• Reference: 2022/2992
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 15 September 2022

In your response to Question 2017/0037, you stated "TfL independently assures the condition of the bus fleet through engineering quality monitoring. This involves monthly inspections, covering around a quarter of the fleet each year and helps to ensure vehicles are fit for purpose regardless of age, make and model.” How can you, therefore, explain the fact that bus drivers have, for years, consistently provided evidence that air conditioning does not work on many buses during the summer months?

• Reference: 2022/2991
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 15 September 2022

Your response to Question 2022/1637 states: "Two Directors at Transport for London, who were displaced, were given the opportunity on a closed listed basis to apply for the position of Director of Safety Health and Environment.” Please provide me with: (a) documentary evidence detailing TfL’s official policy for creating new senior closed recruitment positions; and (b) TfL’s legal opinion that this recruitment process complied with both TfL policy and employment law requirements.

• Reference: 2022/2990
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 15 September 2022

Please provide me with (a) the Professional Safety Qualifications (e.g., Occupational Safety and Health (NEBOSH) and Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH) accreditations) of the following TfL executives; and (b) the date when they achieved the qualification and when they were appointed. Chief Safety, Health and Environment Officer Chief Operating Officer Head of Bus Business Development Director of Buses

• Reference: 2022/2989
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 15 September 2022

Based on your response to Question 2022/1629, bus operators Metroline and Tower Transit show, respectively, 27% and 11% of bus driver deaths from Covid when they account for, also respectively, only 16% and 5% of the total TfL bus driver workforce. How do you explain the fact that these two bus operators represent the only two of ten bus operators which showed a Covid-19 deathrate higher—in these cases, significantly higher—than would be predicted by the percentage of their bus drivers in TfL’s total bus driver workforce? As a result of this alarming trend, has TfL singled out Metroline and Tower...

• Reference: 2022/2988
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 15 September 2022

Further to your response to Question 2022/1629, please provide me with a breakdown of all the bus workers who died from Covid-19 by bus contractor during the period March 2020 - August 2022.

• Reference: 2022/2987
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 15 September 2022

The "Fatal Accident Investigations” information published on TfL’s website shows 81 people killed in Bus Safety Incidents since January 2015. Over that period TfL only commissioned one independent investigation after a fatal bus crash, that involving a vehicle and an R11 Bus operated by Go Ahead which resulted in the bus driver being killed. Can you provide documentary evidence why this crash warranted an independent investigation commissioned by TfL when 64 other fatal bus crashes warranted none?

• Reference: 2022/2986
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 15 September 2022

In the "Fatal Accident Investigations” information published on TfL’s website, 25 of the 81 Fatal Incidents which took place between 5 January 2015 and 2 May 2022 listed on TfL’s Bus Safety Data web page display “Garage Not Available” under the column intended to inform the public about which garage the bus involved in the fatal incident was based. Can you explain why this critical safety information is missing for nearly one-third of these fatal incidents and, moreover, is missing from 17 of the 41 Fatal Bus Incidents (more than 40 percent) that have taken place since your Vision Zero...

• Reference: 2022/2985
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 15 September 2022

Question 2017/0037 asked you to "consider adding additional columns of data showing the make, model and year of any bus involved in a collision incident where injuries have been recorded, and, where relevant, provide an additional column to identify when an Unintended Acceleration Incident has occurred” and you responded "I will ask TfL to look at whether these details would be useful in enhancing transparency as part of its wider Bus Safety Programme”. Please provide me with documentary evidence that you asked TfL to consider adding these details and justify why this simple request was never actioned.

• Reference: 2022/2984
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 15 September 2022

In the "Fatal Accident Investigations” information published on TfL’s website, TfL’s write-up of this incident notes “it was also evident at the time that the lighting at the site was affected by overhanging trees from the local school. The school immediately agreed to cut them back to fully reveal the lamp standards to improve lighting at the junction. TfL to identify if any changes can be made to improving the junction. A project manager has been assigned” and "The Coroner highlighted the lack of pedestrian crossing facilities and poor lighting levels present, but didn't issue a prevention of future death...

• Reference: 2022/2983
• Question by: Keith Prince
• Meeting date: 15 September 2022

In its Prevention of Future Deaths (PFD) Report issued to TfL for this incident, the coroner mandated that TfL act to make changes "related to various aspects of the road junction which is maintained by TfL”. Please provide me with documentary evidence that (a) TfL has implemented, monitored and widely shared the actions compelled by this PFD report and (b) TfL has reviewed similar junctions maintained by TfL across London’s bus network to see if similar dangers exist and should be rectified.