

# **London Strategic Coordination Protocol**

Version 8.7, October 2020

London Resilience Partnership Strategic Coordination Protocol	
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**LONDON RESILIENCE GROUP**

The London Resilience Group is jointly funded and governed by the Greater London Authority, London Local Authorities and the London Fire Commissioner. We are hosted by the London Fire Brigade. Our work, and that of the London Resilience Partnership, is overseen by the London Resilience Forum.

## Strategic Coordination Protocol – Version 8.7 (October 2020)

Section A of this document highlights the key information within the Strategic Coordination Protocol for use by relevant officers to inform their response activity. For further guidance, supplementary and reference information is contained in Section B.

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## Section A: Strategic Response Arrangements

### 1. Definition

#### Definition / Purpose

- 1.1. This protocol describes the escalating strategic coordination arrangements for a multi-agency response to an emergency or major incident in London. The protocol may also be used as the basis for the coordination of other incidents such as public order operations and major events. It is complimentary to the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LES�P) Major Incident Procedure Manual, which describes the arrangements for operational and tactical coordination, and the roles and responsibilities of each of the emergency services and other responders at a Major Incident. It should be used in order to facilitate an efficient, effective and coordinated joint response to incidents of varying levels of severity and scale.

#### Trigger Levels

- 1.2. The principles and core functions of this protocol are deliberately flexible. They are neither prescribed or subject to specific tipping points or trigger criteria, as decisions will be taken based upon the scale and nature of the incident, public perception and/or outrage, impact and consequences.

#### Audience

- 1.3. This Protocol is intended for the nominated representatives of organisations across the London Resilience Partnership, who are tasked with managing the strategic response to major incidents for their respective organisations. It is also aimed at civil contingencies, resilience and emergency planning personnel and other advisors who may provide advice to strategic level representatives during emergencies or major incidents.

### 2. Action Checklist

PERIOD FROM INITIAL RESPONSE TO INITIAL SCG MEETING		Date / time completed
No.	Action	
1	<p>Partnership organisation raising the situation to notify the London Resilience Group (LRG) to consider the need for strategic coordination arrangements.</p> <p><i>Note: For relevant incidents including declared major incidents, a tactical level tri-service phone call will have already taken place between emergency service control rooms. Discussions may also take place between other responding organisations depending on the nature of the incident.</i></p> <p><i>Note: The London Situational Awareness Team (LSAT) may identify and notify LRG of a known or potential major incident.</i></p>	
2	<p>LRG to contact the lead responder organisation (the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) by default) to undertake a joint assessment of the situation. Where necessary this assessment should be undertaken in conjunction with the organisation raising the incident via a tripartite phone call.</p>	
3	<p>Lead responder organisation to determine the necessary partnership coordination arrangements in consultation with LRG and other relevant organisation(s).</p> <p>Consider level of coordination and response, including using teleconferences or convening a physical meeting (see Section A, part 4 for levels of coordination).</p>	

<b>4</b>	<p><b>a)</b> If an SCG meeting is convened; lead responder organisation to appoint an appropriate, suitably trained SCG Chair who should, where possible, be a separate person to their organisation’s strategic commander / SCG representative. This will usually be the MPS for the initial SCG meeting in a fast-time incident.</p> <p><b>b)</b> If an SCG meeting is not convened; lead responder organisation and LRG to share information about the incident with the Partnership using email and/or the London Situational Awareness System (LSAS) as required.</p>	
<b>5</b>	<p>Lead organisation to determine invitation list for SCG meeting, in consultation with LRG. Invitation list to be kept under review for each subsequent SCG meeting.</p> <p>The invitation to an SCG will usually include <b>all</b> Category One responders and relevant Category Two responders. London Resilience Partnership Sector Panels (Business, Faith, Utilities, Voluntary), will only be invited to an initial SCG if their input is specifically pertinent to the incident.</p>	
<b>6</b>	<p>Lead organisation and LRG to agree SCG secretariat arrangements including notification of organisations invited to the SCG meeting. Notification for an SCG should follow, and is not intended to replace, operational and tactical level notifications.</p>	
<b>7</b>	<p>LRG and lead organisation to confirm that relevant partnership organisations are aware of the SCG meeting arrangements and will participate in the initial SCG meeting. LRG to also send a notification email to all partnership organisations for information only.</p>	
<b>8</b>	<p>Partnership organisations not invited to the first or subsequent SCG meetings to request attendance at SCGs where they believe this is required. Requests to be reviewed by the SCG Chair, in consultation with LRG.</p>	
<b>9</b>	<p>Lead organisation must ensure METHANE report has been shared with relevant partners, including LRG, upon notification of an incident (LRG can support dissemination).</p> <p>The sharing of a METHANE report will typically happen between operational and tactical commanders and control rooms. It should also be shared via email and/or using LSAS prior to the first SCG. Updates to the initial METHANE report should be shared in the same way.</p>	
<b>10</b>	<p>LRG or lead organisation to establish an incident on the London Situational Awareness System (LSAS) and invite partnership organisations to contribute to a Common Operating Picture (COP). Where time permits, relevant partners will contribute to the COP prior to the initial SCG meeting.</p> <p>All relevant partnership organisations should continue to update their section on LSAS from this point onwards, including in advance of subsequent SCG meetings.</p> <p>LRG to seek to provide regular updates for all partnership organisations using a combination of LSAS and email from this point onwards.</p>	
<b>11</b>	<p>Lead organisation, with support from LRG, to develop and agree an initial strategy for the incident (see Section A, part 7, to be reviewed and confirmed by partners at the first SCG meeting).</p>	
<b>12</b>	<p><b>Hold initial SCG meeting or teleconference. Decision Log must be started.</b></p>	

<b>13</b>	Ensure relevant SCG sub-groups are identified and activated during the first SCG meeting (see action number 5). This will usually include a pan-London Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG), the London Resilience Communication Group (LRCG) and Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG).	
<b>14</b>	LRG and lead organisation to circulate SCG actions and decisions (either full or redacted, as appropriate) to all organisations involved in the incident response, or that may have a genuine need to know.	
<b>15</b>	Lead and other relevant organisations to disseminate strategy and actions set by the SCG to appropriate tactical staff, including to the pan-London TCG where this has been established.  A system should be put in place to monitor progress and seek periodic updates on the implementation of strategy by the TCG and other relevant SCG sub-groups.	
<b>ONGOING RESPONSE</b>		
These issues may be considered at the initial or subsequent SCG meetings depending on the circumstances of the incident.		
<b>1</b>	SCG to activate relevant sub-groups and cells to coordinate all aspects of the incident and maintain strong reporting lines with each sub-group or cell.	
<b>2</b>	SCG to review which organisation is best suited to chair further SCGs depending on the type of incident.	
<b>3</b>	SCG to review which partnership organisations should be involved in further SCG meetings.	
<b>4</b>	SCG to ensure that NHS England and NHS Improvement (London) lead on casualty figures information and the Coroner leads on fatality figures (disseminated via/in conjunction with the lead police service for the incident).	
<b>5</b>	SCG to consider community engagement and key messages for those affected, businesses and the wider public (see Section B, part 10) - consider activation of LRCG).	
<b>6</b>	Lead organisation and LRG to ensure key information is shared with all relevant partnership organisations via email, LSAS and other means as required.	
<b>7</b>	LRG and lead organisation to record and track actions and decisions, reporting progress to SCG meetings as appropriate.	
<b>8</b>	SCG to anticipate and manage issues around business continuity management, health, safety and general welfare of all responders; this includes the members of the SCG and their support staff. These issues should be considered in terms of personnel welfare and continued resilience of command and coordination functions.	
<b>9</b>	Monitor the implementation and successful delivery of strategic objectives.	
<b>10</b>	Monitor and record financial expenditure committed on behalf of SCG to support SCG Chair.	

HANDOVER / STAND-DOWN CHECKLIST		
1	Engage with all sub-groups to ensure they have achieved their aim and objectives, and/or to clarify how any outstanding work will be coordinated. Include timeframes for completion.	
2	Ensure that a formal handover agreement is in place between the SCG and RCG. Handover to recovery should be agreed at the final SCG meeting and the formal handover agreement should be signed by the SCG and RCG Chairs.	
3	Collect initial learning points during the final SCG and arrange for a hot debrief to take place within 7 days of the incident.	
4	Where an incident response is concluded without handover to the RCG, a formal stand-down message should be issued to the London Resilience Partnership at the end of the incident. This message should contain information about the formal stand down of the response and details of how any ongoing activity will continue to be coordinated (e.g. a single agency lead organisation).	

### 3. Notification and Activation Process

- 3.1. The notification and sharing of information between London Resilience partners does not in itself mean a multi-agency coordinated response is automatically necessary. Experience shows that on the majority of occasions the sharing of information will be the only action required.
- 3.2. If a Blue-lights (emergency services) Gold Coordinating Group is formed the chair should ensure LRG (on behalf of the Partnership) and any other relevant partner organisations (e.g. the London Local Authority Gold (LLAG)) are invited dependent upon the nature of the incident.

#### Notify the London Resilience Group

Any partner organisation experiencing or having knowledge of a potential disruptive, major incident or emergency should contact the London Resilience Group Duty Manager to jointly assess the situation to determine the level of strategic coordination required.

To notify the London Resilience Group of an incident contact the LRG Duty Manager:

- Telephone London Fire Brigade Control.
- Request to page the 'London Resilience Group Duty Manager'. Provide your name, role, organisation and contact number.

The London Resilience Group Duty Manager will call back within 30 minutes.

For any incident led by the MPS, this notification will be performed by the MPS MO6 on-call Emergency Preparedness Advisor.

- 3.3. There may be occasions when organisations within the Partnership identify events or situations which do not satisfy the definition of a 'major incident' or 'emergency' but do, however, show potential to cause significant disruption to the people or infrastructure of London and may, therefore, require a coordinated response. In these cases, the process set out in Section 3 should be followed.
- 3.4. Should LRG or a Partnership organisation need to contact the MPS to share information about a significant event or situation that does not obviously merit the activation of this protocol, they can phone a dedicated number (**Operation Ringmain** – see separate policy) to make contact with a relevant senior officer of the MPS 24/7. Other organisations such as

the City of London Police (CoLP) and the British Transport Police (BTP) may have similar procedures for events or situations that relate to their jurisdictions. Emergency contact details for this are in the Partnership Contacts Directory.


- 3.5. If necessary, the MPS, CoLP or BTP will then ensure that the LRG are informed of the incident so a tri-partite call can take place to make a decision on whether invoking the strategic coordination arrangements are required for the event/situation. If required, LRG will invoke the arrangements as described in this protocol.

## 4. Response Structure and Coordination

- 4.1. 'Command', in this protocol, is recognised as a single-agency function. The focus of this protocol is coordination of the multi-agency management of an incident, including creating and maintaining shared situational awareness and determining a joint strategy.
- 4.2. A **Strategic Commander** for each organisation is responsible for formulating the strategy for their organisation's role in the incident. The Strategic Commander retains overall command of their resources but delegates tactical decision making to their Tactical Commander. Any recorded strategy and rationale should be continually monitored and subject to ongoing review.
- 4.3. **Tactical Commanders** are responsible for formulating the tactics to be adopted by their organisation to achieve the strategy set by their strategic commander. They should make every effort to achieve the closest coordination with counterparts in other organisations by meeting regularly, ideally face to face, and sharing information at the earliest opportunity.
- 4.4. **Operational Commanders** control and deploy the resources of their respective organisation within a geographical or functional area, to implement the tactics formulated by their Tactical Commander.
- 4.5. The levels of strategic coordination are as follows\*:
- **Level 1** Monitor the situation and share information with selected partners via email / use of the London Situational Awareness System as requested / required
  - **Level 2** Partnership teleconference for briefing and information sharing
  - **Level 3** Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) teleconference or meeting

\* A Blue-lights (emergency services) Gold Coordinating Group teleconference or meeting may take place, separate to the SCG arrangements, and information from any such teleconference will be fed into the SCG via situational updates from blue-light services.

**FIGURE 1.** Full multi-agency coordination and information sharing structure: COBR, ResCG, SCG, example SCG sub-groups, TCG, and Local Strategic Partnership Group (not all groups will be stood up for every incident)



Multi-agency coordination

Information sharing only

Connecting lines are multi-agency, not single agency command structures which may differ. The Local Strategic Partnership Group (LSPG) has no connectivity with the Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) or incident scene. While informal conversations may take place within individual organisations, care should be taken to avoid undue intrusion into command and coordination structures.

\*<sup>1</sup> Incident commanders or equivalent representatives should form a coordinating group at the Forward Command Post (FCP).

4.6. Where strategic multi-agency direction is required to deal with a rapid onset emergency or in preparation for a rising tide event, the response may include establishing a Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG). The guiding principle of the membership of the SCG is one of inclusion rather than exclusion.

## Important points regarding SCGs

- ✓ A SCG can form at the request of any partner organisation.
- ✓ The SCG is responsible for determining the strategic aim, objectives and priorities for the incident on behalf of London. The SCG will continue to meet throughout the response phase as long as there is a requirement, or until the group hands over to a Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG) or stands down.
- ✓ The SCG should be chaired by the most appropriate agency, depending on the nature of the incident. Initially, the MPS will chair as default. This may change as the incident progresses.
- ✓ The SCG is not a legal entity in itself and does not have the legal power to direct members. The Group will however, in general terms, accept direction set by the chair.
- ✓ All forms of multi-agency strategic level meetings will be referred to as 'Strategic Coordinating Groups' (SCGs).
- ✓ Two levels of multi-agency coordination operate beneath the SCG: the Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) and on-scene coordination at the Forward Command Post (FCP).
- ✓ The formation of an SCG is not reliant on a Blue-lights (Emergency Services) Gold Coordinating Group; it can come together at the request of any partner organisation.
- ✓ Some incidents may be of such short duration that there is limited scope for strategic coordination as the situation will be dealt with through the tactical and operational response structures.

## Composition of the SCG

- 4.7. The chair of the SCG, in consultation with the members, should initially define and then periodically review the composition and chair of the group. This is to ensure that the right partner organisations and expertise are represented throughout the lifecycle of the group. The suggested membership of a full SCG is illustrated in the Figure 2 below. The SCG can invite further individuals or groups where the need arises.
- 4.8. Representatives at the SCG should have the level of knowledge, expertise and authority to identify and commit the resources of their respective agency.

## Chair of the SCG

- 4.9. The chair is required to provide leadership for the partnership response, and must think beyond their own organisational aims and culture.
- 4.10. The chair of a multi-agency coordinating group does not command the assets of other organisations. Their role is to convene the necessary partner agencies in order to deliver a holistic and thorough response to an incident. They exert influence and achieve consensus without constitutional authority. This may require strong leadership ability.
- 4.11. The SCG may initially be chaired by the MPS, but this may subsequently be handed over to the most appropriate agency, depending on the nature of the incident. A cadre of officers from partnership organisations will be available to fulfil the role of SCG Chair. The

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SCG Chair should be appointed based on the most appropriate partner organisation for the specific incident. They should act as an impartial chair, and where possible, their organisation or sector represented separately on the SCG.

- 4.12. While best practice may be for the chairing organisation to be separately represented on the SCG, this can be difficult to achieve. For example, in response to a spontaneous incident that occurs in unsocial hours, organisations may not be able to immediately resource both roles. In addition, having multiple qualified or appropriate level representatives at an SCG may negatively impact depth and resilience of command for the lead organisation when responding to protracted incidents.




Figure 2. Composition of a complete Strategic Coordinating Group, with common sub-groups

## 5. SCG Sub Groups and other groups to be considered

SCG Sub Group	Purpose	Lead
Tactical Coordinating Group (pan-London)	<p>For an incident where pan-London strategic coordination is in place, there will be a requirement for pan-London tactical coordination to interpret strategic direction, develop tactical plans and coordinate activities and assets.</p> <p>The MPS will normally use a dedicated tactical command facility to host a TCG for a police-run incident or operation. Such a meeting may be referred to as a Blue-light Tactical Coordinating Group and primarily involve emergency services tactical commanders or liaison officers, with other organisations invited to participate as required.</p>	Emergency Services

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	<p>The pan-London Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) will inform and support the strategic decision making process and should be attended by tactical decision makers from the emergency services and relevant partner organisations.</p> <p>This meeting may also be referred to as a Silver meeting.</p>	
London Resilience Communication Group (LRCG)	<p>The MPS is the lead organisation for coordinating strategic communications in support of the incident, by ensuring that mechanisms and structures are in place to share key messages with a particular audience and the wider public. The LRCG emergency plan outlines the coordination arrangements for public communications during an incident.</p>	Metropolitan Police Service
Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG)	<p>Initially, during the response phase, an RCG will sit as a sub-group of the SCG. Once the response phase of the emergency has passed, primacy for dealing with the consequences of the incident will pass to the RCG. This transfer of responsibility is a formal process and should be fully documented. The London Recovery Coordination Framework contains options for a coordinated, multi-agency approach to the development and subsequent implementation of a strategy aimed at rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the affected community following an incident.</p>	Local Authorities
Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG)	<p>Local Authorities will lead the HASG to ensure that humanitarian care is delivered in an effective manner that meets the needs of those affected by major emergencies. This group will determine the direction of the humanitarian response, deploy key capabilities, coordinate and monitor the activities of the responders and ensure that mechanisms for sharing information are in place.</p>	Local Authorities
Mass Fatality Coordination Group (MFCG)	<p>The Coroner will lead the MFCG in order to provide options for dealing with incidents involving large numbers of human fatalities. This function may also be used in response to an incident overseas which calls for the identification and repatriation of large numbers of UK Nationals. The MFCG will assess the potential number of fatalities and complexity of the incident, and select the most appropriate mortuary option to manage the incident and identify the deceased.</p>	Coroner
Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) and Air Quality Cell (AQC)	<p>Public Health England (PHE) London region will activate a STAC at the request of the Gold / SCG Chair or on the advice of the Regional Director PHE London Integrated Region and Centre. The STAC will provide a single point of scientific advice to the Gold/SCG on the scientific, technical, environmental and public health consequences of the incident. The STAC will develop any advice for the public on the health aspects of the incident and advice on actions to protect the public and environment. Please see STAC guidance for further information.</p> <p>The Environment Agency, in consultation with PHE, will convene an AQC in a major air pollution incident. The Met Office, Health and Safety Laboratories and Food Standards Agency may join the AQC. The AQC will be chaired by the Environment Agency and will meet virtually, unless the</p>	<p>Public Health England</p> <p>Environment Agency</p>

	incident is of sufficient magnitude and duration that it needs to meet physically. It is represented at the SCG by the STAC chair.	
Transport Sector Cell	<p>The Transport Sector Cell will provide single cell representation from the Transport Sector to the SCG, where appropriate. Circumstances may require additional agencies to attend the SCG in addition to the Transport Cell representative.</p> <p>The Transport Cell may be activated at the request of the SCG Chair or at the request of a standing member of the Transport Cell to the TfL Gold Commander. The Transport Cell may be co-located at the Network Management Control Centre (Southwark) or conduct business virtually.</p> <p>The Transport Cell enables shared situational awareness, enhances communications and interoperability in the sector and will provide a collective position on impacts and risks to the Transport Sector at the SCG.</p>	Transport for London
Site Management Group	The majority of site clearance activity is likely to take place during the recovery phase. At an early stage, and ideally from the outset of an incident, an RCG and a subordinate site clearance cell should be established to start planning the required arrangements for removal of rubble, debris and other materials.	Local Authority
Cyber - Technical Advice Cell (C-TAC)	<p>A C-TAC should be formed following identification of a sudden-onset (no-notice) or rising-tide (intelligence-led) cyber emergency or significant cyber incident.</p> <p>The purpose of the C-TAC is to ensure that, as far as possible, technical advice and guidance to the SCG (and others involved in the response) is clear and not conflicting. It will do this by coordinating technical discussions to ensure that advice given is the best possible based on the available information in a timely, coordinated and understandable way.</p>	Lead response organisation / organisations
Evacuation and Shelter Coordinating Group (ESCG)	The ESCG will provide central, multi-agency coordination to a large scale / mass evacuation and to meeting shelter requirements. The purpose of the ESCG is to provide a single point of multi-agency coordination at an appropriate tactical level.	Police
Excess Deaths Management Group (EDMG)	The aim of the EDMG is to coordinate the management of excess deaths at the regional level, commissioning service delivery and implementing necessary contingency options as appropriate. It will provide a tactical and strategic response in dealing with high levels of deaths across the capital, particularly on matters that involve coordinated joint working across the organisations with both private and public stakeholders, as well as monitoring and increasing capacity and resources.	Local Authorities
Multi-Agency Information Cell (MAIC)	Emergency responder organisations should support tactical and strategic coordinating groups, when they are activated, by managing information and forming a common operating picture. This capability is known in national doctrine as a	Lead response organisation with support

	<p>multi-agency information cell (MAIC).</p> <p>A core function of the MAIC is to produce the common operating picture that will inform and support the SCG, TCG and other responders.</p> <p>The MAIC may come together in either a physical, co-located form, or virtually. It should be able to source, access, analyse, display and disseminate situational information, drawing on information and expertise from many sources. Both co-located and virtual arrangements for a MAIC should make use of a wide range of information systems to support shared situational awareness, such as the London Situational Awareness System (LSAS), other data sources or social media.</p> <p>A MAIC will not need to be established at the start of every incident involving a TCG and SCG, but the multi-agency response to complex and/or protracted incidents should be supported with a MAIC.</p> <p>The LSAS provides for the production of a Common Operating Picture (COP) through the contribution of information from partner organisations (see also Section 6). This provides the core functionality of a virtual MAIC. For more complex and/or protracted incidents the SCG may activate a physical or virtual MAIC to lead on situational awareness.</p>	<p>from LRG</p>
<p>London Situational Awareness Team (LSAT)</p>	<p>The London Situational Awareness Team (LSAT) provides a 24-hour monitoring, reporting, incident response and liaison function to the GLA. The primary purpose of the team is to deliver fused, timely and extensive actionable intelligence about events in London (or which effect London) to support the Mayor, Authority, and partner's information requirements as BAU. In case of a major incident LSAT is responsible for supporting the Mayor's Gold Cell and Mayoral involvement in COBR.</p>	
<p>Response Coordinating Group (ResCG)</p>	<p>MHCLG Resilience &amp; Emergencies Division (RED) may convene a multi-SCG ResCG where an emergency affects a number of neighbouring SCGs and would benefit from coordination or enhanced support. The ResCG will bring together appropriate representatives from local SCGs (e.g. the SCG Chair or Chief of Staff) where activated, or relevant organisations if an SCG has not been activated.</p> <p>The role of the ResCG may vary depending on the nature of the emergency, but is likely to cover:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Developing shared understanding of the situation, providing early warning of emerging challenges</li> <li>• Assessing the emergency's actual and/or potential impact</li> <li>• Facilitating mutual aid arrangements between SCG responders if required</li> <li>• Ensuring effective flow of communication between local and national levels, to ensure that the national input is coordinated with the local effort</li> </ul>	<p>MHCLG</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Coordinating a coherent and consistent public message</li> <li>• Identifying any issues which cannot be resolved at local level and need to be raised at national level.</li> </ul>	
Local Strategic Partnership Groups (LSPG)	<p>LSPGs may be formed at the borough level where deemed to be required by local organisations to provide a mechanism for strategic level engagement and information sharing. This may include local political engagement.</p> <p>There will be no formal coordination or information sharing link between an LSPG and the Forward Command Post or Tactical Coordinating Group.</p> <p>Multi-agency information sharing should occur between the London SCG and borough level LSPGs, but this is not a line of multi-agency coordination.</p>	

5.1. In addition to the aforementioned sub-groups, there are a number of further resources outlined in Section 6 below.

## Other response frameworks and plans to consider include:

### Service disruption specific

1. Disruption to Telecommunications for Responders Plan
2. Fuel Disruption Protocol
3. Power Supply Disruption Framework
4. Water Supply Disruption Framework

### Risk specific

5. Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Off-Site Emergency Plans
6. Drought Response Framework
7. Pandemic Influenza Framework
8. Pipeline Safety Regulations (PSR) Emergency Plan
9. Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPiR) Plan
10. Severe Weather and Natural Hazards Framework
11. Strategic Flood Response Framework

### Capability specific

12. Cyber Incident Response Framework
13. CBRN(e) Response Framework
14. Mass Casualty Framework
15. Mass Evacuation Framework (Evacuation and Shelter Coordinating Group)
16. Mass Shelter Framework (Evacuation and Shelter Coordinating Group)
17. Structural Collapse Response and Recovery Framework (Site Management Group)

### Generic capability documents

17. Voluntary Sector Capabilities Document

## 6. Resources and Support Available

Resource / Support	Description	Provider(s)
<b>SCG meeting facilities</b>	During the first 24-36 hours following the activation of an SCG, the MPS will use a dedicated command facility for the physical location of an SCG, and this includes teleconferencing facilities. Other organisations may alternatively provide a meeting location and facilities. Remote working and other virtual options can also be used. MPS facilities or other facilities provided by the City of London Police (CoLP) may be used for incidents in the City of London.	Metropolitan Police Service
<b>Secretariat support</b>	<p>The secretariat support for SCG meetings will be provided jointly by the lead response organisation and the LRG. The LRG is able to provide support including but not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Information gathering, sharing, and the production of the COP via LSAS.</li> <li>• Notification and alerts to the London Resilience Partnership.</li> <li>• Administrative arrangements for meetings and teleconferences (e.g. invitations, preparation of paperwork, record of actions, decisions and minutes).</li> <li>• Minutes for SCG meetings will, as a minimum, provide actions and decisions with rationale where stated in the meeting.</li> <li>• An initial record of actions and decisions may be circulated with pertinent situational information. A fuller set of minutes will follow later for sign off and be retained for future information and audit purposes.</li> <li>• Each responding organisation is responsible for the provision of their own logging capabilities.</li> </ul> <p>Where practicable the LRG will deploy staff to the primary strategic coordination / command location of the lead response organisation to enhance liaison and collaboration on the support functions required to facilitate and coordinate the activities of the SCG.</p> <p><i>LRG will primarily provide the secretariat for the SCG, not for sub-groups which should be conducted by relevant lead organisations. The lead response organisation and LRG will jointly consider staffing requirements to fulfil SCG secretariat functions.</i></p>	London Resilience Group / Lead Agency
<b>Chairing and facilitating Partnership Teleconferences</b>	LRG will chair and facilitate Partnership teleconferences as required for the purpose of briefing and information sharing between partnership organisations. Where there is a lead response organisation better suited to chairing the meeting this will be arranged between that organisation and LRG.	London Resilience Group

<p><b>Safety and Security Communications to Businesses</b></p>	<p>The Cross-sector Safety &amp; Security Communications (CSSC) Project was set up to improve safety and security communications to London businesses during an incident. CSSC London operates a partnership-based framework to communicate with businesses in and around London, helping them address safety, security, resilience and emergency prepared issues.</p> <p>CSSC has two mechanisms for facilitating two-way communication between public authorities and the private sector; an email cascade system and a ‘bridge call’ system where direct, verbal updates can be given from public authority partners to a limited number of Industry Sector Leads (key representatives of industry groups). A small project team is responsible for the day-to-day development of the project and stand up as a ‘Hub’ to facilitate exchange and dissemination of information in an incident. The flow of information is designed to be two-way, so real-time information can be fed back by businesses into the Hub to pass on to the authorities. The CSSC Hub can be activated by the police directly, or by other partners through the LRG.</p>	<p>Cross-Sector Safety and Security Communications (CSSC)</p>
<p><b>Military Assistance</b></p>	<p>In the event of a situation that may require military assistance, the Joint Regional Liaison Officers (JRLOs) at Headquarters London District (LONDIST) should be engaged as soon as possible in the strategic coordination process. Initially, any request or potential request for Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) will be discussed with a JRLO who will provide advice, discuss available options and also begin the planning process, if needed.</p> <p>Defence can assist with a range of situations including but not limited to natural disasters, assisting in severe weather situations, network failure or disruption, animal disease outbreaks or public health epidemics, public service related industrial disputes that affect safety or security, transport disruption, and criminal or terrorist activity.</p> <p>In response to MACA requests, the Armed Forces may assist with five main functions: command and control; liaison; specialist advice and capability; general and non-specialist support; and education, training and mentoring. Requests for military assistance for explosive ordnance disposal and search are made directly by the civil police or the Maritime and Coastguard Agency.</p> <p>The provision of MACA is governed by 4 principles: 1. there is a definite need to act and the tasks are clearly defined; 2. other options, including mutual aid and commercial alternatives, have been discounted; 3. either the civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one; or 4. the civil authority has all or some capability, but it may not be available immediately, or to the required scale, and the urgency of the task requires rapid external support from the MOD.</p> <p>MACA is not guaranteed, and when military support is provided the civil authorities normally have to pay for it, in line with HM Treasury rules. The three charging levels are: full costs; marginal costs; and zero costs. There are zero costs for the deployment of Military Liaison Officers or Military</p>	<p>London District via London Joint Regional Liaison Officers (JRLOs)</p>

	Assessment Teams, or when there is an imminent threat to life.	
<b>Emergency Coordination of Scientific Advice (ECOSA) and STAC</b>	<p>ECOSA is the mechanism to provide coordinated scientific advice to the responders at a scene. It is coordinated by PHE and includes Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE), Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) with other agencies included as required.</p> <p>ECOSA has been created to fulfil the requirement for the provision of immediate, coordinated and effective scientific advice to the police, fire and rescue service, ambulance service and public health responders across the UK at what might be a CBRN incident. This scientific advice will be provided up until the time a STAC is formed wherein it will then stand down and hand over to STAC.</p> <p>The role of the STAC is to ensure timely coordinated scientific, technical, environmental and public health advice to the SCG during the response to an emergency (see also Section 5).</p>	
<b>London Local Authority Gold (LLAG)</b>	<p>Any disruptive incident occurring in London will by default occur within a, or across multiple, local authorities. Therefore it is vital that the London Local Authority Gold is notified at an early stage.</p> <p>A London Local Authority Chief Executive is pre-nominated as LAG. LLAG is empowered to represent and give undertaking(s) on behalf of London’s 32 Boroughs and the City of London Corporation.</p> <p>The LLAG will also give early consideration to the wider recovery management issues and when appropriate recommend to the SCG Chair that, if not already convened, an RCG is established.</p> <p>It is important to note that the executive empowerment of LLAG is in strict accordance with the Local Authority Gold Resolution, otherwise LLAG can only act in an advisory capacity to the SCG.</p>	Local Authorities
<b>Faith and Belief Network</b>	<p>London’s Faith and Belief Network is not an organisation but describes activity by a number of organisations to promote community resilience and to help Londoners to be prepared. It consists of a number of umbrella organisations as well as local faith/belief communities, often centred on places of worship and ceremony of which there are hundreds per borough. There are also chaplaincies, faith-based refugee centres, mental health drop-ins, food banks, faith based schools, colleges and universities and a plethora of community activities and services to the general public run by faith and belief organisations. Many organisations within the faith and belief network in work with the local public sector like local authorities, NHS, local police and so on for the better of the community.</p> <p>The London Resilience Forum’s Faith and Belief Sector Panel brings together an advisory group to support the chair who is a member of the LRF. Specific operational cells may be set up at need. The Panel works with others to bring together a contact group to share information and listen to issues which may be arising locally.</p>	London Resilience Forum’s Faith and Belief Sector Panel

	<p>The Panel helps the wider Partnership to understand the faith and belief sector and the services and support it provides to the community, which in an incident may be either needed or disrupted. It works with the Partnership to ensure the specific needs which arise from the faith or belief of individuals are met in times of crisis. It is normally also involved in humanitarian assistance in the recovery phase.</p>	
<p><b>Voluntary Sector</b></p>	<p>The voluntary sector has an important role to play in supporting statutory services, and each of the organisations involved in the voluntary sector is committed to providing the best possible support to the statutory services and the people of London. The voluntary sector can provide support in a number of generic and specific areas, including (for further information, please see the Voluntary Sector Capabilities Document):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Welfare services e.g. staffing of emergency centres</li> <li>• Psychosocial aftercare e.g. befriending and counselling</li> <li>• Advice and guidance on dealing with bereavement</li> <li>• Medical support e.g. support to the ambulance service, first aid posts</li> <li>• Search and rescue e.g. water search and rescue, animal rescue</li> <li>• Transport and escort e.g. transport of evacuees</li> <li>• Communications e.g. telephone/radio operators, interpreters</li> <li>• Administrative support at reception centres, coordinating convergent volunteers</li> <li>• Financial services e.g. establishing and administering a disaster fund</li> <li>• Equipment and resources e.g. bedding, catering, ambulances, shelter, communications.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Community cohesion</b></p>	<p>There are resources in place, both at the borough and regional level in order to monitor and respond to community level tensions and support cohesion. At the borough level, London Local Authority Prevent Coordinators have access to intelligence and links to community groups. At the regional level, London Prevent Network Pan London Assessments are created to provide a picture of community tensions and cohesion activity, and can be used to focus support efforts. This is shared between the police, London Local Authorities and the Home Office.</p> <p>There are a number of roles and departments contributing to furthering and monitoring community cohesion in the MPS and regionally. These include, within the Professionalism Command, the Crime Prevention, Diversity and Inclusion and Community Engagement Team, the Communities Engagement Team (CET) and Prevent resources in the Counter Terrorism Command and local officers and staff in Frontline Policing (Neighbourhood, Faith and Partnership and Prevention</p>	<p>MPS and Local Authorities, Home Office, City of London and City of London Police</p>

	<p>officers and Schools and Youth Engagement officers). In addition the hate crime team offers insight on hate crime affecting a range of communities.</p> <p>Community sentiment and tension indicators are collated from a range of sources, including social media sentiment analysis, assessed and actioned as appropriate. Community Impact Assessments may be produced, and this information is available for a range of briefing documents which are shared with partners in London and regionally. Engagement is considered at a central strategic level, a business group level and at an event/incident. There are a range of networks (including independent advisory groups, community reference groups and faith groups) and stakeholders whose advice is drawn on in each category.</p> <p>In response to an incident or ongoing period of increased (or potentially increased) tension, a Bronze Engagement role will be in place within the police operational command structure. This role ensures that we are engaging at the right time with the right communities in the right way and that insight gained is listened to, shared and actioned. That role works with communication teams on appropriate proactive and reactive communication and engagement mechanisms ensuring a wide reach and opportunities for communities to provide feedback. A specific gold advisory cell may also be put in place to advise the Gold Commander.</p>	
<p><b>Debriefing</b></p>	<p>The College of Policing provide a National Structured Debrief Course to train staff to enable conscious analysis of decision making processes used in emergency response, evaluating experiences in order to inform future actions. There are a number of staff trained in debriefing within Partnership organisations (including the MPS and LRG), who can be called upon to lead impartial debriefing sessions.</p>	<p>College of Policing</p>
<p><b>Victims of Terrorism Unit (VTU)</b></p>	<p>The VTU has been established to coordinate, at a HM Government level, support to citizens affected by terrorist attacks affecting British Citizens a home or overseas. The VTU web pages on GOV.UK contain information on where to seek advice and assistance following a terrorist attack. It also provides details of official helplines and support services available to victims, survivors, witnesses, family members, and all those affected.</p> <p>Where the VTU responds to an incident, it is necessary for the work of the VTU to be closely coordinated with the work of the Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG).</p>	<p>HM Government</p>
<p><b>London Situational Awareness System (LSAS) and Common Operating Picture (COP)</b></p>	<p>LSAS is a secure web based multi-agency data sharing tool.</p> <p>LSAS can be used to generate a COP based on information submitted by emergency response organisations and other members of the London Resilience Partnership. The LSAS COP includes details of partner organisation strategies, situation and response assessments, and forward look / horizon scans. It should be used alongside other means of sharing information to support situational awareness.</p>	<p>London Resilience Group</p>

## 7. Impact Analysis and Draft Strategy

7.1. Using situational information, including information received from the initial METHANE report, and information recorded via the COP through LSAS should be developed. An Impact analysis is the process of assessing the impacts of the emergency across a range of factors, and may be done at the organisational or regional level. A template impact assessment for recovery can be found in the Recovery Coordination Framework. Factors that should be considered are:

- **Health:** Direct (fatalities, injuries) and indirect (strain on health services)
- **Social and welfare:** Evacuation, service disruption, community tension, public disorder
- **Environmental:** pollution of land, water or air, damage to plants or animals
- **Economic:** National, London, local - direct and indirect e.g. financial markets
- **Political:** Central Government, GLA, Mayor's Office, local authorities
- **Media:** Mainstream and social media profile and public communications
- **Organisational:** Implications for critical services of partner organisations
- **Legal** considerations
- **Ethical** considerations.

7.2. Having considered the initial situational information and impacts of the incident, a joint strategy should be agreed by partners. In determining any strategy, consideration should be given to:

- The desired **end-state**. This involves clarifying what a successful resolution of the emergency should look like. What do you want to have achieved?
- The general **ways** in which this should be achieved, and the **resources** required to bring it about.

7.3. By setting a **joint strategy**, leaders can ensure that subordinates and partners are working towards a common goal. This needs a **consensus** and acceptance across the range of contributing partner organisations.

7.4. The strategic aim should look beyond the immediate demands of the response and embrace the longer-term priorities of restoring essential services and helping to facilitate the recovery of affected communities. The strategy should be continuously reviewed to ensure that it remains appropriate.

**An example SCG partnership strategy is as follows (ideal but not exclusive):**

### **Strategic Aim**

*London Resilience Partnership will work together\* to coordinate an effective response to, and recovery from the [incident type] for London's communities and businesses.*

### **Strategic Objectives**

- *Save and protect life*
- *Relieve suffering and provide humanitarian assistance*
- *Provide conditions for a safe and secure London*
- *Work collaboratively and share information with multi-agency partners for the benefit of London*
- *Inform and reassure the public through communication and engagement*
- *Minimise disruption to infrastructure, transport services, communities, businesses, and impacts on the environment*
- *Facilitate recovery; the restoration of infrastructure, transport services, communities, businesses, the environment, and the return to normal or a new normality (identifying opportunities to improve)*

- *Manage resourcing to meet response needs and to maintain essential public services*
- *Continuously debrief, learn lessons and improve throughout incident response(s).*

\* This strategy shall remain valid until it is revised by the SCG or until handover from response to recovery coordination.

\* It is expected that all those responder organisations involved will work together in a directed and coordinated fashion to achieve the strategic aim and objectives.

7.5. Further examples of strategies are included for specific incidents in Annex D.

## SECTION B: Guidance and Supplementary Information

### 8. Pan-London Tactical Coordination - Guidance

- 8.1. This section describes tactical coordination on a pan-London basis, and the Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) as a coordination body directly subordinate to the SCG. It should not be confused with tactical or operational coordination functions discharged to differing degrees by the emergency services and other organisations at the scene of an incident. To ensure clarity in discussions between partner organisations, the terms 'pan-London tactical coordination' and 'on-scene coordination at the FCP' should be used to clearly differentiate between the functions being undertaken by different groups at different locations.
- 8.2. For an incident where pan-London strategic coordination is in place, there will be a requirement for pan-London tactical coordination to interpret strategic direction, develop tactical plans and coordinate activities and assets.
- 8.3. The pan-London TCG will inform and support the strategic decision making process and should be attended by tactical decision makers from the emergency services and relevant partner organisations.
- 8.4. For emergency services led incidents, the MPS will normally use a dedicated tactical command facility to host a TCG for a police run incident or operation. Such a meeting may be referred to as a Blue-light Tactical Coordinating Group and primarily involve emergency services tactical commanders or liaison officers, with other organisations invited to participate as required. This tactical meeting may also be referred to as a Silver Meeting.
- 8.5. For incidents led by non-emergency service organisations, alternative arrangements may be made for tactical coordination. These arrangements will be agreed and overseen by the SCG.

#### Role of the Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG)

- Interpreting the strategy and strategic direction set by the SCG
- Developing tactical level plans to deliver multi-agency activity in support of the strategic objectives and direction set by the SCG
- Resolving issues in relation to multi-agency working at a tactical level
- Identifying multi-agency issues that cannot be resolved at the tactical level and require escalation to the SCG
- Making recommendations to the SCG.

#### TCG activation

- 8.6. For a fast-paced incident, the TCG is likely to be activated in advance of the first SCG meeting. For slower-paced incidents, the SCG will determine the requirement for, and decide to activate a TCG. Where the TCG is active prior to the first meeting of an SCG, the TCG should work to the generic template strategy until such time as the SCG sets a revised strategy.

#### TCG composition

- 8.7. The composition of the TCG will depend on the nature of the incident but will typically mirror that of the SCG, including representatives of other SCG sub-groups where required. Other organisations may be invited to join the TCG as required (e.g. to support a specific task of relevance to that organisation).
- 8.8. The TCG will be chaired by the lead response organisation (i.e. the same organisation as chair of the SCG), or by another organisation in agreement with the lead response organisation.

## **TCG reporting and links to the SCG, FCP and other groups**

- 8.9. The TCG is subordinate to the SCG. The TCG chair will attend and report to SCG meetings.
- 8.10. The TCG will, depending on the nature of the incident, provide multi-agency direction to the incident commanders (operating at the FCP and or from remote locations depending on the situation).
- 8.11. In order to carry out its work, the TCG will need to maintain effective links with other active SCG sub-groups.
- 8.12. It is imperative that there is strong connectivity and sharing of information between the different tiers of command within each organisation, and between the multi-agency strategic, tactical (pan-London) and at FCPs. This enables the strategic and tactical levels to be appraised of the situation at the incident scene in order to inform their decision making, and for direction to be set at the strategic level, tactical plans to be developed at the tactical level and then executed at the incident scene.
- 8.13. This connectivity should be achieved through sharing of information between multi-agency groups to ensure shared situational awareness, and within individual organisations command structures in order to discharge organisational responsibilities.

## **TCG decision making**

- 8.14. The TCG Chair will direct the efforts of, and set tasking for, the TCG.
- 8.15. London TCG is not a legal entity in itself and does not have the legal power to direct members. However, the Group will, in general terms, accept direction set by the Chair. Any issues in relation to decision making at the TCG should be escalated to the TCG Chair for escalation to the SCG or for resolution with the partnership organisation(s) involved as required.
- 8.16. For effective coordination, one organisation generally needs to take a lead role regarding the resolution of specific issues. The chair of a multi-agency coordinating group does not command the assets of other organisations. Their role is to exert influence and achieve consensus without constitutional authority.
- 8.17. Liability for staff welfare lies with the employing organisation, but the 'receiving' organisation must still communicate any concerns and keep the employing organisation appraised on any welfare issues as they arise.

## **TCG information and intelligence reporting**

- 8.18. The TCG will need to be closely aligned with the SCG MAIC (if activated) in order to react to and feed into the COP, any other Situation Reports, and to contribute to fast-time situational awareness across the SCG response structure. The TCG should provide a form of situational report to meetings of the SCG. This may be in the form of an oral update to the meeting, or a combination of written products (e.g. the latest METHANE report and/or COP).

## **TCG secretariat**

- 8.19. The TCG secretariat will be provided by the lead response organisation for the incident, in conjunction with other responder organisations as agreed between them.

## 9. The Coordination of an Incident On-Scene

- 9.1. The commanders of responding agencies who are on-scene are located at, or close to, the scene of a major incident at an agreed location known as the Forward Command Post (FCP).
- 9.2. Multi-agency meetings of on-scene commanders are attended by the on-scene incident commanders as appointed by each emergency service and partner organisation. The composition of this group may include tactical advisors, tactical commanders, operational commanders and liaison officers (e.g. Local Authority Liaison Officer) depending on individual organisations internal command structures and whether they exercise tactical command at the scene or from a remote location / control room.
  - The London Fire Brigade tactical commander will be located where they can maintain effective tactical command of their operations, invariably they will be in attendance at or close to the incident scene.
  - The Metropolitan Police Service tactical commander will be located remote from scene at an MPS dedicated command facility.
  - The London Ambulance Service tactical commander will be located remote from scene at the LAS Specialist Operations Centre where they can maintain effective tactical command of their on-scene and wider operations including casualty distribution.
  - HM Coastguard Tactical Coordination will be carried out from one of their Coastguard Operating Centres. HM Coastguard may appoint an On Scene Coordinator to work on their behalf.
- 9.3. Regardless of the designation given to roles of on-scene commanders by individual organisations, meetings at the FCP should be attended by the senior decision maker located at the scene for each organisation. This meeting may include tactical commanders but should not be confused with a pan-London TCG meeting.
- 9.4. Commanders at the FCP may appoint multi-agency sub-groups of operational commanders assigned to coordinate specific functions, tasks or geographical locations.

## 10. Community Engagement

### Public, Business and Media Information

- 10.1. This is a core function of the SCG. In fact, significant levels of media interest may be reason in itself for the activation of such a group.
- 10.2. The LRCG can form to support the SCG. Given the primacy of the media in the shaping of public perception, it is vital that public information strategies and content reflect, reinforce and (if necessary) defend the strategic aim.
- 10.3. In functional terms:
  - Use any or all forms of media to get the required messages to the public including the business community, so that they know what is happening, what responders are doing and what they should do in the interests of their own safety (including utilising CSSC messaging)
  - Manage expectations on the part of the public as to what responders will be able to do for them and when
  - Identify and articulate the 'lines to take'; these represent the core message(s) that all partner organisations need to reflect and cohere with in their collective and separate interaction with the media
  - Prepare and approve the content of key press releases and other major public announcements

- Hold press conferences and public meetings as appropriate, mindful of the different information needs of different groups and communities
  - Ensure that what is being said in all forms of the media is monitored and, where appropriate, responded to credibly and robustly
  - Make pro-active use of all forms of media wherever possible, to lead and shape the public debate. Social media is crucial here and central; it should not be regarded as an “optional extra” in a communication strategy.
- 10.4. In the event of an emergency the Mayor of London will act as the ‘voice of London’ in order to provide clear information and guidance.
- 10.5. The Mayor of London has a key response role as the ‘voice of London’. The role of the Mayor is to support the operational response to an emergency in London by providing a unified statement – a ‘voice’ for London. It will be the Mayor’s role to provide regional information and reassurance throughout the duration of the response and into the initial stages of the recovery phase – this role is complementary to, and in support of, local responders and operational spokespeople. In addition to press briefings, the Mayor’s Twitter feed (@MayorofLondon) may be used to communicate key information and reassurance messages.

## 11. Financial Management

- 11.1. The need for financial management is self-evident, and essentially represents the extension of good governance into emergency management. An appropriate audit trail will support attempts to recover funds after the emergency.
- 11.2. Bellwin is a scheme of emergency financial assistance to help local authorities meet immediate uninsurable costs they incur when dealing with the aftermath of an emergency in their area. The costs covered typically include: provision of rest centres; evacuating people from dangerous structures and works to make them safe; temporary accommodation (Bed and Breakfast); the clearing of debris from highways, pavements and footpaths. Under the normal rules of the scheme each local authority for whom a scheme is activated can claim for eligible costs above a threshold (set at 0.2% of its calculated annual revenue budget). Following the review of the scheme in 2015 grant is now paid at 100% above threshold (previously it was limited to 85%).
- 11.3. A local authority is as defined by statute. This includes Counties, Districts, unitary authorities, Police Authorities (and Police and Crime Commissioners), Fire Authorities (including Combined Fire Authorities) and National Park Authorities.
- 11.4. We would generally not expect Bellwin to cover:
- costs which are normally insurable, whether by the authority or any other party
  - longer term, permanent repairs
  - the normal wages and salaries of the authority's regular employees, whether diverted from their normal work or otherwise
  - the standing costs of the authority's plant and equipment.
- 11.5. Authorities must notify the Bellwin team at the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government of their likely intention to seek Bellwin within a month of the incident by letter, email or telephone.

## Expenditure incurred by the SCG

- 11.6. Individual responder organisations will record their own expenditure in relation to an incident. In addition, the SCG should maintain oversight of any multi-agency expenditure, or expenditure by one organisation on behalf of two or more SCG members.
- 11.7. In the event that organisations agree to incur expenditure on behalf of other organisations, recharging mechanisms should be confirmed between those organisations on a case by case basis. A record of agreements must be kept and costs must be monitored and reviewed, especially during protracted incidents. The SCG should have sight of spend, as well as inter-agency requests for support and resources.

## 12. Central Government, National Level Support and Assets

### Central Government, National Level Support and National Assets

- 12.1. Most emergencies in the United Kingdom are handled at a local level with no direct involvement by Central Government. However, where the scale or complexity of an incident is such that some degree of central government coordination or support becomes necessary, a designated lead government department (LGD), or where appropriate, a devolved administration department, will be made responsible for the overall management of the Central Government response to the incident.

### What is the role of Government in an emergency?

- 12.2. Government strategic objectives in an emergency are to:

- Protect human life, and as far as possible, property and the environment.
- Support the continuity of everyday activity
- Uphold the rule of law and the democratic process.

- 12.3. This is set out in the UK Concept of Operations (“CONOPS”, updated 2013), which stems from the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act. There are three broad levels for engagement at departmental level. They are as follows:

**Level 1** – The lead department minister runs the crisis response from their premises using their own emergency facilities as appropriate. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office advises as and when necessary.

**Level 2** – The issue is coordinated from the Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms (COBR) by the lead government department.

- Terrorism always starts at this level with Home Office in the lead, whilst National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office are responsible for the activation of COBR and, if required, separate and dedicated crisis facilities.
- Other emergencies where the LGD determines that the crisis response may require the deployment of wider government resources. The Civil Contingencies Secretariat provides support on impact management and recovery issues.

**Level 3** – The Prime Minister or nominated Secretary of State leads in the event of a catastrophic incident requiring the involvement of central government from the outset to deliver an effective response, or where emergency powers are invoked. COBR and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat coordinate, rather than the LGD.

## **Role of the Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED) within the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG)**

12.4. RED supports communities across England to be prepared for all types of incidents and supports them in response and recovery. This is achieved by supporting Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) to develop plans and by providing expertise and liaison during and after emergencies.

12.5. RED has three key objectives that support local resilience:

- 1) Enable resilient localities
- 2) Ensure preparedness for high impact or wide area emergencies
- 3) Provide government support when emergencies do occur.

12.6. RED Government Liaison Officers attend SCGs during emergency responses in order to:

- provide situational awareness of the incident and response, through the RED Operations Centre, to senior officials and Ministers, Other Government Departments (OGDs), Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) and COBR
- provide advice and guidance to the SCG and individual responder organisations, ensure mutual aid is sourced where required, and assess what help and support government should provide
- support local strategic leads attending COBR to give clear updates to Ministers.

## **Response Coordinating Group (ResCG)**

12.7. Most emergencies are dealt with at a local level through SCGs. A Response Coordinating Group (ResCG) may be convened when:

- local response may be / has been overwhelmed
- emergency affects multiple SCGs and information sharing, coordination or enhanced support would be beneficial.

12.8. There is no set ResCG role – it will depend on the emergency. Role may include:

- assessing and sharing info on the emergency's actual and / or potential impacts
- ensuring effective flow of comms across local and national organisations to ensure coordinated response
- reviewing the response and any assistance needed / offered, incl. facilitating mutual aid and providing national support, if necessary
- coordinating a consistent public message.

12.9. Multiple routes to calling a ResCG:

- MHCLG request on its own initiative
- Local responders request (e.g. SCG)
- Lead Government Department and Cabinet Office.

12.10. ResCGs bring together relevant organisations to manage the potential / live emergency.

- SCG Chair and key partners (if SCG stood up);
- LRF Chairs (if no SCG);
- Local Authority Gold
- MHCLG will invite relevant experts e.g. OSCT experts for CT incidents.

## **Other background information**

- An SCG is not needed to call a ResCG.
- No set duration, but intended to be very quick.
- ResCGs are by teleconference
- Chaired by MHCLG RED
- RED will generally facilitate, not direct local command, control and communications (C3)

- MHCLG run the ad hoc secretariat function, by issuing calling notice, including agenda and papers, where applicable
- If there are concurrent emergencies across England, COBR may be used to establish a national picture.

## **National coordination of emergency services assets**

12.11. Fire & Rescue Authorities can draw on mutual assistance under Sections 13 & 16 of the Fire & Rescue Services Act 2004. These arrangements ensure continuity of service provision across authority boundaries.

## **The National Coordination and Advisory Framework (NCAF) supports:**

- everyday assistance and collaboration between FRSs on the occasions that specialist national resilience capabilities can support the resolution of an incident
- FRSs to be provided with specialist assistance where an incident warrants it and it is available from elsewhere, or additional resources where the resolution of an incident is, or is likely to be, beyond a service's own resources
- coordination of the combined FRS response to relevant incidents, and when required, the integration of that coordination with that of other first responders, for example police, ambulance and the military, at any geographical scale.

## **National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC)**

12.12. The National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC) helps to ensure policing is better prepared to deal with wide scale disorder or mobilisation of police assets.

12.13. NPoCC maintains an oversight of national capacity and capability of specialist policing roles and assesses these in relation to the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR) and National Policing Requirement (NPR). NPoCC helps effectively coordinate these resources to support forces during large scale events and operations and in times of civil emergency.

12.14. NPoCC also has a key role to play in providing assurance to government that the British Police Service has the ability to deal with the SPR threats. This is done through formal reporting and representation at COBR.

12.15. UK Disaster Victim Identification (UK DVI) also falls within the NPoCC structure. This is the UK police response to disasters relating to mass fatalities in the UK and abroad. NPoCC also works with other national coordination centres which have responsibility for mobilising specialist resources for example, the Counter Terrorism Coordination Centre (CTCC) and the Police National CBRN Centre.

12.16. To help facilitate mobilisation NPoCC works with nine Regional Information and Coordination Centres (RICCs) each of which has a mandate to communicate and coordinate across their region in order to identify and deploy mutual aid resources from forces within their region.

12.17. In London, the RICC is 24/7 and based within the Met. It coordinates resources across the Region thus MPS, CoLP and also BTP. The MPS, BTP and CoLP share resources often outside the mutual aid structures and do not charge each other for those resources. A request to another region would lead to a cost implication for the force receiving those resources.

## National Ambulance Coordination Centre (NACC)

- 12.18. The NACC coordinates the national ambulance response to an incident.
- 12.19. In the event of an incident of significant scale to require more than normal ambulance service provision in one or more NHS Ambulance Trusts, NHS England or The Association of Ambulance Chief Executives may ask for the NACC to be opened.
- 12.20. The NACC will;
- Collate, assess and disseminate data regarding NHS Ambulance providers in the UK and their ability to provide mutual aid.
  - Coordinate any national response and allocation of mutual aid between NHS Ambulance Trusts.
  - Protect, manage and sustain national ambulance critical infrastructure and capabilities.

## 13. Debriefing

- 13.1. Depending on the nature of the incident, it may be necessary for the SCG to undertake or commission a review of the response and recovery activity to date for the incident at hand in order to immediately inform the remainder of the response and recovery activity until conclusion of the incident.
- 13.2. The incident should be debriefed in line with the London Resilience Partnership Lessons Protocol, with learning fed back into plan and capability development, training and exercising processes.
- 13.3. The usual order of debriefs will be as follows:
1. Individual agency debriefs
  2. Multi-agency Tactical debrief (where appropriate)
  3. Multi-agency Strategic debrief.
- 13.4. The holistic lessons process is designed to ensure that all lessons impacting the London Resilience Partnership Strategy are identified and embedded into the culture of the Partnership. It is therefore important to ensure that all learning is collated and considered against Partnership documentation and activity. The lead for this will be the London Resilience Lessons Review Group, on behalf of the London Resilience Programme Board, but this is a priority for the whole Partnership, in order to enable London to be a resilient city.
- 13.5. All debriefs will be subject to disclosure rules and any investigations may dictate timings of debriefing procedures.

## Annex A: Glossary

The following key definitions are referred to in this protocol:

### **Rising Tide Emergency (JESIP definition)**

An event or situation with a lead-in time of days, weeks or even months e.g. health pandemic, flooding or pre-planned event, the final impact of which may not be apparent in advance.

### **Disruptive Incident**

A disruptive incident is any hazard or threat that could cause significant disruption or harm to either Category 1 or 2 responders and impact on London. This includes incidents that may sit below the declaration of a major incident. There are established criteria for the emergency services declaring a major incident for a rapid on-set emergency requiring joint emergency services response e.g. serious fire, train crash, building collapse.

Harm refers to the type and extent of injury or damage and may include: physical harm including loss of life; psychological harm; economic harm; and harm to the community. It may also include organisational harm, such as the effect on an organisation's reputation.

### **Major Incident (JESIP definition)**

***An event or situation with a range of serious consequences which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agency.***

- “Emergency responder agency” describes all category one and two responders as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004).
- A major incident is beyond the scope of business-as-usual operations, and is likely to involve serious harm, damage, disruption or risk to human life or welfare, essential services, the environment or national security.
- A major incident may involve a single-agency response, although it is more likely to require a multi-agency response, which may be in the form of multi-agency support to a lead responder.
- The severity of the consequences associated with a major incident are likely to constrain or complicate the ability of responders to resource and manage the incident, although a major incident is unlikely to affect all responders equally.
- The decision to declare a major incident will always be a judgement made in a specific local and operational context, and there are no precise and universal thresholds or triggers.

Declaring a 'major incident' triggers a predetermined response from some emergency service and other responder organisations. It takes time for operational structures, resources and protocols to be put in place. Declaring that a major incident is in progress as soon as possible means these arrangements can be put in place as quickly as possible.

### **London Resilience Partnership Guidance Documents**

London Resilience Partnership guidance documents have been created and approved by the London Resilience Forum (LRF) to provide frameworks for partner organisations to work to in response to specific incidents. A full list is at [Appendix 1](#).

## Annex B: Template SCG Agenda

Incident/Event:	Date/Time:	Location:
<b>1 Any Urgent Business</b>		
<b>2 Introductions</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Including roles of representatives (who they are representing)</li> <li>• Actions from previous meeting</li> <li>• SCP checklist review</li> </ul>		
<b>3 Situation Brief</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Briefing by LRG on current situation</li> <li>• Common Operating Picture (COP) review and additional points from partner organisations (to include community and business impacts)</li> <li>• TCG, sub-groups and organisational updates</li> </ul>		
<b>4 Key Issues and Strategic Decisions</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Set and/or review strategic aim and objectives</li> <li>• Agree response options and tasking</li> <li>• Investigation – update (if applicable)</li> <li>• Review, prioritise and monitor the implementation of strategic objectives.</li> <li>• Recovery coordination</li> </ul>		
<b>5 Public Communications (London Resilience Communication Group)</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Briefing on media coverage</li> <li>• Communication and media strategy, including key messages and specific audiences (e.g. those impacted, and general messaging across partnership, public and business)</li> </ul>		
<b>6 Report from SCG Sub-Groups</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Recovery Coordinating Group (LLAG / RCG Chair)</li> <li>• Others if activated e.g. HASG, STAC, MFCG</li> </ul>		
<b>7 Reporting Rhythm</b> (including arrangements for outside of business hours, and any central government reporting requirements)		
<b>8 SCG Membership Review</b>		
<b>9 Resilience of Command, Handovers, and Staff Welfare</b>		
<b>10 Organisational Learning / Debrief of Events So Far</b>		
<b>11 Handover to Recovery</b> (when appropriate)		
<b>12 Any Other Business</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Date / time of next meeting</li> </ul>		

## Annex C: SCG Standing Invitation List

This is the list of expected partners that LRG and MPS (Bronze Emergency Preparedness) will use to advise an SCG Chair of who should be invited to an SCG, depending on the nature of each incident. Fundamental to the success of any incident response is that the designated SCG Chair understands that they represent the interests of the entire partnership, rather than from an organisational response point of view.

### Standing Invitation List\*

- British Transport Police
- City of London Police
- Environment Agency
- Greater London Authority
- HM Coastguard
- London Ambulance Service
- London Fire Brigade
- London Local Authority Gold (LLAG)
- London Resilience Group
- Metropolitan Police Service
- Met Office
- MHCLG – Government Liaison Officer (GLO)
- Military – Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO)
- NHS England and NHS Improvement (London)
- Public Health England
- Transport for London

*\* Category 2 responders and other sectors and organisations will only be invited to an initial SCG if their input is specifically pertinent to the incident, but can also request to participate in an SCG.*

Certain incidents will require that category 2 and other organisations are invited. This may include:

- Business Sector
- Faith sector
- Government Departments
- Health and Safety Executive
- Neighbouring SCGs (Home Counties)
- Royal Parks
- Transport operators / Transport Sector Cell representative
- Utility companies (electricity, gas, telecoms, water)
- Voluntary sector

This list is not exhaustive and invitations should be considered in terms of organisations relevant to the incident and the strategic response. Collaboration is crucial to the achievement of multi-agency objectives and restoration of services.

## Annex D: Examples of multi-agency strategy

All strategic objectives must be disseminated to the tactical and operational levels, and the SCG should monitor progress and implementation of actions to achieve the objectives.

### GENERIC SCENARIO / STANDARD TEMPLATE STRATEGY

**Strategic Aim:** London Resilience Partnership will work together\* to coordinate an effective response to, and recovery from the [incident type] for London's communities and businesses.

#### Strategic Objectives

- Save and protect life
- Relieve suffering and provide humanitarian assistance
- Provide conditions for a safe and secure London
- Work collaboratively and share information with multi-agency partners for the benefit of London
- Inform and reassure the public through communication and engagement
- Minimise disruption to infrastructure, transport services, communities, businesses, and impacts on the environment
- Facilitate recovery; the restoration of infrastructure, transport services, communities, businesses, the environment, and the return to normal or a new normality (identifying opportunities to improve)
- Manage resourcing to meet response needs and to maintain essential public services
- Continuously debrief, learn lessons and improve throughout incident response(s).

This strategy shall remain valid until it is revised by the SCG or until handover from response to recovery coordination.

\*It is expected that all those responder organisations involved will work together in a directed and coordinated fashion to achieve the strategic aim and objectives.

### SCENARIO: FIERCE STORMS OVER A 24HR PERIOD, MAJOR WIND DAMAGE, AND SURFACE WATER FLOODING, SEVERE DISRUPTION TO TRANSPORT AND UTILITIES.

**Strategic Aim:** To work together to coordinate an effective emergency response, to preserve life, to minimise the impact on London communities and business, and aid the return to normality.

#### Strategic Objectives:

- To save and protect life
- To relieve suffering and provide humanitarian assistance
- To protect and restore essential services
- To maintain the health and safety of responders
- To protect the natural environment
- To restore public transport and utilities
- To provide information to the community to aid self-help
- To facilitate recovery and the return to a new normality.

## SCENARIO: LARGE FIRE AT RECYCLING DEPOT IN WEST LONDON. SMOKE PLUME IS DISRUPTING AVIATION FROM HEATHROW AIRPORT AND THE DEPOT IS ADJACENT TO A SITE OF SPECIAL SCIENTIFIC INTEREST

**Strategic Aim:** To resolve the incident expediently, protect the community, the environment, and facilitate recovery and the return to normality.

**Strategic Objectives:**

- To save and protect life
- To protect the health, safety and welfare of responders
- To minimise the impact on the environment
- To minimise the impact on business and the community, and restore transport services
- To provide information to the affected communities and businesses
- To support the return to normality.

## SCENARIO: MARAUDING TERRORIST ATTACK WITH MASS FATALITIES, MULTI-SITED ACROSS LONDON

**Strategic Aim:** To support the Partnership MTA response, to preserve life, to minimise the impact on London's community, and facilitate recovery and the return to normality.

**Strategic Objectives:**

- To save and protect life
- To implement the agreed joint operational plan for an MTA incident.
- To maximise the safety of responders
- To facilitate investigations and inquiries (preserve evidence)
- To maintain continuity of essential service provision
- To provide information to London's communities and businesses
- To facilitate recovery and the return to normality.

## SCENARIO: CYBER INCIDENT

**Strategic Objectives for a Cyber Emergency or Significant Incident**

- Protect human life and, as far as possible, property and the environment
- Understand the scope of the incident, the impact on London's services and communities
- Ensure the continuity or hasten restoration of critical information communication and technology services to maintain a safe and secure London
- Minimise disruption to London's critical infrastructure and public services
- Maintain the continuity of emergency response capability and essential public services
- Provide clear and consistent information to the public regarding the incident including actions they should take to ensure their digital safety and security
- Facilitate recovery and the early and demonstrable return to normality.

## SCENARIO: SERIOUS FLOODING INCIDENT

### Strategic Objectives for a Flooding Incident

- Proactive evacuation of vulnerable locations
- Protection of infrastructure to mitigate secondary consequences
- Develop a coordinated media strategy prior to impacts being observed
- Provide information on the likely level of disruption to travel and other services
- Identify mutual aid to help with rest centres, evacuation, erecting temporary defences, managing traffic disruption, dealing with injuries and rescue etc.

## SCENARIO: STRUCTURAL COLLAPSE OF BUILDINGS

**Strategic Aim:** To ensure an effective emergency response, to preserve life, to minimise the impact on London's community and to aid the return to normality.

### Strategic Objectives

- Ensuring the safe rescue of trapped and injured persons
- Facilitation of criminal and other investigation
- The recovery of fatalities and human remains (London mass fatalities plan)
- The safe removal and disposal of rubble and other debris, with due regard to the environment
- The recovery of personal and other items of value
- Facilitating the recovery process and restoration of normality
- Ensuring environmental impacts from site clearance are appropriately controlled
- Maintaining, so far as possible, normal services at an appropriate level.

## SCENARIO: PANDEMIC OUTBREAK OF NOVEL VIRUS

The overall strategy for the management of a pandemic is to minimise, where possible;

- The potential health impact of a pandemic
- The potential impact of a pandemic on society and the economy, and to instil and maintain trust and confidence.

## SCENARIO: CBRN(e) INCIDENT

**Strategic Aim** To work together to coordinate an effective emergency response to save and protect life, preserve evidence, minimise the impact on London's communities, and facilitate recovery.

### Strategic Objectives:

- To save and protect life and limb, and minimise injuries
- To mitigate and minimise the impact of contaminants on people and the environment
- To implement the Joint Operational Plan for a CBRN(e) incident
- To make the scene safe and secure to protect the wider community, facilitate investigations, gather information and intelligence, and preserve evidence
- To facilitate wider consequence management (including survivor and humanitarian assistance, remote casualty management, and associated economic impacts)
- To ensure the delivery of a timely, effective and cohesive communications strategy
- To inform the public and businesses, and maintain public confidence

- To restore and maintain continuity of essential service provisions
- To steer towards recovery and the return to a new normality.

## SCENARIO: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE INCIDENT

### Strategic Objectives:

Support and care for all those affected will be provided by:

- Providing appropriate support at an early stage through emergency centres and outreach to reduce future suffering and distress
- Applying the principles of psychological first aid during the response phase of the incident
- Respecting every individual's rights to privacy and dignity, empowering people to regain control as soon as they are ready
- Enabling voluntary sector and faith responders to provide support to individuals and families in a way that enhances community resilience.

## SCENARIO: COUNTER TERRORISM INCIDENT

**Strategic Aim** To work together to coordinate an effective emergency response to save and protect life, preserve evidence, minimise the impact on London's communities, and facilitate recovery.

### Strategic Objectives:

- To save and protect life and limb, and minimise injuries
- To maximise the safety of responders
- To make the scene safe and secure to protect the wider community, facilitate investigations, gather information and intelligence, and preserve evidence
- To maintain continuity of essential service provision
- To provide information to London's communities and businesses
- To facilitate recovery and the return to normality
- To facilitate wider consequence management (including survivor and humanitarian assistance, remote casualty management, and associated economic impacts).

## Annex E: Counter Terrorism Incident Management Considerations

### Introduction

This annex covers the implications of and considerations for partner agencies during a terrorist incident and the potential implications of Government Security Classification (GSC) levels on the work of SCGs.

### Implications of Terrorist Incidents on SCG

It is important to note that terrorist incidents may require special measures, some of which will be situationally dependant. Whilst the information picture is being created and collated, information may be restricted to a very specific audience. This helps to ensure the protection of information that is crucial to certain police activities, preventing the circulation of misinformation, and preserving police tactics that could be disrupted when information is widely shared. The SCG Chair will make efforts to ensure that the right people are represented and informed, and that while perhaps initially meetings, or parts of meetings, are restricted as strategy and tactics are discussed, as soon as possible, further organisations will be invited to participate in meetings.

### Levels of classifications

There are three Government Security Classification levels;

- i) OFFICIAL (includes OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE subset)
- ii) SECRET
- iii) TOP SECRET

An SCG and the information relating to an SCG (COP, minutes, actions and decisions etc.) will usually be at OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE. This level is defined as information that could have more damaging consequences if it were lost, stolen or published in the media. This level includes pre-planned policing, security operations and events.

At the higher end of the spectrum, the loss, theft or publication of Secret or Top Secret information would have a severe to critical impact.

In some instances, for example a Marauding Terror Attack (MTA) or CBRN event, a SCG may be required to work to Secret or Top Secret handling and operating procedures.

### Practical considerations; areas of implication

Agencies must recognise the implications of the handling and operating methods for Secret and Top Secret working, as these may fall outside of the realm of business as usual operating procedures. Secret and Top Secret information and documents are subject to conditions in the following areas:

- i) Access
- ii) Remote Working
- iii) Storage – Physical and Electronic
- iv) Movement – Physical and Electronic
- v) Disclosure
- vi) Disposal

## Considerations for SCG members

- While the following information is not exhaustive, it documents some of the most immediate and severe impacts the handling and operating methods might have on an SCG and its members.
- The Police will lead on all communications related to Terrorist incidents, coordinating with partners as required.
- Secret or Top Secret meetings will have to be held in person and on site, and there is unlikely to be any remote dial in or conferencing allowed.
- SCG members should be prepared to attend meetings in absence of any laptop or telephony devices and resort to pen and paper working (although taking written notes of the meeting may also be prohibited).
- Agencies should understand that their IT and email systems may not qualify as a secure method of internal or external communication.

Some people may require security clearance, but this is not always practical or achievable and information may need to be shared on a 'need to know' basis.

## Annex F: Strategic Coordination Centre

### Introduction

This annex details the considerations for and requirements of a Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC). It also provides practical information for the formation and management of a SCC in its early stages.

### Purpose

A SCC co-locates personnel or members of staff from agencies who may be required to provide support functions to their relevant Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG)SCG representatives. It provides a single location where SCG agencies can work to provide their core functions in response to a specific emergency

The formation of a SCC helps to ensure that interaction between agencies can be established and maintained throughout the response to an incident.

### Activation

SCC arrangements can be triggered by a joint decision made at the SCG following a request from any participating member.

Once activated, it will initially be the responsibility of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and London Resilience Group to set up and maintain an SCC.

### Location

While it is ideal for the lead agency to provide the facilities, there are recognisable difficulties for most agencies to supply this, especially in the event of a short or no notice incident. As a result, during the first 24-36 hours following the activation of a SCC, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) will allocate suitable working space and facilities. The City of London Police may host an SCC in an alternative location, or may use the designated MPS location. Similarly, other organisations leading the response where the MPS is not leading by default, or where the chair of the SCG is from another organisation, may utilise their own facilities to host the SCC.

Details of SCC plans will be held by the London Resilience Group and the MPS.

### Initial Considerations

- ✓ The facilities provided by the MPS are not extensive, and only key members of staff from responders participating in the SCG should be requested to assist at the SCC.
- ✓ Non-MPS personnel will be required to provide photo identification to access the SCC and will need to be escorted around the building by MPS personnel.
- ✓ Facilities will include access to standard 3 pin power sockets, secure Wi-Fi (Government Wi-Fi), offices with mobile phone reception, a Wi-Fi printer, land line phones with conference calling capabilities and a Resilient Satellite Network (RSN) phone for use in times of telecommunications failures.
- ✓ It is recommended that the decision to convene a SCC is made as soon as it is evident one will be required as it may take time to establish a staffed and operational SCC.
- ✓ It is important to remember that the provision of MPS facilities will come at a price, displacing business as usual activities, some of which may be relevant to the ongoing incident response for which an SCC has been convened.

## Ongoing considerations and responsibility

- Due to the requirement of having all non-MPS personnel escorted around the premises, hosting a SCC at the MPS facility is very resource intensive and presents the opportunity for delays.
- Some incidents may require a prolonged multi-agency response, and it is possible that the SCC will still be a necessary support function at the point overall command is passed to a Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG).
- For these reasons, it will be the responsibility for the lead response organisation to source and provide a suitable alternative premises that the SCC can be transferred to following the initial 24-36 hour period. In the event of handover from the SCG to RCG, it will be the responsibility of the London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) and/or lead local authority for recovery to provide suitable alternative premises for the SCC.

## Annex G: Response to Recovery Handover Form

[insert name and date of incident]

### Handover from London Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) to [insert London or name of Local Authority] Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG)

#### 1. Date and time of handover

- 1.1. The handover from [insert name and organisation] as the London SCG Chair to [insert name and organisation] as the Recovery Coordinating Group Chair was agreed by both parties and by all members of the London SCG teleconference held at [insert time and date]. The handover took effect from the close of that meeting at [insert time].
- 1.2. This document provides a formal record of the handover process and confirmation of the agreement that formal handover criteria have been met.

#### 2. The SCG Chair should confirm the following prior to handover.

- 2.1. The emergency is contained and there is no significant risk of resurgence.
- 2.2. Public safety measures are in place and working effectively.
- 2.3. The Recovery Coordinating Group is firmly established.
- 2.4. The [insert name of Local Authority] strategic coordination arrangements are functioning effectively and have the necessary resources, communications and media coordination support.
- 2.5. Individual SCG member organisation involved in the response phase are functioning effectively with adequate resources, communications and management of outstanding issues.
- 2.6. The nominated person is able to accept the position of Chair of the Recovery Coordinating Group.

#### 3. The RCG Chair should confirm the following prior to handover.

- 3.1. There is no known further risk to life in relation to this specific emergency.
- 3.2. The circumstances dictate it more appropriate for command and control to rest with a Local Authority in that the phase is clearly now one of recovery.
- 3.3. There are no serious public order or crime prevention issues which impact on the overall strategic coordination of the recovery phase.
- 3.4. The emergency services and partner organisations are operating at a level which does not necessitate an SCG to coordinate and facilitate their activity.
- 3.5. There are no known scenarios which may require the reinstatement of the SCG in relation to this emergency in the foreseeable future.
- 3.6. [insert name and organisation of RCG Chair] is satisfied that [insert name of Local Authority to lead on Recovery] has in place the infrastructure and processes to take over coordination from the Chair of the SCG.

## 4. Incident specific considerations

4.1. [insert incident specific considerations]

4.2. *E.g. At the time of handover police cordons remain in place around areas of the incident scene where forensic investigation is continuing. It is expected to be necessary to maintain these cordons for a period of days. A plan is in place for the phased reduction of cordons and to ensure that reopening areas to the public is managed in a coordinated way between the MPS, [insert name of Local Authority] and Transport for London. This managed approach will take into account of the following factors prior to opening areas to the public:*

4.2.1. *Security of unoccupied / unsecured premises within the cordons.*

4.2.2. *Repairs to damaged street furniture and road infrastructure.*

4.2.3. *Clean-up of the area, street cleaning and presentation issues.*

4.2.4. *Communications with business representatives and residents of premises within the cordons.*

4.2.5. *Reinstatement of public transport and other public services affected by the cordons.*

## 5. Declaration of acceptance of handover criteria

The handover criteria as set out in this document has been met to my satisfaction.

[insert signature]

[insert signature]

Date: [insert]

Date: [insert]

[Insert name], SCG Chair

[Insert name], RCG Chair

[Insert organisation]

[Insert organisation]

For information, please contact:

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**LONDON RESILIENCE GROUP**

The London Resilience Group is jointly funded and governed by the Greater London Authority, London Local Authorities and the London Fire Commissioner. We are hosted by the London Fire Brigade. Our work, and that of the London Resilience Partnership, is overseen by the London Resilience Forum.