Preventing extremism in London
December 2015
Police and Crime Committee
Members

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Role of the Police and Crime Committee
The Police and Crime Committee examines the work of the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) and reviews the Police and Crime Plan for London. The Committee can also investigate anything that it considers to be of importance to policing and crime reduction in Greater London and make recommendations for improvements.

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Chair’s foreword

The issue of extremism, and how best to prevent it, is a complex, emotive, and highly debated one. We know the danger posed by those who choose to harm others in pursuit of their goals is stark: the recent terrorist attacks in Paris remind us of this. There needs to be a collective effort to prevent vulnerable individuals from being drawn into extremist activity.

This effort is most effective when public services have the confidence to deliver, and when communities trust and are engaged in the approach being taken. We heard that, at the moment, some public services have questions about the Government’s Prevent Strategy—designed to deter individuals from engaging in extremism—and some communities continue to view the Strategy with suspicion.

We heard that there is a need for a more open approach to identifying risk and coming up with solutions. For public services, this means being more involved in discussions about threat, risk, and possible interventions. For other organisations, this means knowing what is happening at an operational and strategic level, as well as knowing what good practice is taking place. For the public, who are at the heart of the solution, this means being informed, involved, and having their concerns and ideas listened to.

The introduction of a London CONTEST board—set up to oversee the implementation of the Government’s counter-terrorism strategy in London—has the potential to start addressing these and other issues at a pan-London level. It must not simply be another layer of bureaucracy. It must use its political weight to enable partners to do more, share more, and work together more closely. It must also help to drive public involvement in efforts to prevent extremism.

There is some excellent work being carried out in London on tackling issues like online radicalisation, and in developing narratives that counter extremist messages. The energy of people carrying out this work needs to be harnessed and replicated across the city. Only by being candid about the issues, open about how they are being tackled, and by delivering a strong, positive message, can efforts to prevent extremism be expected to make a difference.

I would like to thank all who gave evidence to assist our investigation for their time and willingness to share their views.

Joanne McCartney AM, Chair of the Police and Crime Committee
Executive summary

Preventing individuals from participating in, or supporting, the kinds of extremism that harm individuals and communities is crucial to our safety and security. Extremism, particularly violent extremism, is one of the most serious challenges facing society today. It has the potential to not only manifest itself in physical attacks on people and places, but to isolate individuals and create a breakdown in relationships between communities.

Our investigation focused on the implementation of the Government’s Prevent Strategy in London. The Strategy—and more recently its Counter-Extremism Strategy—sets out how it intends to help public sector bodies and communities dissuade individuals from engaging in extremism. Throughout our work, one thing stood out to us: that the risk of being drawn into extremist activity is a vulnerability in the same way that some are at risk of exploitation by others. Engaging the person at risk, and all those around them, in an open and honest way is vital to success. Only by being candid about the issues, open about how they are being tackled, and by delivering a strong and positive message, can efforts to prevent extremism be expected to make a difference.

The context: the challenges in preventing extremism

Instances of violent extremism are sadly not new. However, there has in recent years been a step change in the volume, range, and pace of extremist activity. The nature of the threat from extremist groups is now not only from large scale coordinated attacks, but increasingly from lone individuals inspired and encouraged to carry out attacks in the UK.

The violent extremism promoted and carried out by supporters of the so-called Islamic State (ISIL) poses the biggest current threat to UK security. But while there will be different priorities at different times, depending on the nature of the threat, it is important that the agenda covers all forms of extremism. For example, London has—and continues to—experience the impact of far right-wing extremism. Examples include the 1999 nail-bomb attacks in Soho, and a neo-Nazi demonstration in June 2015.

Extremist groups establish a narrative that is used to encourage people to support them. We heard that attempts to deliver a strong counter-narrative—one that rebuts the claims made by an extremist group and tells a different story—to date have been poor. It was suggested that the current emphasis on de-radicalisation has reduced the focus on developing a broader counter-narrative. While this is understandable and necessary, it needs to be in
addition to strong preventive work, and both elements need to be funded in a proper way.

The internet has opened up new ways to promote extremism. It has also made it more difficult to identify, monitor, and support those at risk. The Met’s Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit removes around 1,000 items of material from a range of extremist groups from the internet each week, and this is a trend that is continuing. Engaged and computer-savvy parents and families are critical to addressing the risk present online in their homes, but education for parents and families on managing risk and on their own IT skills needs to improve.

**The policy: the Government’s Prevent Strategy**

The Government’s approach to tackling extremism is set out in its Prevent Strategy. The strategy commits to challenging extremist ideas that can be used to legitimise terrorism, and to intervene to stop people moving towards terrorist-related activity. All local authorities, the police, and the wider public sector are expected to support efforts to prevent extremism. But recently, greater emphasis has been placed on public services through the introduction of a statutory duty for Prevent. This places an obligation on sectors to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, and as a minimum, organisations should demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in their area.

It is hard to measure the impact of the Government’s approach to preventing extremism. It was suggested to us that the real success of Prevent is achieved through public confidence and through the confidence and buy-in of public services and institutions. The Prevent Strategy has, however, had a troubled history and the feedback we received suggests that neither of these elements is being fully achieved at the moment.

Definitions of extremism and radicalisation are highly debated. Each can be defined in different ways and can exist in different forms, and broad definitions could risk labelling some of the more moderate voices as extremist. The Government’s increased focus on non-violent extremism, for example, has raised questions with academics and communities. It has also raised questions about the approach that public services need to take when delivering Prevent. The implications of the Government’s definition for issues such as freedom of speech and open debate need further consideration, and we recognise that the debate is ongoing. What is meant by extremism, and the types of behaviour considered extreme, is a fundamental concern that communities have with the Government’s approach. It needs to get the right balance in both the eyes of communities and public services.
The introduction of the statutory duty for Prevent presents a series of challenges for those public services expected to implement it. We heard, for example, that the new duty is a challenge for schools. Teachers are concerned about how they are expected to apply the duty, and we were told that the numbers seeking guidance and raising concerns about what is expected of them have increased. We also heard that some young people no longer feel able to take part in discussions about extremism and related issues in lessons, for fear of being ‘put on a list’.

The Prevent strategy is often criticised for being delivered through the lens of security. It has been subject to accusations of police heavy-handedness and spying, and its history has led some to consider it a damaged brand. Some of the organisations that we spoke to said that this perception has only been exacerbated by recent announcements and proposals in the Government’s Counter-Extremism Strategy. Community engagement is critical to the success of Prevent, but we heard that there is a risk that the current ‘top down’ approach to Prevent delivery makes it difficult to engage citizens.

The delivery: preventing extremism in London

Preventing extremism is high on the agenda of all boroughs in London. But the government support afforded to them differs. Some receive specific funding and resources to help with efforts to prevent extremism; some have to integrate their efforts into existing functions and services. This has resulted in variations in the level and quality of work being undertaken across boroughs.

At an operational level, there is improving oversight of work taking place across London to tackle extremism and identify those at risk. A London Prevent Board is in place that brings together agencies that are working on Prevent. This board provides a space to share good practice and discuss risks. At a political level in London, there appears to be no London body that has overall strategic oversight of what is taking place at any one time. It is difficult to establish what, why and how decisions have been taken about the delivery of the Prevent Strategy. A more open approach to identifying risk and coming up with solutions needs to be in place in London.

There are missed opportunities in London for joined-up working. Many of the people we spoke to were in favour of a more pan-London approach to projects. A lack of certainty and freedom in funding arrangements is also hampering delivery. Some types of projects that would help to tackle extremism cannot receive Prevent funding and where funding is provided for projects this tends to be on a yearly basis. We heard that boroughs find out very late in the financial year which projects will be funded and that projects that run over a number of years are less likely to be funded. We were told
that this was not beneficial because short, sharp programmes are less likely to change hearts and minds.

The next steps: enhancing efforts to prevent extremism

The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) is seeking greater involvement in efforts to prevent extremism in London. Through the introduction of a London CONTEST Board—set up to examine the implementation of all four aspects of the Government’s CONTEST strategy—it hopes to bring partners together to share information, improve transparency, and deliver interventions more effectively.

The development of the London CONTEST Board provides an opportunity for greater political leadership of counter-extremism work at the London level. It is in a unique position to understand what is happening across the city, to help to target resources more effectively, and to help organisations work more closely together. At its most basic, the London CONTEST Board can add value by ensuring that public services have a clear understanding of risk and opportunity in the capital. It should also seek to clarify the additional pressures being placed on local authorities and other public services as a result of the statutory Prevent duty, and where pressures are identified, it should work to address these with the services concerned. It should do this using good practice and sharing support and information from elsewhere to help them adapt to any new responsibilities.

One of the aims of the London CONTEST Board is to improve transparency between the public and public service providers. Transparency, honesty and collaboration are critical to the success of measures to prevent extremism. For public services, it means more involvement in discussions about threat, risk and solutions. For community and third-sector organisations, it means knowledge about what is happening at both an operational and a strategic level. For the public, it means transparency about what Prevent is for and what activity is taking place. We understand that work is underway to examine how Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles—which provide a risk assessment of an area—can be improved in conjunction with public services, and we look forward to hearing about how this develops as a major step in increasing transparency across public services on this issue.

We are less clear about how the London CONTEST Board will drive transparency with the public. The public must not be the forgotten partner in the fight against extremism, and should be more involved in discussions about the best ways to prevent extremism and how to achieve it across London. The London CONTEST Board should commit to undertaking regular, open and honest communication and engagement with the public about what is happening in London.
By increasing both buy-in from public services, and the confidence of communities, the London CONTEST Board can start to help shape the most effective form of delivery. The Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime (DMPC) wants MOPAC to have a greater role in the commissioning of activity to prevent extremism, in conjunction with the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism. We heard about the aspirations of MOPAC to fund projects to prevent extremism in a different way. The benefits of being able to innovate in the way projects are commissioned are clear. It will result in more joined-up working, increased quality of interventions across the boroughs, and better use of limited resources. It could also help to ensure that, through more local knowledge, projects are delivered by organisations that are seen as highly credible with London’s communities. The Office for Security and Counter Terrorism should take up the opportunity to pilot the joint commissioning of Prevent projects with MOPAC.

In addition to enhancing delivery, the London CONTEST Board has the opportunity to help lead the way in responding to some of the wider concerns we heard about. There are many programmes in London aimed at tackling online radicalisation and enabling parents and families to identify and address risk in their homes. Others are working on developing and delivering a strong counter-narrative. A focus on countering the extremist narrative more broadly and at an earlier stage, and so intervening before radicalisation begins, would put the authorities on the front foot and strengthen their chances of success. The London CONTEST Board should explore what value it may be able to add in the areas of tackling online radicalisation and the need for strong counter-narratives to tackle extremist messages.

**Conclusion**

Extremism is a complex and emotive issue, as is how best to tackle it. There are obstacles to preventing extremism at all levels: from the context in which we are operating in; to understanding and implementing national policy; to identifying what interventions are best delivered at a local level.

Collaboration between public services across London is vital and needs to improve. Sharing information leads to better interventions, and a ‘richer’ picture of the challenges faced by the capital. At the same time, the public must not be the forgotten partner in the fight against extremism. Community engagement is shown to work, but is also the hardest element to achieve.

MOPAC and the London CONTEST Board have the opportunity to enhance efforts to prevent extremism in two ways. First, by creating a more joined up, pan-London approach that encompasses the efforts and needs of public services and the communities they serve. Second, by using the knowledge and experience of doing things in different ways to influence the national agenda, taking into consideration the concerns raised about the overall approach to
preventing extremism, and feeding back to Government about what is and is not working.

This report represents the view of the majority of the Committee. Jenny Jones AM does not support this report. Her views are set out in a minority opinion in Chapter 6.
1. Introduction

1.1 Preventing individuals from participating in, or supporting, the kinds of extremism that harm individuals and communities is crucial to safety and security. Extremism, particularly violent extremism, poses one of the most serious challenges facing society today. It has the potential to not only manifest itself in physical attacks on people and places, but to isolate individuals and create a breakdown in relationships between communities. The recent violent attacks on public venues in Paris are a stark reminder of these dangers.

1.2 The Government’s Prevent Strategy—and more recently its Counter-Extremism Strategy—sets out how it intends to help public sector bodies and communities dissuade individuals from engaging in extremism. The aim of the Prevent Strategy is to deter ‘at-risk’ individuals from participating in, or supporting, violent activity through practical help, advice and support. It has had a troubled history, which has led to it being considered by some as a ‘damaged’ brand, and viewed with suspicion by others.

1.3 Our investigation focused on the implementation of the Prevent Strategy in London. We sought to assess the structures in place in London to tackle extremism, and the way that key services, such as the Metropolitan Police (the Met), local authorities, and community organisations work together to support vulnerable individuals. A range of organisations and individuals told us about the work being carried out in London, and the obstacles and opportunities that they face. Using this information, we identified a set of challenges that must be addressed to better support those who are at risk of being drawn into harmful extremist activity. This report sets out those challenges.

1.4 The ongoing debate about the most effective strategy to prevent extremism was apparent in much of our discussion. As it has been in the past, Prevent policy is subject to differing viewpoints about how best to keep us safe. The issues raised with us about the Government’s approach included the definition of extremism, violent and non-violent extremism, the powers to restrict certain groups from speaking in public and how best for front line services to support those at risk.

1.5 Throughout our work, one theme stood out to us: that of safeguarding. The risk of being drawn into extremist activity is a vulnerability in the same way that some are at risk of exploitation by others. Engaging the person at risk,
and all those around them, in an open and honest way is vital to success. Only by being candid about the issues, open about how they are being tackled, and by delivering a strong and positive message, can efforts to prevent extremism be expected to make a difference.

1.6 There are many people and organisations across London doing excellent work to tackle extremism. The Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) is in a unique position to support them to do more, share more, and work together more closely. It also needs to ensure that those working to prevent extremism at a local level are highly qualified, consistent in their approach, and trusted by the communities that they are aiming to support. MOPAC has already recognised it has a greater role to play in this matter, and, through this report, we hope to help focus its efforts on the issues that people across London would like to see addressed.
2. The context: the challenges in preventing extremism

Key issues

There has in recent years been a step change in the “volume, range, and pace” of extremist activity in the UK. The nature of the threat is now not only from large scale coordinated attacks by extremist groups, but, increasingly, from lone individuals inspired and encouraged to carry out attacks.

Extremist groups establish a narrative—a set of messages and a story—that is used to encourage people to support them. Currently, there are some groups, such as the so-called Islamic State (ISIL), using a strong narrative to persuade people to take violent action, either abroad or at home.

The internet is extending the reach that an extremist group has in promoting its narrative. The Met’s Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit removes around 1,000 items of material from a range of extremist groups from the internet each week, and this is a trend that is continuing.

2.1 The context in which public services are working to prevent extremism is changing: from the nature of the threat itself, to the way that people are being encouraged to support extremism. Extremist organisations often present a powerful narrative that provides ready answers to draw people, especially vulnerable people, into extremist activity. This needs to be challenged.

The changing nature of extremism

2.2 Instances of violent extremism are sadly not new. However, there has in recent years been a step change in the “volume, range, and pace” of extremist activity. In the past three years, the number of counter-terror related arrests made nationally has risen by 56 per cent, compared with the previous three. In the year to March 2015 alone, police forces made 338 arrests linked to suspected terrorist activity, a 33 per cent increase on the previous year and amounting to nearly one arrest a day.

2.3 The violent extremism promoted and carried out by supporters of ISIL poses the biggest current threat to UK security. The emergence of ISIL in Iraq and Syria—and the likely involvement of UK and European nationals taking part in conflicts in those countries—has added a "completely separate set of
dynamics” to the threat picture. In the year to March 2015, 157 counter-terrorism arrests (46 per cent of the total number of arrests) were linked to Syria. Over 700 individuals are thought to have travelled to Syria from across the UK, and of those who have travelled, one estimate is that about half have returned to the UK. The Met says this presents a number of concurrent challenges: “the real threat from people returning as trained terrorists”; “those who have not travelled being encouraged and incited to commit attacks in the UK”; and “the young and vulnerable being enticed out to Syria through internet-based grooming.”

2.4 Other forms of extremism, such as far right-wing extremism, are an ongoing concern. While there will be different priorities at different times, depending on the nature of the threat, it is important that the agenda covers all forms of extremism. We heard that in the current context, far-right extremist groups are using the international extremist threat “as an excuse to push a more extreme racist or anti-Islam agenda.” Mark Rowley QPM, Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations in the Met and the National Policing Lead for Counter-Terrorism, explained that these far-right groups “look at events overseas with cartoons and videos and they think, ‘How can we do this in this country?’ They look at protests and they try to create protests in areas with high minority communities to aggravate them.” He highlighted that this kind of extremism is “nowhere near the volume or threat that international terrorism presents”, but that “there are some people with violent intent and we have to pay attention to it.” London has, and continues to, experience the impact of far-right extremism, for example the 1999 nail-bomb attacks in Soho, marches by far-right organisations in 2014, and a neo-Nazi demonstration in June 2015.

2.5 The nature of the threat from extremist groups is now not only from large-scale, coordinated attacks, but increasingly from lone individuals inspired and encouraged to carry out attacks in the UK. These types of ‘lone wolf’ attacks tend to be “on a smaller scale... [and] less sophisticated but just as deadly.” The brutal public murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in May 2013 is just one example of this type of attack. The Met’s Commissioner, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe QPM, says the increase in ‘lone wolf’ attacks has resulted in “real pressure on us [the Met] in terms of resources and in terms of judgment making.” In particular, the possibility of attacks by lone individuals leaves police forces with “a very short time to interdict, to actually intervene and make sure that these people do not get away with it.”

Countering the narrative of extremists

2.6 Extremist groups establish a narrative—a set of messages and a story—that is used to encourage people to support them. A counter-narrative, or an
alternative narrative, in this context, is one that rebuts the claims made by an extremist group, challenges its legitimacy, and tells a different story.

2.7 We heard that “in fighting terrorism, narrative is actually almost everything” but that attempts to deliver a strong counter-narrative to date have been poor, and that groups such as ISIL “are telling a better story”. Martin Innes, Professor of Police Science at Cardiff University, told us he was not convinced about how effective counter-narrative work to date has been, and Lord Carlile of Berriew, the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, told us that:

“The answer to the question as to whether we are adequately dealing with that narrative has to be a straightforward no.”

2.8 It was suggested that the current emphasis on de-radicalisation—intervening once a person has been identified as at risk—has reduced the focus on developing a broader counter-narrative. We heard that much of the intervention activity takes place once a problem has arisen: Diane Egan, Community Safety Team Leader at the London Borough of Havering, told us that “it seems that the view is you have to develop a problem before you can actually get help.” It was suggested to us by community organisations and think-tanks that once the need for de-radicalisation had been reached, efforts to prevent extremism had already failed. While a focus on de-radicalisation is understandable and necessary, this needs to be in addition to strong preventive work, and both elements need to be funded in a proper way.

Extremism propagated across the internet and through social media

2.9 The internet has opened up new ways to promote extremism. It is one of the key enablers of the change in the pace and volume of extremist activity. Individuals that previously would have had to join groups and attend meetings to be exposed to ideas that promote extremism can now access similar information from their homes. This was described to us as a “very big change in risk”.

2.10 The internet also makes it more difficult to identify, monitor, and support those at risk. Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley said that the ability to monitor the terrorist threat has reduced because “terrorists and criminals had changed their communication tactics” and because of encryption technologies that exist on electronic devices. The use of digital technology in planning and carrying out extremist activity means that the Met now has to collect and analyse masses of electronic evidence involved in suspected extremism.
2.11 Extremist groups are increasingly using social media tools, such as Twitter, Facebook, WhatsApp and YouTube, to spread their message. This is done in several different ways: “broad”, through videos and propaganda; “narrow”, through the use of closed forums and private discussion groups; and “targeted”, in which individuals already involved in extremism contact friends, family, and other associates, in order to influence them. Robert Hannigan, Director of the Government Communications Headquarters, has suggested that social media tools are also being used by these groups as “command and control networks”.

2.12 The Met’s Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit has removed around 1,000 items of material from a range of extremist groups from the internet each week over the past year, and this is a trend that is continuing. The Commissioner said that “on the internet that is a very small impact, but it is a very significant effort.” The Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit, run by the Met, is working with companies, particularly social media companies, in order to achieve this. AC Mark Rowley told us that:

“we try to have a relationship with them [social media companies and websites] wherever possible and say, ‘We found this material. We think you should take it down because it is encouraging terrorism’. Usually, they do.”

However, the relationship between the police and social media companies is sometimes strained and the Met has called on technology companies to do more to help protect the public and accept the “social responsibilities of hosting mass communication platforms”.

2.13 Engaged and computer-savvy parents and families are critical to addressing the risk present in their homes. Education for parents and families on managing risk online and on their own IT skills, however, needs to improve. Diane Egan, for example, told us that online safeguarding was a “real gap”, and Shiraz Maher, Senior Research Fellow at the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, told us that “the part we are really missing is the parents” and there needs to be greater clarity about “what kinds of activities you can get up to online and what you can really achieve online.”
3. The policy: the Government’s Prevent Strategy

Key issues

The Government’s approach to tackling extremism is set out in its Prevent Strategy. The strategy commits to challenging extremist ideas that can be used to legitimise terrorism, and to intervene to stop people moving from extremist groups into terrorist-related activity. Local authorities, the police, and the wider public sector are all expected to support efforts to prevent extremism.

Efforts to prevent extremism work best when the services expected to deliver have the confidence to do so, and when communities trust in the approach being taken. For a variety of reasons, both of these are not being fully achieved. The need for a shared understanding of what is meant by extremism; a perception that the Prevent Strategy is only a police activity; and a history that makes it hard for communities to trust public services on this issue are all obstacles to preventing extremism.

3.1 The Government’s approach to tackling extremism is set out in its Prevent Strategy. This strategy forms part of the Government’s overall counter-terrorism strategy, known as CONTEST (see box 1). First introduced in 2005, Prevent is designed to tackle all forms of extremism that “create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism” and “popularise views which terrorists then exploit.” The strategy commits to challenging extremist ideas that can be used to legitimise terrorism, and to intervene to stop people moving towards terrorist-related activity. It has had several revisions since its introduction but remains focused on a set of objectives:

- to respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism;
- to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism; and
- to work with a range of sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation, such as education, faith, health and criminal justice. 
Box 1: The Government’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy

The Government’s approach to counter-terrorism is set out in its CONTEST strategy. The aim of the strategy is to “reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.” It is organised around four key principles, each with a specific objective:

- Pursue – to stop terrorist attacks;
- Prevent – to stop people becoming terrorists of supporting terrorism;
- Protect – to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack; and
- Prepare – to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack.33

3.2 The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), based in the Home Office, manages the delivery of Prevent. It has identified a number of locations across the UK that it considers a ‘priority’ and that people in those locations are high risk and vulnerable to extremism.34 Priority areas are provided with funding for a local Prevent Coordinator to oversee Prevent work in their area. In addition, OSCT produces a “best practice catalogue” of projects that it provides funding to as part of the Prevent Strategy. From this list, Prevent Coordinators identify projects and make bids, on behalf of their local authority, for funding from government. The OSCT distributes funding to priority areas for project work on a grant basis.

3.3 A major element of the Prevent Strategy is the Channel Programme. Channel is a multi-agency project in place across England and Wales, which aims to help identify and support people who are at risk of radicalisation, and divert them away from extremist activity. Members of the public, the police, and staff in frontline services can refer people they suspect are at risk. Referrals are initially assessed by a dedicated police officer. An individual viewed as being at risk of radicalisation is further assessed by a local, multi-agency panel. A support plan is developed for the individual concerned, which may include mentoring, or support in areas such as education or life skills. It requires voluntary engagement by the individual referred.35

3.4 In 2013/14, 1,281 referrals were made nationally to the Channel programme, compared with 748 in the previous year. This looks set to increase again. Between June and August 2015, 796 people were reported to Channel for assessment.36 Not all referrals result in an individual receiving support or intervention: the National Police Chiefs Council state that around 20 per cent of referrals have resulted in a person receiving support through the programme since it began in 2007.37
Recent developments

3.5 All local authorities, the police, and the wider public sector are expected to support efforts to prevent extremism. But recently, greater emphasis has been placed on public services. Sectors such as health, education and prisons have had their role reinforced through the recent introduction of a statutory duty for Prevent. The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 now places an obligation on sectors “to have due regard, in the exercise of their functions, to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.” As a minimum, organisations in these sectors should “demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in their area, institution or body.”

3.6 The focus on preventing extremism has moved increasingly towards tackling both violent and non-violent forms. In July 2015, the Prime Minister said that “when you look in detail at the backgrounds of those convicted of terrorist offences, it is clear that many of them were first influenced by what some would call non-violent extremists.” He spoke of the need to confront groups and organisations that may not advocate violence, but that promote other parts of the extremist narrative.

3.7 The Government’s new Counter-Extremism Strategy’s stated aim is to provide the tools to help “tackle all forms of extremism: violent and non-violent, Islamist and neo-Nazi.” The strategy commits to: introducing a range of measures, including a review of public services—such as schools and universities—to ensure that extremist individuals and groups cannot gain positions of influence within those services; strengthening powers to ban extremist organisations; and measures “to ensure anyone with a conviction or civil order for terrorist or extremist activity is automatically banned from working with children and vulnerable people”. The strategy also commits to introducing a new cohesive communities programme “to respond to the challenges of isolated and segregated communities.”

Challenges for the Government’s approach

3.8 It is hard to measure the impact of the Government’s approach to preventing extremism. Quantitative measures and results are hard to identify when success is based on a ‘counterfactual’: “but for X happening, Y would have become a terrorist”. Lord Carlile told us that because quantitative results were harder to identify than qualitative ones, the success of projects such as Channel are “too anecdotal”.

3.9 It was suggested to us that the real success of Prevent “comes about through public confidence in the initiative and through the confidence of agencies and institutions in the initiative and the buy-in from them.” The Prevent
Strategy has, however, had a troubled history and the feedback we received about the approach to tackling extremism suggests that neither of these elements is being fully achieved at the moment. We heard that communities recognise the dangers of extremism and want to engage and involve themselves in efforts to prevent it. But a range of obstacles, such as a lack of clarity over what is meant by extremism, and perceptions about the purpose of Prevent, are resulting in suspicion about the policy and a subsequent reduction in community engagement. These are challenges that need to be overcome.

Clarity over what is meant by extremism

3.10 Definitions of extremism and radicalisation are highly debated. Each can be defined in different ways and can exist in different forms. The Government defines radicalisation as “the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism”;46 and extremism as the “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.”47

3.11 Broad definitions of extremism could risk labelling some of the more moderate voices as extremist. AC Mark Rowley told us that “the challenge will be defining extremism in a way that captures things that everyone agrees are wicked and does not capture simply strong views.”48 In reaction to the Government’s Counter-Extremism Strategy, Sir Peter Fahy, the National Lead on Prevent, has said that by using a broad definition, the Government “may undermine the very rights and British values you seek to protect.”49

3.12 The increased focus on non-violent extremism has raised questions with academics and communities. For example, we heard from Faith Matters that the Government’s definition of extremism as non-violent as well as violent has been developed from the theory that radicalisation is a “religious and political process rather than one related specifically to violence.”50 This, it says, is an unhelpful approach because there is little evidence that either ‘religiosity’ (aspects of religious activity, dedication, and belief) or political beliefs lead to the approval of violence. It expresses concern that this approach could lead to the alienation of certain communities.51

3.13 The increased focus on non-violent extremism has also raised questions about the approach that public services would need to take when delivering Prevent. Shiraz Maher told us that the shift towards non-violent extremism meant “it would go from previously just challenging those who say, “I am going to actually do something about this”, to now also challenging those who say, “they have a point”.52 Sir Peter Fahy suggested that it could turn police
officers into “thought police”. The implications of the Government’s broad
definition for issues such as freedom of speech and open debate need further
consideration, and we recognise that the debate is ongoing. What is meant by
extremism, and the types of behaviour considered extreme, is a fundamental
concern that communities have with the Government’s approach. It needs to
get the right balance in both the eyes of communities, and public services, if
any approach to preventing extremism is to work.

Safeguarding versus security

3.14 The Prevent strategy is often criticised for being delivered through the lens of
security. It has been subject to accusations of police heavy-handedness and
spying. Imran Awan, Deputy Director of the Centre for Applied Criminology
at Birmingham City University, told us that “sadly, the notion and links
between the prism of security and policing in particular has led to some
communities feeling they are officially under suspicion.” We heard that
communities were aware of the dangers of extremism and wanted to help to
prevent it, but are worried about doing so under the banner of the Prevent
strategy.

3.15 Vulnerability to an extremist narrative is, however, primarily a safeguarding
rather than a counter-terrorism or policing issue. The Deputy Mayor for
Policing and Crime (DMPC) told us about the risk of trying to prevent
extremism in isolation to other safeguarding measures, and said that “it is
about making sure that we get an integrated approach to the problem and
are not continually seeing things through one lens.” We heard from AC
Mark Rowley that:

“If we look at bullying and abuse online, if we look at child sexual
exploitation, if we look at people being drawn into gangs and if we look at
this agenda we are talking about today, there are quite a lot of
commonalities that revolve around how people are safer online and how
people from vulnerable backgrounds get drawn into making bad
decisions.”

Implementing the Prevent duty

3.16 The introduction of the statutory duty for Prevent presents a series of
challenges for those public services expected to implement it. For those
services already ‘round the table’ it may have little impact as they are already
doing much of what is covered. But some London boroughs are concerned
about the new duty, particularly non-priority boroughs that, by fact of their
status, may be less well placed to adapt to the new duty. Sutton, for example,
says it has had no support from the Home Office or OSCT in adapting to the
new duty, despite an increase in “administration, bureaucracy, training and
referrals”. Bexley told us that it has written to the Home Office asking if there are plans for ‘train the trainer’ sessions for the Prevent awareness training sessions as they are anticipating an increase in demand.

3.17 We also heard about the broad risks in the practical application of the duty:
- that simply flagging an individual as a risk would mean that a service provider believes they had ‘done their duty’;
- the subsequent increase in the number of referrals being dealt with, and the quality of those referrals;
- that certain aspects of the duty may cause concern for some public services, resulting in a lack of confidence to deliver; and
- for communities, the potential risk that public services become less trusted, as they are perceived to have a greater role in security issues.

3.18 We heard, for example, that the new duty is a challenge for schools. Teachers are concerned about how they are expected to apply the duty, and we were told that the numbers seeking guidance and raising concerns about what is expected of them have increased. We heard that much more training is needed for teachers and governors of schools. Some of the consequences of the new duty on schools were highlighted to us, the most worrying being that some young people no longer feel able to—and parents are telling their children not to—take part in discussions about extremism and related issues in lessons, for fear of being “put on a list”. We heard that providing a safe space for debate is important to develop a counter narrative and challenge views.

Community engagement

3.19 The history of the Prevent Strategy has led to communities distancing themselves from it. The conflation of counter-terrorism policy with community cohesion efforts in the past has contributed to this. We heard different interpretations of the aims of the Prevent Strategy. Shiraz Maher said that Prevent falls under two spheres: long-term community and social cohesion, and the “cutting edge” point at which a person is at risk of moving into criminality. Professor Martin Innes said that Prevent is focused on three areas: to counter radicalisation, to challenge those who have been exposed to radical ideas and to address “broader community cohesion/community tensions”. These elements have created a tension that has contributed to communities’ lack of clarity about what Prevent aims to achieve, and has resulted in them viewing it with suspicion.

3.20 We heard that the level of attention placed on Muslim communities has led some people to see it as discriminatory. Harun Khan, Deputy Secretary General of the Muslim Council of Britain, said young Muslim people see the
Government’s approach to preventing extremism “as a target on them and the institutions they associate with.” Dal Babu, a former senior Met officer, described the Prevent Strategy as “toxic”.

3.21 The history surrounding the Prevent Strategy had led some to consider it a damaged brand. We heard that “the overriding perception is that Government and the police are seeking to work against, rather than with, the community, and are unwilling to engage with the communities’ concerns.” Some of the organisations that we spoke to said that this perception has only been exacerbated by recent announcements and proposals in the Counter-Extremism Strategy.

3.22 Community engagement is critical to the success of Prevent. The Commissioner referred to it as the “golden thread” in the success of counter-terrorism operations and described local officers as “the first opportunity to talk to local people, and to find out if they are worried about something.” The Met has argued that community engagement has been shown to work. AC Mark Rowley told the Home Affairs Select Committee that the Met has “good cooperation from communities”. He said 87 people had been reported missing to them and between 600 and 700 people had been referred to the Channel programme by communities. While this is encouraging, we heard that the current ‘top-down’ approach to Prevent delivery “risks becoming too proscriptive [...] making it more difficult to engage citizens in the longer term.”
4. The delivery: preventing extremism in London

Key issues

Countering extremism is high on the agenda of all boroughs in London. But the government support afforded to them differs. Some receive specific funding and resources to help with efforts to prevent extremism; some have to integrate their efforts into existing functions and services, such as community safety. This has resulted in variations in the level and quality of work being undertaken across boroughs.

There is little strategic and political oversight of efforts to prevent extremism in London. Instead this responsibility sits at a national level with the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism. It is therefore difficult to establish what, why and how decisions have been taken. A more open approach to identifying risk and coming up with solutions needs to be in place in London.

4.1 Around half of the areas across England and Wales identified as a priority under the Prevent Strategy are in London. The priority areas were identified by the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) and set out in the 2011 Prevent Strategy. These have changed over time, but a complete list of current priority areas is not publicly available. We do know from various Freedom of Information requests, however, that areas such as Enfield and Islington have been added to the list since 2011, and Brent has been removed.

4.2 Preventing extremism is high on the agenda of all boroughs in London. The increasing pressure to focus more on the issue is becoming more apparent:

“The intensified and changed nature of the threat, particularly from those seeking to travel to, or return from Syria, now affects all London boroughs, not just those deemed ‘priority areas’.”

4.3 But the support offered to the London boroughs differs. Priority boroughs are each allocated a Prevent Coordinator—employed by the local authority, but centrally funded and accountable to the OSCT to help it to deliver Prevent work. The OSCT has overall responsibility for the coordination of Prevent in these areas and for the “funding, evaluation and monitoring” of Prevent work that takes place.
4.4 Non-priority boroughs integrate Prevent into other areas of local authority activity:

- In Croydon, for example, it is the responsibility of an officer in the Public Safety Service, who has responsibility for a number of crime and disorder issues.  
- In Harrow, Prevent is the responsibility of a Senior Professional for Community Cohesion.

Non-priority boroughs have far less contact with OSCT. Bexley, for example, told us that it is “not aware of any support from the Home Office apart from notification of the duty and guidance notes”.

Challenges for preventing extremism in London

4.5 At an “operational and tactical” level, there is improving oversight of work taking place across London to tackle extremism and identify those at risk of the extremist narrative. A London Prevent Board is in place that brings together “all the government agencies and various other agencies that are working on Prevent in London.” This board, which has been in operation since early 2011, provides a space to share good practice, discuss risks, and provide a mechanism for senior officials from local authorities to feed information about Prevent work back into their local borough. Prevent Coordinators from priority boroughs make up much of the membership of the Board. Other members include government departments, the Met, and the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC). Prevent Coordinators feed in information from their local areas, but it does not appear that communities can feed information directly into the board.

4.6 At a political and strategic level in London, there is less oversight of efforts to prevent extremism. We asked MOPAC about the evaluation of Prevent activity in London and were told that not only did it have no involvement in any evaluation, but that “no Police and Crime Commissioner in the country has that information and so does not carry out evaluation.” In respect of the projects that are being delivered in London, the OSCT “holds the list” and it is not widely shared. There appears to be no London body that has overall oversight of what is taking place at any one time.

4.7 It is difficult to establish what, why and how decisions have been taken in respect of preventing extremism. We invited the Home Office and OSCT to contribute to our investigation by setting out the framework for applying the Prevent Strategy in London. We were disappointed that they were reluctant to engage fully with us. This, for us, reflects the general feeling among many of a lack of openness by those in central government on this issue.
Collaboration across public services

4.8 Yet, there is broad agreement that sharing information leads to better interventions, and a ‘richer’ picture of the threat. The development of Counter-Terror Local Profiles (CTLPs) is one example that demonstrates where sharing of information among partners can create a rich picture. The CTLP is the main document that sets out risk in a particular area. It provides a crime overview, information on community tensions, and the context of threats from all forms of extremism. CTLPs have historically been intelligence-led and only shared with a limited number of people. We heard that “all London boroughs will be issued with their own CTLPs and that is very closely safeguarded”, often only seen by the Borough Commander and the borough’s Chief Executive.

4.9 Information about other cities demonstrates that the involvement of many public services is effective. Partners in Birmingham, for example, have taken steps to make its CTLP as open as possible. Now, through a meeting held with stakeholders from different public services, using an analysis of intelligence and version of the CTLP that is redacted where necessary, stakeholders are encouraged to identify emerging issues and come up with the solutions to those issues. The approach to preventing extremism in Birmingham is as a result more highly valued because more partner agencies feed into it, for example health services and schools. High-level outcomes and aims are then made available publicly. We also heard that in Manchester some senior council officers have been vetted so they can be briefed by the police on local issues “without giving anything away that is of national security importance.”

4.10 A more open approach to identifying risk and coming up with solutions needs to be in place in London. Deputy Commissioner Craig Mackey QPM suggested that “the more people who inform the picture the better” and Rebecca Lawrence, Director of Strategy, MOPAC, told the Committee the Met was “very keen to change the way they [CTLPs] are produced and to improve their quality.” Lord Carlile said that most of the CTLP may be suitable for sharing with a wide range of organisations and that in doing so, “the narrative should be as open as possible.” By doing so, the approach will be more inclusive, rather than public services feeling that they have little say in respect of projects and initiatives.

Delivery

4.11 There are variations in the level and quality of work being undertaken across the boroughs. We heard from Lord Carlile that “the quality of work being done by some boroughs in London is extremely high and by some boroughs in London it is rather less high. There is a serious lack of uniformity.” Waltham
Forest, a priority area, was cited as an outstanding example and was praised for the effectiveness of its “Prevent Cabinet” meetings, which bring together a range of partners and community groups to engage in robust debate. It also has several well respected prevent projects, such as its Digital Resilience programme, and its Building Resilience through Integration and Trust (BRIT) programme, which “takes a family-focused approach to working with primary school children and their families to prevent extremism”.

Other boroughs, however, particularly non-priority boroughs, stressed it is difficult to deliver similar levels of work. Diane Egan told us that in Havering:

“We are in a difficult position as a non-funded, non-priority borough because funding is just not available to develop those community projects for interventions.”

4.12 There are missed opportunities in London for joined-up working. Martin Esom told us that local authorities may share information with another authority “but there is not that pan-London commissioning that goes on.” He also said that because Prevent Coordinators bid separately for projects there is no pan-London approach.

4.13 Many of the people we spoke to were in favour of a more pan-London approach to projects. AC Mark Rowley, for example, said “it may make sense to procure those [projects] across London in the way that MOPAC is looking to choreograph the procurement of extra support around counter-gangs work.” Diane Egan suggested that “there is a role here for the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime and the development of maybe some pan-London interventions that we can either buy into or direct those young people who are at risk in our borough.”

4.14 A lack of certainty and freedom in funding arrangements is hampering delivery in London. Some types of projects that would help to tackle extremism cannot receive Prevent funding. Martin Esom identified that tackling housing need and worklessness was important in addressing extremism, but said activities focused on these issues would not currently be eligible for Prevent funding. Funding for projects tends to be provided on a yearly basis. We heard that this means that Prevent coordinators find out very late in the financial year which projects will be funded. Those projects that can run over a number of years are less likely to be funded. We heard that this was not beneficial because “short, sharp programmes will not change hearts and minds.”
5. The next steps: enhancing efforts to prevent extremism

**Key issues**

MOPAC is seeking greater involvement in efforts to prevent extremism in London. Through the introduction of a London CONTEST Board, it hopes to bring partners together to share information, improve transparency, and deliver interventions more effectively.

MOPAC’s involvement in preventing extremism, and the development of the London CONTEST Board, provides an opportunity for greater political leadership of counter-extremism work at the London level. It is in a unique position to understand what is happening across the city, to help to target resources more effectively, and to help organisations work more closely together.

At its most basic, the London CONTEST Board can add value by ensuring that public services are engaged with the overall approach to preventing extremism. The London CONTEST Board should drive this agenda to ensure that public services have a clear understanding of risk and opportunity in the capital.

However, the public must not be the forgotten partner in the fight against extremism. It should be more involved in discussions about the best ways to prevent extremism and how to achieve it across London.

5.1 MOPAC has recognised the challenges and gaps in preventing extremism in London. It has sought to address some of London’s specific challenges with the introduction of a London CONTEST Board, which had its first meeting in July 2015. The DMPC has set up a board to examine the implementation of all four aspects of the Government’s CONTEST strategy: Pursue, Protect, Prepare, and Prevent. Its membership includes the London Resilience Forum; London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority; London Prevent Board; the London Safeguarding Children Board; and the Met.99

Rebecca Lawrence set out the case for the board to us:

“At the London Prevent Board at the executive, tactical and strategic level there is now some very good work going on, you need political support and buy-in above that. You need political-awareness raising so that the political leadership of boroughs, and in this building [City Hall], can then help the prioritisation through all our work and all of the statutory partners’ work to make sure that this area of
vulnerability is understood as well as other areas of vulnerability that are also moving up the agenda like sexual exploitation and so on.”

5.2 The London CONTEST Board differs from the London Prevent Board. It focuses on all of the counter-terrorism strands of the CONTEST strategy, rather than just Prevent. It does, however, have several aims in respect of preventing extremism. It aims to address a lack of uniformity across the London boroughs; provide for greater oversight of how money is being spent; make sure that all partners understand the nature of the threat; and improve transparency. Helen Bailey, Chief Operating Officer at MOPAC, told us that the Board exists “specifically to make sure that all partners understand what the nature of the threat is, that there is some accountability of the activity undertaken, and that it brings everybody to the table.”

5.3 The London CONTEST Board aims to replicate the work of similar boards elsewhere in the country. We visited Birmingham City Council to hear about its CONTEST Board, which is regularly cited by the DMPC and others as a model of good practice. The structure within Birmingham includes: a Strategic Board, which is chaired by the Deputy Leader of the City Council and brings partners together to provide oversight of the Prevent strategy and Duty; an Executive Board which is made up of Senior Council officers and other partners that deliver measures to tackle extremism (much like the London Prevent Board), which considers the risk profile for Birmingham and agrees an action plan for the city as well as maintaining oversight of delivery; and a Prevent Programme Board, which is tasked to implement actions against the delivery plan for the city.

5.4 There is potential value in London having a CONTEST Board. In Cardiff, for example, we heard that its CONTEST Board has been important in bringing the different strands of CONTEST together more effectively. Professor Martin Innes told us that the Board in Cardiff was now “at a point where we have all of the key agencies at the table, joining up and discussing these issues.” He went on to say that the Cardiff CONTEST Board has been able to “exert pressure and influence”, and has helped with decisions about “where the emphasis lies in terms of Prevent, Pursue, Prepare and Protect”. The value of the Birmingham CONTEST Board was highlighted to us by Rebecca Lawrence, who said that the Board had created “a really rich sharing of information” and “trusted relationships” that has resulted in a much better picture of what was happening in communities.

5.5 MOPAC’s involvement in efforts to prevent extremism, and the creation of the London CONTEST Board, has been broadly welcomed. Deputy
Commissioner Craig Mackey told us it could help to support “standard reporting so that we know which are the good boroughs and the not-so-good boroughs and then try to understand what lies behind that.” Martin Esom suggested that “a London-wide body could well make a valuable contribution to oversee the whole of the CONTEST area.” Faith Matters suggested that it presents “an opportunity to implement the Prevent strategy in a way that can have positive outcomes by learning from past experiences nationwide that stress the value of community engagement.”

5.6 However, the London CONTEST Board needs first to be clear with partners across public services in London about its role and its place in the counter-extremism framework. We heard concerns that the London CONTEST Board might be seen to duplicate, or stand in place of, the work of the London Prevent Board or local authorities. Martin Esom argued that the London Prevent Board already had the “right membership, the right buy-in and the right people around the table” so the board could be better served focusing on the other strands of CONTEST strategy. We also heard that some were not aware that a board had been set up, and some boroughs questioned how the board will affect the local authority duty to oversee Prevent. One borough suggested that “there is no statutory remit for a London-wide Board to oversee Prevent. The duty lies with local authorities not MOPAC” but that it “could possibly add to understanding of regional risk, share good practice and promote cooperation”.

**Recommendation 1**

Awareness and understanding about the newly formed London CONTEST Board needs to improve. MOPAC should publicise information about the creation, roles and responsibilities of the Board.

MOPAC should in particular engage with local authorities to make clear the responsibilities of the Board, and how it aims to support the London Prevent Board and those already working to tackle extremism in London.

5.7 MOPAC’s involvement in preventing extremism, and the development of the London CONTEST Board, provides an opportunity for greater political leadership of counter-extremism work at the London level. The London CONTEST Board is in a unique position to understand what is happening across London, to help to target resources more effectively, and to help organisations work more closely together. London Councils suggests that sharing information, greater transparency, and a more strategic overview would “provide a strong foundation for the proposed Board’s work to support decision makers and partners (locally, regionally and nationally) in delivering an improved response to violent extremism in London.” Its unique
potential contribution is just that: improving delivery on the ground, and helping to address some of the broader concerns about the approach to preventing extremism that are hampering its success.

The added value of the London CONTEST Board

5.8 At its most basic, the London CONTEST Board can add value by ensuring that public services are engaged with the approach to preventing extremism. The range of partners represented on the board is in itself a positive step towards achieving this.

5.9 Part of the solution is to ensure that everyone understands that responsibility for preventing extremism does not sit solely with the Met. It is heavily involved in efforts to prevent extremism: Prevent Officers are in place across the boroughs; officers deliver training in schools; and they run various community groups. But as Deputy Commissioner Craig Mackey told us, “one of the challenges with the whole work around Prevent is that it has been seen as the police front and centre doing this. We are actually not.”

5.10 The role of the police should not be to lead on efforts to prevent extremism, but to intervene when appropriate. Lord Carlile told us that the reason the Met has been so heavily involved to date is because it provides consistency, but that its role should “be very limited” to dealing with actual crime. He explained that this approach has worked in places like Birmingham, where “the police are there to deal with what police should deal with” and the majority of work to prevent extremism is done by community workers, social workers and those working in wards for Birmingham City Council. In the case of Birmingham, the balance has been re-established: the police are stepping away from training to allow others to deliver it. The Council, for example, has trained 6,000 staff last year to raise awareness of Prevent.

5.11 Equipping public services with the skills and resources to adapt to the new statutory Prevent duty will be critical to achieving buy-in and redressing the balance between them and the Met. The challenge is doing so in the context of resource reductions across the public sector. Part of the solution to this is to ensure that measures to prevent extremism are undertaken through a safeguarding practice rather than a separate activity. Tackling vulnerability to extremism as a safeguarding issue rather than allowing it to be seen as a criminal one will change the approach public bodies can take with local communities. It should also open up a common space for dialogue as to what is going on in homes, schools, community centres and places of worship. Many public services recognise that preventing extremism falls within the safeguarding sphere and are organising themselves as such. We heard, for example, that in Lewisham, Prevent issues are incorporated into the
children’s safeguarding board. In Waltham Forest, the Channel programme is “firmly rooted in safeguarding procedures”.

5.12 But this approach does have its own challenges. The potential use of courts and child protection measures, for example, is a challenge for children’s social services teams. Child and adult safeguarding teams also face the challenge of balancing those who are at risk from actual physical harm (what we might think of as more traditional safeguarding issues), versus those who are in need and have the potential to be involved in extremism.

Recommendation 2
The London CONTEST Board should seek to clarify the additional pressures being placed on local authorities and other public services as a result of the statutory Prevent duty. Where pressures are identified, it should work to address these with the services concerned, using good practice and sharing information from elsewhere to help them adapt to any new responsibilities.

5.13 Transparency, honesty and collaboration are critical to the success of measures to prevent extremism. We know, however, that this is a major cause for concern at the moment. For public services, it means more involvement in discussions about threat, risk and solutions. For community and third sector organisations, knowledge about what is happening at an operational and strategic level is important, as well as knowing what good practice is taking place elsewhere in the city. Some of the organisations that we spoke to, for example, told us that they do not know what the London Prevent Board discusses, or what work is being done in different parts of London to address extremism. For the public, transparency about what Prevent is for and what activity is taking place is critical. We know that community engagement is hampered by suspicion and fear, and much of this is the consequence of the secrecy that surrounds the delivery of the Prevent Strategy.

5.14 One of the aims of the London CONTEST Board is to improve transparency between the public and public service providers. Rebecca Lawrence told us that:

“we all need to get much better at confidently describing in the public domain work that is going on and the threat that is going on, and to be much more daring about what is put out in public.”
5.15 We understand that work is underway, through the London CONTEST Board, to examine how Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles—which provide a risk assessment of an area—can be improved, and we look forward to hearing about how this develops as a major step in increasing transparency across public services on this issue. We are less clear about how the London CONTEST Board will drive transparency with the public and with community and third sector organisations. The discussions that take place at the London CONTEST Board and the London Prevent Board, for example, are private. While this is understandable to some extent, given the nature of the discussion, to treat all information as confidential does not support statements about a “dare to share” approach to preventing extremism encouraged by those in MOPAC, including the DMPC.  

5.16 We heard calls to increase openness with the public about Prevent and its delivery. Imran Awan, for example, suggested that the London CONTEST Board could provide the public “the opportunity to understand and oversee the rationale behind the guidance of Prevent” and to raise awareness about the concerns of Prevent and “the notion of Islamophobia in relation to it”.  

We also heard many calls for direct engagement with communities. RightsWatch UK suggested that the London CONTEST Board should “prioritise community engagement as a method of reaching the more vulnerable members of the community” and Imran Awan also told us that the London CONTEST Board could gather the views, particularly of Muslim communities on “future policy recommendations and ideas.” AC Mark Rowley told us that a pan-London approach to community engagement would be beneficial and that “if you are thinking about how we empower certain communities across London, then it would make sense to do it at a London level.”

**Recommendation 3**

Collaboration between public services on this issue needs to improve. The London CONTEST Board should drive this agenda to ensure that public services have a clear understanding of risk and opportunity in the capital. In developing Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles in London, for example, it should encourage the use of the method used in Birmingham, in which public services are brought together to identify risks and recommendations for action.
Recommendation 4
The public must not be the forgotten partner in the fight against extremism. The London CONTEST Board needs to ensure it lives the ‘dare to share’ ethos in the way it communicates with the public. It should commit to regular, open and honest communication and engagement with the public about what is happening in London.

For Prevent to work the public must be fully engaged and own the agenda. The public and communities should be more involved in discussions about the best ways to prevent extremism and how to deliver measures to prevent extremism across London. As a starting point, we recommend that MOPAC and the London CONTEST Board:

- arrange a London-wide consultation to engage Londoners on anti-extremism issues, to ensure that their concerns and ideas are listened to. This in turn should help to shape any pan-London approach to preventing extremism; and
- act as a conduit for feedback from London’s communities to the Government about what is and is not working.

5.17 By increasing both buy-in from public services, and the confidence of communities, the London CONTEST Board can start to help shape the most effective form of delivery. The fact that funding goes to some boroughs and not others, and that those boroughs with funding use it in isolation from one another, means that there is great scope for collaboration. AC Mark Rowley told us that “it may make sense to procure [diversionary projects] across London in the way that MOPAC is looking to choreograph the procurement of extra support around counter-gangs work. You might want to do the same thing, rather than trying to procure it 32 times.”

5.18 The DMPC has called for the London CONTEST Board to have a greater role in the commissioning of activity to prevent extremism in conjunction with OSCT. We heard that OSCT keep a “tight grip” on processes related to Prevent, but the DMPC has argued that “it is quite hard to run a Prevent programme entirely from Whitehall”, that there is a place for city government working alongside councils, and that by having a stronger role in commissioning the CONTEST Board will be able to implement a pan-London approach to delivery. The DMPC also said there is an opportunity to use funding for crime prevention and victims commissioning to support local authorities’ work around preventing extremism.

5.19 We heard about the aspirations of MOPAC to fund projects to prevent extremism in a different way. Rebecca Lawrence said:
“Our thinking was that if there were two or three boroughs that have some experience in Prevent that wanted to come forward and look at commissioning in a different way from the current framework set out by the Home Office—perhaps multiyear, perhaps across borough boundaries—they could come forward with innovative projects and a different way of commissioning.”

5.20 The benefits of being able to innovate in the way projects are commissioned are clear. It will result in more joined-up working, increased quality of interventions across the boroughs, and better use of limited resources. It could also help to ensure that, through more local knowledge, projects are delivered by organisations that are seen as highly credible with London’s communities. We heard that there was support for a new way of doing things. Rebecca Lawrence told us that “there is enthusiasm in some boroughs that do not want annual funding [but] want their coverage of programmes to be more innovative and flexible.” MOPAC is negotiating with the OSCT and the Minister for Security for greater joint working in the commissioning of Prevent projects and a new commissioning framework for London. We welcome the approach to more local involvement in the decisions about commissioning and the OSCT should help MOPAC to realise this goal as soon as possible.

**Recommendation 5**
The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism should take up the opportunity to pilot the joint commissioning of Prevent projects with MOPAC.

**Recommendation 6**
While negotiations are ongoing with the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in respect of projects funded as part of the Prevent Strategy, MOPAC and the London CONTEST Board should step in to ensure that all London boroughs are given the opportunity to deliver excellent interventions in preventing extremism. It should explore, for example, how it could:
- support projects that would help to address specific challenges to preventing extremism in London that would otherwise not have received Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism funding;
- fund some projects for more than one year, where this would be beneficial; and
- help priority and non-priority boroughs join up to deliver projects.
5.21 In addition to enhancing delivery, the London CONTEST Board has the opportunity to help lead the way in responding to some of the wider concerns about preventing extremism: for example, the rise in online radicalisation and the need for a strong narrative against extremist propaganda. These two issues are particularly important and inextricably linked. We would like to see MOPAC and the London CONTEST Board reflect on these to see where it could add value.

5.22 There are many programmes in London aimed at tackling online radicalisation and enabling parents and families to identify and address risk in their homes. The Jan Trust, for example, is one organisation that is supporting mothers to tackle online radicalisation. It aims to “strengthen the role that women and mothers play in building a stronger, safer society” and has developed the Web Guardians© project, which “educates mothers on how to use the internet and keep their children safe when they are online.” In the London Borough of Havering the risk of online radicalisation has been integrated into efforts to improve safeguarding online as a whole, including issues of sexual exploitation. Diane Egan told us there has been “a real appetite from parents who know nothing about the internet but just want to protect their teenagers from those risks that we never experienced when we were their age.” AC Mark Rowley said that projects such as these are helping families to “be more able online to challenge those ideologies so that the debate takes place, rather those pushing a corrupt view being the only people occupying the internet space.” It is unclear, however, whether these programmes reach everyone that needs them.

5.23 A focus on countering the extremist narrative more broadly and at an earlier stage, and so intervening before radicalisation begins, would put the authorities on the front foot and strengthen the chances of success. Some organisations are working on developing and delivering a strong counter-narrative. The Active Change Foundation (ACF), based in Walthamstow, is making efforts to deliver its counter-narrative online to “take away the space” of extremists. It operates in the belief that there is a need to “move into the operating space of the enemy” and use online and technological methods to deliver a strong counter-narrative.

5.24 Local communities are best placed to develop and deliver the counter-narrative. AC Mark Rowley told us that “I do not think the most powerful voices will ever come from law enforcement or other parts of the state, they have to come from community leaders.” In Birmingham, community groups such as Upstanding Neighbourhoods—a community-led initiative to
prevent extremism—are training young people to challenge the narrative of extremists online and face to face. The community is encouraged to deal with low-level vulnerability themselves. There has been some welcome success in Upstanding Neighbourhood’s approach with several people being dissuaded from travelling to Syria to support ISIL.132

5.25 The commercial sector has a role to play in helping empower communities to deliver the counter-narrative. Lord Carlile has said that technology companies and “consultants with the imagination and skills to move the counter-narrative on at a very fast pace” should use their expertise to “provide some inspiration to the counter-radicalisation effort”, and could, for example, “create games, literally, in which the good guys win”.133 Imran Awan suggested that the London CONTEST Board should help to get “communities together on social messaging and building resilience-based activities.”134 Lord Carlile also said that the public sector has a role to play in supporting the message that communities are delivering:

“I think that if Londoners feel that there is a much more public narrative, that it is supported by the leaders of the various political parties in the GLA and by the Mayor and that you can ask questions about it, then Prevent will become a much greater reality in Greater London.”135

Recommendation 7
The London CONTEST Board should explore what value it may be able to add in the areas of tackling online radicalisation and the need for strong counter-narratives to tackle extremist messages.

As a starting point, the London CONTEST Board should arrange for a piece of work to map activity to tackle online radicalisation and develop counter narratives by public services, communities and other organisations in London. This should highlight where the gaps are, and how this work might be joined up and shared to achieve greater impact at a pan-London level.
6. Minority Report from Jenny Jones AM

6.1 I regret that I am unable to support this report.

6.2 I am concerned that no upfront definition of what is meant by extremism is made for the purposes of the report. However, I recognise that, along with the Government’s definition of ‘radicalisation’, these are very contested words and not all Members of the Committee would be able to agree a common definition. Flexibility is obviously required when professionals seek to define what is and is not ‘extremism’, just as flexibility is required when debating what is ‘Britishness’, and the interpretation will often vary according to local circumstances. But there are obvious dangers to this. For example, the Met has previously included myself and several journalists in their database of ‘domestic extremists’. This shows how words such as ‘extremism’ can be interpreted in a surprisingly broad brush way.

6.3 I am also unhappy that while the report references the concerns raised about the Government’s focus on non-violent extremism, this is not reflected in the recommendations. There is academic evidence that the ‘conveyor belt’ idea, which underpins the Government’s new approach to Prevent, is not a valid one. These academics argue that violent terrorists do not grow out of a culture of non-violent extremist ideas. If these academics are right, then I believe there are three ways in which Prevent could be counter-productive. First, it could alienate people who have ‘extremist’ ideas but would be potential allies in the fight against violent extremism. Second, it may hinder the development of the counter-narrative in classrooms and colleges as communities withdraw from discussions in those controlled spaces. Finally, I believe the larger the number of people being monitored as ‘extremists’, the thinner the spread of Met Police resources becomes. I believe there should be consultation about whether the emphasis in Prevent on linking violent and non-violent extremism is having a detrimental effect on the work of those trying to engage in their communities and develop a counter-narrative.

6.4 I am concerned that the recommendations in the report avoid questioning the Prevent Strategy adopted by the Government. I believe the most significant barriers which the professionals and organisations are facing all stem from the way Prevent is being framed. If we believe that counter-terrorism increasingly relies on information gathered from communities, and less on intelligence services at home and abroad, then we need to radically overhaul programmes like ‘Prevent’. If decent, law-abiding people view these programmes as counter-productive and we wish Prevent to be more
successful on the ground, then it needs to address any fundamental problems in its approach which are creating barriers to implementation. Prevent is failing to win the hearts and minds of many people it needs to reach.

6.5 For these reasons I am unable to support this report.
Conclusion

Extremism is a complex and emotive issue, as is how best to tackle it. There are obstacles to preventing extremism at all levels: from the context in which we are operating in; to understanding and implementing national policy; to identifying what interventions are best delivered at a local level.

The risk of being drawn into extremist activity is a vulnerability in the same way that some are at risk of exploitation by others. Engaging the person at risk, and all those around them in an open and honest way is vital to success. Only by being candid about the issues, open about how they are being tackled, and by delivering a strong and positive message can efforts to prevent extremism be expected to make a difference.

Collaboration between public services across London is vital and needs to improve. Sharing information leads to better interventions, and a ‘richer’ picture of the challenges faced by the capital. The role of the police should not be to lead on efforts to prevent extremism, but to intervene when appropriate.

At the same time, the public must not be the forgotten partner in the fight against extremism. Community engagement is shown to work but is the hardest element to achieve, given the history of the Government’s strategy to prevent extremism. Communities recognise the dangers of extremism and want to engage and involve themselves in efforts to prevent it. But a range of obstacles are resulting in suspicion about the policy and a subsequent reduction in community engagement. This is a challenge that needs to be overcome.

MOPAC and the London CONTEST Board have the opportunity to enhance efforts to prevent extremism in two ways. First, to create a more joined up, pan–London approach that encompases the efforts and needs of public services and the communities they serve. Second, to use the knowledge and experience of doing things in different ways to influence the national agenda, taking into consideration the concerns raised about the overall approach to preventing extremism, and feeding back to Government about what is and is not working.
Appendix 1 – Recommendations

Recommendation 1

Awareness and understanding about the newly formed London CONTEST Board needs to improve. MOPAC should publicise information about the creation, roles and responsibilities of the Board.

MOPAC should in particular engage with local authorities to make clear the responsibilities of the Board, and how it aims to support the London Prevent Board and those already working to tackle extremism in London.

Recommendation 2

The London CONTEST Board should seek to clarify the additional pressures being placed on local authorities and other public services as a result of the statutory Prevent duty. Where pressures are identified, it should work to address these with the services concerned, using good practice and sharing information from elsewhere to help them adapt to any new responsibilities.

Recommendation 3

Collaboration between public services on this issue needs to improve. The London CONTEST Board should drive this agenda to ensure that public services have a clear understanding of risk and opportunity in the capital. In developing Counter-Terrorism Local Profiles in London, for example, it should encourage the use of the method used in Birmingham, in which public services are brought together to identify risks and recommendations for action.

Recommendation 4

The public must not be the forgotten partner in the fight against extremism. The London CONTEST Board needs to ensure it lives the ‘dare to share’ ethos in the way it communicates with the public. It should commit to regular, open and honest communication and engagement with the public about what is happening in London.

For Prevent to work the public must be fully engaged and own the agenda. The public and communities should be more involved in discussions about the best ways to prevent extremism and how to deliver measures to prevent extremism across London. As a starting point, we recommend that MOPAC and the London CONTEST Board:

- arrange a London-wide consultation to engage Londoners on anti-extremism issues, to ensure that their concerns and ideas are listened to.
This in turn should help to shape any pan-London approach to preventing extremism; and

- act as a conduit for feedback from London’s communities to the Government about what is and is not working.

**Recommendation 5**

The Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism should take up the opportunity to pilot the joint commissioning of Prevent projects with MOPAC.

**Recommendation 6**

While negotiations are ongoing with the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in respect of projects funded as part of the Prevent Strategy, MOPAC and the London CONTEST Board should step in to ensure that all London boroughs are given the opportunity to deliver excellent interventions in preventing extremism. It should explore, for example, how it could:

- support projects that would help to address specific challenges to preventing extremism in London that would otherwise not have received Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism funding;
- fund some projects for more than one year, where this would be beneficial; and
- help priority and non-priority boroughs join up to deliver projects.

**Recommendation 7**

The London CONTEST Board should explore what value it may be able to add in the areas of tackling online radicalisation and the need for strong counter-narratives to tackle extremist messages.

As a starting point, the London CONTEST Board should arrange for a piece of work to map activity to tackle online radicalisation and develop counter narratives by public services, communities and other organisations in London. This should highlight where the gaps are, and how this work might be joined up and shared to achieve greater impact at a pan-London level.
Appendix 2 – How we conducted this investigation

On 19 May 2015, the Police and Crime Committee agreed to undertake an investigation into the application of the Prevent Strategy in London.

The investigation’s terms of reference were:

- To examine the impact the new Prevent duty will have for the Met and MOPAC, and its work with partners and community groups; and
- To consider what the objectives and priorities should be for the new strategic board to oversee the work of Prevent and the other elements of the CONTEST Strategy across London.

Public meetings
The Committee held two public evidence sessions to collect evidence to inform its investigation.

On 19 May 2015, it heard evidence from:

- Professor Martin Innes, Cardiff University;
- Shiraz Maher, Senior Research Fellow, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence;
- Martin Esom, Chief Executive, London Borough of Waltham Forest; and
- Diane Egan, Community Safety Team Leader, London Borough of Havering.

On 11 June 2015, it heard evidence from:

- Rebecca Lawrence, Director of Strategy, MOPAC; and
- Lord Carlile of Berriw CBE.

The Committee also used parts of its regular Question and Answer sessions to gather evidence. On 26 March 2015 it heard from:

- Deputy Commissioner Craig Mackey QPM, Metropolitan Police Service;
- Stephen Greenhalgh (Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime); and
- Lord Carlile of Berriw CBE.

On 25 June 2015 it heard from:

- Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley QPM, Metropolitan Police Service;
- Detective Superintendent Jim Stokley, Metropolitan Police Service; and
- Helen Bailey, Chief Operating Officer, MOPAC.
Transcripts of these meetings are available at http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor-assembly/london-assembly

Round tables
The Committee met with a number of think-tanks and local organisations to talk about their experiences of preventing extremism in London, and the challenges in implementing the Prevent Strategy.

Submissions
The Committee received a number of written submissions from individuals and organisations during the course of its investigation. Submissions are available to view at https://www.london.gov.uk/about-us/london-assembly/london-assembly-publications
Appendix 3 – Endnotes

1 For example, the series of nail-bomb attacks in Soho in 1999; the July 2007 bombings on the London Transport Network; and the bombing of mosques and murder of a man in the West Midlands in 2013
2 Metropolitan Police, AC Mark Rowley sets out counter-terrorism challenges and renews public appeal, 17 October 2014
3 Metropolitan Police, Latest counter terrorism arrest statistics announced, 14 May 2015
4 Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre website, information on International Terrorism
5 Comment made by Lord Carlile of Berriew, former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, to the Press Association on 28 June 2015
6 Metropolitan Police, Latest counter terrorism arrest statistics announced, 14 May 2015
7 Metropolitan Police, Latest counter terrorism arrest statistics announced, 14 May 2015
8 Metropolitan Police, Statement from Specialist Operations, 11 August 2015
10 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 25 June 2015, page 7
11 Written submission from the City of London Corporation
12 The demonstration had originally been planned to take place in the Golders Green area of London and aimed at the Jewish community, but was moved to Whitehall by police
13 Martin Esom, meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 19 May 2015, page 28
14 The Security Service website, information on lone actors
15 The Guardian, Increased terror threat is stretching resources, says Met police chief, 23 November 2014
16 Lord Carlile, meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 11 June 2015, page 12
17 Round table meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 22 October 2015
18 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 19 May 2015, page 34
19 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 26 March 2015, page 26
20 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 19 May 2015, page 23
21 Round table meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 22 October 2015
22 Martin Esom, meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 19 May 2015, page 5
23 The Telegraph, Britain’s top counter terrorism officer warns UK faces jihadist threat ‘for many years to come’, 24 November 2014
24 Presentation by Dr Lewis Herrington, at the Tackling Extremism: Effective Intervention and Re-engagement seminar organised by Gov-Know, 19 August 2015
25 Financial Times, Tech groups aid terror, says UK sky chief, 3 November 2014
26 AC Mark Rowley, meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 25 June 2015, page 4
27 Meeting of the Home Affairs Select Committee, 10 March 2015
28 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 25 June 2015, page 4
29 Financial Times, Police say social media companies ‘undermining’ terror probes, 5 October 2015
30 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 19 May 2015, page 27
31 Home Office, Prevent duty guidance, 12 March 2015
33 HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, July 2011
34 Home Office, Prevent Strategy, June 2011, page 97
35 HM Government, Channel Duty Guidance, April 2015
77 See, for example, The Guardian, Government steps up efforts to prevent young Muslims becoming jihadis, 13 February 2015; and Home Office, Response to Freedom of Information request from M Norris, 11 September 2014
78 London Councils website, Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 and the Prevent Programme
80 Written submission from the London Borough of Croydon
81 Written submission from the London Borough of Harrow
82 Written submission from the London Borough of Bexley
83 Martin Esom Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 19 May 2015, page 1
84 Rebecca Lawrence, meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 11 June 2015, page 32
85 Martin Esom, meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 19 May 2015, page 6
86 Visit of the Police and Crime Committee to Birmingham City Council, July 22 2015
87 Lord Carlile, meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 11 June 2015, page 3
88 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 26 March 2015, page 23
89 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 11 June 2015, page 8
90 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 11 June 2015, page 12
91 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 26 March 2015, page 26
92 Written submission from the London Borough of Waltham Forest
93 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 19 May 2015, page 9
94 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 19 May 2015, page 14
95 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 25 June 2015, page 6
96 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 19 May 2015, page 9
97 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 19 May 2015, page 14
98 Round table meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 22 October 2015
99 Helen Bailey, Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 25 June 2015, page 7
100 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 11 June 2015, page 12
102 Visit of the Police and Crime Committee to Birmingham City Council, July 22 2015
103 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 19 May 2015, page 22
104 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 11 June 2015, page 13
105 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 26 March 2015, page 27
106 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 19 May 2015, page 21
107 Written submission from Faith Matters
108 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 19 May 2015, page 21
109 Written submission from the London Borough of Sutton
110 Written submission from London Councils
111 Deputy Commissioner Craig Mackey, meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 26 March 2015, page 22
112 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 26 March 2015, page 18
113 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 11 June 2015, page 3
114 Visit of the Police and Crime Committee to Birmingham City Council, July 22 2015
115 Written submission from the London Borough of Lewisham
116 Written submission from the London Borough of Waltham Forest
117 Round table meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 22 October 2015
118 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 11 June 2015, page 28
119 Speech by Stephen Greenhalgh at the Cohesive Communities event organised by the London Borough of Waltham Forest, 7 July 2015
120 Written submission from Imran Awan
121 Written submission from Rights Watch UK
122 Meeting of the Police and Crime Committee, 25 June 2015, page 5
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