by London Resilience Group and provides a regional coordination function with Information Management and Situational Awareness responsibilities. It supports the London Local Authority Gold functions.
London Risk Advisory Group (LRAG)	A sub-group of the London Resilience Forum and has the delegated responsibility to conduct the partnership risk assessment for London. Key responsibilities to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Review the national planning assumptions for relevance in London, • Determine whether the national figures are appropriate for London or whether there is a need for a London specific planning assumption.
London Risk Register	Summarises the types of emergencies that may affect London. Risks are graded by their expected impact and likelihood to provide a way a prioritising which risks need to be managed or specifically planned for.
London Resilience Group (LRG)	Supports the coordination of any multi-agency response to major incidents in London. It is the centre of excellence to help deliver the work to achieve the London Resilience Partnership’s goals. LRG delivers services on behalf of the Greater London Authority, London’s Local Authorities, and the London Fire Brigade (where it is hosted) to coordinate and support resilience in London.
Modelling	Are qualitative and/or quantitative descriptions of key components and drivers of the Death Management system and the relationships between these. As a tool, it can be used to assess and predict the impacts of drivers
National Planning Assumptions	Taken from the National Security Risk Assessment.
National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA)	Designed to compare, assess and prioritise all major disruptive risks to national security. The approach builds on the existing, classified National Risk Assessment.
RAG status	Red - Unsustainable operational pressures: immediate attention required Amber – Some operational pressures, close monitoring required Green – Normal Working and / or operational pressures are low Threshold – Upper Limit for each defined RAG status.

Recovery Coordination Group (RCG)	Stood up to manage the recovery phases of an Excess Deaths event. Will report in to the SCG.
Scenario	Are representations of possible futures for one or more components of the Death Management System, including management options.
Sub-Group	Tactical delivery groups which may be required in the event of excess deaths in London.
Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG)	The group will convene to translate strategy into operations with reference to the pre-determined tactical options and considerations available.

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LONDON RESILIENCE GROUP

The London Resilience Group is jointly funded and governed by the Greater London Authority, London Local Authorities, and the London Fire Commissioner. We are hosted by the London Fire Brigade. Our work, and that of the London Resilience Partnership, is overseen by the London Resilience Forum.