London Resilience Partnership Strategic Coordination Protocol
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LONDON RESILIENCE GROUP
The London Resilience Group is jointly funded and governed by the Greater London Authority, London Local Authorities and the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority. We are hosted by the London Fire Brigade. Our work, and that of the London Resilience Partnership, is overseen by the London Resilience Forum.
Notify the London Resilience Group

Any partner organisation experiencing or having knowledge of a potential disruptive, major incident or emergency should contact the London Resilience Group Duty Manager to jointly assess the situation to determine the level of strategic coordination required.

To notify the London Resilience Group of an incident contact the LRG Duty Manager:

- **Telephone** London Fire Brigade control: [CONTENT REMOVED]
- Request to page the ‘London Resilience Group Duty Manager’. Provide your name, role, organisation and contact number.

The London Resilience Group Duty Manager will call back within 30 minutes.

For any incident led by the MPS, this notification will be performed by the MPS SC&O22 on-call Emergency Preparedness Officer.

Provide the following information to the London Resilience Group Duty Manager:

**M** - Major incident declared / potential to be declared?
- Has a command structure been established?
- Has a strategy been set, what is it and does it include recovery?
- SCG meeting: time and location of any scheduled meetings and which organisations are required.

**E** - Exact location of incident

**T** - Type of incident
- Scale - how significant and widespread is the incident or might it become?
- Impact - how bad is it, and how bad could it become?
- Time and duration - how long is it likely to continue?

**H** - Hazards / risks - present, potential or suspected

**A** - Access - routes that are safe to use

**N** - Number, type, severity of casualties and other people involved (e.g. evacuees)

**E** - Emergency services and partners now present and those required.
- Which partner organisations have been notified?
- Which additional partner organisations need to be notified?

Depending on the nature of the situation it may be appropriate to provide information in an alternative format to METHANE which is intended as a reporting tool for Major Incidents. The information should include what is known at the time to inform situational awareness.
Assessment

Undertake a joint assessment of the situation

The partner organisation raising the issue and the London Resilience Group should jointly assess the situation to inform a decision on the level of strategic coordination required. A tripartite discussion with the MPS should take place at this stage if required.

Start to develop shared situational awareness. Consider the following factors in your impact analysis:

- **Health**: Direct (fatalities, injuries) and indirect (strain on health services)
- **Social and welfare**: Evacuation, disruption of essential services, community tension, public disorder
- **Environmental**: Pollution of land, water or air, damage to plants or animals
- **Economic**: National, London, local - direct and indirect e.g. financial markets
- **Political**: Central Government, GLA, Mayor’s Office, local authorities
- **Media**: Mainstream and social media profile and public communications
- **Organisational**: Implications for critical services of partner organisations
- **Legal** considerations
- **Ethical** considerations

Engage other partner organisations if required to inform the situation assessment.
Coordination Level

Jointly determine the level of partnership coordination required

Partnership coordination options:

- **Level 1**: Monitor the situation and share information with selected partners

- **Level 2**: Achieve shared situational awareness across the partnership through production of a Common Operating Picture using the London Situational Awareness Tool (LSAT)

- **Level 3**: Partnership teleconference for briefing and information sharing

- **Level 4**: Blue-lights (emergency services) Gold Coordinating Group teleconference or meeting (with other partners if required)

- **Level 5**: Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) teleconference or meeting

- **Activation of partnership capabilities e.g.**:
  - London Resilience Communication Group Emergency Plan
  - Scientific and Technical Advice Cell Arrangements
  - Recovery Management Protocol
  - Humanitarian Assistance Framework
Activate relevant partner organisations

Activation options:

- Lead organisation and/or London Resilience Group to telephone/page selected partner organisations.
- London Resilience Group to use mass-messaging system to alert selected or all partner organisations, followed by distribution of further information via email.

On receipt of activation partner organisations should take action as directed by the activation message. This will typically include:

- Continue to monitor email and the London Situational Awareness Tool (LSAT) for further information.
- Contribute to the Common Operating Picture (COP) via LSAT.
- Confirm participation in teleconferences / meetings as required.

If only selected partners are activated, consider sending an all-informed message and/or COP (via LSAT) to all partners for awareness.
A proposed multi-agency strategy should be presented to the first SCG meeting for consideration and agreement.

The strategy should be written in conjunction with relevant partners.

It should include a clear aim and a set of objectives for partner organisations to work towards collectively.

**Discuss and agree the aim:**
- Does the aim state a singular overall condition to be achieved?
- Is the aim realistic?
- Is the aim clear, concise and memorable?

**Discuss and agree the objectives:**
- Do they take account of the common objectives for responders (section 2.6 of this document)?
- Do the objectives identify tasks?
- Do the objectives set clear priorities?
- The objectives should be focussed, not an exhaustive list of wishes

The strategy should be communicated to the tactical coordinating group and individual organisations tactical commanders. Tactical commanders should use the strategy to determine tasks for each organisation or group of organisations working together.
Implementation of the Recovery Management Protocol should be considered at an early stage.

The recovery process usually begins during the response phase. This is to prepare for longer-term recovery and to inform the SCG to ensure decisions made by the SCG are compatible with the recovery strategy.

The Recovery Management Protocol is usually activated by the Chair of the SCG or at the request of the London Local Authority Gold (LLAG). LLAG will appoint a local authority chief executive to chair the Recovery Coordination Group (RCG).

During the response phase the RCG is a sub-group of the SCG. At a suitable phase the responsibility for multi-agency coordination will transfer from the SCG to the RCG. Transfer of responsibility is a formal process and should be documented.

The initial tasks of the RCG are to:

- Agree a recovery strategy
- Advise the SCG on matters relating to recovery
- Undertake an impact assessment
- Develop a recovery action plan
- Coordinate activity with other SCG sub-groups as required (e.g. Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group)

A template recovery strategy is at Appendix 6. The Recovery Management Protocol contains a template meeting agenda, impact assessment, and criteria for handover of strategic coordination from the SCG Chair to the RCG Chair.
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1.1 Introduction

‘Making decisions is the raison d’être of a coordinating group’

1.1.1 This Protocol details the escalating strategic coordination arrangements for London’s response to a disruptive incident. This applies to a range of incidents including relatively frequent low-level disruptive events, major incidents as defined in the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles Joint Doctrine (Edition 2), and an emergency as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

1.1.2 The principles and core functions of this protocol are deliberately flexible. They are neither prescribed or subject to specific tipping points or trigger criteria, as decisions will be taken based upon the scale and nature of the incident, its impact, and consequences.

1.1.3 This document describes strategic coordination arrangements. It is complimentary to the LESLP Major Incident Procedure Manual which describes the arrangements for operational and tactical coordination, the roles and responsibilities of each of the emergency services at a Major Incident, and outlines the operational and tactical support role provided by local authorities.

1.2 Principles

1.2.1 The protocol reflects the eight guiding principles taken from the UK Central Government Arrangements for Responding to an Emergency to capture the core characteristics of effective emergency response. These should be applied to the management of any emergency:

A. Preparedness: All individuals and organisations that might have to respond to emergencies should be properly prepared, including having clarity of roles and responsibilities, specific and generic plans, and rehearsing response arrangements periodically

B. Continuity: The response to emergencies should be grounded within organisations’ existing functions and their familiar ways of working – although inevitably, actions will need to be carried out at greater speed, on a larger scale and in more testing circumstances during the response to an incident

C. Subsidiarity: Decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level, with coordination at the highest necessary level. Local responders should be the building block of response for an emergency of any scale

D. Direction: Clarity of purpose should be delivered through an awareness of the strategic aims and supporting objectives for the response. These should be agreed and understood by all involved in managing the response to an incident in order to effectively prioritise and focus the response

E. Integration: Effective coordination should be exercised between and within organisations and local, regional and national tiers of a response as well as timely access to appropriate guidance and appropriate support for the local, regional or national level
F. **Communication:** Good two-way communications are critical to an effective response. Reliable information must be passed correctly and without delay between those who need to know, including the public.

G. **Cooperation:** Positive engagement based on mutual trust and understanding will facilitate information sharing and deliver effective solutions to arising issues.

H. **Anticipation:** In order to anticipate and manage the consequences of all kinds of emergencies, planners need to identify risks and develop an understanding of both the direct and indirect consequences in advance where possible.

### 1.3 Leadership in Multi-agency Coordinating Groups

1.3.1 The notification and sharing of information between London Resilience partners does not in itself mean a multi-agency coordinated response is automatically necessary. Experience shows that on the majority of occasions the sharing of information will be the only action required.

1.3.2 Where multi-agency coordinating groups are established to define strategy and objectives, it should be achieved through consensus. It is expected that all those responder organisations involved will work together in a directed and coordinated fashion to achieve the strategic aim and objectives.

#### Command structure

1.3.3 ‘Command’, in this protocol, is recognised as a single-agency function. The focus of this protocol is coordination of the multi-agency management of an incident, including creating and maintaining shared situational awareness and determining a joint strategy.

1.3.4 A Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) can form at the request of any partner organisation.

1.3.5 The SCG should be chaired by the most appropriate agency, depending on the nature of the incident. This may change as the incident progresses.

1.3.6 All forms of multi-agency strategic level meetings will be referred to as ‘Strategic Coordinating Groups’ (SCG’s).

1.3.7 Operating beneath the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) are two levels of multi-agency coordination; the Tactical and Operational Coordinating Groups.

#### Chair of multi-agency coordinating group

1.3.8 The chair of a multi-agency coordinating group does not command the assets of other organisations. Their role is to exert influence and achieve consensus without constitutional authority. This may require strong leadership.

1.3.9 The SCG may initially be chaired by the Metropolitan Police Service, but this may subsequently be handed over to the most appropriate agency, depending on the nature of the incident. A cadre of officers from partnership organisations will be available to fulfil the role of SCG chair. The SCG chair should be appointed based on the most appropriate partner organisation for the specific incident. They should act as an impartial chair, with their organisation or sector represented separately on the SCG.
1.4 Key Definitions

1.4.1 The following key definitions are referred to throughout this protocol:

**Steady State**

1.4.2 Steady state is the term used to describe the activities that organisations respond to and manage as part of their everyday responsibilities. Steady state may also be known as business as usual or normality.

**Rising Tide Emergency (JESIP definition)**

1.4.3 An event or situation with a lead-in time of days, weeks or even months e.g. health pandemic, flooding or pre-planned event, the final impact of which may not be apparent in advance.

**Disruptive Incident**

1.4.4 A disruptive incident is any hazard or threat that could cause significant disruption or harm to either Category 1 or 2 responders and impact on London. This includes incidents that may sit below the declaration of a major incident. (There are established criteria for the emergency services declaring a major incident for a rapid on-set emergency requiring joint emergency services response e.g. serious fire, train crash, building collapse).

1.4.5 Harm refers to the type and extent of injury or damage and may include: physical harm including loss of life; psychological harm; economic harm; and harm to the community. It may also include organisational harm, such as the effect on an organisation’s reputation.

**Critical Incident (police definition)**

1.4.6 The police (authorised professional practice) define a critical incident as any incident where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family and/or the community.

**Major Incident (JESIP definition)**

1.4.7 A major incident is defined as:

*An event or situation with a range of serious consequences which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agency.*

- “Emergency responder agency” describes all category one and two responders as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004).
- A major incident is beyond the scope of business-as-usual operations, and is likely to involve serious harm, damage, disruption or risk to human life or welfare, essential services, the environment or national security.
- A major incident may involve a single-agency response, although it is more likely to require a multi-agency response, which may be in the form of multi-agency support to a lead responder.
- The severity of the consequences associated with a major incident are likely to constrain or complicate the ability of responders to resource and manage the incident, although a major incident is unlikely to affect all responders equally.
- The decision to declare a major incident will always be a judgement made in a specific local and operational context, and there are no precise and universal thresholds or triggers.
Declaring a ‘major incident’ triggers a predetermined response from some emergency service and other responder organisations. It takes time for operational structures, resources and protocols to be put in place. Declaring that a major incident is in progress as soon as possible means these arrangements can be put in place as quickly as possible.

A major incident may be declared by a single partnership organisation, or jointly. It is feasible that only one organisation may determine an emergency as a major incident based on the type of incident and scale of their resources required. This may not necessarily mean it is a major incident for all other organisations.

**Emergency**

1.4.8 An emergency is defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 as:

- An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK;
- An event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the UK; or
- War, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK.

**Coordination (JESIP definition)**

1.4.9 The integration of multi-agency efforts and available capabilities, which may be interdependent, in order to achieve defined objectives. Co-ordination occurs at one or more of three ascending levels Operational, Tactical and Strategic, with national level co-ordination in the most serious of emergencies.

Co-ordination involves commanders discussing resources and the activities of each responder agency, agreeing priorities and making joint decisions throughout the incident. Co-ordination underpins joint working by avoiding potential conflicts, preventing duplication of effort and minimising risk.

For effective co-ordination, one agency generally needs to take a lead role. To decide who the lead agency should be, factors such as the phase of the incident, the need for specialist capabilities and investigation, during both the response and recovery phases should be considered. There is specific guidance for some types of incidents, highlighting which agency should take the lead role. The decision on who takes the lead role should be documented – the lead agency may change as the incident develops.

The lead agency should chair co-ordinating meetings and make sure they take place regularly.

**London Resilience Partnership Guidance Documents**

1.4.10 London Resilience Partnership guidance documents have been created and approved by the London Resilience Forum (LRF) to provide frameworks for partner organisations to work to in response to specific incidents. A full list is at Appendix 1.
PART TWO - CORE FUNCTIONS

2.1 Core Function 1: Notification of Strategic Coordination Arrangements

2.1.1 In the event of a partner agency experiencing or having knowledge of a live or potential disruptive, critical major incident or emergency that may impact London or another partner organisation, then they should contact the London Resilience Group (LRG) duty manager (refer to Notification) to jointly:

- Assess the actual and/or potential impact of the incident
- Start to develop shared situational awareness - a common understanding of the circumstances, consequences and implications of the incident, along with an appreciation of the available capabilities and the priorities of responding organisations. Review the steps being taken to manage the situation, and any partnership assistance that may be required

2.1.2 The LRG duty manager may contact the Metropolitan Police Service Senior Officer on-call to discuss the option of a tripartite call.

2.1.3 The tripartite call enables discussion and assessment between the organisation raising the incident, the London Resilience Group and the on call MPS SC&O22 Senior Officer. A decision would then be taken on the appropriate coordination option to be activated – Refer to Core Function 2.2 – Coordination Options.

2.1.4 The LRG, MPS and organisation raising the issue will then make a decision about the level of coordination arrangements that should be activated.

2.1.5 Following the initial assessment of an incident the LRG duty manager may send an initial 'notification' holding message (using a mass-messaging system) followed by an email containing further information to inform partner organisations of the situation and confirmation that further information will follow.

2.1.5 The LRG duty manager will check that relevant organisations are aware including the London Local Authority Gold (LLAG). The LRG will seek further information about the incident by contacting relevant partner organisations concerned and seek to establish regular updates and lines of reporting.

2.1.6 If a Blue-lights (emergency services) Gold Coordinating Group is formed the chair should ensure LRG (on behalf of the partnership) and any other relevant partner organisations (e.g. the London Local Authority Gold (LLAG)) are invited dependent upon the nature of the incident.

2.1.7 If required, the LRG will then:

- Send a Common Operating Picture (COP) message via the London Situational Awareness Tool (LSAT), containing information relating to incident type, scale, impact, duration, coordination structure, timings of subsequent reports, and meetings – and any expectations for partner organisations
- Establish lines of communication with appropriate organisations including the Mayor’s Office, the London Resilience Communication Group, and the CSSC Hub, and request receipt of any MPS Strategic Briefing Cell (SBC) briefings (if established). Relevant information from the SBC will be used to inform the COP.
2.1.8 Upon notification of an incident all partner organisations should upload any relevant information to the LSAT to inform the COP. As a fall-back option information can instead be sent to [CONTENT REMOVED] or relayed to the LRG duty manager by telephone.

2.1.9 The dynamics of the incident may dictate that some or all of the above steps occur in a different sequence.

2.2 Core Function 2: Coordination

2.2.1 The immediate response to an incident will typically be run from the respective emergency service control rooms. In the event of an escalation following a tri-partite call a Gold Coordinating Group consisting primarily of the emergency services will be formed.

2.2.2 If the impact of the incident requires it, wider strategic level representation will be invited at the earliest opportunity. E.g. The LRG duty manager (who may attend on behalf of the partnership) and the LLAG. The MPS Special Operations Room (SOR) will typically be used to host this group.

2.2.3 The Chair will invite additional strategic level representation from appropriate partner organisations as necessary to maintain an effective coordinated strategic response. At this point the Blue-lights (emergency services) Gold Coordinating Group augments to become a Strategic Coordination Group (SCG), irrespective of its size.

2.2.4 The London Resilience Partnership has a number of coordination options available to suit the circumstances of the incident:

- **Level 1**: Monitor the situation and share information with selected partners
- **Level 2**: Achieve shared situational awareness across the partnership through production of a Common Operating Picture produced using the London Situational Awareness Tool (LSAT)
- **Level 3**: Partnership teleconferences for briefing and information sharing
- **Level 4**: Blue-lights (emergency services) Gold Coordinating Group teleconference or meeting
- **Level 5**: Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) teleconference or meeting
- Activation of a Strategic Coordination Centre
- Activation of partnership capabilities e.g.:
  - London Resilience Communication Group Emergency Plan
  - Science and Technical Advice Cell Arrangements
  - Recovery Management Protocol
  - Humanitarian Assistance Framework
2.2.5 Where strategic multi-agency direction is required to deal with a rapid onset emergency or in preparation for a rising tide event, the response may include establishing a Strategic Coordinating Group. The guiding principle of the membership of the SCG is one of inclusion rather than exclusion.

2.2.6 The formation of an SCG is not reliant on a Blue-lights (Emergency Services) Gold Coordination Group; it can come together at the request of any partner organisation. The SCG may initially be chaired by the MPS, but this may subsequently be handed over to the most appropriate organisation, depending on the nature of the incident.

2.2.7 The Strategic Coordinating Group is responsible for determining the strategic aim, objectives and priorities for the incident on behalf of London. The SCG will continue to meet throughout the response phase as long as there is a requirement, or until the group hands over to a Recovery Management Group or stands down. Some disruptive incidents may be of such short duration that there is limited scope for strategic coordination as the situation will be dealt with through the tactical and operational response.
Location of Strategic Coordinating Group meetings

2.2.8 Where the size and nature of the incident is greater than a conventional major incident or disruptive incident, it may be appropriate to convene immediate and full strategic representation from the London Resilience Partnership. This would be considered appropriate where, from the outset, it is apparent that there is the requirement for prolonged and significant strategic coordination.

2.2.9 The default location for hosting an SCG is Lambeth Police Headquarters (2nd floor). The primary fall-back location is LFB Headquarters, Southwark.

2.2.10 Additional potential locations to hold SCG meetings include a range of partnership premises, for example, the LFB London Operations Centre (London Local Authority Coordination Centre), Merton.

These other premises offer meeting space only and do not have dedicated Strategic Coordination Centre facilities designed for the purpose of hosting an SCG.

Composition of the SCG

2.2.11 The chair of the SCG, in consultation with the members, should initially define and then periodically review the composition and chair of the group. This is to ensure that the right partner organisations and expertise are represented throughout the lifecycle of the group. The suggested membership of a full Strategic Coordinating Group is at Appendix 2.

2.2.12 Representatives at the SCG must have the level of knowledge, expertise and authority to identify and commit the resources of their respective agency.

Emergency Powers

2.2.13 Should the Strategic Coordinating Group require emergency powers under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, the Group would request this through the Government Liaison Team (GLT).

Connectivity between Strategic, Tactical (pan-London) and On-Scene Coordination

2.2.14 It is imperative that there is strong connectivity and sharing of information between the different tiers of command within each organisation, and between the multi-agency strategic, tactical (pan-London) and on-scene coordination groups. This enables the strategic and tactical levels to be appraised of the situation at the incident scene in order to inform their decision making, and for direction to be set at the strategic level, tactical plans to be developed at the tactical level and then executed at the incident scene.

2.2.15 This connectivity should be achieved through sharing of information between multi-agency groups to ensure shared situational awareness, and within individual organisations command structures in order to discharge organisational responsibilities.

2.3 Core Function 3: Tactical Coordinating Group (pan-London)

2.3.1 For a live incident where pan-London strategic coordination is in place, there will be a requirement for pan-London tactical coordination to interpret strategic direction, develop tactical plans and co-ordinate activities and assets.

The MPS will utilise the Special Operations Room (SOR) at Lambeth HQ for a tactical meeting venue for a police run incident or operation. Such a meeting may be referred to as a Blue-light Tactical Coordinating Group and primarily involve emergency services tactical commanders or liaison officers, with other organisations invited to participate as required.
The pan-London Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG)\(^1\) will inform and support the strategic decision making process and should be attended by tactical decision makers from the emergency services and relevant partner organisations.

This section describes tactical coordination on a pan-London basis, and the TCG as a coordination body directly subordinate to the SCG. It should not be confused with tactical or operational coordination functions discharged to differing degrees by the emergency services and other organisations at the scene of an incident. To ensure clarity in discussions between partner organisations, the terms ‘pan-London tactical coordination’ and ‘on-scene coordination’ should be used to clearly differentiate between the functions being undertaken by different groups at different locations.

2.4 Core Function 4: On-scene Coordinating Group

2.4.1 The On-Scene Coordinating Group is located at, or close to, the scene of a major incident at an agreed location known as the Forward Command Post (FCP).

2.4.2 Multi-agency meetings of on-scene commanders are attended by the on-scene Incident Commanders as appointed by each emergency service and partner organisation. The composition of this group may include tactical commanders, operational commanders and liaison officers (e.g. Local Authority Liaison Officer) depending on individual organisations internal command structures and whether they exercise tactical command at the scene or from a remote location / control room.\(^2\)

2.4.3 Regardless of the designation given to roles of on-scene commanders by individual organisations, meetings of the On-Scene Coordinating Group at the FCP should be attended by the senior decision maker located at the scene for each organisation. This Group may include tactical commanders but should not be confused with a pan-London Tactical Coordinating Group meeting.

2.4.4 The On-Scene Coordinating Group may appoint multi-agency sub-groups of operational commanders assigned to coordinate specific functions, tasks, or geographical locations.

2.5 Core Function 5: Creating and Maintaining Shared Situational Awareness

2.5.1 A primary task for the members of the London Resilience Group, the multi-agency partnership and any subsequent coordinating group is to analyse and gain an understanding of ‘the situation’ and its wider implications across London and Partnership organisations. It is important to take into account all that is known or may be safely presumed about it, and achieve a state of shared situational awareness. The following questions will support this process:

1. What has happened?
2. What is happening now?
3. What is being done about it?

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\(^1\) The MPS may refer to this tactical meeting as a Silver meeting.

\(^2\) The London Fire Brigade tactical commander will be located where they can maintain effective tactical command of their operations, invariably they will be in attendance at or close to the incident scene. The Metropolitan Police Service tactical commander will be located remote from scene at the MPS Special Operations Room as part of the MPS pan-London tactical command facility. The London Ambulance Service tactical commander will be located remote from scene at the LAS Specialist Operations Centre where they can maintain effective tactical command of their on-scene and wider operations including casualty distribution.
4. What has not or is not happening, that you might otherwise have expected?

5. What are the likely impacts arising from this and the risks to the community, infrastructure and environment?

6. On the basis of the facts and your assessment of impacts and risks, what might happen in the future?

2.5.2 Shared situational awareness is a cognitive state, achieved through three mental processes. These are:

- **Perception**: identifying the facts of the situation
- **Comprehension**: understanding what this means and implies
- **Projection**: making judgements about potential outcomes and the future development of the emergency.

2.5.3 Situational awareness allows partners to move beyond knowing what is going on, towards an understanding of its significance and eventually to a “mental model” of the way the situation is likely to develop – so that challenges can be anticipated.

2.5.4 The acquisition and maintenance of shared situational awareness can help the coordinating group get ahead of the crisis, exert greater control over an unfolding and complex situation, and think and plan more coherently and purposefully.

2.5.5 Representatives of each agency must not only contribute to situational awareness and help shape it, they must also satisfy themselves that they agree with it.

2.5.6 Shared situational awareness will be documented through the creation of a Common Operating Picture using the London Situational Awareness Tool (LSAT). All partner organisations should upload their situational awareness information on LSAT. The London Resilience Group will oversee this process, set the reporting timeframes, and produce a COP to be shared with the partnership.

2.5.7 The Common Operating Picture (COP) should be available for scrutiny before any meeting or teleconference and is not normally subject to debate at the meeting itself unless it is necessary to add to or amend the information contained based on more recent information presented at the meeting.

2.5.8 Tools to help in developing a shared situational awareness can be found at Appendix 4.

2.5.9 The coordinating group should consider that:

- As emergencies evolve over time, the opportunity and resource to conduct situational awareness is more likely to be available.
- As time elapses, the failure to carry out recordable and structured analyses may become increasingly difficult to defend.
- A record of analysis based on auditable and commonly recognised tools is a powerful enabler of defensible decision-making.
2.6 Core Function 6: Determining Strategy, the Strategic Aim and Objectives

2.6.1 As situational awareness develops - a response strategy needs to be determined. The strategy then needs to be articulated in a useful aim that guides other and subordinate decision-makers, with objectives for different partner organisations to work towards collectively.

2.6.2 In determining the strategy consideration should be given to the end, the ways and the means:

- The desired **end-state**. This involves clarifying what a successful resolution of the emergency should look like. What do you want to have achieved?
- The general **ways** in which this should be achieved.
- The **means** required to bring it about.

2.6.3 By setting a joint strategy, leaders can ensure that subordinates and partners are working towards a common goal. This needs a **consensus** and acceptance across the range of contributing partner organisations.

2.6.4 The aim and objectives should be made explicit and disseminated to all decision-makers and their support staff. As with the current state of shared situational awareness, the strategy should be continuously reviewed to ensure that it remains appropriate.

2.6.5 The strategic aim should look beyond the immediate demands of the response and embrace the longer-term priorities of restoring essential services and helping to facilitate the recovery of the affected communities.

2.6.6 An example of a SCG partnership strategy:

**Strategic Aim**

*London Resilience Partnership will work together to coordinate an effective response to, and recovery from, the [incident name/type] for London’s communities and businesses.*

**Strategic Objectives**

1. **Save and protect life**
2. **Relieve suffering and provide humanitarian assistance**
3. **Provide conditions for a safe and secure London**
4. **Inform and reassure the public through communication and engagement**
5. **Minimise disruption to London’s infrastructure, communities and business**
6. **Manage resourcing to meet the response needs of the emergency and to maintain essential public services**
7. **Facilitate recovery and the return to normality**

*This strategy shall remain valid until it is revised by the SCG or until handover from response to recovery coordination.*

2.6.7 Further examples of multi-agency strategies can be found at Appendix 5.
2.6.8 Common objectives for responders that should be considered when devising the response strategy:

- saving and protecting human life;
- relieving suffering;
- containing the emergency – limiting its escalation or spread and mitigating its impacts;
- providing the public and businesses with warnings, advice and information;
- protecting the health and safety of responding personnel;
- safeguarding the environment;
- as far as reasonably practicable, protecting property;
- maintaining or restoring critical activities;
- maintaining normal services at an appropriate level;
- promoting and facilitating self-help in affected communities;
- facilitating investigations and inquiries (e.g. by preserving the scene and effective records management);
- facilitating the recovery of the community (including the humanitarian, economic, infrastructure and environmental impacts);
- evaluating the response and recovery effort; and
- identifying and taking action to implement lessons identified.

2.7 Core Function 7: Decision Making

“If not recorded at the time, the opportunity to capture your decision making fully, and your credibility along with it, will slip rapidly away”

Mark Scoggins, Solicitor Advocate

2.7.1 It is important to ensure that decisions are reasonable, defensible and recorded. There is no expectation that all decisions will, with hindsight, turn out to be correct. But there is a requirement that they are (and are seen to be) reasonable in terms of what was known at the time - as well as necessary, proportionate and legal. This implies the need to record decisions. A fully recorded decision should include at least:

- A summary of the issue
- The options that were considered
- The risks attached to them, and
- The rationale for the decision.

2.7.2 It is a shared function to ensure that decisions that the group is collectively responsible for are justified and recorded in this way. Administrative support to the SCG will be provided by London Resilience Group in conjunction with the lead response organisation, including the recording of actions and decisions and minutes of SCG meetings.

2.7.3 It is the responsibility of each partner organisation represented at the SCG to ensure that the strategy and decisions made by the group are promulgated within their organisation
in a timely manner and that actions are implemented as required. Decisions should also be shared with the pan-London Tactical Coordinating Group and individual organisations tactical commanders.

2.7.4 Having established situational awareness and an agreed strategy with an aim, and objectives, action needs to be determined:
- What do we need to do now?
- What do we need to find out?
- What do we need to do next?
- What do we need to communicate?
- What might we need to do in the future?

2.7.5 A key feature of leadership decision-making in crises and emergencies is the need for decisions to be made quickly, in conditions of uncertainty and before all the “required” information is available. This requires all members to make a conscious determination not to delay or defer decisions without very good cause.

2.7.6 Responders will naturally be concerned about whether or not they know enough to make a safe and effective choice, in the knowledge that it may be subject to scrutiny later. It should help them to refer back to the strategic aim and objectives and the common objectives for responders (see core function 6), noting that saving and protecting human life is the highest priority objective.
- The need for decisions to be reasonable and defensible at the time, rather than being driven by a concern with being “right”, when this assessment is only possible with hindsight
- More facts do not equal more (useful) information
- Making decisions is the **raison d'être** of a coordinating group

2.7.7 The collective use of a recognised decision making process, such as the Joint Decision Model (JDM), is a powerful supporting tool. It not only improves decision-making; it also lends credibility and authority to the result. It is organised around three primary considerations.

1. **Situation**: What is happening, what are the impacts, what are the risks, what might happen and what is being done about it? Having **situational awareness** is having an appropriate knowledge of these factors.

2. **Direction**: What end-state is desired, what is the aim and objectives of the crisis response and what overarching values and priorities will inform and guide this?

3. **Action**: What needs to be decided, and what needs to be done to resolve the situation and achieve the desired end state?

2.7.8 The JDM is shown below. Use of this common approach and trusted mechanism should boost the confidence of group members when they are tempted to delay vital decisions in the hope of more gaining more information.
2.8 Core Function 8: Liaising with Central and London Government

2.8.1 Liaison with Central Government is a key function of leaders, and especially the chair, within an SCG. It can be assumed that an emergency serious enough to warrant formation of a London SCG will provoke some level of central government interest and a requirement for information sharing. This may or may not escalate to the full activation of a cross-Government response and the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR).

Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR)

2.8.2 Where the nature of the emergency is such that it affects the business of a number of government departments, a collective response will be required, led by the Lead Government Department (LGD). Collective decision-making within central government is delivered through the Cabinet committee system and decision-making during emergencies follows the same structure. Due to the unpredictable nature of emergencies, the Government maintains dedicated crisis management facilities (COBR) and supporting arrangements which are activated in the event of a situation requiring central Government coordination.

Local to National Coordination

2.8.3 DCLG’s cross-government Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED) is responsible for providing the Government liaison function on resilience issues below the national level. RED works with local organisations to build resilience, to support Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) working together and, as appropriate, support the response to any emergency. This includes through assisting the exchange of information between responders in affected Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCGs) and with UK central government.
2.8.4 In an emergency, RED will immediately take steps to ensure that they can provide support to the local emergency response, where necessary and as appropriate. This could involve any or all of the actions below, depending upon the nature of the incident:

- establishing whether Strategic Coordinating Groups have been set up, or are on standby, then maintaining immediate lines of communication with them, including identifying whether there are likely to be issues arising or capability gaps emerging which may require central government support or input;

- deploying a Government Liaison Officer (GLO) once an SCG has been established, unless alternative arrangements have been agreed. In some cases such as a terrorist or nuclear emergency the Lead Department may deploy the GLO and DCLG will support as a consequence management Liaison Officer as part of a multidisciplinary Government Liaison Team;

- working with partners to identify priorities and providing advice to COBR and Lead Government Departments to support national discussions on the deployment of scarce resources across the affected area;

- facilitating mutual aid arrangements between LRFs;

2.8.5 Using the DCLG RED as the main point of contact reduces the risk of duplicated requests from different central government departments. Where required by the scale or duration of the emergency, the DCLG RED will draw on staff and expertise from across DCLG and other Government departments.

2.8.6 If deemed to be required, the COBR secretariat (undertaken by the Cabinet Office) will request participation of the London SCG chair (or nominated representative) in COBR meetings (either in person or via teleconference). The Mayor of London may also be invited to participate in COBR meetings.

Response Coordinating Group

2.8.7 DCLG RED might also convene a multi-SCG Response Coordinating Group (ResCG) where an emergency affects a number of neighbouring Strategic Coordinating Groups and would benefit from coordination or enhanced support. The ResCG will bring together appropriate representatives from local Strategic Coordinating Groups (e.g. the chair or Chief of Staff) where activated, or relevant organisations if an SCG has not been activated.

2.8.8 The role of the ResCG may vary depending on the nature of the emergency. However, it is likely to cover:

- developing a shared understanding of the evolving situation, including horizon scanning to provide early warning of emerging major challenges;

- assessing the emergency’s actual and/or potential impact;

- reviewing the steps being taken to manage the situation, and any assistance that may be needed/offered, including through facilitating mutual aid arrangements between SCG responders if required;

- ensuring an effective flow of communication between and across local and national levels, including reports to the national level on the response effort, to ensure that the national input is coordinated with the local effort;

- coordinating a coherent and consistent public message; and
identifying any issues which cannot be resolved at local level and need to be raised at national level, including advising on priorities and guiding the deployment of scarce resources across the area.

The Mayor of London and the Greater London Authority

2.8.9 In the event of any disruptive incident it is likely that the Mayor’s Office will require initial and regular information about the situation. This function will usually be carried out by the London Resilience Group in conjunction with the relevant lead response organisation(s), and by the Mayor’s Press Office. In addition, the Mayor may obtain specific advice at a senior level through the Mayor’s Advisory Group (MAG).

2.8.10 The Mayor will collaborate closely with the Strategic Coordinating Group, and where appropriate, central government. The Mayor may also be invited to attend meetings of COBR.

2.8.11 The Mayor of London has a key response role as the ‘voice of London’. The role of the Mayor is to support the operational response to an emergency in London by providing a unified statement – a “voice” for London. It will be the Mayor’s role to provide regional information and reassurance throughout the duration of the response and into the initial stages of the recovery phase – this role is complementary to, and in support of, local responders and operational spokespeople. In addition to press briefings, the Mayor’s Twitter feed (@MayorofLondon) may be used to communicate key information and reassurance messages.

2.9 Core Function 9: Obtaining Local Authority, STAC, AQC & Military Advice

London Local Authority Gold (LLAG)

2.9.1 Any disruptive incident occurring in London will by default occur within a, or across multiple, local authorities. Therefore it is vital that the London Local Authority Gold is notified at an early stage.

2.9.2 A London Local Authority Chief Executive is pre-nominated as London Local Authority Gold (LLAG). LLAG is empowered to represent and give undertaking(s) on behalf of London’s 32 Boroughs and the City of London Corporation.

2.9.3 The LLAG will also give early consideration to the wider recovery management issues and when appropriate recommend to the SCG Chair that, if not already convened, a Recovery Management Group is established in accordance with the principles set out in the London Recovery Management Protocol.

2.9.4 It is important to note that the executive empowerment of LLAG is in strict accordance with the Local Authority Gold Resolution, otherwise London Local Authority Gold can only act in an advisory capacity to the Strategic Coordinating Group.

Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)

2.9.5 Public Health England will activate a Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) at the request of the Gold/SCG Chair or on the advice of the Regional Director Public Health England London Integrated Region and Centre. STAC will provide a single point of scientific advice to the Gold /SCG on the scientific, technical, environmental and public health consequences of the incident. STAC will develop any advice to be given to the public on the health aspects of the incident and advice on actions to protect the public and environment. STAC will liaise with the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies
(SAGE) if activated to ensure a consistent scientific picture between London and Central Government scientific advice.

**Air Quality Cell (AQC)**

2.9.6 The Environment Agency, in consultation with Public Health England, will convene an Air Quality Cell in a major air pollution incident. The Met Office, Health and Safety Laboratories and Food Standards Agency may join this AQC. The AQC will be chaired by the Environment Agency and will meet virtually, unless the incident is of sufficient magnitude and duration that it needs to meet physically. It is represented at the Strategic Coordinating Group by the STAC chair.

**Strategic Advice Cell**

2.9.7 There may be a requirement for the SCG to request the formation of a group to consider a specific issue and to provide advice to inform SCG decision making. In many circumstances the STAC may be the most appropriate group to perform this function in terms of provision of scientific or technical advice. For other situations where the STAC is deemed not to be an appropriate structure or composition for the given task, the SCG may form a Strategic Advice Cell (SAC). Examples include the requirement for advice on the implications and prognosis of a cyber attack, space weather emergency, significant utilities or transport sector emergency. The SAC would be comprised of relevant experts for the situation who may be from organisations outside of the resilience partnership, and would be chaired by the most appropriate lead partner organisation as determined by the SCG.

**Military Assistance**

2.9.8 In the event of a situation with the potential to require military assistance, the London Joint Regional Liaison Officers should be engaged as soon as possible in the strategic coordination process. Initially this is to discuss any request or potential need for military support, what effect the military forces may be asked to achieve, and to start the planning process.

2.9.9 The support of the armed forces to civil authorities in the UK is officially termed Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA).

The role of the Ministry of Defence is concentrated on 2 main areas:

- Providing niche capabilities, which MOD needs for its own purposes and which would not be efficient for the rest of government to generate independently, for example Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD).
- Standing ready to support the civil authorities when their capacity is overwhelmed. The armed forces provide this support from spare capacity, so it is subject to the availability of resources, without affecting core MOD objectives. The MOD does not generate and maintain forces specifically for this task.

2.9.10 The provision of military assistance is governed by 4 principles. MACA may be authorised when:

- There is a definite need to act and the tasks the armed forces are being asked to perform are clear.
- other options, including mutual aid and commercial alternatives, have been discounted; and either
the civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one; or

the civil authority has all or some capability, but it may not be available immediately, or to the required scale, and the urgency of the task requires rapid external support from MOD.

2.9.11 As there are no standing military forces for these tasks, military support is not guaranteed. When military support is provided the civil authorities normally have to pay for it, in line with HM Treasury rules.

2.9.12 The armed forces can be brought in to deal with a range of situations including, but not limited to:

- natural disasters, helping people in severe weather situations, such as flooding, where there is a need to protect human life, property and alleviate distress
- network failure or disruption; animal disease outbreaks or public health epidemics; and public service related industrial disputes that affect our safety or security, or disrupt transport or communications links
- criminal or terrorist activity, providing specialist expertise in specific circumstances
- after a terrorist attack where armed military personnel may be deployed to locations usually guarded by armed police officers, to enable those officers to undertake other duties
- bomb disposal: known officially as ‘explosive ordnance disposal’; this can be related to terrorism, or involve unearthing a bomb from the Second World War
- UK waters: protecting our territorial waters, ports, ships and energy installations from terrorist attack, protecting fisheries, preventing drug or people smuggling
- UK airspace: detecting and deterring aircraft approaching UK sovereign airspace and protecting UK and NATO monitored airspace

2.10 Core Function 10: Public, Business and Media Information

2.10.1 This is a core function of the Strategic Coordinating Group. In fact, significant levels of media interest may be reason in itself for the activation of such a group.

2.10.2 The London Resilience Communication Group can form to support the SCG. Given the primacy of the media in the shaping of public perception, it is vital that public information strategies and content reflect, reinforce and (if necessary) defend the strategic aim.

2.10.3 In functional terms:

- Use any or all forms of media to get the required messages to the public including the business community, so that they know what is happening, what responders are doing and what they should do in the interests of their own safety
- Manage expectations on the part of the public as to what responders will be able to do for them and when
- Identify and articulate the “lines to take”; these represent the core message(s) that all partner organisations need to reflect and cohere with in their collective and separate interaction with the media
- Prepare and approve the content of key press releases and other major public announcements
- Hold press conferences and public meetings as appropriate, mindful of the different information needs of different groups and communities
- Ensure that what is being said in all forms of the media is monitored and, where appropriate, responded to credibly and robustly
- Make pro-active use of all forms of media wherever possible, to lead and shape the public debate. Social media is crucial here and central; it should not regarded as an “optional extra” in a communication strategy

2.10.4 In the event of an emergency the Mayor of London will act as the ‘voice of London’ in order to provide clear information and guidance.

**Cross-Sector Safety and Security Communications (CSSC)**

2.10.5 The Cross Sector Safety and Security Communications Project was set up to improve safety and security communications to London businesses during an incident. CSSC has two mechanisms for facilitating two-way communication between public authorities and the private sector; an email cascade system and a ‘bridge call’ system where direct, verbal updates can be given from public authority partners to a limited number of Industry Sector Leads (key representatives of industry groups). A small project team is responsible for the day to day development of the project and stand up as a ‘Hub’ to facilitate exchange and dissemination of information in an incident. The flow of information is designed to be two-way, so real time information can be fed back by businesses into the Hub to pass onto the authorities.

2.10.6 The CSSC Hub can be activated by the Police directly, or by other partners through the London Resilience Group.

### 2.11 Core Function 11: Facilitating Coordinating Group Meetings

2.11.1 There are several factors that need to be taken into account when determining the arrangements for coordinating group meetings and teleconferences. They include:

- The pace and tempo of the emergency;
- The urgency of tasks and objectives that have to be considered;
- The information and briefing needs of higher or lower tiers, which might impose deadlines on your own group’s programme;
- The need to establish a battle rhythm (frequency) of reporting and correct sequence of meetings;
- The time needed for subordinate tiers to actually deliver and report back on the objectives they have been given;
• Any practicalities, such as travel time for members and time for the situation cell and information managers to make sense of what is happening and manage the development of shared situational awareness;

2.11.2 The decision will involve a balance. There may be times of apparent urgency to meet, when a slight delay would give shared situational awareness a chance to resolve the issues for decision-makers. This is a leadership decision, and members should look to support and guide the chair.

2.11.3 The location of the group’s support activities and meetings is a key consideration. Communications, facilities and convenience are key elements of the choice. Proximity to the emergency is not. A template SCG agenda can be found at Appendix 3.

Secretariat support

2.11.4 The secretariat support for coordinating group meetings will be provided jointly by the lead response organisation and the London Resilience Group. The LRG is able to provide support including but not limited to:

• Information gathering, sharing, and the production of the Common Operating Picture via the London Situational Awareness Tool.

• Notification and alerts to the London Resilience Partnership.

• Administrative arrangements for meetings and teleconferences (e.g. invitations, preparation of paperwork, recording of actions, decisions and minutes).

2.11.5 Chairing and facilitating partnership teleconferences.

2.11.6 Where practicable the LRG will deploy staff to the primary strategic coordination / command location of the lead response organisation to enhance liaison and collaboration on the support functions required to facilitate, and coordinate the activities of, the SCG.

2.12 Core Function 12: Controlling and Capturing Financial Costs

2.12.1 The need for this is self-evident, and essentially represents the extension of good governance into emergency management. An appropriate audit trail will support attempts to recover funds after the emergency.

2.13 Core Function 13: Oversight of Internal Resilience and Safety Issues

2.13.1 The chair and members of a coordinating group need to anticipate and manage issues around business continuity management, health and safety and the general welfare of all responders – this includes the members of the SCG and their support staff.

2.13.2 This relates, of course, to the legal duty to provide a safe scheme of work (which is not abrogated in emergencies) and the common law duty of care. It also includes the professional duty to plan for continuity and sustainability of the response and business-as-usual.
2.14 Core Function 14: Recovery Management

2.14.1 Recovery should be considered at the outset of the coordinated response and should be reflected in the initial strategy.

2.14.2 The London Resilience Partnership has a dedicated protocol covering recovery - London Recovery Management Protocol. This protocol contains options for a coordinated, multi-agency approach to the development and subsequent implementation of a strategy aimed at rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the affected community following an incident.

2.14.3 Initially, during the response phase, a Recovery Management Group will sit in parallel with the SCG. Once the response phase of the emergency has passed, primacy for dealing with the consequences of the incident passes to the Recovery Coordination Group. This transfer of responsibility is a formal process and should be fully documented.

2.15 Core Function 15: Debriefing

2.15.1 The incident should be debriefed in line with the London Resilience Partnership Lessons Protocol, with learning fed back into plan and capability development, training and exercising processes.

2.15.2 The holistic lessons process is designed to ensure that all lessons impacting the London Resilience Partnership Strategy are identified and embedded into the culture of the Partnership and therefore it is important to ensure that all learning is collated and considered against Partnership documentation and activity. The lead for this will be the London Resilience Lessons Review Group, on behalf of the London Resilience Programme Board, but this is a priority for the whole Partnership, in order to enable London to be a resilient city.

2.15.3 The usual order of debriefs will be as follows:

   1. Individual agency debriefs
   2. Multi-agency Tactical debrief (where appropriate)
   3. Multi-agency Strategic debrief

2.15.4 Depending on the nature of the incident, it may be necessary for the SCG to undertake or commission a review of the response and recovery activity to date for the incident at hand in order to immediately inform the remainder of the response and recovery activity until conclusion of the incident.

2.15.5 All debriefs will be subject to disclosure rules and any investigations may dictate timings of debriefing procedures.
Appendix 1 - London Resilience Partnership Documentation and Capabilities

This appendix provides a list of the London Resilience Partnership emergency plans, frameworks and guidance documents. A short summary is provided for each generic and specific capability document. The full suite of documents is available on Resilience Direct.

**Generic capability documents**
1. Strategic Coordination Protocol
3. London Resilience Communication Group Emergency Plan
4. Recovery Management Protocol
5. Voluntary Sector Capabilities Document
6. London Local Authority Gold Arrangements

**Specific capability documents**
7. Science and Technical Advice Cell Arrangements
8. Humanitarian Assistance Plan
9. Mass Casualty Framework
10. Mass Fatalities Framework
11. Excess Deaths Framework
12. Mass Evacuation Framework
14. Structural Collapse Response and Recovery Framework
15. CBRN(E) Response Framework

**Risk specific documents**
16. Adverse Weather Framework
17. Strategic Flood Response Framework
18. Drought Response Framework
19. Pandemic Influenza Framework
20. Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Emergency Plans
21. Pipeline Safety Regulations (PSR) Emergency Plan
22. Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPIR) Plan

**Service disruption specific documents**
23. Power Supply Disruption Framework
24. Water Supply Disruption Framework
25. Disruption to Telecommunications for Responders Plan
26. Fuel Disruption Protocol
### 1. Strategic Coordination Protocol

**Coordination structure:** Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG)

**Lead organisation:** Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)

**Aim:** This protocol details the escalating strategic coordination arrangements for London’s response to a disruptive incident. This applies to a range of incidents including relatively frequent low-level disruptive events, major incidents as defined in the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles Joint Doctrine (Edition 2), and an emergency as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004.

**Core responsibilities (SCG):**
- The SCG will coordinate the partnership response to the incident. It will:
  - Create and maintain shared situational awareness.
  - Determine the multi-agency strategic aim and objectives.
  - Decide on actions to be taken and set priorities.
  - Liaise with central government.
  - Establish sub-groups as required. E.g. Scientific and Technical Advice Cell, Recovery Coordinating Group, Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group, London Resilience Communication Group.
  - Oversee provision of information to the public, businesses, and media.

### 2. London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Major Incident Procedure Manual

**Coordination structure:** Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG)

**Lead organisation:** Police

**Aim:** This manual provides summaries of the responses and responsibilities of each of the emergency services at the scene of a major incident, as well as an outline of the support role offered by local authorities and other agencies.

**Core responsibilities:**
- Rescue will most frequently be the prime function required of the emergency services.
  - Responsibility for the rescue of survivors lies with the London Fire Brigade (LFB).
  - The care and transportation of casualties to hospital is the responsibility of the London Ambulance Service (LAS).
  - Police will ease these operations by coordinating the emergency services, local authorities and other agencies.
  - The primary responsibility of the emergency services is the saving of life.

### 3. London Resilience Communication Group Emergency Plan

**Coordination structure:** London Resilience Gold Communication Group

**Lead organisation:** Metropolitan Police Service

**Aim:** This plan sets out the arrangements for co-ordinating strategic communications in support of the emergency operation, by ensuring that mechanisms and structures are in-place to share key messages with a particular audience and the wider public.

**Core responsibilities (LRCG):**
- Co-ordinating strategic communications in London during a major incident or emergency.
- Ensuring that mechanisms and structures are in-place to share key messages with a particular audience and the wider public.
- Establishment of a media centre (if required).

Coordination structure: Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG)

Lead organisation: Local authorities

Aim: This protocol details the arrangements for multi-agency pan-London recovery coordination. Recovery is the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency. This process is distinct from, but will usually overlap with, the response phase.

Core responsibilities (RCG):
The RCG is the strategic decision making body for the recovery phase, it determines, and ensures implementation of, the recovery strategy. During the response phase the RCG is a sub-group of the SCG. At a suitable phase the responsibility for multi-agency coordination will transfer from the SCG to the RCG. The RCG will:

- Agree a recovery strategy including communications, clean-up, health, welfare, economic and business recovery.
- Advise the SCG on matters relating to recovery.
- Undertake an impact assessment and develop and coordinate delivery of a recovery action plan.

5. Voluntary Sector Capabilities Document

Coordination structure: N/A

Lead organisation: N/A

Aim: This document aims to promote and raise awareness of the potential voluntary sector contribution within London. It provides an overview of the services that may be available from pan-London voluntary organisations.

Summary of available capabilities:

- Welfare services e.g. staffing of emergency centres
- Psychosocial aftercare e.g. befriending and counselling
- Spiritual care & religious services e.g. advice and guidance on dealing with bereavement
- Medical support e.g. support to the ambulance service, first aid posts
- Search & rescue e.g. water search & rescue, animal rescue
- Transport & escort e.g. transport of evacuees
- Communications e.g. telephone/radio operators, interpreters
- Documentation / admin. e.g. at reception centres, coordinating convergent volunteers
- Financial services e.g. establishing and administering a disaster fund
- Equipment & resources e.g. bedding, catering, ambulances, shelter, communications.

6. London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) Arrangements

Coordination structure: Strategic Coordinating Group

Lead organisation: Local authorities

Aim: The LLAG arrangements underpin the pan-London local authority emergency response. They empower a single local authority chief executive to act in the interest of the 33 London local authorities to deliver a coordinated local government response.

Core responsibilities (LLAG):

- Formulate strategy for the collective London local authority response.
- Participate in the SCG and ensure local authority input to the response strategy.
- Appoint the chair of the Recovery Coordinating Group.
Specific capability documents

7. Scientific & Technical Advice Cell (STAC) Arrangements

**Coordination structure:** STAC

**Lead organisation:** Public Health England

**Aim:** The STAC brings together technical experts operating under the direction of the SCG. The STAC will be expected to advise on issues such as the impact on the health of the responding organisations, the health of the population, public safety, environmental protection, and sampling and monitoring of any contaminants.

**Core responsibilities (STAC):**
- Provide a common source of scientific and technical advice to the SCG.
- Monitor and corral the responding science and technical community to deliver the SCG’s objectives and priorities.
- Pool available information and arrive at a common view on the scientific and technical merits of different courses of action.

8. London Humanitarian Assistance Framework

**Coordination structure:** Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG)

**Lead organisation:** Local authorities

**Aim:** To ensure that humanitarian care is delivered in an effective manner that meets the needs of those affected by major emergencies.

**Core responsibilities (HASG):**
- Determine the direction of the HA response, deploy key capabilities, coordinate and monitor the activities of the responders.
- Ensure that the needs of affected people are understood and met, consulting with communities and individuals as required.
- Ensure effective mechanisms exist for sharing of information.


**Coordination structure:** SCG overarching coordination, but direct coordination via NHS, LAS and other relevant organisations command and control arrangements

**Lead organisation:** NHS

**Aim:** The aim of this framework is to provide the agencies in the London Resilience Partnership with a framework to ensure that London has arrangements in place to support the management of incidents with a large number of casualties arising from a sudden impact incident (conventional attack). The aim of the NHS in a mass casualty incident is to ensure that the maximum numbers of those involved survive.

**Core responsibilities (NHS):**
- To identify requirements, maintain, or increase if necessary the capability of the essential and emergency services to sustain safe levels of service to the rest of London during a mass casualty incident.
- LAS: Deploy mass casualty vehicles to ensure adequate medical supplies at scene, gain approval for use and commence modified triage to ensure maximum survivor numbers.
- NHS England (London): Alert health Trusts, support the Emergency Bed Service and other NHS organisations in rapid discharge of acute patients to create bed capacity.
### 10. London Mass Fatalities Framework

**Coordination structure:** Mass Fatalities Coordination Group (MFCG)

**Lead organisation:** Coroner

**Aim:** To provide options for dealing with incidents involving large numbers of human fatalities. The plan may also be used in response to an incident overseas which calls for the identification and repatriation of large numbers of UK Nationals.

**Core responsibilities (MFCG):**
- Police Senior Identification Manager, Senior Investigation Officer and Coroner: Assess the potential number of fatalities and consider the complexity of the incident (i.e. condition of the victims, extent of disruption and whether multiple sites are involved).
- Coroner, SIO, SIM and Pathologist will set the policy and strategic framework for body recovery and identification.
- MFCG will select the most appropriate mortuary option to manage the incident.

### 11. London Excess Deaths Framework

**Coordination structure:** Excess Deaths Steering Group (EDSG)

**Lead organisation:** Local authorities

**Aim:** The purpose of this framework is to highlight the issues and arrangements required for dealing with excess deaths efficiently and effectively, with dignity and respect.

**Core responsibilities (EDSG):**
- To coordinate the management of excess deaths at the regional level, commissioning service delivery at the right level.
- Ensure that the deaths management process can cope with the increase in deaths.
- Maintain (and adapt if necessary) critical processes of the death management process throughout the incident, including provision of body storage capacity, registration and burial/cremation services.

### 12. London Mass Evacuation Framework

**Coordination structure:** Evacuation and Shelter Coordination Group (ESCG)

**Lead organisation:** Police (Metropolitan Police Service / City of London Police)

**Aim:** The aim of this Framework is to provide the London Resilience Partnership, and relevant responders in neighbouring LRFs, with a strategic framework and operational guidelines to support an evacuation of an area or areas of London. The ESCG will provide tactical, multi-agency coordination of the evacuation and shelter elements of incident response.

**Core responsibilities (ESCG):**
- Coordinate the overall evacuation of persons from places of danger to places of safety.
- Provide relevant information to self-evacuees and identify suitable transport for those who require assistance.
- Identify a traffic management strategy.

**Coordination structure:** Evacuation and Shelter Coordination Group (ESCG)

**Lead organisation:** Local authorities

**Aim:** The aim of this framework is to provide a strategic framework and operational guidelines to support the shelter of those persons evacuated from an area or areas of London. The ESCG will provide tactical, multi-agency coordination of the evacuation and shelter elements of incident response.

**Core responsibilities (ESCG):**
- Identify suitable locations for sheltering people ranging from:
  - Emergency Evacuation Centre (5,000+ persons)
  - Short Term Shelter (up to 5,000 persons)
  - Emergency Rest Centres (typically no more than 200 persons)


**Coordination structure:** Strategic Coordination Group

**Lead organisation:** Local authorities

**Aim:** The aim of this framework is to prepare, inform and guide the Partnership in response to Structural Collapse Response and Recovery. The primary objectives of the SCG strategy may include: ensuring safe rescue of trapped persons, facilitation of investigation, recovery of fatalities, removal and disposal of rubble, controlling environmental impacts.

**Core responsibilities:**
- LFB: Preservation of life, search & rescue, site stabilisation.
- MPS: Collation of evidence, Disaster Victim Identification.
- Local Authorities: Restoration, transportation, storage and disposal of rubble, and recovery.

## 15. CBRN(E) Response Framework

**Coordination structure:** Strategic Coordinating Group

**Lead organisation:** London Fire Brigade

**Aim:** This framework outlines the framework within which the London Resilience partner agencies would respond to a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, (Explosive) incident. It sets out the principles that govern the multi-agency response.

**Core responsibilities:**
- SCG: Ensure a coordinated multi-agency response to CBRN(E) incidents in London.
- Emergency services: First response, scene assessment, life saving actions, rescue and triage, decontamination, survivor management.
Appendix 2 - Representation at a full SCG meeting

**STRATEGIC COORDINATING GROUP (SCG)**

- **LOCAL AUTHORITIES**
  - London Local Authority Gold / Local Authority Chief Executive

- **POLICE**
  - Metropolitan Police Service City of London Police
  - British Transport Police
  - Ministry of Defence Police

- **GOVERNMENT LIAISON OFFICER**
- **FIRE**
- **AMBULANCE**
- **MILITARY**
- **MEDIA**
- **UTILITIES**
  - Transco
  - National Grid
  - Thames Water
  - BT
  - Other telecoms and utility providers

- **PUBLIC HEALTH ENGLAND**
- **ENVIROMENT AGENCY**
- **TRANSPORT**
  - Transport for London
  - Network Rail and TOCs
  - Port of London Authority
  - Airports

- **SCG Sub-Groups (as required)**
  - **Humanitarian Assistance (HASG)**
  - **Mass Fatalities (MFCG)**
  - **Recovery Management Group (RMG)**

- **COBR**
  - CHAIR (Police or agreed partner)

* RMG chaired by local authority

* STAC chaired by PHE
Appendix 3 - Template SCG Agenda

Date/Time: Location:

1 Any Urgent Business

2 Introductions
   - Including roles of representatives (who they are representing)
   - Actions from previous meeting

3 Situation Brief
   - Briefing by LRG on current situation
   - Common Operating Picture (COP) review (any additional points from partner organisations (to include community and business impacts)

4 Key Issues and Strategic Decisions
   - Set and/or review strategic aim and objectives
   - Options and tasking
   - Investigation – update (if applicable)
   - Interdependencies

5 Public communications
   - Briefing on media coverage (mainstream / social)
   - Communication / media strategy
   - Key messages
   - Specific audiences e.g. those impacted by the event, general messaging – across partnership, public and business

6 Report from SCG Sub-Groups
   - Recovery Coordination Group (LLAG / RCG Chair)
   - Others if activated e.g. HASG, STAC, MFCG

7 Reporting Rhythm (including arrangements for weekend)

8 Composition of the SCG

9 Organisational learning / debrief of events so far

10 Stand down arrangements / exit strategy (when appropriate)

11 Any Other Business
   - Date / time of next meeting
Appendix 4 - Models to develop situational awareness

The London Situational Awareness Tool (LSAT) is the primary means by which a Common Operating Picture will be produced to support shared situational awareness. The following models may assist in developing situational awareness.

**Impact analysis** - this is the process of assessing the impacts of the emergency across a range of factors.

- **Health**: Direct (fatalities, injuries) and indirect (strain on health services)
- **Social and welfare**: Evacuation, disruption of essential services, community tension, public disorder
- **Environmental**: pollution of land, water or air, damage to plants or animals
- **Economic**: National, London, local - direct and indirect e.g. financial markets
- **Political**: Central Government, GLA, Mayor’s Office, local authorities
- **Media**: Mainstream and social media profile and public communications
- **Organisational**: Implications for critical services of partner organisations
- **Legal** considerations
- **Ethical** considerations

**Deliberate challenge of assumptions** - All estimates, plans and arrangements are based on assumptions. Some may be safe and relatively reliable. Others may be more “load-bearing”, in that if they are wrong then so will be the choices based on them. Assumptions need to be identified, examined and challenged very carefully – especially in the multi-agency context where they may be made about the capability, capacity and operational tempo of partner organisations.

**Assessment of data and information** - A systematic, robust and clear-minded assessment of the accuracy, timeliness, completeness and relevance of information received will assist decision makers with the most reliable evidence base possible in the circumstances. Selective, careless or biased analysis of information (e.g. prioritising consistent or positive information over that which is dissonant or negative) will undermine the response as a whole. Particular questions and challenges to consider are:

- What is known, unclear, caveated and presumed?
- Are the criteria for these judgments established, clear and commonly understood?
- Does evidence from one source conflict with or corroborate that from other sources?
- Is there any anomalous evidence? If so, might it support a different interpretation/direction?
- What is unknown? What gaps in evidence or understanding can be identified?
- What steps are you taking to resolve uncertainties?
Appendix 5 - Examples of multi-agency strategy

Scenario: Fierce storms over a 24hr period, major wind damage, and surface water flooding, severe disruption to transport and utilities.

Strategic Aim: To work together to coordinate an effective emergency response, to preserve life, to minimise the impact on London communities and business, and aid the return to normality.

Strategic Objectives:
- To save and protect life
- To relieve suffering and provide humanitarian assistance
- To minimise the impact on, and provide support to, the community and businesses
- To maintain and restore essential services
- To maintain the health and safety of responders
- To provide information to the community to aid self-help
- To facilitate recovery and the return to normality

Scenario: Large fire at recycling depot in West London. Smoke plume is disrupting aviation from Heathrow Airport and the depot is adjacent to a Site of Special Scientific Interest.

Strategic Aim: To resolve the incident expediently, protect the community, the environment, and facilitate recovery and the return to normality.

Strategic Objectives:
- To save and protect life
- To protect the health, safety and welfare of responders
- To minimise the impact on the environment
- To minimise the impact on business and the community, and restore aviation services
- To provide information to the affected communities and businesses
- To support the return to normality

Scenario: Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack, multi-sited across London

Strategic Aim: To support the Partnership MTFA response, to preserve life, to minimise the impact on London’s community, and facilitate recovery and the return to normality.

Strategic Objectives:
- To save and protect life
- To implement the agreed joint operational plan for an MTFA incident.
- To maximise the safety of responders
- To facilitate investigations and inquiries (preserve evidence)
- To maintain continuity of essential service provision
- To provide information to London's communities and businesses
- To facilitate recovery and the return to normality
Appendix 6 - Recovery Strategy Template

The following generic template may be used to develop the initial recovery strategy:

**Strategic Aim**

- To support the community and businesses in their return to normality or a new normality.

**Strategic Objectives**

Depending on the incident, choose some/all of the following objectives to support your strategy and amend as necessary:

- Create a comprehensive overview of local and pan-London impacts by carrying out an impact assessment for the community, built environment and businesses.
- Determine possible funding streams and provide funding to the impacted community.
- Establish effective communication links with the affected community and ensure the community is fully involved and participating in the recovery process.
- Establish close links with central, regional and local government where appropriate and maintain these throughout the recovery process.
- Develop a concise and realistic recovery Action Plan that can be quickly implemented, involves all organisations and fits the needs of the emergency.
- Ensure all organisations work closely with the community and those directly affected, including on monitoring and protection of public health.
- Reinvestate the built environment.
- Coordinate environmental protection and recovery issues.
- Establish a pro-active and integrated framework of support to businesses and others on the financial and commercial implications of the emergency.
- Coordinate information and media management of the recovery process with an adequate communication strategy.
- Determine if there is an opportunity to enhance the resilience of the area (physical and social).
- Reduce the risk of a similar incident occurring again.

**Targets**

Utilising the impact assessment and action plan, you can set additional targets/milestones to measure the progress of recovery. E.g.:

- Utilities are fully functional
- Transport infrastructure is running normally
- Local businesses are trading normally
- Residential issues are fully resolved