Mass Evacuation Framework

June 2018
Version 3.0

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED
# Version Control

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Version</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Change (owner)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>June 2014</td>
<td>Approved by London Resilience Forum</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
<td>June 2018</td>
<td>Updates made to:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Terminology</td>
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<td>• Organisations</td>
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<td>• Section 17. to reflect ‘Communicating with the Public Framework’ no longer</td>
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<td>• Annex B: Roles and Responsibilities</td>
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<td>• Mass Evacuation and Shelter Group meeting agenda</td>
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# Critical Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>In the event of an incident requiring the evacuation of those who live, work or are visiting London, the London Resilience Partnership will be required to provide a coordinated, multi-agency response. This Framework is intended to provide guidance to responders at all levels on the way in which the evacuation of large numbers of people can be achieved.</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>First Steps</td>
<td>In the event of an incident requiring provision of mass evacuation:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Where possible, estimate the numbers displaced and the status of the transport network, and make a decision on the most appropriate location for Evacuee Loading Points / Evacuee Disembarking Points bearing in mind the proposed locations for interim sheltering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To establish the Strategic Coordinating Group as soon as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Establish an Evacuation and Shelter Coordination Group (ESCG) or appropriate equivalent to support the work of the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) or Strategic Commanders if that group is not sitting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To consider the appropriate level of activation and scale upwards/down as the circumstances dictate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Coordinate the evacuation of persons from the affected area taking into account those who may have already self-evacuated and dispersed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Work with all agencies that may be required to support the sheltering process appropriate to their organisational role and responsibilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to use this Framework quickly</td>
<td>This Framework is divided into five sections:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• An overview of the Framework, including information about the aim, objectives and audience, please see Section 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The principles, scale and planning assumptions for a mass evacuation, please see Section 2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The activation schedule which covers how the Framework might be activated, coordination of evacuation and shelter and communication, please see Section 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The evacuation process in detail is described in Section 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Recovery is described in Section 5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principles</td>
<td>An incident requiring a mass evacuation is likely to be disruptive and challenging, with long-term impacts and a need for central coordination. This Framework is based on the planning assumption that a significant number of persons will self-evacuate and disperse and the majority of those displaced will make their own arrangements for shelter, whilst recognising that this may vary considerably based on the nature of the initiating incident and the areas affected.</td>
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Executive Summary

The purpose of this Framework is to offer guidance to responders managing a mass evacuation of displaced persons and, where appropriate, other living creatures. In this context, the term “evacuation” may take a range of forms dependent on the circumstances and will include self-evacuation and dispersal with or without the need of support. The underlying principle is that for persons not needing assistance existing public transport will be used. The underground, bus and rail networks will be utilised. Displaced persons will be directed to Evacuee Loading Points (i.e. existing transport infrastructure facilities near the evacuation area) and Evacuee Disembarking Points (i.e. stations where those evacuees requiring shelter will be dispatched to Local Authority care).

The Framework has been developed by the Multi-Agency London Resilience Partnership Mass Evacuation Group (MEG). In addition to providing guidance, it is intended to support decision-making and expectation management across all multi-agency partners and stakeholders. The content facilitates a flexible, scalable and coordinated approach to managing an evacuation.

This document is not intended to be prescriptive, as every incident is different; rather, its aim is to capture the core principles for the management of a mass evacuation enabling key organisations to respond consistently and with a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities.

The Framework has been aligned with the Mass Shelter Framework where information about the arrangements for shelter may be found.

Membership of the Multi-Agency Group

British Transport Police
City of London Police
Government Liaison Team (GLT)
Local Authorities
London Resilience Group
MPS SCO 22 (13)
NHS England (London)
Rail Delivery Group
Transport for London
Voluntary Sector
Section 1: Overview

1. Background and Purpose

1.1. The management of evacuation is coordinated by a variety of agencies and the provision of emergency shelter is primarily the responsibility of Local Authorities. The London Mass Evacuation Framework is the strategic framework for the mass evacuation of people from part, or parts, of London. It includes the process by which assessments will be made, decisions taken, and action co-ordinated to achieve the evacuation of large numbers of people from a place of danger in London to places of safety.

1.2. The aim of any evacuation is to ensure the movement, as safely as is reasonably practicable, of people from places of danger to places of safety. Mass evacuation will always be a last resort and only undertaken when absolutely necessary.

1.3. The plan will assist the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG), the Evacuation and Shelter Coordination Group (ESCG) and those directing the mass evacuation process, to coordinate the activities of the responding organisations.

1.4. An incident which causes a mass evacuation may be a ‘sudden impact’ or a ‘rising tide’ type of incident. A ‘sudden impact’ incident will require immediate evacuation of a population to protect life, which may have to be initiated before the full command and control structure is in place. In a ‘rising tide’ incident, agencies will have some warning of a potential incident, enabling command and control structures to be put in place to coordinate the response to the incident and any associated evacuation. Although this plan primarily outlines arrangements for evacuation when there is time to set up a full command and control structure, it also includes provision for evacuation as a result of a sudden impact incident.

1.5. Please note that the term “Police” is used throughout. This may refer to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) or the City of London Police (CoLP). Where the British Transport Police (BTP) are referenced, this will be specified.

1.6. This document should be read in conjunction with the Mass Shelter Framework and the Evacuation and Shelter Guidance issued by the Cabinet Office, which can be accessed via www.gov.uk.

2. Aim and Objectives of the London Mass Evacuation Framework

2.1. The aim of this Framework is to provide the London Resilience Partnership, and relevant responders in neighbouring LRFs, with a strategic framework and operational guidelines to support an evacuation of an area or areas of London.

2.2. The objectives of this Framework are:

- Support the Strategic Coordinating Group to respond effectively to an event that requires the evacuation of part of London;
- Provide responding organisations with the necessary strategy to allow them to effectively implement their roles and responsibilities in support of an evacuation; and
- Provide the process by which appropriate information is supplied to all responding agencies, the public and businesses, at the start of and throughout the evacuation process.
3. Legal Context

3.1. In most situations, there are no specific statutory powers by which the Police or other agencies can enforce members of the public to evacuate an area. The two exceptions to this are as follows:

- The Police have statutory powers to cordon off areas in relation to acts of terrorism, and it is an offence to fail to comply with an order to leave these cordoned areas.\(^1\)
- There is provision to give effect to agreement or arrangement if it is necessitated by infectious or disease under public health legislation.\(^2\)

3.2. In extreme circumstances the use of emergency powers under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 may be sought to facilitate evacuation.

4. Links to Other Plans

4.1. This Framework is intended to enhance and complement existing London emergency plans and procedures and to provide the overarching document from which partner agencies may develop their own supporting plans.

4.2. This Framework should be read in conjunction with the Mass Shelter Framework. The processes of evacuating and sheltering a population are inextricably linked and coordination between the two is vital to ensure an effective response.

4.3. In the event of an incident requiring large-scale or mass evacuation, other London-wide plans are likely to have been activated. Specifically, the London Mass Evacuation Framework is designed to link into the following protocols:

- London Resilience Partnership Strategic Coordination Protocol
- Mass Shelter Framework
- London Recovery Management Protocol
- Humanitarian Assistance Plan
- London Emergency Services Liaison Panel / Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme doctrine

4.4. The Framework provides a general overview of actions, roles and responsibilities and provides an overview of options available. All responding agencies will hold copies of specific plans relevant to themselves and which will be used when responding in conjunction with this Framework.

5. Equalities

5.1. When determining the roles and responsibilities of all agencies and staff involved in the evacuation, due consideration should be given to fairness, equality and diversity, regardless of disability, ethnic origin, race, gender, age, religious belief or sexual orientation.

5.2. Further information regarding equalities can be found in the Partnership Strategy for Disability Equality. This document is produced by the London Resilience Group (LRG) and can be found on the London Prepared website.

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\(^1\) Terrorism Act 2000, section 36.
\(^2\) Health and Social Care Act 2008, section 129.
6. Document Ownership and Review

6.1. This draft version of the London Mass Evacuation Framework was produced by the Mass Evacuation Group (MEG) on behalf of the London Resilience Partnership.

6.2. The Framework will be reviewed following a major exercise or incident requiring mass evacuation, or at the direction of the London Resilience Forum.
Section 2: Principles, Scale and Planning Assumptions

7. Key Principles

7.1. This Framework has been developed on the basis and understanding that the agencies involved in the planning and activation of a mass evacuation will have given careful consideration to the possible issues that may arise and that participant organisations will have undertaken their own specific risk assessments in respect of the processes and procedures they will implement in support of The London Mass Evacuation Framework. The Framework assumes that once a mass evacuation starts relevant staff will work as directed by their managers.

Scale:
- The London Mass Evacuation Framework is intended to be scalable but will only be used when local resources are exceeded i.e. when a level of pan-London strategic coordination is required.
- It would be assumed that a large proportion of people evacuating from an area would disperse.
- The evacuation of hospitals and prisons will not be specifically covered in this Framework, as it requires detailed technical planning by individual hospitals and prisons. See Section 4 for more information.

Geography:
- Evacuees requiring shelter will be accommodated within the London boroughs wherever possible and the use of shelter facilities in other LRF areas will only be considered as a last resort.
- The Framework will be flexible and will cover any part of London. It will be capable of dealing with a single or multiple location event(s).
- It will provide contingency for the evacuation of people to safe areas either within or outside London.

Transport:
- The Framework assumes that a sufficient proportion of the transport network is still available to be used to assist evacuation.
- Public transport will continue to run to normal timetables to the extent that this is possible under the circumstances.
- Evacuation Loading Points (ELP) and Evacuee Disembarking Points (EDP) will be determined on the day by a sub-group as directed by the SCG, in conjunction with Mass Shelter arrangements.

Shelter:
- Although the Framework will refer to the processes for sheltering, this is covered in full detail in the Mass Shelter Framework.
Return and Recovery:

- The Framework will only cover the return of evacuated persons in outline. Beyond the 48hr period the Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG) will address any return and recovery issues with relevant organisations.
- Reoccupation of the evacuation site will be site specific and dependant on the nature of the incident, therefore, it resides outside the scope of this framework and will be addressed by the RCG.
- See Section 5 on Recovery.

Contaminated People:

- The management of contaminated evacuees is not specifically addressed within the scope of this Framework. However, for the purposes of this Framework, it is assumed that in the event of a Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) incident, any contaminated persons will be decontaminated before being evacuated, or that sheltering-in-situ would be the chosen course of action. Transport operators will not knowingly convey contaminated people.

8. Scales of Evacuation

8.1. The term ‘mass evacuation’ is not specifically defined within the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) legislation. The Cabinet Office Mass Evacuation and Shelter Guidance defines scales of evacuation in terms of the response arrangements that would be needed to support them.

8.2. This Framework will focus on the response to an incident requiring pan-London coordination and resources, encompassing a range of scales.

8.3. Scales of evacuation are defined for the purpose of this guidance as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Decision to trigger taken by</th>
<th>Resources likely to be required</th>
<th>Likely number of people affected</th>
<th>Examples of incidents triggering evacuation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small-scale / local evacuation</td>
<td>Incident controller or Operational or Tactical Commander</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Up to 1,000</td>
<td>Major gas leak, site-specific evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-scale evacuation</td>
<td>Multi-agency Strategic or Tactical Commander</td>
<td>Local (possibly with regional / national support)</td>
<td>1,000 – 25,000</td>
<td>Unexploded ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-scale evacuation</td>
<td>SCG / Police Strategic Commander</td>
<td>Local with regional / national support</td>
<td>25,000 – 100,000</td>
<td>Major chemical release or terrorist event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass evacuation</td>
<td>National / Police Strategic Commander</td>
<td>Local, regional and national</td>
<td>More than 100,000</td>
<td>Significant fluvial flood event</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Planning Assumptions

9.1. A range of risks (as outlined in the London Risk Register\(^3\)) could result in a scenario requiring mass evacuation. The current reasonable worst case planning assumption for London is based on a major fluvial flooding incident, giving the following impacts:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Properties flooded (homes and businesses)</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential total number of evacuees</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People requiring assisted evacuation*</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People stranded requiring rescue</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People stranded requiring assistance in situ</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People needing assisted sheltering (first few days)</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This may include elderly, very young, sick, disabled and those with pets

9.2. The London Mass Evacuation Framework is intended to be a scalable framework, providing strategic direction for a range of scenarios, up to the reasonable worst case outlined above. The intention however is to activate the Framework at the lowest level necessary so as to minimise disruption to evacuees, keep the management simple and use responder resources sparingly. The scale of the evacuation will therefore need to be kept under review.

9.3. It is assumed that the Police, BTP and local authorities will be liaising with transport operators about the various options for supporting a mass evacuation.

9.4. It has to be appreciated that staff of responding agencies may find themselves involved in the incident/event, or wrapped up with the implications, so that they may be delayed in the wrong location. Also, it has to be recognised that staff may fail to report for their duties due to the circumstances of the incident (e.g. because of concerns for their own welfare or that of their family).

9.5. This may impact on the responding agencies’ ability to be able to undertake some of the roles set out in this Framework.

10. Training and Exercising

10.1. Each organisation is responsible for ensuring that its staff are fully trained in its own emergency response procedures, and in its particular role in support of the operation of the London Mass Evacuation Framework and associated plans and protocols.

10.2. The Mass Evacuation Framework will be exercised as part of the London Resilience Forum Training and Exercising programme.

10.3. The London Resilience Programme Board (LRPB), has set out the standardised approach to training and exercising which was agreed in May 2014 and is set out below:

Exercising and Review

10.4. All responders should have a clear understanding of their role and responsibility throughout any incident where the procedures outlined in this document have been invoked. This should be achieved through training and exercising at all levels. Training should take place prior to

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\(^3\) The latest version of the London Risk Register is available from www.londonprepared.gov.uk
exercising the plan. The experience from exercises and incidents should contribute to reviews of the document.

10.5. The London Resilience Group maintains a list of lessons identified through exercises and incidents on behalf of the wider Partnership. These are identified, recorded and implemented in accordance with the Partnership’s Learning and Improvement Protocol. The status of these lessons is reported to LRPB, and the London Resilience Forum.

Responsibilities for Training and Exercising

10.6. Agency specific: Agencies are responsible for ensuring that they are able to carry out the roles and duties described in this document. It is expected that this will include role specific training and an appropriate level of knowledge of multi-agency procedures.

10.7. Partnership wide: The following will support a consistent approach to multi-agency cooperation approach across the London Resilience Partnership:

- A Capability Awareness Package accompanies the document. This is prepared by the Lead Agency responsible for developing the capability. The package provides basic information about the capability for all responders.
- The LRF Training and Exercising Group will coordinate:
  - Briefing and workshops hosted by the London Resilience Group.
  - Partnership wide exercises at the sub-regional and pan-London level.

10.8. Record keeping: Agencies are to maintain records of their training programmes as evidence. The London Resilience Forum will, from time to time, carry out an audit of multi-agency training across the Partnership to ensure a consistent approach. The Lead Agency for each Partnership work stream is to document the development of the capability through the record of exercises, testing and activation – see below.

Record of Exercises, Testing or Activations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed Exercise / Training</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>What will be tested/ Covered</th>
<th>Validation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>e.g. Professional Partner Training</td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>Roles and responsibilities; flood warning procedures</td>
<td>Evaluation sheets/ feedback from Participants.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION 3: ACTION SCHEDULE

11. Introduction

11.1. The Strategic Coordination Protocol (SCP) details the escalating strategic coordination arrangements for London’s response to a disruptive incident. This includes an emergency, as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and major incident as defined in LESLP and the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme Joint Doctrine (JESIP).

11.2. The decision to activate The London Mass Evacuation Framework will normally be taken by the SCG.

11.3. Due to the potential impact a mass evacuation could have on the capital, it may be necessary for the Chair of the SCG to refer to COBR (if sitting) as part of the final decision.

11.4. The below two statements if answered in the positive are intended to support the SCG in deciding whether an evacuation is required:

- Following a risk assessment, is the risk to life of remaining in situ assessed to be greater than the risk of evacuation; and
- The incident requires a level of pan London strategic coordination and response

11.5. It has to be understood that for a sudden impact event some local decision making at the scene may mean some form of evacuation and dispersal may have already started before the matter is referred to the SCG or Police Commander.

12. Evacuation May Be Required

12.1. For a sudden impact event, where a decision to evacuate has to be made before the formation of a SCG, this decision will be taken by the Police Strategic Commander in consultation with other relevant agencies. The answers to the two statements in sub section 12.4 above, should be considered when taking this decision and the London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) consulted regarding shelter requirements and capability.

12.2. It is advised that when the decision is made to activate an evacuation, a Recovery Coordinating Group is set up at the same time, if not already sitting as part of the response to a wider incident. This group can begin, from the outset, to consider the return and recovery phase following the evacuation. The Recovery Coordinating Group should be linked into the SCG to engage with the strategic return and recovery. Further information on recovery can be found in Section 5 below.

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4 Procedures for interaction between SCG and COBR through the Government Liaison Team are set out in the non-statutory guidance to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, Emergency Response and Recovery, and The Central Government’s Concept of Operations (CONOPs)
13. The Evacuation & Shelter Coordination Group (ESCG)

Introduction
13.1. Either the Metropolitan Police Service or City of London Police is likely to take the lead in coordinating the evacuation element of an incident (where this is of a scale to require activation of this document).

13.2. Invoking the Framework will create significant challenges for the partnership and the SCG. To assist in this process an ESCG will be convened with multi-agency representation (either in person or virtually). This group will directly manage the evacuation process and liaise with the relevant organisations to provide information and operational direction.

13.3. Set out in Appendix A are the role and proposed membership of the ESCG. A draft agenda for the first meeting of the ESCG has been developed with the MPS.

13.4. The timing of the setting up of the ESCG will be dependent on the nature of the evacuation and whether it relates to a rising tide or sudden impact incident. What is set out in this Framework is the ideal situation but it should be recognised that for a sudden impact event not all the key personnel will be available at short notice.

Location
13.5. The location of the ESCG will be decided by the SCG (if one has been established) or by agreement with key partners. The location should enable close liaison with the emergency services tactical group and provide the necessary facilities to ensure effective coordination of the evacuation.

Role
13.6. The ESCG will provide tactical, multi-agency coordination of the evacuation and shelter elements of incident response.

Membership
13.7. Membership of the ESCG (beyond the core shown in Appendix A) will be decided, based on circumstances and informed by discussions with partners.

13.8. There will be a time delay before all the required representatives can attend the ESCG. Until representatives are able to attend, liaison should be made directly with the relevant contact or operation centre as detailed in the London Resilience Partnership Contacts Directory.

Operating Procedures
13.9. Individual agencies have different internal command and control mechanisms. The purpose of the ESCG is not to bypass or replicate these structures, but to provide a single point of multi-agency coordination at an appropriate tactical level. Representatives on this group should be able to liaise effectively with their home organisations to provide the information required by the group and, as part of the group, take tactical decisions based on that information.

13.10. It is each individual agency’s responsibility to consider how this group should link into its command structure and make the necessary arrangements to ensure the ESCG is provided with the information it needs.
Evacuation – Sudden Impact Incident

13.11. Also referred to as “Immediate Impact” or “Big Bang” incidents, these may occur with little or no prior warning and with the impact felt immediately. The decision to evacuate members of the public and subsequently to open shelters in response to a sudden impact incident may need to be taken prior to the formation of a SCG. In this instance the decision will be taken by Police Strategic in consultation with LLAG and other key agencies.

Evacuation - Rising Tide Incident

13.12. A “Rising Tide” incident may have a lead-in time allowing a more coordinated response to be arranged. This will be governed by the level of pre-warning received and the response resources available.

13.13. The diagrams at the end of this section reflect the likely steps taken prior to the decision to evacuate and shelter the public in advance of an anticipated major incident and when an incident has already occurred.

13.14. The setting up of the ESCG and how it might operate has already been identified as a key aspect of the Framework to be addressed through training and exercising.

14. Command and Control

14.1. The Strategic Coordination Protocol (SCP), details the escalating strategic coordination arrangements for London’s response to a disruptive incident. Please refer to this Protocol and the LESLP Major Incident Procedure Manual.

14.2. For Local Authorities, each affected London borough (both dispatching and receiving) will set up a Borough Emergency Control Centre (BECC) responsible for coordinating Local Authority activity within their borough. The London Local Authority Coordination Centre (LLACC), working on behalf of LLAG, will provide a central coordination centre through which the BECCs and local authority elements of the evacuation can be coordinated.

14.3. The coordination structure is detailed and it will vary depending on the nature of the incident. The SCG and ESCG will need to be aware of and communicate the command and control arrangements in place for the incident.

14.4. A summary of the roles and responsibilities of the relevant agencies is shown in Appendix B.

15. Communicating with Neighbouring Areas

15.1. It is essential that there is communication with neighbouring areas especially when a mass evacuation (including dispersal) will impact on areas beyond London, this will be considered by the SCG. Coordination with other neighbouring areas is supported by MHCLG RED; coordination for a mass evacuation will not be different from generic arrangements for any large scale major incident. It should be noted that there may be a requirement for neighbouring areas to establish their own SCG(s).

15.2. Feedback provided by partners outside of London is that there is a need to supply early information about London’s response, the intended involvement of surrounding LRFs and the extent to which London can support them (if this is necessary).

16. Communicating with the Public

16.1. Communicating with the public is key to ensuring an effective evacuation. The London Resilience Communication Group (LRCG) is responsible for coordinating strategic communications in London during a major incident or emergency. The LRCG will coordinate
communications to the public and other key audiences regarding the evacuation process. Face to face communications, and local advice, will be the responsibility of local responders. The Communications Strategy in Appendix C outlines some specific messages in relation to mass evacuation.

Figure 1: Evacuation/Shelter Activation: Rising Tide Incident
Figure 2: Evacuation/Shelter Activation: Sudden Impact Incident

Police Commander in consultation with London Local Authority Gold and other agencies

DECISION IS TAKEN TO EVACUATE AND SHELTER

IDENTIFICATION OF EVACUATION ASSEMBLY POINTS
As per the London Mass Evacuation Plan.

IDENTIFICATION OF SHELTER VENUES
Considerations include likely incident duration, estimated numbers of evacuees and venues available

STRATEGIC COORDINATING GROUP ESTABLISHED

Evacuation and Shelter Coordination Group (ESCG)
The ESCG coordinates the evacuation and shelter aspects of the response, based on information received from all partners.

Evacuation is implemented as per the London Mass Evacuation Framework.

See separate Mass Shelter Framework.
SECTION 4: THE EVACUATION PROCESS IN DETAIL

17. Introduction

17.1. The decision making process will be very different for a rising tide and a sudden impact event so in this section of the Framework each sub section has been split. The first narrative covers a Rising Tide event and the second narrative (if necessary) covers any differences for a Sudden Impact event. This is intended to differentiate between the ideal position when time allows for partners to pre-plan for an evacuation and when planning is taking place during or post incident.

17.2. Feedback from incidents that have occurred in other countries reveal that the nature of the event will have a significant bearing on the availability of partners to support an evacuation. In some cases partner resources might be overwhelmed in dealing with the incident and this will be their priority until a measure of control is in place. Partners should also be prepared for a significant level of absenteeism due to a failure to be able to respond or where individuals have chosen for personal reasons not to respond.

17.3. There is a strong expectation in the Framework of promoting self-help, self-evacuation and self-shelter. It is recognised that many will be in need but with scarce resources the focus must be on those who are least able to help themselves.

18. The Relationship between Evacuation and Shelter

18.1. The diagram on the next page (reproduced in the Mass Shelter Framework) is a graphical representation of the evacuation and shelter process showing typical evacuee journeys. The key to the numbers in the diagram is on the following page.
Self Supported Shelter under own arrangements

Closed Communities – individual agency arrangements

Evacuation fully supported by Authorities

Assisted Evacuation

Self Evacuation
1. **Self-Evacuation** – individuals will make their own arrangements to move from a place of danger or threat of danger to a safe place using existing public transport or their own mode of transportation. They require no assistance from the responder community beyond general warning and informing communications.

2. **Assisted Evacuation** – individuals are capable of transporting themselves but require support through way finding and directions / identification and communication of a safe place to go / the need to utilise public transport to move them from a place of danger or threatened danger to a place of safety.

3. **Supported Evacuation** – individuals require greater support from the emergency services and public authorities to move from the place of danger or threat of danger. This is likely to have been preceded by the identification of the vulnerable. Support could be in many forms and is likely to require special transport arrangements to cater for the vulnerable.

4. **Direct movement to an Emergency Rest Centre (ERC)** – in some circumstances where individuals are identified with specific vulnerabilities they can be moved directly to an ERC to ensure the provision of adequate support for their vulnerabilities. The decision to move them directly to an ERC should be taken at the earliest point of identification either at the scene or at an EEC.

5. **Emergency Evacuation Centre (EEC)** – A facility offering immediate, basic shelter to a large number of people in the event of an emergency. An EEC does not provide feeding or dormitory facilities but will have basic sanitation and access to drinking water. An EEC is only likely to be needed in the event of an incident requiring Mass Evacuation.

6. **Short Term Shelter (STS)** - A facility offering short term shelter for those who cannot make alternative arrangements. A STS will make basic food provision but is unlikely to provide dormitory facilities. All efforts will be made to register occupants where possible, in order to identify welfare requirements.

7. **Emergency Rest Centre (ERC)** - A facility offering basic feeding, washing and dormitory provision for those without alternative accommodation options.

8. **Self-Supported Shelter** – individuals making their own alternative shelter arrangements for the period of the incident and not reliant on support from the public authorities.

9. **Closed Communities** – an independent or self-sufficient community that will take action through pre-determined plans to manage their own evacuation. They may require support from the emergency services and or public authorities – this should be agreed prior to any incident occurring e.g. Prisons, Hospitals, Care Homes, Zoos, etc. If evacuees from a closed community utilise any of the shelter venues or facilities they should do so supported by their own organisations to meet the specific needs of those persons.

10. **Shelter Support** - Potential for shelter support to be provided by neighbouring counties or other organisations under prior agreements, MoUs or contracts.
19. Phases of Evacuation

Rising Tide Event

19.1. Once the decision has been taken to implement the London Mass Evacuation Framework, the responding agencies identified within this Framework will be required to implement their respective operational procedures in support of the evacuation.

19.2. The time that it will take agencies to respond will be dependent on the nature, type, location and time of the incident. In a rising tide event, agencies will have been able to coordinate their response in advance and undertake some communication with persons to be affected.

19.3. The evacuation process is broken down into five principal phases as follows (the Return and Recovery phase is only outlined in this Framework as that will be dependent on a number of factors and will be passed to the Recovery Coordinating Group for decision):

- Initiate Evacuation
- Alert Population
- Move Population
- Shelter / Assistance
- Return / Recovery.

19.4. The key actions of these phases are outlined in Figure 4 on the next page. Communicating with the public runs through all five phases.

Sudden Impact Event

19.5. In a sudden impact event agencies will have little or no opportunity to coordinate their responses or communicate in advance with persons affected.

19.6. It is highly likely that it will take even longer for agencies to respond to a sudden impact event and in comparison with a rising tide event they will in effect be playing catch-up from the very start. Referring to the five phases above, for a sudden impact event agencies will already be at phase three before any coordination can be started.

19.7. Members of the public affected by the incident may have already started to self-evacuate and disperse to locations of their choosing (and not that of the ESCG). There will have been no opportunity to alert affected persons in advance of them moving and in order to do so it must be remembered that they may now be widely dispersed. How effective any communications post self-evacuation and dispersal needs to be considered carefully.
Fig. 4: Phases of Evacuation

**Initiate Evacuation**
- Responding Agencies initiate operating procedures
- Transport availability identified
- Evacuation assembly point identified
- Recovery Cell setup
- Local authorities to provide pan London shelter availability
- Alert neighbouring areas

**Alert Population**
- Initiate Warning and Informing methods

**Move Population**
- Affected local authorities move evacuees requiring help to evacuation assembly point (with assistance from Partner agencies)
- Coordination Groups to liaise with transport operators and move evacuees to locations where shelter can be provided

**Shelter / Assistance**
- Local authorities receive evacuees and provide short term shelter where needed.
- Handover to Recovery Group
- Inform Population/Residents
- Assess Situation
- Reoccupation (if possible)
- Local authorities consider longer term shelter options

**Return / Recovery**
- Responding Agencies initiate operating procedures
- Transport availability identified
- Evacuation assembly point identified
- Recovery Cell setup
- Local authorities to provide pan London shelter availability
- Alert neighbouring areas

**Initiate Evacuation**
- Responding Agencies initiate operating procedures
- Transport availability identified
- Evacuation assembly point identified
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- Handover to Recovery Group
- Inform Population/Residents
- Assess Situation
- Reoccupation (if possible)
- Local authorities consider longer term shelter options

**Return / Recovery**
- Responding Agencies initiate operating procedures
- Transport availability identified
- Evacuation assembly point identified
- Recovery Cell setup
- Local authorities to provide pan London shelter availability
- Alert neighbouring areas
20. Initiate Evacuation

Rising Tide Event

20.1. All agencies will be alerted of the decision to evacuate via existing communication links. The MHCLG RED will alert other LRF areas that the decision has been made. The LLACC will inform all London boroughs to prepare to receive evacuees if needed.

20.2. All responding agencies to implement their respective operating procedures in support of the evacuation.

20.3. The overarching principle is that evacuation will take place by the use of public and private transport. Public transport networks will be utilised. Existing operational protocols (i.e. emergency plans\(^5\)) are in place for all these organisations should the London Mass Evacuation Framework be implemented.

20.4. For the purpose of this Framework the following terms will be used:

- Evacuee Loading Points (ELPs): Existing transport infrastructure facilities near the evacuation area. For example Rail and Bus stations (to be determined on the day).
- Evacuee Disembarking Points (EDPs): Stations where those evacuees requiring shelter will be dispatched to Local Authority care (to be determined on the day).

20.5. Local authorities, transport operators, the Police and the BTP should liaise in advance to maintain a list of locations suitable for use as EDPs and/or ELPs. Which of these to actually use will be determined on the day according to the circumstances.

20.6. The affected Local Authority(s), in conjunction with local responders, will identify one or more suitable evacuation assembly point(s) (ideally close to a transport evacuee loading point) and outside the affected area, to which evacuees requiring assistance can be directed.

20.7. A decision will be taken by the LLAG (in consultation with other organisations as appropriate) regarding level of shelter requirements and whether an Emergency Evacuation Centre (EEC) needs to be opened.

20.8. Transport operators will identify which transport options are available and liaise with the ESCG to inform their operational decision making.

20.9. In liaison with the ESCG, The LLACC will coordinate the local authority response and identify local authorities outside the affected area that can be reached by transport links and are able to shelter evacuees.

Sudden Impact Event

20.10. There are no differences in initiating an evacuation between a sudden impact and rising tide event except that if the SCG has not been set up then this will be a decision for the Police Commander in charge. As mentioned before, those involved in the evacuation and shelter arrangements may have to take into account members of the public who have already self-evacuated or dispersed to locations of their choosing.

\(^5\) These plans whilst not developed with support to an evacuation in mind, should be adaptable.
21. Alert Population

Rising Tide Event
21.1. Warning and informing procedures will be determined by the LRCG Emergency Plan and will be implemented as soon as the decision to evacuate is made.
21.2. All responders are required to initiate their warning and informing systems and await instruction from the SCG representative on the messages to be distributed. Some of the current processes used by responders may not be fully suited to supporting a mass evacuation so they will need to be reviewed and updated as required.
21.3. The primary focus of the evacuation is on managing those who need support and shelter rather than those who are able to self-evacuate. Self-evacuees should be encouraged to make their own way to safety and information about safe routes should be communicated quickly.

Sudden Impact Event
21.4. The main difference between a sudden impact and a rising tide event is that there will have been no opportunity to warn and inform the public before the decision to evacuate is made.
21.5. The primary focus of the evacuation will be on managing those who need support and shelter rather than those who have or are able to self-evacuate.

22. Move Population

Introduction
22.1. Evacuees may fall in to one of the following categories:
- No support – making their own arrangements (in which case they are unlikely to come in to contact with responders)
- In need of support to make their own arrangements e.g. help with onward travel, making contact with friends/family, etc.
- A greater degree of support is required by providing transport to organised shelter

22.2. Feedback from other incidents (like 7/7) is that there was not enough time taken at the earliest opportunity in witness identification and record keeping of evacuees. The Police and local authorities will need to consider whether this type of data capture is important and at what stage it should take place.

Evacuation of Affected Area - Rising Tide Event
22.3. The local authorities, the Police and relevant transport operators will work together to facilitate the movement of evacuees to appropriate ELPs. Measures to meet the needs of vulnerable groups including people with mobility, hearing or visual impairment must be readily available.
22.4. Evacuees will be encouraged to make their own way home or to places of safety (friends/family, etc.). Evacuees who require assistance will be directed to the evacuation assembly point6 where their needs will be considered. Evacuation assembly points will ideally be located near or at ELPs (transport links). At the evacuation assembly point people should be encouraged to consider where they might be able to stay in a longer term scenario and,

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6 See Also LESLP Major Incident Procedure Manual, Section 9.5
where possible, directed accordingly until only those who will require local authority shelter remain. This is likely to be an ongoing process as people arrive seeking assistance.

22.5. See the Mass Shelter Framework for more detailed information about shelter arrangements.

**Evacuation of Affected Area – Sudden Impact Event**

22.6. There will be differences in the approach to an evacuation between a sudden impact and a rising tide event. It is highly likely that many people who are able to self-evacuate will already have done so and the main focus of Local Authorities, the Police and relevant transport operators will be to work together to:

- Gain some control (as necessary) over the self-evacuation and dispersal; and
- Facilitate the movement of vulnerable groups including people with mobility, hearing or visual impairment.

22.7. The challenge for responders will be their ability to commit to the evacuation and how they are each affected by the incident itself.

22.8. Self-evacuees will already be making their own way home or to places of safety (friends/family, etc.). Due to the lack of prior notice, it might take responders much longer to be able to identify and resource evacuation assembly points. The transport system may also be working to capacity dealing with self-evacuees in the first instance. Evacuees may also be presenting themselves for shelter before this has been coordinated.

**Receiving Evacuees – Rising Tide and Sudden Impact Events**

22.9. The principal role of the local authorities receiving evacuees is, in partnership with relevant responders, the movement of evacuees from the EDPs to the evacuation shelters and the provision of shelter for up to 72 hrs. For detailed information regarding shelter provision please see the Mass Shelter Framework.
23. Transport Options

Rising Tide Event

23.1. The following paragraphs highlight the key mechanisms and modes of transport that will be used in a mass evacuation and briefly explain the individual agency plans that might be invoked. These plans are held and maintained by those responding agencies. Transport operators will endeavour to ensure that accessibility for people with mobility, hearing or visual impairments is addressed but what is possible will be very dependent on circumstances.

Rail

23.2. Rail operators will run the existing timetable services, to the extent that this is possible under the circumstances. The advantage of this approach are:

i. passengers will be familiar with existing routes and schedules and so are more likely to know where to go, including alternative options;

ii. rail industry staff are familiar with the existing timetable and there will be no need to redirect them to roles or locations with which they are not familiar; and

iii. this will generally allow those self-evacuating to return to their homes, hence significantly reducing the burden on local authorities for the provision of shelter.

23.3. Arrangements are already in place for service coordination between rail operators and Network Rail with the Police, BTP and other agencies. Separate arrangements are not deemed necessary for a mass evacuation.

23.4. In the event of the London Mass Evacuation Framework being invoked, the normal services will be used to provide a safe and simple means of transporting the maximum possible number of evacuees away from the affected area in the shortest possible time.

23.5. It should be noted that with sufficient notice (i.e. 24 – 48 hrs) it would be possible for rail to enhance or amend the normal timetable to reflect the circumstances.

23.6. Crowd control at ELPs and EDPs will be managed by station staff and other transport operator staff. The Police and BTP will be required to assist where necessary.

London Underground

23.7. In the event of mass evacuation being invoked, the normal services will be used to provide a safe and simple means of transporting the maximum possible number of evacuees away from the affected area in the shortest possible time, with suitable fallbacks identified.

Buses

23.8. Bus Evacuation Loading Points will be established by London buses as part of the TfL operational procedures after the hazard zone has been identified. Loading points will be existing locations where buses can turn around safely and with sufficient capacity to both accommodate queuing passengers and buses.

Road Network

23.9. The management of the road network will be undertaken by TfL supported by the Police, Highways England and other road providers. There are already in place pre-planned routes to support the role of the Police at an incident and keep strategic routes flowing.
River

23.10. The deployment of river craft to facilitate evacuations over longer distances raises issues as to efficiencies associated with long transit times and extended turn-around times, as well as safety issues. However, the river may be used for specific site evacuation where the movement of people over a short distance is a factor, e.g. from Canary Wharf and the Isle of Dogs.

Air

23.11. To enable evacuation managers to operate safely and effectively, an air exclusion zone may be introduced over the affected areas if appropriate. Police have the facility, through the Civil Aviation Authority, to request this, and requests for temporary emergency flying restrictions should be made through the Police Tactical, who will review the necessity for such restrictions.

Sudden Impact Event

23.12. The main difference between a rising tide and a sudden impact event is that the identification of the ELPs and EDPs will be taking place alongside tackling the incident itself and within the context of self-evacuation without prior communication having taken place with the public. This will be a significant challenge for responders.

Transport Operators

23.13. Transport operators will run the existing timetable services, to the extent that this is possible under the circumstances. Depending on the location, time and day of the incident, services might not be able to cope with the level of evacuation and dispersal especially as this will have happened without the benefit of prior notification to operators and the public.

23.14. Depending on the availability of other transport options, in the event of no prior communication with the public services might initially become overwhelmed and it might take some time for a normal service to be resumed.

23.15. The aim will be to use transport services but the key difference will be the lack of advance notification and planning.

23.16. Without prior notification there may not be sufficient station, bus and transport operator staff in place to manage the level of self-evacuees. It should not be presumed that transport staff will be able to provide significant and special assistance to vulnerable persons.

23.17. The Police will be required to assist but they might not be readily available.

24. Evacuating Vulnerable Persons and Communities

Rising Tide Event

24.1. Being evacuated can be a disturbing experience for all involved. However, for a significant proportion of people the experience can be potentially very serious as it removes them from established support mechanisms or exposes particular vulnerabilities.

24.2. In the context of evacuation, vulnerable people are defined as those who require specific support with one or more elements of the evacuation process, and who do not have sufficient support mechanisms available to assist them. This may include individuals and communities known to health and social care services, but there are likely to be people requiring assistance who are not known to these services.

7 LESLP Major Incident Procedure Manual, Page 36, Paragraph 10.6.1
24.3. There are three categories of individuals that may fall in a ‘vulnerable group’;

- Those who are generally independent, albeit with a structured support environment, in their normal daily circumstances, i.e. a residential care home, hospital or similar environment.
- Those who due to an event or situation, such as an illness, operation or accident are now dependent upon others to support & care for them to survive independently within the community at large.
- Those who through their individual circumstances (such as age, disability or language barriers (such as foreign tourists) would require extra support and care to deal with the consequences of being involved in an emergency.

24.4. Several agencies, including London Local Authorities, NHS provider services in the community and utility companies, hold local registers of people identified as vulnerable under their own criteria. In the event of an incident requiring mass evacuation, the ESCG should task these organisations to work together to identify vulnerable people in the affected area who may require support evacuating or specialist shelter requirements. It is recognised that this process may take some time and depending on the urgency of the evacuation, alternative processes may have to be used to identify and evacuate vulnerable individuals which include a process for self-identification.

24.5. All agencies should take into account the requirements of the Equality Act 2012 and the Disability and Discrimination Act 2005 when developing their plans in support of the London Mass Evacuation Framework. Guidance on this is not within the scope of this Framework.

Sudden Impact Event

24.6. The key difference for a sudden impact event is the lack of prior notification therefore it is even more important that agencies, including London Local Authorities, NHS provider services in the community and utility companies, hold local registers of people identified as vulnerable under their own criteria. There will be no opportunity to compile this information in a structured way once the event has occurred and self-evacuation has already commenced.

24.7. It is therefore highly likely that the emergency services will be encountering vulnerable people in the affected area, who may require assistance evacuating or specialist shelter requirements, whilst they are tackling the event itself. In the first instance there may be insufficient resources to manage the incident and address the needs of vulnerable persons in the affected area. This will be of key concern for the ESCG.

25. Evacuation of Closed Communities

Introduction

25.1. For the purposes of this Framework, closed communities are defined as self-contained facilities which by virtue of their operational purpose may have specific, individual evacuation requirements. Closed communities in this context include hospitals, care homes, prisons and zoos.

25.2. For planning purposes it is assumed that closed communities have the necessary plans in place should an evacuation become necessary. The SCG/ESCG might however find itself having to deal with the consequences of closed communities not being adequately prepared. Early liaison with these communities might help mitigate the risk of this happening.
Rising Tide Event

25.3. NHS hospitals and HM Prison Service have local plans for the evacuation of their sites. Complete evacuation would provide these agencies with exceptional challenges, and immediate mass evacuation is not possible. Planning for evacuation of care homes is likely to vary between facilities, and may be dependent on mutual aid or local authority support.

25.4. Evacuation of multiple closed communities will lead to considerable demand for resources and require coordination, and possibly prioritisation at a pan-London, and possibly national level. Early identification of closed communities in the affected area is vital to ensure maximum time for decisions to be taken around evacuation and shelter. The identification of closed communities needs to have taken place prior to an incident.

Sudden Impact Event

25.5. The identification of closed communities must have taken place prior to an incident. The authorities in charge of these communities must have already engaged with the emergency services and other agencies about what support they can expect to receive in the early phases of a sudden impact event.

26. Evacuation of Animals

Rising Tide Event

26.1. Facilities with large numbers of animals, particularly those with large and/or exotic species (e.g. London Zoo, City Farms) should have appropriate evacuation arrangement in place to safeguard their animals.

26.2. Members of the public should be advised to make their own arrangements for evacuations and looking after their pets.

26.3. Transport operators have established procedures for the transportation of pets and members of the public should be made aware about what can and cannot be transported.

26.4. Voluntary agencies (e.g. Blue Cross, RSPCA) may be able to assist in animal evacuation and should be involved in the ESCG. However these resources are likely to be extremely limited and will need to be prioritised.

Sudden Impact Event

26.5. Transport operators may temporarily suspend their normal operating procedures to either facilitate the movement of pets or additional restrictions might be in place so as to maximise the evacuation of the public.

26.6. It will take a considerable time for resources from the voluntary sector to be able to support the evacuation of animals so members of the public should be prepared to make their own arrangements in the first instance and where possible.

27. Shelter of Evacuees

27.1. The London Mass Shelter Framework provides details of different types of shelter which may be utilised during a mass evacuation incident. All information relating to shelter is set out in that Framework.
SECTION 5: RECOVERY

28. Coordination of Recovery

28.1. In accordance with the London Recovery Management Protocol, a Recovery Coordinating Group (RMG) should be set up as soon as possible after the establishment of a Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG). The RCG functions as a sub-group of the SCG is chaired by a nominee of London LLAG.

28.2. At the point at which it is felt by members of the SCG that the balance of work leans more naturally towards recovery than response, the Chair of the SCG and the Chair of the RCG will formally agree this and the Recovery Coordination Group will take over from the SCG. The RCG will be chaired by the most appropriate Local Authority Chief Executive and will direct partnership recovery efforts.

28.3. It may be necessary to have shelters remain open despite a move to the recovery phase of the incident. In this case, the ESCG should become a sub-group of the RCG, maintaining an overview of the sheltering process and providing updates as required on the numbers still being sheltered. The ESCG has a coordinating role in supporting the return of people to their homes and the return of shelter venues to their owners/operators.

28.4. The recovery from an incident requiring the use of the Mass Evacuation Framework and the Mass Shelter Framework is likely to be complex and prolonged. Temporary or permanent alternative accommodation may be required and it is likely that, given the potential numbers, this will need to be centrally coordinated. During the response phase, the ESCG will undertake the coordination and report on such matters to the SCG and/or RCG. The ESCG, possibly with amended membership, might then be retained to report to the RCG. Please see the below diagram.
29. **Return to Affected Area**

29.1. Due to the wide variety of incidents that could potentially cause an evacuation of an area or areas of London it is not possible to predict when return may be possible. Managing the return of evacuees will be the responsibility of the RCG.

29.2. The London Local Authorities Coordination Centre (LLACC) will be available, as during the evacuation process, to coordinate the return of evacuees from the receiving local authorities back to their point of origin - this is particularly important when considering vulnerable groups.

29.3. Planning can be done in advance to help the return process - it is advised that local authorities pre-plan potential options with local transport providers to assist in the facilitation of this.

30. **Reimbursement of Costs**

30.1. In the event of an exceptional emergency, Government departments may consider providing financial support to various aspects of the recovery effort. Guidance on financial support in an exceptional emergency is available from the Ministry of Housing Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) [www.gov.uk](http://www.gov.uk)

30.2. Financial assistance through the Bellwin Scheme\(^8\) may be available for Local Authorities to cover part or all of the costs of responding to a major incident, which may assist with temporary accommodation costs during the response phase.

30.3. The use of Special Requisition / Purchase Order forms during a crisis should be planned for, so that cost recovery from insurance companies and other emergency grant schemes has a clear audit trail.

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\(^8\) Further information available at [www.gov.uk](http://www.gov.uk)
APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A: EVACUATION & SHELTER COORDINATION GROUP

1. Role

1.1. Individual agencies have different internal command and control mechanisms. The purpose of the ESCG is not to bypass or replicate these structures, but to provide a single point of multi-agency coordination at an appropriate tactical level. Representatives on this group should be able to liaise effectively with their home organisations to provide the information required by the group and, as part of the group, take tactical decisions based on that information.

1.2. The ESCG will provide central, multi-agency coordination to an evacuation and to meeting shelter requirements. Specifically, but not exclusively, the group will be responsible for:

- Coordinating the overall evacuation of persons, as safely as is reasonably practicable, from places of danger to places of safety;
- Coordinating those evacuees who are able to self-evacuate by providing relevant information;
- Identify the approximate population requiring assistance with evacuation;
- Identify suitable locations for sheltering people (using information supplied by the BECCs via the LLACC);
- Identify suitable transport methods (through liaison with transport operating companies), taking into consideration any impacts on transport from the trigger incident;
- Identify a traffic management strategy;
- Co-ordinate multi-evacuations should this be necessary in an incident that requires evacuation from more than one location to co-ordinate those evacuations;
- Provide operational direction to agencies on how to manage those needing to be evacuated and/or sheltered from their areas;
- Provide regular information to Tactical and the SCG on the status of the evacuation. Provide information to SCG to inform the strategic public information messages to be disseminated by communications teams; and
- Provide advice to the Recovery Coordinating Group.

2. Membership

2.1. In the event of a sudden impact event requiring a mass evacuation it will take some time for the full membership of the ESCG to be in place. The ideal membership of the ESCG is likely to include:

- Police
- London Fire Brigade
- London Ambulance Service
- Local authorities
- Network Rail (representing Train Operating Companies)
- TfL and other transport operators (as appropriate)
- London Resilience Communication Group Liaison Officer
- NHS England (London)
3. First Meeting Draft Agenda

3.1. The below draft agenda is supplied for the information of the ESCG Chair. The nature of the agenda items will vary according to the event.

First Meeting Draft Agenda

1. Any Urgent Business
2. Introductions
3. Apologies for absence/substitutes
4. Roles of those present (who are they representing)
5. Briefing: Current Situation: Feedback from SCG or Police Strategic Commander
6. Briefing: Command and Control arrangements
7. Stage of Evacuation
8. Situation Report from responders
9. Key Messages: Evacuation input to:
   - Warning and informing
   - Communication / media strategy
   - Specific audiences e.g. those impacted by the event, general messaging – across partnership, public and business
10. Shelter Update
11. Recovery
12. Reporting Rhythm (including arrangements for weekend)
13. Composition of the ESCG
14. Stand down arrangements
15. Any Other Business
16. Date / time of next meeting
17. Invitees and organisations attending
APPENDIX B: ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

This Appendix gives an overview of the key functions and responsibilities of the organisations who will be involved in the management of the mass evacuation process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Key Functions and Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lead Gov. Dept. (depends on nature of incident)</td>
<td>For any major incident there will be a designated lead government department where a degree of central government co-ordination or support is necessary, although COBR may take overall control. Provide representation on the SCG (as part of the Government Liaison Team (GLT)), if necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Liaison Team (GLT)</td>
<td>Provide representation on the SCG. Act as central Government’s principal channel for information on the situation. Support the lead agency in notification to neighbouring LRF areas as appropriate as soon as the decision has been made to evacuate an area(s) of London. Assist with the communication between Local Authorities in their regions and the LLACC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Resilience Group (LRG)</td>
<td>Provide advice to the SCG on London Resilience Partnership plans. Develop and maintain a Common Operating Picture (COP) of the overall incident. Liaise with the Mayor’s Press Office to provide support to the Mayor in his role as the ‘voice of London’. Update information on the London Prepared website as far as possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Authorities</td>
<td>Undertake the roles and responsibilities as defined in LESLP. Provide representation on the SCG through the LLAG arrangements. Provide representation at the ESCG and to provide co-ordination of the local authority aspects of the evacuation through the LLACC. Responsible for the safety and preparedness of schools, children’s homes and public highways that are not motorways or major trunk roads. Set up Local Borough Emergency Control Centres to support the response Coordinate Local authority and Voluntary agency resources with a view to appropriately supporting the management of large numbers of evacuees. Work with transport operators to coordinate transport infrastructure for evacuees between the Evacuee Disembarking Points and Evacuation Shelters. Ensure that local authorities work with providers of NHS funded care to identify and support the vulnerable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 For full details on the role of the Lead Government Department in an emergency see “Central Government’s concept of operations” available on [www.gov.uk](http://www.gov.uk)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Key Functions and Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Police (MPS, BTP, CoLP)**  | Provide a Strategic Incident Commander (of NPCC rank), – N.B. The “lead” Police force for a declared emergency incident within Greater London will follow operation Benbow protocols.  
Provide a police officer to chair the Evacuation & Shelter Coordination Group.  
Provide a location and resources for the ESCG to operate effectively.  
Undertake the roles and responsibilities as defined under the heading Police in the LESLP manual.  
Provide policing support as per the incident strategic aim and objectives.  
Provide appropriate assistance with a view to achieving a safe and expeditious mass evacuation process through the implementation of road and rail network strategies.  
Assist with the Crime Prevention Strategy.  
Assist with Community Cohesion.                                                                                     |
| **County Police Forces**     | Provide appropriate assistance with a view to achieving a safe and expeditious mass evacuation process through the implementation of road and rail network strategies.  
Assist with the Crime Prevention Strategy and Community Cohesion.                                                      |
| **London Fire Brigade**       | Provide representation on the SCG.  
Provide representation at the ESCG (if necessary).  
Undertake the roles and responsibilities as defined under the heading Fire Brigade in the LESLP manual.  
Provide and coordinate search & rescue activity  
Provide safety for responders working within the inner cordon                                                        |
| **London Ambulance Service**  | Provides representation on the SCG.  
Provide representation at the ESCG (if necessary).  
Undertakes the roles and responsibilities as defined under the heading Ambulance Service in the LESLP manual.  
Coordinate resources deployed by voluntary and the private health sector (ambulance).  
Deal with casualties.  
Providing medical assistance/ transportation for the vulnerable with NHS and local authorities.                     |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Key Functions and Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| NHS England (London)         | To ensure providers of NHS funded care undertake detailed Contingency Planning to manage mass evacuation of vulnerable people receiving NHS funded care  
Ensure that providers of NHS funded care work with local authorities to identify and support the vulnerable.  
Ensure that providers of NHS funded care plan for the evacuation of NHS inpatient facilities.  
Coordinates and liaises with other areas of the National Health Service (NHS).  
Ensure appropriate provision of NHS representation at the ESCG (if necessary).  
Provide representation on the SCG.                                                                                           |
| Public Health England        | Maintains an overall responsibility for public health.  
Provide representation on the SCG.  
Establish, and provide a chairperson for, the Science and Technical Advisory Cell (STAC), if one is required.                                                                                                             |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Key Functions and Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Transport for London (TfL) | Draw up and exercising transport evacuation plans, in liaison with other transport operators to ensure resilient mechanisms are in place to support mass evacuation processes.  
Support designating, establishing and overseeing identified contingency routes (High Capacity Emergency Access Routes - HCEAR), including Borough Roads, available for emergency access and evacuation as necessary.  
Responsible for the identification, establishment and management of the ELPs  
Provide representation on the Strategic Co-ordinating Group on behalf of TfL transport agencies – Surface Transport (buses, river, taxis/ private hire and London Rail) and London Underground  
Provide representation at the ESCG  
Provide a communications capability and media, including call centre, web site, local staff and PA announcements on buses.  
Provide support and resources in respect of Traffic Management systems.  
Undertakes business continuity planning to ensure restoration and adoption of road network and re-establishment of transport access in and across London.  
Provide a point of liaison with the Highways England.  
Provide a means of coordination with other transport agencies ensuring that the transport mechanisms in place complement each other.  
Arrange and manage additional transport support from:  
- London Buses and independent contractors  
- River Services and independent operators  
- Taxi and private hire.  
Give relevant advice to ‘Gold’ on safety issues, capacity and service options and the implications of proposed strategic decisions.  
Provide services to support the overall strategy, including:  
- Re-structuring network services to effect mass evacuation if required.  
- Assistance in moving emergency supplies.  
Arrange and manage additional transport support from DLR, Tramlink, North London and Barking – Gospel Oak lines. |
| Network Rail     | Provide representation on the SCG and the Evacuation & Shelter Coordination Group.  
Give relevant advice to ‘Gold’ and the ECG on National Rail transport issues, capacity and service options and the implications of proposed strategic decisions.  
Coordinate any National Rail responses which may be required.  
Work with the train operators in managing the provision of rail services in support of the mass evacuation strategy. Ensure coordination of transport response with other agencies. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Key Functions and Responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Aviation Authority</td>
<td>Provide a point of liaison with the SCG.                                                                                             Consider instigating an air exclusion zone at the request of the emergency services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London City Airport</td>
<td>Provide a point of liaison with the SCG if required.                                                                                   Address issues affecting London City Airport.                                                                                           Provide a point of liaison for coordination across other airports in the UK if required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gatwick Airport</td>
<td>Provide a point of liaison with the SCG if required.                                                                                   Address issues affecting Gatwick Airport.                                                                                           Provide a point of liaison for coordination across other airports in the UK if required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heathrow Airport</td>
<td>Provide a point of liaison with the SCG if required.                                                                                   Address issues affecting Heathrow Airport.                                                                                           Provide a point of liaison for coordination across other airports in the UK if required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime &amp; Coastguard Agency</td>
<td>Provide a point of liaison with the SCG.                                                                                               Undertake the roles and responsibilities as defined within legislation and guidance.                                                                                                                                  Initiate and Coordinate the response to Maritime Search and Rescue Incidents within UK SAR zone, other specified inland waters and tidal River Thames up to High Water Mark.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of London Authority</td>
<td>Provide a point of liaison with the SCG.                                                                                               Undertake the roles and responsibilities as defined in Appendix D of the LESLP Manual.                                                                                                                        Provide appropriate support and resources in the event of a river based incident or evacuation where river vessels are deployed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highways England</td>
<td>Provide a point of liaison with the SCG.                                                                                               Provide advice on road closures and traffic management.                                                                                                                                         Liaise with Transport for London, County Highways Departments, the Police, BTP and other police forces regarding traffic management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provide advice on road closures and traffic management.                                                                                   Liaise with Transport for London, County Highways Departments, the Police, BTP and other police forces regarding traffic management.                                                                                                                                         Close roads at the request of the police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deal with abandoned/ damaged cars and providing roadblocks.                                                                               Deal with abandoned/ damaged cars and providing roadblocks.                                                                                                                                          Deal with abandoned/ damaged cars and providing roadblocks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Key Functions and Responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Provides a point of liaison with the SCG. Undertakes the roles and responsibilities as defined in Appendix F of the LESLP Manual.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HM Prison Service</td>
<td>Undertake detailed contingency planning with a view to identifying mechanisms for managing the evacuation of prisons and prisoners. Provide a point of liaison with the SCG. Move prisoners to secure areas and outside the prison perimeters where there is national direction to do so.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Voluntary Sector      | Provide assistance through liaising with Local Authorities and London Ambulance Service as appropriate.  
  
| Environment Agency    | Provide a point of liaison with the SCG. Prevent and minimise environmental impacts. Issue flood warnings and mobilise flood defence assets where possible. Provide advice on waste disposal.                                                |
| Business              | Developing and testing evacuation plans and business continuity. Provide a point of liaison with the SCG if required.                                                                                                                  |
1. Introduction

1.1. This communication strategy was formulated to support version 1 of the London Mass Evacuation Plan, and updated for the current version. It aims to support the implementation of the Framework through consideration of key public messages which may be used in the event of an incident requiring mass evacuation.

1.2. The scale of an incident resulting in mass evacuation is such that the LRCG would manage the strategic communication response in support of the emergency operation. The LRCG would feed back into the SCG.

1.3. It is recognised that individual organisations may already have their own internal and external communication plans for engaging with stakeholders, the media and staff. In using this strategy, organisations should ensure they do not comment on other agencies’ areas of responsibility.

Aim

1.4. Through effective internal and external communication to support the implementation of the London Mass Evacuation Plan.

Objectives

1.5. The objectives of the communications strategy are:

- To educate, inform and reassure the public about the work of London Resilience and its partners in preparing for a mass evacuation and to ensure that the public understand the potential impact and what it might mean for them in terms of actions.
- To ensure that relevant agencies/ organisations are aware of and are encouraged to plan for the effects of mass evacuation in their business resilience.
- To share good practice with stakeholders and opinion formers and to ensure that staff from Category 1 & 2 Responders are aware and informed about the plans and their responsibilities.
- To work with the media and stakeholders to identify future risks and communication challenges.
- To co-ordinate and manage the strategic communication response to a mass evacuation in the capital.
- To manage the communication response during the recovery phase.

Evaluation, testing and review

1.6. In formulating this communication strategy we have liaised with our partners and stakeholders, including the media. The strategy will be reviewed in line with the Mass Evacuation Framework and LRCG Emergency Plan.

1.7. Exercising of the communications response to incidents will be achieved through the London Resilience Partnership Training and Exercising Programme.
Budget / Resources

1.8. No additional money has been identified to contribute to the media and communication response. London Resilience will look to use its existing communication structures to manage a mass evacuation event. Although this does not take into account the need for any adverting or marketing material that may be required.

2. Principles of communication

2.1. In support of our aim and objectives, key messages will be built around three principles; to educate, to inform and to reassure. Principles should be that pre-education of the public is not practical due to costs involved of marketing and evidence that the public do not retain the messages and fail to instil a sense of personal responsibility\(^{11}\). Therefore communication activity will be in the form of three stages:

- Pre-education of relevant agencies/ organisations pre-event
- Public communication during an event
- Post-event communication on recovery for both public and partners.

2.2. The guiding principle should be that messages are based on a hierarchy from broad contextual messages, general then detailed specific messages. These could be:

**First tier:** ‘Emergencies are part of life in London’
- Emergencies happen, understand the risk – London is prepared but are you?
- What to expect when the unexpected occurs – To challenge responders and others to think about likely response in event of emergency.

**Second tier:** ‘Be prepared’
- What you need know – Factual messages on information people need to know ahead of emergency. To know the risks, have a plan and prepare an emergency grab bag.
- Are you and your family prepared? – ask the question to raise the issue. Provide pointers to receive advice and guidance.

**Third tier:** ‘Be ready to act’
- What you need to do, now! - Detailed messages on what you need to do, where to go.

Communication tools

2.3. A variety of communication tools may be used by London Resilience partners to ensure messages are appropriate and targeted to different target audiences. The timing, nature and urgency of the messages may influence what tools are used. The LRCG Emergency Plan contains a mechanism to bring together, at short notice, a teleconference of the category 1 responder communications leads and a mechanism to bring in wider communications leads.

\(^{11}\) COI research ‘Mass Evacuation of London – Pre-education, Warning and Informing report’ 4th September 2008
Spokespersons

2.4. London Resilience Partnership organisations will put up spokespersons to talk about the preparation, response and recovery from an incident involving mass evacuation. Joint press briefings are likely to be coordinated by the LRCG. Spokespersons who may be considered include:

- Mayor of London
- Representative from London local authorities
- Transport for London
- Police spokesperson
- London Ambulance Service
- Representative from the business community

3. Communications to raise awareness

Key Messages

3.1. The key messages are:

- Risk is inherently unpredictable. We would only ask the public to evacuate in cases where there is a credible risk to loss of life.

- London Resilience and its partners have been working for some time to develop plans to handle mass evacuation. However there are things you can do to prepare yourself in the event of an emergency:
  - Think about an emergency contact list
  - Prepare a grab bag and keep it in the office or at home which includes warm clothes, water, first-aid kit and wet wipes.

- London businesses, public buildings have mass evacuation plans in the event of incident. It is your duty to prepare those in your care or employment to evacuate in an emergency. For guidance on what to expect think about:
  - Have you plans in place to receive messages/instruction and act on them?
  - Are plans in place so all those in your care can see/hear all emergency messages?
  - Will your plans work in all types of emergency?

- Visit the London Prepared website (www.londonprepared.gov.uk) for guidance and further information on how you can prepare for an emergency.

3.2. These key messages are not exhaustive and will be reviewed and updated as national/regional policy develops or based on the specific nature of an incident.

Facilities

3.3. Where possible we should look for media opportunities to highlight our planning and preparatory work e.g. exercises. This would also help us to put some context around specific issues.
4. Incident communications

4.1. In the event of a mass evacuation, communication channels for those affected may not be the most convenient i.e. online or TV.

4.2. London Resilience should look to build on the raising awareness messages by informing Londoners about specific events and issues that could or will impact on London. Some of the issues we could highlight are shown below.

Key Messages

4.3. The key messages are:

- Those who can self-evacuate, should. The authorities need to focus their efforts and resources on assisting those who are vulnerable.
- Always carry with you:
  - your medication
  - emergency contact numbers
  - important documents such as a driving license or passport
  - some basic essentials in your grab bag.
- You should make arrangements for your pets, as it may not be possible to take them on public transport or to emergency shelters.
- You should not attempt to return to the area until it is safe to do so.
- The area affected is [insert location]
- Rendezvous points are [insert pre-arranged destinations for those evacuating].
- Contact the Metropolitan Police Casualty Bureau number for those affected by the initial incident.

4.4. These key messages are not exhaustive and will be reviewed and updated as the situation develops at a national and London level.

Facilities

4.5. There is no doubt that there will be a demand for pictures and information relating to the mass evacuation. There may be some merit in organising facilities where partners can jointly brief the media on key response activities and public safety messages. The process for establishing a Media Centre is outlined in the LRCG Emergency Plan.

5. Recovery Communications

5.1. Recovery messages and timeline are important to support evacuees in their recovery process, particularly information around when and how they return to their homes.

Key Messages

5.2. The key messages are:

- Thank the public for their co-operation and support. We are doing all we can to return everyone affected to a degree of normality.
• The local authorities are doing all they can to prepare the area for return of local inhabitants and businesses. However they will not be able to return until it is safe to do so.
• Those that cannot return due to damage to their property or business premises will be assisted.
• Some public services may still be affected, but we will try and keep disruption to a minimum.

5.3. These key messages are not exhaustive and will be reviewed and updated on an on-going basis depending on developments.

Facilities

5.4. We should seek to identify suitable media facilities that demonstrate London running as normal and business as usual activity.


The following diagram identifies the London Resilience Communication Structure.
London Resilience Communication Structure

Strategic Coordinating Group

London Resilience Communication Group

Blue Light Services
Health (incl. PHE and NHS England)
Transport (incl. TfL, PLA, Airports)
Mayor / GLA
Local Authorities
London Resilience
# APPENDIX D: GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BECC</td>
<td>Borough Emergency Control Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTP</td>
<td>British Transport Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological &amp; Nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COBR</td>
<td>Cabinet Office Briefing Room</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoLP</td>
<td>City of London Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>DLR</td>
<td>Docklands Light Railway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Environment Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDPs</td>
<td>Evacuee Disembarking Points</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>Emergency Evacuation Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELPs</td>
<td>Evacuee Loading Points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Rest Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESCG</td>
<td>Evacuation and Shelter Coordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLA</td>
<td>Greater London Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLT</td>
<td>Government Liaison Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JESIP</td>
<td>Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (Joint Doctrine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESLP</td>
<td>London Emergency Services Liaison Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLACC</td>
<td>London Local Authority Coordination Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLAG</td>
<td>London Local Authority Gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LRF</td>
<td>London Resilience Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRG</td>
<td>London Resilience Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRCG</td>
<td>London Resilience Communication Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRP</td>
<td>London Resilience Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>LRPB</td>
<td>London Resilience Programme Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>LU</td>
<td>London Underground</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEG</td>
<td>Mass Evacuation Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHCLG</td>
<td>Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHCLG RED</td>
<td>Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Resilience and Emergencies Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHS</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPCC</td>
<td>National Police Chiefs Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pan London</td>
<td>The whole or a large part of London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCG</td>
<td>Recovery Coordinating Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSPCA</td>
<td>Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>Strategic Coordinating Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCP</td>
<td>Strategic Coordination Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAC</td>
<td>Science and Technical Advisory Cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STS</td>
<td>Short Term Shelter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TfL</td>
<td>Transport for London</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For information, please contact:

**LONDON RESILIENCE GROUP**

London Fire Brigade Headquarters  
169 Union Street  
London  
SE1 0LL  
www.londonprepared.gov.uk

**LONDON RESILIENCE GROUP**

The London Resilience Group is jointly funded and governed by the Greater London Authority, London Local Authorities and the London Fire Commissioner. We are hosted by the London Fire Brigade. Our work, and that of the London Resilience Partnership, is overseen by the London Resilience Forum.

[www.londonprepared.gov.uk](http://www.londonprepared.gov.uk)