

**Harris Review into London's
Preparedness to Respond to A Major
Terrorist Incident:
Progress Report – One Year On**

October 2017



This year has been an unbelievably difficult one for London. The terrorist attack on Westminster – the heart of our democracy; the attack on innocent people, enjoying a night out in London Bridge and Borough Market; the horrific fire at Grenfell Tower, which stretched all our emergency services; the attack on innocent people near Finsbury Park Mosque during Ramadan; and the attack at Parsons Green station on Londoners, as they travelled into work and school all show the challenges we face in keeping our capital city safe.

Our safety is my number one priority, and that is why, when I was elected, one of my first acts was to commission Lord Harris to review our preparedness to respond to a major terrorist incident. His review was an extraordinarily thorough piece of work, and it is testament to the hard work and dedication of our emergency services and other partners that they have embraced those recommendations, working tirelessly to see – one year on – over two-thirds resolved.

We all hoped, when the review was commissioned, that the outcomes would be theoretical; that we would never have to test, in real life, our ability to respond to such a tragedy. Unfortunately we have been able to see that response in real life, but this has borne out Lord Harris' view that our emergency services are broadly well prepared.

The updates in this document show the huge amount of work that has taken place over the last year, and the continuing work that is taking place. I want to record my thanks, on behalf of all Londoners, to everyone who has worked so hard to make our city safer, and improve our response should the worst happen.

Sadiq Khan
Mayor of London

Introduction

The Harris Review into London's Preparedness to Respond to a Major Terrorist Incident was published in October 2016, following a commission by the Mayor to Lord Harris of Haringey shortly after the Mayoral election of 2016.

The background to this work was a series of attacks across European cities and elsewhere in 2015 and 2016, with further attacks, such as the one in Nice taking place as the Review was prepared.

It was essential, then, that the Mayor sought assurances that London was adequately prepared to respond to an attack if one were to take place in the capital, with the emergency services well trained and equipped to respond, with the public well informed about what to do. Tragically, on 22 March such an attack took place in Westminster, killing five people.

Subsequent to that attack there have been a further three attacks in London – at Borough Market and London Bridge, outside Finsbury Park Mosque and on the London Underground at Parsons Green. In addition, an attack took place in Manchester at the MEN Arena.

After both the Manchester and Parsons Green attack the national threat level was raised to Critical. While in both instances this was only for a matter of days, it saw many of the issues raised in the Review implemented, some for the first time.

This progress report, one year on from the original review, does not seek to review the response to the recent terror attacks in the capital and elsewhere, although does reference them in the update on the recommendations. The Metropolitan Police Service, and others, are currently carrying out significant reviews into all of these attacks, and that work will continue. When these are completed there will be lessons to be learnt, and some of those will be relevant to the work being undertaken following Lord Harris' Review.

Despite making 127 recommendations for improvements to be considered by various agencies working in London, the Review found that London is broadly well prepared to respond, and certainly better prepared than five years ago. It is widely considered that this view was borne out by the response to the attacks London has faced. This should be reassuring for all Londoners, but must not lead to us being complacent.

Since publishing the Review, the Mayor's Office have been working with other parts of the Greater London Authority and the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime to review the recommendations and put them into place. Given that many of the recommendations are not aimed at the Mayoralty, or agencies which we oversee, this has involved seeking the responses from others about whether and how they

plan to put the recommendations into practice.

By and large all agencies have been receptive to Lord Harris' recommendations, and the information below is based on ongoing engagement with them. We are grateful to them for their support.

Those recommendations which are within the Mayor's gift have all been accepted, and work is underway to implement them. Across all the recommendations, it is gratifying to see that over two thirds have already been completed, one year after the recommendations were made.

MOPAC will now oversee the remaining recommendations on behalf of the Mayor. This will be done in conjunction with the London Resilience Forum, which brings together all the key partners involved and the London CONTEST Board, where necessary.

About this Document

As with the Harris Review itself, it is important to note that there is a considerable amount of detail that cannot be put in the public domain – and this is more so the case for the detail of implementation plans than the recommendations themselves. As such, the update on each recommendation seeks to provide only a public facing snapshot of the work that has taken, or is taking, place. More detailed implementation plans, specific to each organisation and agency and owned by them, sit behind this short document.

For ease of reference the document first looks at those recommendations aimed at the Mayor's Office and wider Greater London Authority (GLA), before then covering the remaining recommendations.

Where recommendations are marked as 'Resolved' this means that we consider that a satisfactory amount of work has taken place to address the issues Lord Harris was raising. In some cases activities will need to continue on an ongoing basis, or certain recommendations could only be fully completed in the event of their activation following an attack, despite a large amount of preparatory effort. We would not wish this hard work by agencies to go unrecognised and as such these recommendations are marked 'Resolved'. No complacency can be inferred from this categorisation, and the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) will continue to oversee the work to ensure that no slippage occurs or that, where resolved recommendations need continuing action, such as refreshing training, that this takes place.

In other instances work has been carried out which achieves the same outcome as a recommendation in the Review, albeit not through the same means. This may, for instance, include recommendations which could not have foreseen the specific details of the response to the recent attacks in London. These recommendations are marked as 'Resolved by other means'.

Recommendations Aimed at the Mayor's Office, MOPAC and the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority

2.

The Mayor should consult the London boroughs and the Corporation of London on an alteration to the London Plan to formally identify the need for specialist emergency services worker housing as an important planning issue for London.

As the draft Plan is being developed, the importance of ensuring sufficient housing at the right price to support the city's resilience will be recognised. The draft Plan will acknowledge that the shortage of affordable housing in the capital is hindering the recruitment and retention of public service workers, including those crucial to the operation of the emergency services, the health system and London's transport infrastructure. The Mayor's commitment to delivering more affordable housing across the capital is key to meeting this challenge.

The Mayor will consult all London local authorities and other stakeholders on this as part of the draft London Plan consultation period, which is expected to commence in late 2017.

7.

Consideration should be given to the appointment of a counter-terrorism adviser to the Mayor and Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime.

In the attacks which have taken place in London over the past months the Mayor has been confident in the advice and support provided to him by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), the MOPAC and others. As such, it is not considered necessary to appoint a specific adviser, although capacity within MOPAC is being reviewed.

This recommendation has been resolved by other means.

8.

The role of the Mayor in an attack needs to be more clearly considered by all partners.

Work has taken place to confirm the role of the Mayor in the existing structures. This resulted in the role of the Mayor being clear in recent attacks, with good and

timely briefing from the MPS and other partners and effective engagement across City Hall and the wider Greater London Authority (GLA) family.

It has been clear in all of the recent incidents in London – both Terrorism-related and otherwise – that the Mayor is an integral attendee at COBR meetings and is treated as such by government.

This recommendation has been resolved.

10.

The Mayor and the Metropolitan Police Service should strongly resist any attempts by central government to move the counter-terrorism function and wider counter-terrorism policing network from the MPS to the National Crime Agency.

The Mayor has written to the Home Secretary to raise this issue with her and will continue to make the case for the MPS to retain its counter-terrorism function. This commitment is restated in the Police and Crime Plan.

This recommendation has been resolved.

29.

The Mayor and the Commissioner should give joint consideration to whether there is a case for equipping more, properly trained and supervised, officers with CEDs (Taser).

The MPS has reviewed the provision of Taser across the force to ensure consistent use and that officers are adequately protected and this has been discussed with the Mayor. This has resulted in an agreed 20 per cent uplift in Taser provision across the MPS which is being rolled out over the coming two years.

This recommendation has been resolved.

32.

Consideration should also be given by the GLA and relevant local authorities to the wider installation of protective bollards in areas of vulnerability around London and to explore the case for retractable bollards in certain areas.

Under the London CONTEST Board, work has taken place between MOPAC, the MPS, City of London Police, local authorities, Transport for London (TfL), the Walking and Cycling Commissioner and the Home Office to identify and deliver a

permanent solution to the protection of some of London's key bridges and other crowded places.

The Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime chaired the initial London CONTEST Board sub group and the MOPAC Chief Executive Officer is now chairing subsequent meetings to ensure appropriate steps are taken to agree what and how protective security measures should be made in the capital.

This group has worked through the complexities of protecting some of our public spaces and prioritising locations by risk and vulnerability. It reported back to the London CONTEST Board on 20 October 2017 with a statement of principles, outlining how progress is being, and can continue to be made on the installation of protective bollards across London.

This work will continue, overseen by the CONTEST Board.

This work was given extra importance following the Westminster and London Bridge attacks. The placement of temporary barriers on eight bridges in London following the London Bridge attack provides an indication of what can now be achieved in protecting Londoners.

41.

MOPAC should consider repeating the survey of firearms officers with MPS officers to ascertain whether the recent armed uplift, concerns about an MTFAs, or further changes to the post-incident procedures have added to, or reduced, concerns.

The Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime are repeating the survey of firearms officers. The findings from the work will be shared with the MPS and other partners to ensure that any appropriate lessons are learned.

This recommendation has been resolved.

47.

It is important that agreement is rapidly reached for the current LFB/LAS co-responding pilot to be expanded to all London boroughs as quickly as training resources allow.

The current co-responding pilot has been concluded as a result of a national failure in the negotiations on firefighter pay. Pay negotiations are continuing but unless there is a resolution to the pay claim, it is unlikely the co-responding pilot will resume and roll-out is not expected to happen in the short term. The issues are exacerbated by the lack of funds from central Government to fund any required

increase in pay, and we will continue to make the case that they should step in to resolve this situation.

We will continue to work with the Home Office, national employers and staff representative bodies to support these negotiations.

48.

There should be no delay in implementing the new training for LFB personnel, and there should be a strategic approach to this training to ensure that the training is rolled out to those officers most likely to find themselves on the scene of an attack, based on assessments by the police and others, before other officers are trained subsequently.

A new “Enhanced Immediate Emergency Care” course has been designed and developed in close collaborations with London Ambulance Service. A significant number of firefighters have already undertaken the enhanced training course, and crews at Fire Rescue Unit stations have been prioritised. Specialist teams train to undertake casualty treatment and recovery alongside colleagues from London Ambulance Service (LAS), and the teams would deploy if a terror attack resulted in large numbers of injured.

All firefighters undertake an annual refresher training course for Immediate Emergency Care (IEC), and the enhanced IEC course will be delivered during these planned refresher sessions across London.

The strategic planning of training delivery has allowed an early and encouragingly high confidence level of firefighters with enhanced medical skills who are available to save lives in the event of further terror attacks in London.

The level of training will be kept under review to ensure that it is sufficient to keep our firefighters safe.

This recommendation has been resolved.

49.

It is important that agreement is reached as soon as possible between the fire service and the FBU to encourage all relevant fire officers to have the special training to enable them to crew Fire Rescue Units with the appropriate equipment so that they are able to respond to MTFAs. I would hope that this agreement could be reached by the end of this year.

Discussions on pay and the roles that firefighters perform are ongoing at a national level between firefighter representative bodies and the national employers. Whilst

these discussions continue, London Fire Brigade (LFB) firefighters will respond to all incidents, including suspected or confirmed terror attacks. LFB has highly trained and specially equipped teams who train regularly with colleagues from LAS, MPS, British Transport Police (BTP) and other agencies.

It should be noted that these specialist response teams have deployed to terror incidents on four separate occasions during 2017. On each occasion, the specialist teams have been supported by firefighters without specialist equipment and enhanced training. The unprotected responders operate in declared safe areas at the incident, whilst specialists forward deploy to areas where there could be potential for greater risk. Their response has been part of a highly effective multi agency operation to ensure life saving responders react immediately and move forward to treat casualties without delay.

Every firefighter is trained to undertake a Dynamic Risk Assessment at operational incidents, and take appropriate actions if their safety becomes compromised. Firefighters would always forward deploy as soon as confirmation was received that an immediate threat from attackers had been dealt with by Police.

Utilising Fire Rescue Units to deliver a greater capacity of specially trained and protected responders to a terror attack is one option being considered and one element of the ongoing negotiations concerns potential payments for specialist teams. We will continue to work with the national employers and Home Office to support them in resolving this recommendation.

51.

The Mayer review into the London Fire Brigade should look at the number of FRUs and the possibility of an attendance standard for these specialist units. Reallocation of existing resources should be considered in order to provide this.

This recommendation was referred to Anthony Mayer and was considered as part of his review.

The LFB continuously considers the disposition of specialist assets, and also continuously assesses the capacity and capability to respond in a robust and effective manner to a broad range of threats and challenges.

After every major incident or terror related attack, reviews and debriefs are undertaken, and these include reviewing the location and disposition of assets. This includes the review after the Grenfell Tower fire, which identified some additional equipment requirements. There are no immediate plans to relocate any Fire Rescue Units or specialist assets.

This recommendation has been resolved.

75.

There should be a comprehensive review of safety and security on the river, commissioned by the Mayor, to report by May 2017.

Following the publication of the Harris Review a significant amount of work has begun – with some completed – to review safety and security on the river and deliver improvements. Many partners have been involved in this work, including the MPS, the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI), the Port of London Authority (PLA), the Department for Transport (DfT) and MOPAC. For example, as a result of this, and other, recommendations the MPS have conducted exercises on the river to test their capability and approach. Relevant learning from these is being shared and incorporated.

A working group has been established which developed partners' understanding of their roles and identified how future issues could be addressed. The working group ratified their views through a small strategic group.

Given this work, it is considered that the right course of action to ensure safety and security on the river is to bring together these elements and identify any gaps in their work, rather than commissioning a separate review which would undoubtedly cover the same ground and may risk delaying the implementation of sensible measures.

This recommendation has been resolved by other means.

77.

The police and security services should consider producing a regular newsletter – perhaps once a fortnight – put together with business in order to ensure that it meets their needs, which can provide up to date, and specific, guidance. This can then be distributed to heads of security in businesses, business groups and placed online for others.

The Cross-sector Safety and Security Communications (CSSC) Hub has begun the publication of London Protect, a newsletter which is intended to be a 'two-way engagement of ideas' between business and security services. Feedback has been extremely positive and the London Protect template will now be rolled out as a series of regional updates.

At the moment there is not considered the demand to publish something as regularly as every two weeks, but this will be kept under review as London Protect becomes a more regular part of the counter-terrorism communications landscape.

This recommendation has been resolved.

78.

I recommend that the Mayor convenes a small group to take forward discussions about how further information can be provided to business.

Following the publication of the Harris Review a significant amount of work has taken place with the business community, some of which is covered by other updates in this document.

The business sub-group of the London Resilience Forum has been providing specific advice, via MOPAC, and the National Counter Terrorism Policing HQ (NCTPHQ) has convened business to understand their needs. As a result of this work, six industry sector bespoke workshops have been established with an agenda that includes the themes identified at a summit which took place in the summer as being the most significantly challenging, namely:

- Legislation and Regulation
- Communication
- Business Partnership
- Research and Innovation
- Training, Learning and Qualifications

Each workshop will be co-chaired by an expert from the relevant business sector and a senior police officer. The workshops will also include representatives from across that business sector, academia and policing (although the focus should be on keeping police numbers small).

In addition, the London CONTEST Board, which is chaired by the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime has discussed this issue and will continue to take work forward.

As a result of the considerable work taking place, this recommendation has been resolved by other means.

87.

The Mayor should build on the creation of the MPS Muslim Communities Forum and create a separate pan-London, multi-faith, reference group who can provide advice, guidance and, most importantly, a unified voice to London in the event of a terrorist attack of whatever kind.

The Deputy Mayor for Social Integration, Social Mobility and Community Engagement, Matthew Ryder, has agreed with the Metropolitan Police and the Chair of the Faith Sector Panel (FSP) of the London Resilience Forum that the FSP

should be the primary vehicle for responding to this recommendation.

The Deputy Mayor for Social Integration, Social Mobility and Community Engagement is formally joining the FSP, which will enable the panel to have high-level engagement with the Mayor's Office and facilitate much faster dissemination of key messages and relevant information in the event of a major incident. The Mayor's Community Engagement Team is taking over secretariat responsibility for the Panel and be responsible for keeping in close contact with Panel members both in the event of, and outside of, any such incidents. This will enable us to build on the strengths of the existing structures, with its established links to the Forum and the MPS, whilst retaining the knowledge and expertise of panel members and offering a significant boost in capacity by using City Hall staff. It is intended that the newly-constituted panel will meet before the end of the year.

This recommendation has been resolved by other means.

90.

In the event of a significant terrorist attack all those who are registered as victims or survivors should have access to a dedicated source of information and advice.

Victims and survivors of terrorist attacks in London are supported in the first instance by a range of voluntary providers on an emergency footing, funded by the Ministry of Justice. Victim Support, British Red Cross, St John Ambulance and Salvation Army provide people resources and onsite support at humanitarian assistance centres (HACs) for the duration of any emergency response. This was the case following the recent attacks.

Victims of terrorism, their families and others affected who attended HACs for support can then be directly referred into Local Support Services (LSS) run by Victim Support and funded by MOPAC, after having an initial onsite assessment of needs. In this way longer term support will be provided by the LSS. Information and advice forms an important part of the support offer at all stages.

The Mayor has appointed London's first Victims' Commissioner who will be exploring these issues, including through the development of the MOPAC-commissioned online victims' portal for London. This will be a dedicated source of information and advice for victims and survivors of terrorist attacks will be incorporated. This portal will launch in Spring 2018.

91.

In the event of an incident that the Mayor determines is of sufficient severity, this London Emergencies Trust should be immediately stood up to become the official, but independent, vehicle to provide charitable support for those affected.

GLA officers have held meetings with the London Emergencies Trust and the recommendation has been agreed. We are now developing a series of different funding models which can be deployed to assist with those impacted by a major incident. This may range from a major relief fund, to providing advice to local authorities on how to establish smaller local funds, depending on the scale of any incident. This work will ensure that the public, charities and other bodies are able to provide donations which will reach those in need quickly and effectively.

The next steps are to agree a formal protocol including draft 'decisions' which can be used if and when the need arises. There will also be twice-yearly review with the London Emergencies Trust to ensure that any emergencies fund set up by the Mayor is learning from other funds established nationally and internationally. It will also ensure any fund meets best practice requirements as laid out by the Charities Commission.

This recommendation has been resolved.

98.

The LRF should have a bigger role in ensuring that lessons are learnt following any incidents and that, with added political weight behind them, they are able to use the power of the Mayoralty to ensure that agencies across London implement any changes required to improve preparedness.

The (Local Resilience Forums) LRF's Partnership Training and Exercise Group has now been restructured to give effect to this recommendation. The inclusion of the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime, the Deputy Mayor for Transport and, in the future, the Deputy Mayor for Fire into the LRF structure, as recommended in recommendation 97 will increase this political engagement.

This recommendation has been resolved.

106.

The regular PAS survey commissioned by MOPAC should be adapted to include specific questions on public perception of the threat and the public attitude to the measures being taken to counter the threat.

The most recent Public Attitude Survey by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime included questions on how the public perceive firearms. About two thirds of the respondents agreed that it was necessary for more officers to carry firearms (67%) and half agreed with the statement that seeing a firearms officer made them feel safer (50%). In addition, almost two thirds stated they would feel comfortable approaching a firearms officer (64%).

The results from this survey are valuable and, as such, are being shared with the MPS for learning and development on engagement practices between firearms officers and the public. They will also be shared with the London CONTEST Board who have a role in scrutinising the work of the MPS in relation to counter-terrorism.

This recommendation has been resolved and the questions will feature in future surveys.

115.

Consideration should be given to requiring that counter-terrorism advice be brought into the process of obtaining venue or event licences and that appropriate assurances are given about staff training. The Mayor, together with the police and London Councils should consider how this can be done.

Specific decisions about various licensing regimes are for local government. As such, this recommendation has also been remitted to the London CONTEST Board, which includes representation from local councils, for consideration.

Discussions have commenced on the opportunity to look at how the licensing framework can reflect this recommendation; however, it is likely that a similar effect can be achieved in a more direct manner by improving the training given to staff working at such venues. Work in MOPAC has already commenced on developing a self-assessment tool. This will cover various licensing related matters including information and guidance with regard to the terrorist threat and how best to respond to it. The development of this is being supported by Police CPI Ltd.

In addition, the Mayor has appointed a Night Czar, Amy Lamé, who chairs the London Music Board and Philip Kolvin QC, who chairs the Mayor's Night Time Commission. The London Music Board and Night Time Commission will work with MOPAC to include counter-terrorism advice in their work on licensing. Both the Night Czar and the Chair of the Night Time Commission work with local authorities, the Metropolitan Police, Transport for London, businesses and Londoners to ensure

London thrives as a 24-hour city. The Night Time Commission will deliver a report to the Mayor in 2018 advising as to the future of London as a 24-hour city.

126.

Consideration should be given to appointing a Mayoral Adviser on resilience.

With London Resilience being part of the London Fire Brigade, the new Deputy Mayor for Fire and Rescue will be the Mayoral Adviser on resilience. The Mayor is pushing the Home Office to take the necessary action so that this post can be created at the earliest opportunity, as part of the changes that will replace the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA).

Insofar as a decision to appoint a Mayoral Adviser, with the new Deputy Mayor for Fire and Rescue identified as the holder of the post, this recommendation has been resolved.

127.

The new Mayoral Adviser should be supported by a Chief Resilience Officer for London, who would report directly to the adviser and the Mayor.

Detailed work is underway defining this role, with a view to an appointment being made by the time the new Mayoral Adviser is in post.

In the interim, the Mayor's Office is advised as necessary by the Head of London Resilience.

Other Recommendations

1.

The Mayor should ask the Chair of the London Resilience Forum to consider how London's preparedness to deal with a major incident may be impacted by a majority of the three main 'blue light' emergency services workers living outside London.

The Chair of the LRF has carried out a questionnaire with key members of London's emergency services and other interested parties.

The feedback showed that responders did not consider the question of where staff live to be an issue affecting their response. They consider that the business continuity and other plans they have in place – which are constantly under consideration – ensure that they have the staff in place to meet the needs of each agency.

This recommendation has been resolved.

3.

A full review of perimeter security at London City Airport should be conducted by the MPS and airport management.

Following the Black Lives Matters protest at London City Airport on 6 September 2016 the airport authorities conducted a review of security. The Civil Aviation Authority and the Department for Transport have deemed their operations to be fully compliant with industry security regulations.

This recommendation has been resolved.

4.

The Civil Aviation Authority should, building on the work of the House of Lords review into the civil use of drones, ensure that the current legislation relating to the use of drones is suitable. Government should also explore technological options to improve the capacity to restrict drone use or disable them.

The Department for Transport (DfT) has recently published a response to its consultation on drone policy which sets out the intention to introduce a range of new measures for drones, which DfT is now in the process of developing and scoping with other departments and the Civil Aviation Authority. The Government

plans to implement mandatory registration requirements for all users of drones weighing between 250g and 20kg. Upon registering there would then be a mandatory competency test for leisure pilots to undertake in order to demonstrate their knowledge of the regulations. Both measures are integral in ensuring users are aware of their responsibilities and will additionally be used to target them with further educational materials to improve their awareness and adherence to safety, privacy and security rules. These measures are also envisaged to improve law enforcement efforts and give the Government and regulators indications of the numbers of drones in the UK. This will help to assess risk and develop future policy.

In addition, DfT have confirmed that they are working to create an authoritative source of UK airspace data, to facilitate the implementation of geo-fencing (a useful tool in addressing inadvertent incursions into restricted airspace and over sensitive sites, whereby a drone is programmed not to fly at certain GPS coordinates) and build greater awareness of airspace restrictions amongst drone users. To achieve this, the Government is launching a pilot project – Project Chatham – that will look to regularly publish data for UK areas that drones, whether commercial or leisure, should not be flown in. The intention is to publish this data in formats that can be easily and instantly used by app developers to visually show restrictions on map apps, as well as a format that is easily digestible by members of the public. The Government will then also work with drone manufacturers for them to use this data to implement geo-fencing for these areas in their drones. The Government views this project as one of the first steps in moving towards a dynamic drone traffic management system in the future.

Finally, the Government is also working on scoping other possible measures to take forward, such as raising penalties, amending law enforcement powers, and further restricting drone flight above 400ft and within a certain distance of airports.

This recommendation has been resolved.

5.

The Mayor should seek, nationally, assurances that the routine screening and searching of cars and freight entering the country is being significantly enhanced, with an uplift in land-based and sea-based border force coverage. In addition, the aerial surveillance capacity available to the Border Force, the National Crime Agency (NCA) and the police enabling them to monitor and control the border needs to be enhanced given that existing capacity is already fully utilised.

The Home Office have confirmed that they constantly review their approach to border security and are introducing new technologies such as the Advanced Freight Targeting Capability (AFTC) at the border to enhance the targeting capability across different modes of transport. The Border Force has invested £68m in

technology and infrastructure in 2016/17, a 70% uplift on the previous year, to make our borders even stronger.

As outlined in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, the Home Office anticipates an enhancement of joint working between Law Enforcement Agencies and the Royal Navy.

The Joint Maritime Operations Coordination Centre (JMOCC) has now been established at the Portsmouth Technology Park, Portsmouth. This brings together a number of key stakeholders in the maritime sphere, including Border Force, the Ministry of Defence, Department for Transport, National Crime Agency, Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Marine Management Organisation, Marine Scotland, National Maritime Information Centre, and the Police (National Police Air Service and the emergency Blue Light Air Service).

The JMOCC will act as the National single point of focus for all maritime law and marine enforcement, and will seek to develop plans on the future operating environment of the maritime security sector, taking into account partners' available capabilities and resources.

The Mayor will continue to raise the issue of access to firearms by potential terrorists, including through these routes, with the Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations at his regular meetings.

This recommendation has been resolved.

6.

Joint intelligence hubs should be established between the NCA and MPS to tackle the illegal importation of firearms with regular reports to Ministers and to the Mayor's Office on the progress being made.

The MPS and the National Crime Agency (NCA) have been liaising more closely as demonstrated by a recent multi-agency operation, which saw the recovery of a significant number of illegally held firearms as well as other weapons and quantities of Class A drugs and cash which enhanced law enforcement's shared understanding of the illegal firearms market. Learning from this work is now being developed into an enduring multi-agency model with a national and international focus.

The issues raised in the recommendation have been discharged and the Mayor will continue to raise this with the Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations (ACSO) at his regular meetings.

This recommendation has been resolved by other means.

9.

The Cabinet Office should urgently update their guidance on COBR attendees to unequivocally include the Mayor in all meetings about incidents affecting, or potentially affecting, London.

It has been clear in all of the recent incidents in London – both Terrorism-related and otherwise – that the Mayor is an integral attendee at COBR meetings and is treated as such by government.

This has been resolved.

11.

It is essential, in the EU exit negotiations, that UK policing is able to maintain the required international arrangements that currently work to keep us safe.

The Mayor and Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime are clear that leaving the EU must not negatively impact UK law enforcement's ability to keep people safe. The Mayor has set out six red lines which are crucial for continued cooperation on security and counter-terrorism with European partners and which must be held to in Brexit negotiations in order to keep the British public safe:

- 1. The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol)** – enables vital intelligence sharing to help combat serious crimes including: illicit drugs; trafficking in human beings; illegal immigration; fraud, money laundering and asset tracing; mobile organised crime groups and terrorism.
- 2. The European Arrest Warrant (EAW)** - enables the extradition of individuals between Member States to stand trial or serve a sentence. Losing the EAW would make it harder to bring suspects back to the UK to face justice.
- 3. The Schengen Information System II (SISII)** – provides real-time alerts between countries to share information on people and property, and was consulted 3.9bn times in 2016 alone by Member States and Associated Countries.
- 4. EU Passenger Name Records** - the name, date of birth, nationality and passport number of passengers are screened by the UK Border Agency against watch-lists to allow early identification of persons of known interest for security, immigration, customs or law enforcement purposes. This makes it far harder for organised criminals and terrorists to hide their movements.
- 5. European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS)** – allows the UK access to criminal records throughout the EU, critical in making speedy decisions and understanding how great a risk certain individuals represent.

6. The Prüm arrangements - enables instant access to DNA profiles, fingerprint data and vehicle registration data.

These issues have been raised directly with the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the Home Office, and others, and MOPAC will continue to support the police in achieving this aim. The Mayor, and others, will continue to make this case in discussions with Government as negotiations with the EU continue.

Work is ongoing within policing, with the National Crime Agency, the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) and the MPS working closely together on the evidence base and national priorities for negotiation.

12.

In all cases where terrorism is considered in the initial phase of an operation, and the counter-terrorism protocols are, or should have been, implemented, there should be a thorough review of the operation to ensure any lessons can be learnt.

A review process is now in place within the MPS to ensure that a review is carried out of MPS response and activity for all incidents where terrorism was considered in the MPS initial or later response. The review will ensure lessons are learnt where appropriate and the adjustments and improvements can be made by the MPS and partners. In relation to the recent attacks, considerable review work is taking place.

This recommendation has been resolved.

13.

In choosing how to allocate resources, the MPS must strike a reasonable balance between the intelligence picture and a sensible assessment of other tactics which terrorists might use and, above all, there should be a readiness to expect the unexpected.

The MPS is continuing to work with all the intelligence agencies to ensure an intelligence-led policing response to the current threats, albeit not just exploring currently used tactics by terrorists.

This recommendation has been resolved, but will be kept under review through the London CONTEST Board and the Mayor's regular meetings with the Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations to ensure that active consideration continues.

14.

When deploying the military, it is important that proper communication takes place with the public, led by senior politicians and police and military leaders, to provide reassurance and give confidence to Londoners and visitors to the city.

London has moved to Critical twice in recent months – following the Manchester attack and the recent attack on the London underground at Parsons Green. In both cases the military have been deployed as part of Operation Temperer.

When Temperer deployment has taken place this has been accompanied with significant communications activity by the military, police and others to reassure Londoners.

This recommendation has been resolved.

15.

The Operation Temperer process should be fully tested during one the regular counter-terrorism response exercises.

London has moved to Critical twice in recent months – following the Manchester attack and the recent attack on the London underground at Parsons Green. In both cases the military have been deployed as part of Operation Temperer.

Lessons learnt from these deployments are being considered by the military, the police and others.

This recommendation has been resolved by other means.

16.

The military and police must keep under constant review, in the light of developing threat assessments, the level and availability of specialist troops used to confront or neutralise a terrorist threat.

The Military and police have confirmed that preparedness is kept under constant review, and has been specifically looked at again as part of the response to the terrorist attacks in Paris last year. There are tried and tested arrangements for the provision of military support and both police and military routinely exercise together to ensure maximum interoperability. These arrangements have been put into practice in the two times the UK national threat level has gone to Critical in recent months.

Well established measures are in place to draw on wider support in the event

of specific intelligence and/or a rise in the national threat level for a temporary period (typically 14 days). These include activation of the National Strategic Armed Policing Reserve, Operation Temperer and use of local, regional and national armed policing mobilisation plans to rapidly surge forces.

This recommendation has been resolved.

17.

A permanent armed policing presence should be maintained at the MOD headquarters on Whitehall. Any attempt to reduce this resource, with an expectation that the MPS will provide policing cover, should be accompanied by the appropriate transfer of funds.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) have now confirmed that they have no plans to change the policing and guarding requirements for the MoD Head Office in Whitehall.

This recommendation has been resolved.

18.

The MPS should review the number of motorcycles and trained drivers available to ensure an adequate response is still available should the road network around an incident – as is likely – become heavily congested.

The MPS has motorcycles capable of deployment with Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officers (CTSFOs) as crew and the capacity has increased line with the armed uplift programme.

All operational CTSFO's have recently received familiarisation training as a motorcycle pillion which would allow the MPS to deliver them to an incident as a pillion if required.

This recommendation has been resolved.

19.

Consideration should be given to wider measures to increase the number of firearms instructors

As part of the ongoing armed uplift programme the MPS has been working to increase the number of instructors through conventional means, as well as wider

measures to deliver the right number of instructors for the programme.

This work has included activity to make the roles more attractive to applicants, including through pay and conditions, as well as identifying opportunities for authorised firearms officers approaching retirement. These measures have seen instructor numbers steadily increase, and they will continue to do so.

20.

It should be ensured that the fullest use is made of all available providers of firearms training, such as the City of London Police and the MOD Police.

There is significant work ongoing by the MPS to ensure that every opportunity to use other providers of firearms training is explored. This includes the use of “facilities only” arrangements as well as the provision of full training courses. Recent arrangements and those under continuing discussion involve collaboration with the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the City of London Police, other regional forces outside London as well as non-police organisations such as MoD and Fire Service College.

This recommendation has been resolved.

21.

The Home Office and National Police Chief’s Council should review firearms training to generate a national picture of capacity to see if further resources are needed, in the short-term.

As part of the armed policing uplift, the police have developed a national training plan, which takes account of all police firearms training within Home Office forces, including specialist training. This is allowing them to manage delivery of the armed uplift, and also to monitor ongoing training, refresher courses and maintenance in all forces. The armed uplift programme also works closely with non-Home Office forces on training matters; for example coordinating the training of specialist firearms officers with Police Scotland.

This recommendation has been resolved.

22.

The ‘30plus’ scheme should be reintroduced to help to ensure that there is a pool of suitably qualified and experienced instructors and firearms officers maintained and enhanced within the Service.

The Home Office has been working with the police in relation to the retention of firearms officers and instructors post-retirement. In relation to the '30plus' scheme, the Home Secretary has been consulted and is not in favour of the legislative change that would be required, as this would not be swift enough to support the armed uplift.

The Home Office have agreed with the MPS that they are able to re-hire instructors as civilian staff in order to boost numbers of available instructors and recruitment for these posts is underway.

While the 30plus scheme is not being reintroduced, there are no measures in place which would prevent the Metropolitan Police Service from re-engaging retired officers.

This recommendation has been resolved by other means.

23.

Work to introduce a reservist programme has the potential to increase flexibility and resources at times of higher demand and should be explored thoroughly.

A national programme of work, being led by a chief officer from Leicestershire Police on behalf of the National Police Chiefs' Council is underway. The MPS are observing this programme to see if it can deliver the requirements necessary for such a programme in London.

24.

It is important that the MPS does not lose focus on improving the diversity – in terms of both gender and ethnicity – of the cadre of firearms officers.

The MPS have accepted the need for this and recognise the unique opportunity to increase diversity amongst firearms officers. As such, they have put plans in place to this effect, such as a mentoring scheme, which is now the subject of ongoing review, and are monitoring performance.

This recommendation has been resolved.

25.

While focusing on the recruitment of firearms officers the MPS needs to develop an appropriate retention strategy to reduce wastage levels of these officers.

The MPS have now created a retention strategy to address this concern. It includes structured career progression for officers and peer mentoring schemes, a pragmatic approach to the posting of officers who successfully apply for promotion, support for retiring officers to return to the MPS as members of police staff where they are able to contribute to the armed capability and strong investment in post-incident support to ensure the appropriate return of officers to operational roles in armed policing where they have been involved in incidents where firearms have been discharged.

This recommendation has been resolved.

26.

If any recommendation about special payments to firearms officers is made by the Independent Police Remuneration Review Body, there must be a mechanism that ensures this does not add to existing funding pressures within the MPS.

No full proposals have yet been made regarding a special payment scheme. However, the Home Office asked the independent Police Remuneration Review Body (PRRB) to consider some outline NPCC proposals for their 2017 report. PRRB concluded that a scheme for appropriate, targeted arrangements to allow local flexibility for chief constables to address hard-to-fill roles should be devised by NPCC.

The MPS is currently facing an unprecedented funding challenge, being required to make £400 million of savings, in addition to savings of £600 million which have already been made. We are clear that, should any special payments be recommended at a national level, these should be funded by central Government. We will continue to make this case to Government if such a proposal was made.

27.

In future, the Home Office should fully fund the National and International Capital Cities Grant to ensure that London is properly protected and London's communities are not having to subsidise national functions.

The MPS spends £346m a year on activity linked to London's position as a major global capital. The MPS is supposed to receive full compensation for this work so that Londoners do not pay the cost. However, they currently only receive £174m a

year - £172m short. The average London council tax payer, then, pays £61 a year to subsidise this national work. The Home Office's own panel looked into this and proposed that the MPS should receive £281m a year, but Ministers refused.

The Mayor will continue to make the strongest case for fair funding for London in light of the Home Office's continued refusal to fully fund the National and International Capital Cities (NICC) grant.

28.

Action should be urgently taken to approve the new conductive energy device as a less lethal option for policing.

The Home Secretary's decision to authorise a new conductive energy device (CED), Taser International's TASER X2, for use by police forces in England and Wales was announced on 2 March 2017. This decision was in response to the formal request from the national policing lead, Deputy Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu, following the end of production of the existing authorised device, the TASER X26, and an open and transparent procurement exercise to identify a replacement.

The decision to authorise the TASER X2 follows stringent consideration of strategic, ethical, operational and societal issues, including an assessment of environmental factors. The decision to authorise the TASER X2 for use by the police also marks the award of a commercial contract with Taser International's UK distributor, Axon Public Safety Limited. A new national procurement framework agreement is now in place.

This recommendation has been resolved.

30.

The Home Office should have a clear, light-touch, approach to agreeing funding that operational leaders believe is important in keeping the public safe.

The Home Office work closely with National Counter-Terrorism Policing HQ and the MPS to ensure that they have the resources they need to counter the threats we face. That includes processes for reallocating expenditure in response to emerging risks.

While the Home Office are confident that these processes allow them to quickly agree changes to expenditure where it is appropriate to do so it is clear that there is, and will continue to be, a tension between the resources available and requests from the police.

We will work with the MPS to ensure that they can present the best possible business cases for future investment where it will help to keep London safe and lobby Government to provide the right level of funding to meet the threat London faces.

31.

A business case for these flexible barriers has previously been considered by the Home Office, but may be revisited. They should review this urgently and move to fund a solution.

A multi-agency project led by the Metropolitan Police Service has begun to consider the design, planning and costing for a more rapidly deployable scheme for securing Ceremonial Events in the Westminster ceremonial footprint.

The Westminster Ceremonial Streetscape Project is progressing well and protective security measures have already been installed in some locations. On other locations, installation can begin once design agreements have been made. Whilst further funding still needs to be found, a proportion is already pledged.

33.

The MPS should learn from the mapping technology being developed by the BTP and introduce similar systems for major sites in London such as shopping centres, large entertainment venues and even museums and galleries.

The MPS work closely with partner agencies to ensure floor plans are available to police or other emergency services in case of an incident. Many of the MPS Boroughs already hold plans or maps for major locations in their areas. In the case of an incident at one of these, the plans will be dispatched to scene where officers can view them, before taking appropriate action. Where circumstances allow, many large businesses and public venues provide copies of the plans to police officers in the event of an incident.

Other teams within the MPS also hold plans and maps, both physically and digitally, and these have been enhanced to ensure good coverage of crowded places and other potential sites. Some of these facilities have been piloted during a recent live exercise.

This recommendation has been resolved.

34.

The MPS should work with BTP, and others, to see how live CCTV streaming could be introduced to all parts of London where it might have value.

Live access to CCTV is now available to the MPS and is a possible tactical option for incidents.

This recommendation has been resolved.

35.

The MPS should, as quickly as possible, begin the implementation of Project Servator as part of the existing armed uplift programme in the Metropolitan Area, using the full range of tactics associated with the Project, and adhering to its principles and practice as closely as possible.

Project Servator was launched in the MPS in November 2016.

This recommendation has been resolved.

36.

As the process of replacing the existing Airwave radio system continues, policing, and particularly the BTP, must be fully engaged and any concerns they have should be considered carefully. The Airwave network should not be switched off until it can be shown that the new ESN works adequately everywhere and, in particular, underground to the satisfaction of the MPS, the BTP and TfL.

The Home Office have worked closely with their core suppliers, Motorola and EE, and are working with the emergency services, to determine the best approach to major operational trials and to make sure that transition to the new network happens as soon as is technically and operationally feasible.

They have been clear that as this cutting-edge technology is introduced they will not be taking any risks with public safety and so Airwave will continue until the emergency services have completed transition on to Emergency Services Network (ESN).

The Police Service position remains unchanged in that the new radio network should offer coverage that is at least as good as the Airwave system. The Home Office have led a specific steering group bringing key parties together on ensuring that the new network will deliver coverage on the underground system and the Mayor has also lent his support to ensuring this is achieved.

Although some concerns remain about the project overall, good progress has been made by TfL and the radio network providers to deliver the required coverage. A solution has been developed and it is currently being trialled.

37.

Should the Home Office continue with plans to merge certain national policing functions, such as the MOD Police and the Civil and Nuclear Constabulary, they should undertake a full assessment of the benefits of bringing the MPS and BTP underground network together.

It is clear from recent attacks – particularly the attack at Parsons Green - that interoperability between the BTP and the MPS is essential in responding to terror threats. It is this interoperability which is at the heart of this recommendation, rather than structural reform for its own sake.

This joint-working is a feature of other updates on recommendations in this document, and it is clear that an excellent relationship exists between the two forces.

At this time, we consider this recommendation resolved by other means and do not plan to pursue a merger as the most effective means of securing better joint-working.

38.

Following the COLP example, and in discussions with them about their learning from the process, the MPS should consider whether a contingent Anti-Terrorism Traffic Regulation Order (ATTRO) would be valuable in other parts of the capital.

The MPS have considered the value of contingent ATTROs across London and have concluded that there would be value in having one in place in Westminster. This has now been implemented. It is not considered necessary for other contingent ATTROs to be put in place in other parts of the capital at this time, however flexible ones are available in certain circumstances, such as around the Notting Hill Carnival Footprint where a range of Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) measures were put in place.

This recommendation has been resolved.

39.

The Home Office should undertake a full assessment of the benefits of merging the MPS and the CoLP, with the national financial and fraud functions moving to the National Crime Agency.

As with recommendation 37, above, it is clear from recent attacks – particularly the attack on London Bridge and Borough Market - that interoperability between the City of London Police (CoLP) and the MPS is essential in responding to terror threats. It is this interoperability which is at the heart of this recommendation, rather than structural reform for its own sake.

This joint-working is a feature of other updates on recommendations in this document, and it is clear that an excellent relationship exists between the two London forces.

At this time, then we consider this recommendation resolved by other means and do not plan to pursue a merger as the most effective means of securing better joint-working.

40.

The CoLP and MPS must work together to ensure that MPS officers who might be deployed into the City during an attack have a very good working knowledge of the area and the significant buildings which might become targets.

The MPS is co-ordinating liaison with CoLP and the British Transport Police in order to provide contingency plans for the most sensitive premises within London. BTP, City of London and Parliamentary/Diplomatic premises are now included within this contingency planning to ensure that all of the contingency plans are compatible and accessible by armed officers responding to any incident.

In addition, there is an ongoing process where CoLP are making arrangements for MPS officers to visit premises for guided tours or buildings and crowded places with security staff.

This recommendation has been resolved.

42.

I would urge the Home Secretary to sign off the guidance on (Independent Police Complaints Commission) IPCC investigations into deaths following police contact as soon as possible, and certainly by the end of the year.

Since the Review was published the IPCC have published an updated draft of this guidance which is currently with the Home Secretary awaiting sign off. It is disappointing that this has not yet been resolved, and we will continue to monitor this and urge rapid consideration by the Home Secretary.

43.

Central to the statutory guidance to the IPCC – whether currently included in the draft or not – should be measures to speed up investigations, and the Home Office should consider additional resources to the IPCC if needed to deliver this.

As part of a three year change programme, the IPCC has received more resource to increase the number of investigations they undertake and are developing new ways of working to improve their efficiency and performance across all areas of their business, including the quality and timeliness of completing cases.

In 2017/18, the IPCC is on track to open 650-750 independent investigations. They are continuing to reduce the average duration of active cases and continue to introduce a number of operational process improvements designed to further speed up the investigation process.

The MPS will, of course, continue to engage with the IPCC and raise concerns where investigations are unduly delayed.

44.

The draft protocol that the IPCC have developed with the police specifically on responding to a major terrorist incident, should be agreed swiftly.

The police and the IPCC have now agreed this protocol.

This recommendation has been resolved.

45.

The IPCC must, at a senior and operational level, be fully involved in future full exercises of MTFA response.

The IPCC have now been involved in dealing with the post-incident investigations of the terrorist attacks which took place since the Review was published. In addition, they have been invited to attend the next major MPS live exercise.

This recommendation has been resolved.

46.

There should be audio-recording of all command decisions taken by senior tactical and strategic leads in the command centres during an incident.

In line with the national policing policy this issue has previously been extensively reviewed and agreement has been reached by Chief Constables on the level and type of recording necessary during these types of operations.

The MPS currently ensures that records are made of command decisions using a computer based system, and this system is currently being trialled in the Special Operations Room.

At present, recording is required from the moment a Counter-Terrorism Commander is considering authorising a critical shot until either they are no longer actively considering that authorisation or until that element of the operation has concluded.

However, the national policing view is that specific audio-recording of command decisions could compromise an effective response.

We accept the national policing view and so consider that this recommendation has been resolved by other means.

50.

The Home Office should give consideration to supporting the costs associated with LFB increased MTFA capability, or at least match-funding the provision with the LFB/Mayor.

The Home Office is currently undertaking a national project to uplift the Fire and Rescue Service's specialist capability to undertake life-saving casualty care, firefighting and rescue operations at terrorist incidents. The Fire and Rescue Service forms an integral part of the co-ordinated multi-agency response to terrorist attacks, ensuring a fast and flexible deployment of specialist resources.

London Fire Brigade continues to petition the Home Office to advise on capacity and capability requirements aligned to a dynamic and evolving threat picture. We will continue to support them in this work.

52.

The Department of Health should examine how extra resources can be provided to the LAS to reflect the additional demands placed on it as being the provider of services to our capital city.

While the LAS is confident that it has the resources to deliver the capabilities required for responding to a terrorist attack, the Mayor is clear that it remains underfunded in general.

The Mayor will continue to make the case to Government for increased resources for the LAS in recognition of the significant pressures they face in providing services across the capital

53.

There should be four dedicated 24/7 Hazardous Area Response Teams (HART) in London and a similar number of Mass Casualty Vehicles. These should be strategically located around London.

The Home Office and the Ambulance Service NHS Trust consider the current provision of HART and MCVs to be appropriate, provided that they are able to maintain their current marauding terrorist firearms attack (MTFA) capacity.

HART is a national capability designed to be interoperable across ambulance trust boundaries. Any major or mass casualty incident would be responded to by London HART teams together with support from HART teams outside of London. For example, if a major incident occurred in London requiring HART capabilities, LAS would mobilise their HART units first.

If additional HART resource was required, units in neighbouring ambulance trusts (specifically those based at Gatwick, Braintree, Ashford and Eastleigh) would be required to mobilise towards London within 30 minutes.

While the Trust agrees with the national position in that two HART teams are sufficient for London (provided that current MTFA capacity is maintained), the national HART establishment of 84 working time equivalents did not take into account abstractions due to training, annual leave and short term sickness. The Trust has therefore increased its HART establishment from 84 to 98 to bolster capacity and recruitment to fill these additional posts is currently underway. In terms of MCVs, LAS has three strategically located (and nationally provided)

MCVs which are further supplemented by six equipment support vehicles. These are strategically located across London and would be mobilised in response to any major incident in London. It is the view of the Trust that this number of MCVs is sufficient.

Given this reassurance, this recommendation is considered resolved by other means.

54.

Agreement on future MTFA funding for the LAS should be reached quickly, with the NHS adequately funding LAS' requirements.

The LAS secured funding for the current 2017/18 period and is now in discussion with NHS England in regard to the 2018/19 funding.

This recommendation has been resolved.

55.

The number of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) trained LAS staff should be reviewed with a view that it should return to the higher levels previously seen in London over the past few years.

The most recent guidance issued by the National Ambulance Resilience Unit (NARU) in April 2015 advised Trusts that the requirement is to have 91 CBRN trained staff (based on 7 cells of 13 staff).

In order to ensure resilience, LAS has aimed to have double this number and the current HART staff also provide additional cover as they are CBRN trained. This gives a current figure of 273 CBRN trained staff which will continue to grow further when the HART establishment reaches 98.

Additional resilience is provided via initial operational response (IOR) training. 411 control room staff are IOR trained and provide initial advice on the telephone while 2,454 frontline staff are IOR trained and can provide advice (based on JESIP guidance) on scene, for example, advice about removing clothes and wiping down. These measures help to negate the need for CBRN deployment and ensure that the CBRN teams are only required for mass or clinical decontamination.

Finally, mutual aid arrangements are in place for protracted incidents with other ambulance trusts. So in summary, we have four layers of staff involved: (1) the control room (2) frontline staff (3) CBRN trained staff and (4) mutual aid arrangements.

Given this reassurance, this recommendation is considered resolved by other means.

56.

The Home Office should review the provision of CBRN equipped response vehicles operated by the London Fire Brigade to ensure their numbers are sufficient.

In October 2016 the Home Office completed a review of the mass decontamination capability with the Fire and Rescue Service and others and have been implementing improvements to the capability. The detailed review process seeks to ensure that the provision of CBRN Detection, Identification and Monitoring (DIM) capabilities remains sufficient and suitable to support emergency responders in London.

This will see the delivery of a faster and more flexible mass decontamination capability which makes more efficient use of our existing resources and ensures value for money. The main change is to move from the existing 'Incident Response Units', which are slow to unload, to a different set-up which will give a faster response with fewer units.

This recommendation has been resolved.

57.

Personal radiation monitors, which should be available to fire, ambulance and police personnel, should routinely be used.

Across the MPS, LAS and LFB work has taken place to identify which staff would benefit from the provision of radiation monitors. These officers and staff now have access to monitors and use them when required.

This recommendation has been resolved.

58.

A full testing and exercise programme should be developed to test the readiness of the LAS Control Room, including with no-notice exercises.

In addition to the live incidents that the LAS has responded to during the past 12 months – Croydon Tram Crash, Westminster Bridge Attack, London Bridge Attack, Grenfell Tower Fire, Finsbury Park Mosque, Parson Green, Cromwell Road/ Natural History Museum, they have carried out a range of other exercises of their procedures and systems and will continue to do so.

This recommendation has been resolved.

59.

I would encourage the tri-service heads meetings to continue, with perhaps a greater focus on dealing with the attacks considered in this review, as well as the important matter of on-going collaboration.

These meetings are continuing in line with Lord Harris' recommendation.

This recommendation has been resolved.

60.

The capacity of London's major trauma centres should be reviewed further in the light of the latest planning assumptions and, in any event, it would be helpful if this could be exercised thoroughly to ensure that the assumptions used are sufficiently robust.

All of the major trauma centres in England (including those in London) are scheduled to participate in an exercise to test their preparedness for a mass casualty event before March 2018, which will consider their capacity. The NHS in London has also undertaken a thorough lessons learned exercise in light of the response to the recent terrorist attacks.

61.

There would be value in NHS England working closely with those countries' health agencies – for example France and Belgium – to ensure that lessons are learnt from their response and best practice can be shared.

NHS England is working with a range of organisations, the Devolved Administrations and other countries on emergency planning. This has included visiting Paris and sharing learning with colleagues in Belgium. This work is informing the NHS England Mass Casualty Plan.

This recommendation has been resolved.

62.

There is a specific need to bolster community mental health services in London to support vulnerable people who might be at risk of radicalisation

Prevent training is being given to mental health professionals and the Department of Health are working to improve the availability of mental health interventions and support structures for those vulnerable to radicalisation. This work also includes

extra training, working in conjunction with the Royal College of Psychiatry.

The Mayor commissioned an independent report by the King's Fund and Nuffield Trust which shows that greater city-wide leadership is needed to successfully implement NHS plans which make earlier access to mental health services a priority.

These plans have the potential to improve health and care in London through collaboration between NHS organisations, local authorities and other stakeholders. The Mayor, as chair of the London Health Board, has called for a greater role in providing oversight of these NHS's future plans, which focus on improving care in priority service areas such as mental health, and improving mental health services and their integration with other community services.

The Mayor has already taken steps to improve the health of Londoners by launching Thrive LDN, a city-wide movement improve the mental health and wellbeing of Londoners.

This issue is also being considered by the London CONTEST Board who will maintain an interest in this area of work, particularly focused on the capacity of provision.

63.

The Home Office should work with the Department of Health to ensure that the Prevent duty applies to GPs.

The Home Office have continued to work closely with the Department of Health to support GPs in safeguarding against radicalisation. This work is undertaken in conjunction with appropriate stakeholders from the sector and clinical practitioners.

Further progress on this would require legislation and, as such, is not within the gift of the Mayor.

64.

It is important that CCTV is also available on all underground and mainline trains, and options for ensuring a suitable system, enabling operational commanders to have access in the event of an emergency, should be explored.

All London Underground stations already have CCTV systems and there are plans in place to complete the provision of CCTV to the trains that do not currently have it either by retrofitting or when new trains come into service. Links to operational commanders are being extended for station CCTV and provision for remote links is

also included in longer term plans for trains where further infrastructure needs to be provided. All plans remain on target.

TfL will continue to monitor this work, albeit that the replacement of trains on the London Underground network will be a process taking place over a number of years.

65.

It is my view, having listened to the advice of experts, that in every situation as much of the transport network should be kept running as possible.

TfL and National Rail work closely with the police to ascertain where closures need to take place for public safety reasons. This approach forms a common framework that recognises the need, as highlighted in the Review, to keep as much of the network running as possible, where it is safe to do so, to avoid stranding people or exacerbating security threats.

This recommendation has been resolved.

66.

TfL and the BTP should provide advice to passengers – based on discussions and decisions taken by the Strategic Coordination Group – that goes beyond just the provision of information.

In the case of a terrorist attack, to ensure one consistent message, the advice to Londoners would usually be decided by the police. If the advice was to avoid certain parts of the transport network, or all of it, TfL would reflect the message very quickly through a wide range of communications channels.

TfL will engage with other agencies to look to whether this system might be improved further in such situations to make sure that information and advice can flow down effectively from the Strategic Coordination Group as tactical customer facing advice.

This recommendation has been resolved.

67.

TfL should work with taxi and private hire companies – including Uber – to ensure that drivers have a good level of awareness about how to prevent a terrorist attack through a clear understanding of what constitutes suspicious behaviour.

TfL's Taxi and Private Hire Department have been working with the Cross-sector Safety & Security Communication project to promote engagement by drivers, helping to make them aware of the key prevention messages. TfL also work with the police to encourage Taxi and Private hire businesses to participate in Project Argus and Project Griffin and tailored Argus and Griffin packages have been delivered to both drivers and employers.

TfL has incorporated a briefing on counter-terrorism in its publication that goes out to all taxi and private hire drivers and operators.

This recommendation has been resolved.

68.

TfL should also work with the MPS to ensure that there are sufficient processes in place to prevent the use of taxis or licensed minicabs by would-be terrorists.

A longstanding national programme under the Protect strand of CONTEST and undertaken nationally by the police aims to mitigate the impact of the use of all types of vehicles for terrorist purposes, and is part of our wider protective security work. Any intelligence relating to a specific threat from taxis or mini-cabs would precipitate the implementation of enhanced measures. These arrangements are under constant review in line with any changes in threat methodology and CT guidance and awareness is now contained in the TfL website for use by the taxi industry.

TfL are working with the police to develop processes such as introducing a minimum three-year enhanced Disclosure and Barring Service check for drivers to guarantee that a full and comprehensive period of criminal history is available for consideration as part of the licensing process.

The MPS Taxi and Private Hire Policing Team, along with TfL Taxi and Private Hire Compliance Officers, have increased the level of stopping and checking taxi and private hire vehicles. This random preventative measure sits alongside the enhanced DBS checking to help reduce any risk.

London locations vulnerable to permitting unauthorised vehicle access have also been reminded of the need for not accepting vehicles at face-value.

This recommendation has been resolved.

69.

DCLG should ring-fence budgets for local resilience teams and introduce a small inspectorate, sitting either within the Cabinet Office or DCLG, to monitor performance. If central government will not introduce such a review mechanism, the London Resilience Forum should consider its role here.

It is disappointing to note that the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) have rejected this recommendation and determined that it is a matter for each local authority to allocate resources and decisions. While the principles of localism would broadly lead to such an approach, the potential impact of a local authority failing adequately to invest in resilience, or being prepared to respond in an emergency, is significant. The tragedy at Grenfell Tower in Kensington and Chelsea demonstrates that such incidents cannot be predicted and could happen right across London.

The Civil Contingences Secretariat in the Cabinet Office is currently reviewing any early lessons for how resilience can be enhanced in light of recent incidents. This work, which has engaged with the Mayor's Office and London Resilience is looking at, among other things, the effectiveness of local responses in the event of a major civil emergency, in order to identify more rapidly where capacity and capability may be overwhelmed or showing signs of overstretch. This work is welcome and should provide further evidence of the pressures many local authorities face.

The LRF is continuing to explore its role in the this space with a need for further discussions on developing standards and assurance processes for Local Resilience Forums.

70.

Local authorities should work with the London Resilience Forum to consider where effective partnerships might be built at a sub-regional, but supra-borough, level, ensuring that local knowledge and connections can be retained.

Local authorities have now established enhanced sub-regional coordination and collaboration arrangements. Service Level Agreements have been developed between authorities to support this. This initiative forms part of a suite of recommendations included in the Recommendations for Local Government Emergency Planning and Resilience for the 2020's document, which are designed to enhance London local authority resilience arrangements. The other recommendations continue to be progressed.

This recommendation has been resolved.

71.

The police and security agencies should ensure that timely and detailed information about the threat – including changes in police and terrorist tactics – is provided to their local authority partners to enable effective resilience planning to take place.

The government prepares for a broad range of threats and hazards through the National Risk Assessment (NRA). The NRA is intended to capture significant emergencies that might have a major impact on all, or significant parts of, the UK, including marauding terrorist attacks. To assist with national and local planning, the government shares a version of the NRA with each Local Authority, covering the scale, duration and impact that could reasonably be expected to occur as a result of these emergencies.

The NRA is now published at official-sensitive classification for the first time. This means that local planners, such as Local Resilience Forums (LRFs), can now access threat information with greater ease, allowing for more complete local risk assessments to be undertaken.

The government also provides guidance to LRFs on how to interpret the risks in the NRA to help with their local assessment of risk. This ensures that risk assessment at all levels of government is integrated and can underpin coherent emergency planning throughout the country.

National table-top exercises are also underway, launched in London last year, which are helping to improve Local Authority understanding of risks and tactics.

This recommendation has been resolved.

72.

Local authorities should be prioritising an effective functioning CCTV network for the detection and prevention of terrorist (or indeed other criminal) activity across the capital in the interests of public safety. The level and functionality of CCTV provision should be kept under review by the Mayor's Office.

MOPAC, Local Authorities, the MPS and London Councils have been working together to identify good practice, future proof technologies and recommendations for interoperability.

MOPAC is currently procuring expertise to conduct this technical project. The

project will see a high level review of existing local authority control room facilities, considering issues such as the technology used, quality of images gathered, status of investment, nature of monitoring and additional services offered. The assessment will also consider the nature of existing working relations between control rooms and partners such as the MPS, allowing for identification of best practice.

73.

There is a strong argument in favour of putting in place a stricter regime that ensures the River is a safer and more secure place and this should be considered.

A group chaired by the Department for Transport has been formed to examine what the options are for delivering this recommendation. It is reviewing what is currently in place, assessing the risks and seeing whether action in putting in place a stricter regime would be appropriate and would more appropriately manage the risks as they stand today.

The recommendation is linked to Recommendation 74, below.

74.

I recommend that consideration should be given to widening the remit of the Port of London Authority to give them a formal interest in the security of the River.

A working group met in the summer to consider recommendation 74. Having gained a more comprehensive perspective stakeholders felt that more strategic guidance on how the work should be taken forward was required. It was therefore agreed that a senior Executive Group (EG) will be established to provide strategic guidance on and coordination of all the security related work emanating from the River Thames recommendations (73-75) contained in the Lord Harris Review.

This guidance will take note of an updated intelligence assessment on what the threat and risk is. This work will help shape future plans for ensuring the security of the river and its users.

76.

The London Resilience Forum should establish a sub-group of partners to consider resilience on the Thames.

The Port of London Authority will be chairing and supporting a River Group which

includes the emergency services and local authorities. The Terms of Reference and details of membership have been agreed by the LRF and their work is ongoing.

This recommendation has been resolved.

79.

Communication should be improved with security operatives, via the Security Industry Authority (SIA). This includes both communications of the threat in advance, and effective communication during an attack. This should include single points of contact in the key organisations.

Points of contact exist between policing and the SIA who sit on the Crowded Places Information Exchange which shares confidential information regarding defences against terrorist attack, both immediately post incident and as part of business-as-usual. The Step Change Summit 2017 was set up by National Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters and the Cross-sector Safety and Security Communications (CSSC) hub (supported by The Corporation of London), in response to recent terrorist attacks. It brought together leading voices from the police, counter terrorism and business communities to share their experiences and knowledge, and provide a platform to discuss practical challenges and solutions. The SIA is a key partner in this and the programme will continue to improve coordination between policing and private industry.

80.

Effective training should be given to SIA licensed security operatives that goes beyond the Griffin and Argus training already conducted. There should be a tailored package available to all SIA licensed personnel.

This work is now in the final development phase to take it from a beta product to a final version, and industry are working to support this. The next set of discussions will focus on the most appropriate platform for the product to be held on.

A full evaluation of the beta is currently taking place, with the response from industry so far being overwhelmingly positive.

81.

As the menu of tactical options for responding to an MTFAs or other terrorist attack are developed, there should be specific consideration given to the role that SIA licensed operatives can play.

The SIA are provided with information and advice on how to react to incidents

through the Crowded Places Information Exchange and London PROTECT (see recommendation 77). The role of the SIA is being considered alongside the role of all private sector organisations, as policing and the Home Office seek to develop options for their greater involvement in protective security in conjunction with government. NCTPHQ are actively working with the SIA as part of the Step Change initiative, which is beginning this discussion.

82.

Support should also be given to in-house security, assuming assurances can be gained about their security credentials.

A fully revised Griffin product has been produced and distributed for in-house security. At the same time a survey was been launched to understand the impact of the revised product which has so far showed a very high level of satisfaction by industry users. Counter Terrorism Focus Desks are available to provide advice to all security staff in all businesses as required.

This recommendation has been resolved.

83.

A package of support, to extract the most value in the event of an attack, should exist for those security personnel working in sports stadia and airports.

The National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) leads on both Argus and Griffin and work is ongoing to widen the development of CT awareness across all sectors, in addition to providing regular briefings on the threat. Training is being provided to airports and stadia to ensure they understand the role they can play during and following a terrorist attack.

In London bespoke Griffin, training, testing and exercising and other initiatives for airports and sports stadia have been developed and are being delivered. This has included all football league clubs receiving support from Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs), along with other sports stadia. In addition, Project Servator is being rolled out to UK airports which will include joint operating with security staff at those airports.

This recommendation has been resolved.

84.

NaCTSO should review the published guidance given to crowded places, including stadia, to ensure it is up to date with relevant police and potential terrorist tactics.

All specific guidance, including the factsheets and links provided by CT Policing have been revised by NaCTSO, the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and small and medium enterprises from across industry. The guidance has been updated to reflect the current threat and mitigation options and is available on the NaCTSO website at <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-crowded-places-guidance-launched>.

This recommendation has been resolved.

85.

The London Resilience Forum business group, which currently exists, should be renewed with a broader spectrum of businesses and business groups added to it to ensure a genuine cross-section of London's business community. The Metropolitan Police should ensure that a senior officer acts as the point of contact with this group and takes responsibility for ensuring that the issues that arise from their discussions are properly pursued.

The changes to the business group have been agreed by the LRF and new terms of reference, agendas and membership have been established, with the addition of the City of London Police. .

This recommendation has been resolved.

86.

The MPS should work with faith and community leaders to ensure that the current Argus and Griffin training packages are appropriately tailored to their needs, and ensure that adequate training is given.

The MPS have now developed these packages so that they are appropriate for different audiences, including faith and community groups. Some of this training has already been delivered, for example to over fifty leading Muslim organisations, Christian groups and, following the Orlando attack, to LGBT organisations and venues. This work will continue.

This recommendation has been resolved.

88.

Local police and local authority chief executives and leaders should annually review the membership of the police engagement groups to ensure that they comprise the right members, and that they are regularly refreshed.

Membership of local engagement groups are regularly reviewed and amended as necessary. The Local Authority Panel has confirmed that all Local Authority Chief Executives are willing and ready to work with the police on this, ensuring the groups have the appropriate membership.

The MPS works with Borough Resilience Forums, including following any incident, to communicate key messages to these groups.

The MPS Community engagement team, working with the counter-terrorism community engagement team and the MPS diversity team are identifying gaps corporately, at borough and at ward level, to ensure corporate delivery and engagement groups have the appropriate membership.

This recommendation has been resolved.

89.

Key members of the LRF, including the police, fire and ambulance services, along with the Mayor's office should work together with London's voluntary sector to ensure they are being used effectively and that the lines of communication are sufficient in the event of an attack or other emergency. When the response to an MTFA and other terror attacks is exercised, the role of the voluntary sector should be properly rehearsed.

This work has been taken forward by the LRF's Voluntary Sector Panel who have developed a new system in conjunction with the MPS, LFB, LAS, Local Authorities and Team London. This work has also involved discussions with a range of voluntary sector partners and has been supported by the Voluntary Sector Capabilities document which was published in May this year.

Some of this work was born out in the voluntary sector response to the tragic fire at Grenfell Tower.

This recommendation has been resolved.

92.

The London Resilience Forum should define, for all situations of civic emergency, which organisations are responsible for marshalling and directing volunteers, or dealing with those who might have the best intentions, but whose energy and time could be better directed elsewhere.

This work is actively being taken forward with a range of evaluation and research projects currently underway. Discussions have taken place at the pan-London Humanitarian Assistance working group and the LRF Voluntary Sector Panel will be considering further recommendations.

Alongside the strategic-level discussions, individual voluntary organisations have also been engaged to develop and implement new approaches to registering and managing convergent volunteers before and during incidents. This is best demonstrated by the launch of the British Red Cross Community Reserve Volunteer initiative.

93.

The College of Policing should consider whether it is currently devoting sufficient resources to the provision of MAGIC training, particularly when demand for the course is currently outstripping the ability to provide places.

The MAGIC course was originally designed to meet the needs of police commanders. The College of Policing have established that there are other training providers who can assist in meeting the learning needs of the wider community that are involved in preparing for, responding to and recovering from major incidents and civil emergencies. To this end the College of Policing, Fire Service College, National Ambulance Resilience Unit and Emergency Planning College have been working with the Cabinet Office to better understand the needs of leaders of other Category 1 and Category 2 responders.

The LRF is now of the view that there is no unmet demand in London for this training beyond the current training round and so this recommendation is considered resolved.

94.

There is a need to ensure that all front-line personnel are adequately trained to deal with the types of injury that might be seen in an MTFA.

A Mandatory training programme is in place for all front line emergency services staff for Emergency Life Support, this is renewed annually. Following this recommendation an assessment of this training to ensure it covers the relevant injury types has taken place and initial training has been increased.

This recommendation has been resolved.

95.

The LRF should give consideration to how it can improve representation by faith groups, and of groups representing the interests of commuters and tourists.

The LRF has now taken forward all elements of this recommendation. London Travelwatch are being engaged for the Transport Sector Panel; the Faith Sector Panel is working with partners, including City Hall, to increase representation by a wider range of faith groups, including smaller institutions; and the business sector panel has widened to incorporate those working with tourists.

This recommendation has been resolved.

96.

It is important that TfL are not considered just an adjunct to the LESLP guidance process, rather, as it is rewritten they should be engaged with directly, rather than simply consulted following the publication of draft guidance.

TfL is included within the structure of the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) and this relationship will continue as guidance is refined and the LESLP manual is reviewed.

This recommendation has been resolved.

97.

There would be value in ensuring that the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime sits on the LRF, along with the Deputy Mayor for Fire and the Deputy Mayor for Transport.

The Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime and the Deputy Mayor for Transport, and any other relevant Deputy Mayors will attend special meetings with the LRF to ensure continued and active political oversight in their respective areas. A meeting of the LRF with Deputy Mayors in attendance has already taken place.

This recommendation has been resolved.

99.

Given the importance of communications during an incident, there should be consideration given to giving a place on the Strategic Coordination Group (SCG) to a representative of the telecoms and mobile phone network providers.

When necessary the chair of the Utilities Sector Panel, which includes the telecoms industry, will attend the SCG. If an incident requires it, the telecoms representative will also be in attendance to ensure that network providers and others working in the telecoms sector are adequately represented.

This recommendation has been resolved.

100.

The work to develop specially trained chairs for the SCG should continue urgently, with agreement reached quickly on who they are and training and communication begun as soon as possible.

The LRF is continuing to take this work forward and MAGIC training for SCG representatives, including chairs is continuing. London Resilience held three strategic coordination summits during 2017-18 while further specific training for SCG chairs is currently being delivered, albeit slightly delayed due to the on-going impact of the Grenfell Tower fire. London local authorities have confirmed seven chief executives willing to support this initiative and undertake training.

101.

It is important that the process of creating a situational awareness tool for the SCG continues at speed, and that the tool is tested quickly and regularly to ensure that it is fit for purpose in the event of an incident.

The London Situational Awareness tool went live on 10 January and has been used by Partners. Further enhancements are taking place in late 2017.

102.

Wherever the main operational decision making centre is located, there should be space for the Mayor or his representative to be present.

There is now a formal role for the Mayor's representative in the SCG to act as a direct liaison between the Group and City Hall.

This recommendation has been resolved.

103.

A subgroup of the LRF should be set up, comprising the MPS, LAS, LFB and others, to consider the future exercise programme.

The LRF Training and Exercise Group has now been refreshed to incorporate this recommendation and now reports to the London Resilience Programme Board to ensure adequate buy-in.

This recommendation has been resolved.

104.

There should be a clear role for the Mayor and the relevant Deputy Mayors in overseeing the exercises in London, and ensuring that remedial action to address lessons learnt is taken very quickly.

As and when exercises take place there will be full debriefing to the relevant Deputy Mayors. Lessons to be learnt by London's emergency services and other agencies will be considered by this group to ensure that where political oversight and energy could lead to quicker, more effective, implementation this takes place.

This recommendation has been resolved.

105.

Simple lessons from Project Servator, such as clear instructions to all armed officers to engage with members of the public, the provision of public information leaflets and the use of basic behavioural detection should be embedded in the training of armed officers.

Project Servator has now been implemented in London. As part of this, national CT policing continues to work with both police and CPNI partners to learn from the current Servator deployments and to use this learning to further refine and improve uptake, delivery and effect. This is a continual activity and as such will be ongoing throughout the life of the use of the Servator approach.

This recommendation has been resolved.

107.

On the whole, and where reasonable, the MPS should aim to provide information quickly, even if corrections need to be made. This should go beyond the generic messages that are currently part of the prepared output.

The most recent Major Incident Communication plan makes provision for this, in line with Lord Harris' recommendation. Speed of bespoke communication is at the centre of the current planning and exercising.

The recent attacks in London demonstrated the ability of the MPS to get timely and relevant information out to Londoners during and following an attack. In general the approach has been to ensure information is accurate before it is provided, but each incident is considered separately to ensure the right balance between speed and accuracy is struck.

This recommendation has been resolved.

108.

In all major exercises the MPS Directorate of Media and Communications should have a central role, and, where possible, specific members of the media should be invited to participate.

In all the exercises, including table-top and Hydra exercises, the Directorate of Media and Communications have been actively involved along with, where appropriate members of the media. A specific MTF A Hydra event for media took place earlier this year.

This recommendation has been resolved.

109.

Table-top media exercise sessions should continue, adequately resourced, and should involve both home affairs specialists and broadcast and print editors and sub-editors, along with representatives of social-media companies

As above, a specific MTF A Hydra event for media took place earlier this year, supplemented by further such events. The experience of the recent attacks is continuing to inform engagement between law enforcement and the media.

This recommendation has been resolved.

110.

The Mayor should quickly work with the Cabinet Office to introduce a London-wide pilot of public alert technology.

This recommendation is currently sitting with the Cabinet Office. Engagement is continuing between City Hall, the Cabinet Office and other partners on this work. MOPAC will continue to work with central government to make the case for a trial in London of the technology suggested in Lord Harris' Review.

111.

The MPS should introduce sufficiently clear protocols on their own internal communications to ensure that information is disseminated effectively and speedily within the organisation. In particular, it is important that borough commanders are rapidly informed of relevant activity so that they can brief their local Members of Parliament, Assembly Members, and councillors. This process should be tested during exercises.

The MPS now has in place a clear structure, including using the Territorial Policing Community Engagement group, for getting information out across boroughs and to other interested partners, including local politicians. This process was tested in response to recent terror attacks and was feedback from partners said it was largely considered to be effective. We will continue to work with partners on communications to see what more can be done to make improvements.

This recommendation has been resolved.

112.

As the Home Office revise the CONTEST strategy, they should place effective communication and the provision of timely and detailed information to others at the heart of the strategy.

We continue to await the publication of the new CONTEST strategy. The Home Office have confirmed that one of the six key themes of the new CONTEST strategy will be "Improving partnerships with the private and third sectors". Ahead of publication of the new strategy, the Home Office have initiated an information sharing pilot to see if they can develop a two-way flow of information on a regular basis. We will review the final strategy when it is published.

113.

The Home Office should urgently look again at the total number of CTSAs and CTAAAs that it funds around the country with a view to enhancing the resource.

The Home Office do not directly fund CTSAs or CTAAAs. The numbers are decided by policing based on operational requirements and resources. Following the recent attacks in London and Manchester the number of requests for CTSAs or CTAAAs has increased and as London has a high proportion of the national crowded places it is felt particularly keenly here. The ongoing National Security Capability Review is reviewing all CT capabilities across all departments, including policing. CT policing will seek support from government to increase the level of protective security across crowded places and public events, including through closer partnership with the private sector.

We will support the MPS in this engagement with the Home Office.

114.

The MPS should continue their aim to train one million people nationally, seeking to expand this in future years with explicit stretch targets set for London.

The MPS have trained, and are continuing to train, large numbers of people through Argus and Griffin. The online tool, referenced in recommendation 80 will help to expand this number dramatically.

At this time specific targets are not considered helpful to this exercise as there is no evidence that progress is unsatisfactory.

116.

There should be discussions with the insurance industry, so that businesses and venues are required to obtain and act on advice in return for lower premiums or making take-up of advice and training compulsory for certain businesses or establishments.

The advice received from the Association of British Insurers is that any decisions taken to lower premiums in response to businesses or venues taking CT advice would be a matter for individual insurance companies. At this time we are focusing our efforts on encouraging venues and businesses to engage with the police and others to gain advice in the best interests of their staff and their customers, as set out in the response to previous recommendations.

117.

Short-form advice on CT matters for small and micro businesses should be signed off quickly, and then rolled out, including utilising local authority and neighbourhood policing networks.

Counter Terrorism Focus Desks are now able to deliver 10 minute snap shots of CT advice in the workplace. This work was piloted earlier in the year and, having proved popular, is now in active implementation.

This recommendation has been resolved.

118.

The MPS should make use of the venue mapping work that is being led by the GLA to identify appropriate places to whom training should be offered.

The MPS are currently liaising with the GLA as the mapping work continues to be developed to ensure that they are adequately reaching venues where training might be of value.

119.

Owners and operators of shopping centres and landside retail at airports should, as many do, make sure that basic Project Griffin training is given, possibly via in-house security managers, at regular enough intervals to cope with the high staff turnover that these businesses experience.

Project Griffin self-delivery was launched by NaCTSO in April 2016 which encourages owners and operators to take responsibility for delivery to their staff. The MPS is continuing to engage with operators and owners to encourage uptake.

This recommendation has been resolved.

120.

Engagement with relevant premises and communities should be routine whenever a terrorist attack takes place outside the UK in order to improve awareness and security, along with awareness of the risk of copycat attacks.

The MPS is working with Local Resilience Forums following every major event that impacts London, including those overseas. An Engagement and Communication plan was developed following the Strong Tower exercise – which is referenced in Lord Harris' Review – and this is now in operation.

This recommendation has been resolved.

121.

The Department for Education should build on the model of having a designated governor responsible for safeguarding and ensure that all schools in London appoint a governor responsible for ensuring security and terrorism preparedness. They should require all schools to have full preparedness plans in place, with requirements that they are tested. If the Department for Education do not consider this valuable nationally, the Mayor should ensure it is implemented in London's schools.

The Department for Education (DfE) has said that this is a matter for local schools and governing bodies within their general health and safety requirements. We remain concerned, however, that while there is no specific threat against schools in London, schools should have adequate measures in place. In fact, some schools have already begun to consider their preparations, risking the creation of a piecemeal approach across the capital.

CT Policing has developed a product for schools, supported by Scouts, Guides, NSPCC, head teachers, teaching unions, and the DfE and will be made available via NaCTSO's site, teaching support networks and DfE channels. A lot of work has been done to ensure that this is put out in an age appropriate manner and the product is supported by PSHE Association lesson plans.

The MPS will work with Safer Schools Officers to ensure that this package is promoted within all of London's schools and other educational establishments. In addition, the Chair of the London Children's Safeguarding Board will be writing to all directors of children's services highlighting the advice and supporting its use in schools

122.

The Government should consider the case, with police, CPNI and others, for the introduction of a statutory obligation for resilience to be designed into new buildings.

The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) have set out their view that a statutory obligation is not required given that significant guidance is available from sources including the NaCTSO and that local authorities are responsible, building on Planning Practice Guidance.

The Chief Planner has recently written to all Local Planning Authorities to remind them of their role in reducing the risk of terrorism, and ensuring resilience. This is particularly relevant following the tragic fire at Grenfell Tower where we await the ongoing inquiry to provide further advice on and potential changes to planning rules.

We will continue to work with local authorities to ensure they are confident in the advice they are given and press the DCLG for action in this area.

123.

A phased programme of assessing the resilience of existing buildings should be considered.

Counter Terrorism Security Advisers already provide advice on effective mitigation of terrorist threats to owners and operators of buildings which might be considered a target. Once the process of learning lessons from the recent terrorist attacks in London has completed, we will work, via the London CONTEST Board, with the MPS and others to consider if further work needs to be done to assess the resilience of buildings in the capital.

124.

When discussions are taking place about increasing the opening hours of the Palace of Westminster in order to provide more access for tourists and enhanced commercial use during recess, the implications for counter-terrorism policing should be carefully considered and discussed with the relevant authorities.

The Palace Authorities have confirmed that, should any changes be proposed, they will work closely with the MPS and others (including the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure) to assess any security risks, apply appropriate measures and think through wider consequences.

This recommendation has been resolved.

125.

The law should be changed to ensure that in every case where an individual with a firearms licence negligently allows a weapon to be lost or stolen they have their licence removed permanently.

Provision covering the negligent loss or theft of a firearm is covered within existing legislation under section 30 of the Firearms Act 1968, which is concerned with revocation of a firearm or shotgun certificate where there is a risk to public safety. If an individual has not kept their firearms securely they may have breached a condition on their certificate. It will be for the police to determine the circumstances in which the loss or theft occurred and whether any offence has been committed by the certificate holder. The default position when someone has a gun lost or stolen is for the police to investigate for negligence. If they consider there to be sufficient

evidence (based on the civil test) they will revoke the person's certificate.

In cases where a firearms offence has been committed, the courts will consider the sentencing options available under the 1968 Act. Depending upon the sentence handed down by the court, a lifetime ban may automatically be imposed on a certificate holder. Generally, people who are sentenced to three years or more are never allowed to possess a firearm again. The 1968 Act provides for a five year ban where someone has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment for three months or more but less than three years.

This recommendation has been resolved.

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