AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF

LONDON’S PREPAREDNESS TO RESPOND TO A MAJOR TERRORIST INCIDENT

LORD TOBY HARRIS ■ OCTOBER 2016
On 27 May, the Mayor of London announced that, in the light of the terrible events in Paris on 13 November 2015, in Brussels on 22 March 2016 and elsewhere, he had asked me to undertake an independent review of the city’s preparedness to deal with a major terrorist incident. Since then, I have had the full co-operation of all of the organisations that are engaged in protecting Londoners from, and responding to, such an incident. I am grateful to them and to all the other people who spoke to me and provided me with submissions. The conclusions are mine alone, however, and I am responsible for any inadvertent errors or misinterpretations.

This is my report and I present it for wider consideration and discussion. In addition, I have provided the Mayor with further advice on a number of matters which it would not be appropriate to include in the public report because of their sensitivity.

It is now nearly five years since I was last heavily immersed in the policy and practice involved in protecting us all from terrorism. The headline conclusion of this review is that the response by the emergency services would now be substantially faster and more effective than it could have been then.

However, it is important to be clear. The quality and effectiveness of the work done by the intelligence agencies and the counter-terrorist police is amongst the best in the world. Despite this, a serious terrorist attack remains highly likely — or, as some have expressed it, a matter of not if, but when.

Moreover, the more effective and faster response of the emergency services referred to above might not be sufficient to avoid multiple fatalities. The appalling knife attack in Russell Square on 3 August this year does not appear to have been a terrorist incident. However, the initial police response assumed that it might have been.

The incident lasted less than six minutes from the moment that the initial emergency call was received to the point when the Metropolitan Police control room was informed that the suspect had been subdued (using a Taser rather than lethal force) and arrested. By any standards, this was quick and is a credit to all involved. However, had the incident instead involved multiple attackers and automatic weapons, even a response as quick as on that occasion might have left dozens of people dead and seriously injured on the streets of London.

It would, in theory, be feasible to reduce effective response times substantially below that which should be possible with the current planned level of resource. However, that would be at the cost of transforming the look and feel of our capital city with visible heavily-armed response teams at virtually every street corner. I am not sure that many would think that either desirable or appropriate. Nor is it necessarily reassuring. In recent months - quite separately from this review - I have visited countries where that sort of armed presence is more normal and where that presence has sadly not prevented terrorist atrocities. The economic cost is high, but the psycho-social cost is possibly even greater.

I would not, therefore, at this stage recommend a further increase in the number of armed officers routinely available beyond those available with the current uplift programme. In any event, even if it were deemed desirable to do so, such an addition to the plans would take some time, as officers would have to be found to volunteer to carry out these duties and the present uplift is stretching to the limit the training facilities available.

I have looked in detail at the arrangements for armed response to a variety of possible incidents and have considered the arrangements for the mobilisation of emergency and allied services. A huge amount of thought and analysis have gone into planning — and exercising — for such scenarios. The detail is impressive — as is the commitment of those involved.

When incidents occur elsewhere in the world (or in this country) or when there is intelligence suggesting a new or different attack methodology, this is considered and rapidly incorporated into response planning. I witnessed some of this at first hand, sitting in on meetings convened in response to the mass murder in Nice and the incident at RAF Marham.

Rightly, there is no complacency. There is a constant need to consider developing threats and evolving attack methodologies. The fact that London has not suffered a major attack with multiple fatalities since 2005 is, in part, a tribute to the effectiveness and skill of those involved in the painstaking work of collating and analysing intelligence, of disrupting terrorist activity, and of developing evidence so that those who would perpetrate such attacks can be arrested and brought to justice.

Since 2012/13, 287 individuals have been charged with terrorist offences and 191 have been convicted in the courts, with 35 awaiting trial.

No doubt, as a nation we have also benefited from the fact that firearms are more difficult to acquire here than elsewhere in the world. However, London is not firearms-free. Indeed, in July and August the Metropolitan Police recorded 202 firearms discharges, compared to 87 in the same months last year. In 2015, the National Crime Agency intercepted a boat travelling from France containing firearms obtained by a UK-based organised crime group. Our borders are not as secure as they should be and much greater efforts should be made to prevent the illegal transportation of weapons and people into the country. It would be naive in the extreme to assume that would-be terrorists will not attempt to exploit any such weaknesses.

Similarly, however good the intelligence, we should always be prepared for the unexpected. It is often said that generals have a tendency to fight the last war, and most counter-terrorist planning reflects the attacks that have gone before. Certainly, with the speed of modern communications, it should be assumed that an attack technique developed several thousand miles away might speedily be used in this country. But because a particular type of attack has not yet happened, that is not a sufficient reason for failing to consider its consequences and how to avert them.

That is why preparedness has to be proactive and why the responses prepared have to enable all the relevant organisations - along with the business community and the public - to react seamlessly and effectively, whatever the nature of the incident.

This requires that we all acquire a mind-set of community security and resilience, that London becomes a city where security and resilience is designed in and is part of the city’s fabric, and where everyone who lives and works here sees security and resilience as their responsibility just as much as it is for the emergency services and civic authorities. And it is in this context that this report and its recommendations are presented.

Lord Toby Harris
October 2016
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<td>ATTRO</td>
<td>Anti-Terrorism Traffic Regulation Order</td>
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<td>Armed Response Vehicle</td>
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<td>British Transport Police</td>
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<td>CPNI</td>
<td>Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure</td>
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<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear</td>
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<td>JESIP</td>
<td>Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme</td>
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<td>Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre</td>
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<td>London Ambulance Service</td>
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<td>London Bombing Relief Charitable Fund</td>
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<td>London Emergency Services Liaison Panel</td>
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<td>MTFA</td>
<td>Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack</td>
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<td>MOPAC</td>
<td>Mayor's Office for Policing And Crime</td>
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<td>Metropolitan Police Service</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 It has been 11 years since Londoners suffered a terrorist attack involving multiple sites and loss of life on a massive scale. That attack, on the morning of 7 July 2005, had a devastating impact on the friends and loved ones of those killed and injured, as well as Londoners as a whole, and asked significant questions of our ability to prevent and, ultimately, respond to a major terrorist attack. Subsequent attacks, both prevented and carried out, such as the appalling murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby, have shown how lessons have been learned by our security services, police and other emergency services.

1.2 By and large, the story of counter-terrorism policing in the UK has been a successful one. However, as the Home Secretary recently said, six plots in Great Britain were successfully disrupted in 2015 by the police and the security and intelligence agencies. So, the intelligence picture continues to be challenging.

1.3 The current threat level for international terrorism in the UK is considered by the security services to be SEVERE, and that from Northern Ireland-related terrorism is SUBSTANTIAL. Taken together, we have to face the reality that an attack in London is highly likely. It is, therefore, incumbent on us to ensure that we are as prepared as we possibly can be to respond to any such attack.

1.4 The arrival on London’s streets of suicide bombers in 2005 marked a significant shift in the methods terrorists would use in order to carry out their activities. The police, security services and other emergency services had to adjust their tactics and response plans, particularly following recommendations made by the London Assembly and the coroner, Lady Justice Hallett.

1.5 The 2008 attacks in Mumbai, when 10 terrorists carried out a series of 12 coordinated shooting and bombing attacks lasting four days, killing at least 160 people, necessitated a further change in the defensive response. Recent attacks in Paris and Orlando have indicated that this type of marauding firearms attack is the new normal, particularly for attacks inspired by the so-called Islamic State.

1.6 Now is an appropriate time to review our collective preparedness to respond to this type of attack, while also ensuring we have maintained the capability to respond to attacks of the type with which we have been more used to dealing, as well as novel forms of attack, such as the Bastille Day attack in Nice.

1.7 A developing trend has been the increasing number of what have come to be called ‘lone wolf’ attacks, carried out by individuals who have been radicalised online, or have become self-radicalised and so are inspired by the so-called Islamic State, rather than directed by them. These attackers also seem to be following the guidance from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Daesh leadership, to use whatever weapons are most easily available to them to kill westerners, including knives. In addition, there are those with pre-existing mental health conditions who might be vulnerable to radicalisation through the rhetoric online.

1.8 The UK response to terrorism is delivered through the CONTEST Strategy, which is the responsibility of central government, delivered with a range of partners, including the police and the security and intelligence agencies. It has four components:

- **PURSUE:** the investigation and disruption of terrorist attacks;
- **PREVENT:** work to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism;
- **PROTECT:** improving our protective security to stop a terrorist attack; and
- **PREPARE:** working to minimise the impact of an attack and to recover as quickly as possible.

1.9 This review, commissioned by the Mayor of London, is principally concerned with the Prepare strand of the strategy, ensuring that London, our emergency services and other agencies, are as prepared as they reasonably can be to respond to, and recover from, a terrorist attack. While the correct objective of the police is to make the UK as hostile an environment for those intent on terrorism as possible, this review is a study of what happens when, despite those efforts, a terrorist incident nonetheless occurs. The full Terms of Reference can be found in Annex 2.
1.10 Notwithstanding this, however, I will address some issues that more properly fall into the other CONTEST strands where they seem most relevant to the general work of the police and emergency services, or where particularly pressing issues have been brought to my attention and need addressing.

1.11 As part of this review I have held a series of over seventy meetings with a wide range of those involved in London’s emergency services, central and local government, community groups and the charitable and voluntary sector, and the work has been supported by many more submissions from other interested parties. A full list of meetings can be found at Annex 3. I am grateful to all those involved for giving their time to contribute.

1.12 Given the nature of the issues under review, there is a considerable amount of detail that cannot be put into the public domain in the interests of national security and in order not to compromise the response to the threat. Where possible, I have tried to give a sense of my general views, without undermining our security, going into more detail on those areas where security considerations are less acute. My general approach has been to put as much information into the public domain as is reasonably possible.

1.13 This public report has been supplemented by private advice given to the Mayor over the course of the summer on additional areas for improvement.

1.14 I have been grateful for the support of Sarah Egan, Robin Merrett and Martin Tunstall in the Mayor’s Office for Policing And Crime who have helped with this review, and Supt. Dawn Morris of the Metropolitan Police Service who has provided valuable assistance working with the police and other agencies.
2. THE THREAT

2.1 The current threat level in the UK, and consequently London, is set at SEVERE (Box 1 sets out the different domestic threat levels). This means that it has been judged, on the basis of the available intelligence, that an attack here is highly likely. As Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has said, it is currently a matter of ‘when not if’ a terrorist attack takes place here.

2.2 While the predominant threat is from the so-called Islamic State inspired terrorism, there remains an ongoing threat from groups linked to Al-Qaeda, Irish dissidents or the domestic nationalist and far-right movements. These threats can be complex and various, with some clearly linked to, and directed by, terrorist organisations, with others simply inspired by actions or events overseas, but with no direct link to existing groups.

This adds a significant level of complexity to the intelligence picture. While the inspiration for attacks may vary, the police and other emergency service response needs to be as robust in each case.

2.3 Terrorist attacks overseas have shown the diversity of methods currently being deployed, and Box 3 sets out some of the recent international attacks. Some of these attacks have been relatively unsophisticated, such as those using knives, machetes or improvised weapons. But some have been significantly more complex, involving multiple attackers using guns or explosives to target and kill dozens of civilians, or even using methods to destroy civilian aircraft. Box 2 sets out more detail about the kind of marauding terrorist firearms attacks that we have seen on the continent and in the United States of America in recent months.

Terrorist capability. An examination of what is known about the capabilities of the terrorists in question and the method they may use based on previous attacks or from intelligence. This would also analyse the potential scale of the attack.

Terrorist intentions. Using intelligence and publicly available information to examine the overall aims of the terrorists and the ways they may achieve them including what sort of targets they would consider attacking.

Timescale. The threat level expresses the likelihood of an attack in the near term. We know from past incidents that some attacks take years to plan, while others are put together more quickly. In the absence of specific intelligence, a judgement will need to be made about how close an attack might be to fruition. Threat levels do not have any set expiry date, but are regularly subject to review in order to ensure that they remain current.

Threat levels are designed to give a broad indication of the likelihood of a terrorist attack. The threat level for the UK from international terrorism is set by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). The current threat level is set at SEVERE. The levels are:

- LOW means an attack is unlikely
- MODERATE means an attack is possible, but not likely
- SUBSTANTIAL means an attack is a strong possibility
- SEVERE means an attack is highly likely
- CRITICAL means an attack is expected imminently

According to the intelligence agencies, in reaching a judgement on the appropriate threat level in any given circumstance several factors need to be taken into account. These include:

Available intelligence. It is rare that specific threat information is available and can be relied upon. More often judgements about the threat will be based on a wide range of information, which is often fragmentary, including the level and nature of current terrorist activity, comparison with events in other countries and previous attacks. Intelligence is only ever likely to reveal part of the picture.
A marauding terrorist firearms attack (MTFA) is currently considered to be the most significant terrorist threat affecting the UK and other western countries. It was the main method used by terrorists in Mumbai in 2008, in Nairobi in 2013, in Paris in 2015 and in Orlando in 2016. For this reason this report, while providing a general assessment of our preparedness, gives a special focus to this type of attack.

An MTFA may involve:

- shootings;
- the use of explosives and grenades;
- fires;
- hostage taking; and
- sieges.

There is also a significant likelihood of serious injuries and deaths.

Such attacks are complex, and their nature often changes rapidly during the course of an attack. As such, they present difficult challenges for the police and other emergency services. Specific plans and procedures have been, and continue to be, developed in order to deal with such incidents.

Because attacks of this nature can be carried out by a small number of attackers – sometimes an individual – there is the possibility for multiple attacks to be carried out simultaneously. Such tactics would stretch emergency service resources, and contribute to the confusion and panic created. If such an attack did occur, multiple casualties would be inevitable.

All emergency services, and the military, regularly test and refine the plans they have in place, including in major exercises such as Strong Tower in 2015. These exercises include the characteristics of MTFAs taking place simultaneously at multiple locations.

2.4 The diversity of these attacks, and the introduction of new methods by terrorists, means that we need to be prepared not only for those types of attacks we have seen before, but also for attacks the nature of which we cannot yet know. This means we must have a generic response where possible that is flexible enough to respond to new methods of attack.

2.5 It is thought that around 850 UK extremists have travelled from the UK to Syria and Iraq to join the so-called Islamic State. Of these, around half are estimated to have returned, and may have received combat and terrorist training and may additionally be motivated by their experiences and what they have witnessed whilst away. These individuals represent a real threat and present particular challenges to the intelligence agencies and the police in keeping track of them.

2.6 In addition, online activity and self-radicalisation mean that lone actors can become motivated to launch attacks in a process that can sometimes be very quick. Manuals on bomb-making and attack methodology are readily available online for those who know where to look. Such individuals are very difficult to detect and present particular difficulties to the intelligence agencies and the police.

2.7 Responding to all of this means that cooperation between the police, intelligence and security agencies and the public is essential. And the public are responding to this: every day, on average, the police receive 32 calls to the confidential anti-terrorist hotline passing on information about suspicious activity. They also receive two referrals relating concerns about radicalisation and five referrals of violent extremist material online, leading to thousands of items of extremist online content being removed each week. This community-led response to these threats is to be celebrated, and demonstrates how, by working together, we can help combat terrorism. In addition, statutory bodies such as those engaged in social care and health services are making referrals to the police, although in some instances the limited resources available to these services may limit what is done.

2.8 While the 2008 Mumbai attack and the 2013 attack in the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi were carried out by marauding terrorists using firearms, this type of terrorist attack has only fairly recently been seen in Europe. When any attack takes place, the police and security agencies study both the methods used and the response, in order to ensure that appropriate tactics can be developed at home. Box 3 outlines some of the recent international attacks which have influenced UK policing, and which inform this review. Chapter 4, below, goes into more detail about how the police response has changed in recent years to respond to the changing threat.
Over the past year there have been a number of major terrorist attacks in Europe and the United States, which have resulted in significant numbers of casualties. In each case, the police and other emergency services in London have drawn lessons from the attacks in order to prepare better for such an attack here. These attacks include:

**SAINT-ÉTIENNE-DU-ROUVRAY**
On 26 July, during Mass at the church of Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray in Normandy, two terrorists armed with knives took six people hostage and killed Father Jacques Hamel, an 85 year-old priest. Armed French police responded and killed the attackers.

**WURZBERG, GERMANY**
On 18 July, a young man armed with a knife and axe attacked and seriously injured four people on a train in Wurzberg, Southern Germany. The attacker was killed by police as he attempted to flee the scene.

**NICE**
During Bastille Day celebrations on the Promenade des Anglais, a man deliberately drove a cargo truck into a crowd of people, killing 86 and injuring over 200 others. The attacker was killed by police once his truck had come to a halt.

**ISTANBUL AIRPORT**
On 28 June, Ataturk Airport in Istanbul was attacked by three terrorists armed with bombs and guns. They killed 45 people and injured over 230, before blowing themselves up after police engaged them. Some reports suggested the attacks lasted for less than two minutes.

**ORLANDO**
On 12 June, the Pulse nightclub, a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida, was attacked by a man armed with semi-automatic weapons. 49 people were killed, with at least another 50 injured, before police shot the attacker dead.

**BRUSSELS**
On 22 March, two suicide bombers attacked Brussels Airport, with a subsequent suicide attack on a train at Maalbeek Metro Station. The coordinated attack killed 32, with over 300 people injured. As with the attack in Nice, the so-called Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack.

**PARIS**
In November 2015, a series of suicide bomb and gun attacks were carried out in Paris, including the killing of 89 people in the Bataclan theatre. In total 130 people were killed, with over 350 injured.

In the previous January, terrorists had carried out attacks at the offices of the Charlie Hebdo magazine, an industrial estate, and a kosher supermarket killing, in total, 17 people.
3. THE LONDON DYNAMIC

3.1 The Metropolitan Police coordinate the national policing counter-terrorism effort, meaning that any review into London’s preparedness could, in some ways, be considered a review of national preparedness, albeit that the Home Office, in their Annual Review of the CONTEST Strategy, conduct regular assessments of general preparedness. However, there are a number of significant areas where London presents unique challenges which the Mayor, on behalf of Londoners, needs to be reassured are being considered.

TARGETS IN THE CAPITAL

3.2 London has some of the most iconic sites in the country and, indeed, the world. And as the nation’s capital, there are numerous important Government buildings which, as we have seen in previous attacks, can become a focus for terrorists.

3.3 As the most visited tourist destination in the world, visitors – both domestic and international – come to enjoy our history and culture at a huge range of locations scattered across the city. Because of the nature of these sites, and the large numbers of potential victims available, these can again be a draw for terrorists. In fact, of the 73 highest risk crowded places across the UK, 50 of those are in London.

3.4 It has become clear in recent years, though, that while a desire persists amongst terrorist groups to attack iconic locations, other sites where large numbers of potential victims gather can also be targeted. Attacks and plots around the world have demonstrated that crowded places, such as shopping centres, sports stadia, entertainment venues and places of worship are attractive targets for terrorists. London, with its population of 8.6 million, has countless such places, and a large and complex transport system that carries millions of people each day.

3.5 As the economic heart of the UK, any attack in London would have a significant impact on the national economy. Security and a sense of safety are important for inward investment, and we know that following major incidents tourism can be badly affected. For example, recent data shows that one million fewer tourists visited Paris between January and June 2016 compared to the same period in the previous year, which has been linked to the November attacks. This is estimated to have cost the French economy £644 million in lost revenue. It is easy to imagine that the consequences of a similar attack in the UK could be over £1 billion.

3.6 It is also clear that major international companies, such as banks and other financial institutions, who have flexibility in where they establish themselves, take a keen interest in the safety of their staff, including working closely with the police and others to ensure that they are protected. If London is not a safe place to work, we will be less attractive to these companies.

3.7 So, while it is our status as the economic hub of the country that contributes to London being a great city, this status increases our attractiveness as a target, and could be significantly undermined if an attack occurred.

LONDON’S DIVERSITY

3.8 Another unique characteristic of London is its extraordinary diversity. Our cultural and civic life is immeasurably strengthened by the mixture of nationalities and religions in the capital. However, there can be challenges for the police and other agencies in engaging effectively with all of these communities to the same extent. This can be particularly the case for those from traditions where history and culture work against such police and public collaboration and are more characterised by a lack of engagement. If we do too little to integrate, then communities can become inward-looking and tensions can build. These tensions can, and are, exploited by those who wish us harm, and we can be susceptible to international events proving the inspiration for action on our streets.

3.9 It is vital, therefore, that the police and others have the skills necessary to reach into all of the city’s communities. Likewise, for the capital’s continued cohesion, it is equally vital that all communities are encouraged and enabled to play a full part in the city and help build a cooperative and resilient society.
COST OF LIVING

3.10 London also faces some particular challenges in terms of the delivery and cost of some of our most vital public services. The London Ambulance Service (LAS), for example, was put into special measures by the Care Quality Commission in November 2015, with concerns raised about emergency planning and staffing. While other services do not suffer from the same acute problems that the LAS has, there are some defining challenges all services in London face.

3.11 First, doing business in London is simply more expensive than other parts of the country. This is largely driven by higher wages, linked to the higher cost of living, and a higher cost of services provided to agencies. Secondly, and intrinsic to the high cost of living, is the cost of housing in the capital.

3.12 The London Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in their June 2016 report Living on the Edge highlighted some of the problems facing those working in London’s emergency services, and the consequences for service delivery. The report found that:

“Average starting salaries for London emergency services workers appear not to be sufficient to rent a home within London. Using the generally accepted definition for affordable rent of no more than 35% of take-home pay, an emergency services worker who earns £24,000 after taxes and benefits, should not pay more than £700 per month in rent. That is £500 below the average one-bedroom rent in London.”

3.13 Consequently, based on information provided to them, the report found that the majority (54%) of ambulance paramedics, police officers and firefighters live outside the capital. In an emergency situation, where having extra personnel available for support can be essential, this can have a significant impact. It can also impact recruitment and retention of staff, if they have to commute considerable distances to get to work.

3.14 Given these issues, it is important that work is undertaken to address the problem. The beginning of a solution can be found in the Living on the Edge report, and I would like to echo two of the principal recommendations here:

The Mayor of London should ask the Chair of the London Resilience Forum to consider how London’s preparedness to deal with a major incident may be impacted by a majority of the three main ‘blue light’ emergency services workers living outside London. (Recommendation 1)

The Mayor of London should consult the London boroughs and the Corporation of London on an alteration to the London Plan formally to identify the need for specialist emergency services worker housing as an important planning issue for London. (Recommendation 2)

3.15 These issues were also recently raised in the Policy Exchange report *Commuter Cops* which recommended conversion of existing police buildings into residential property for officers. Given the considerable number of police buildings sold under the last Mayor, this seems like an unlikely source of a significant amount of housing.

FIREARMS

3.16 As referenced above, the story of counter-terrorism work in the UK has mainly been a successful one. This is, in large part, a product of excellent work by the intelligence and security agencies, the police and others, but it is also a product of our tough gun laws and our ability to control our borders as an island nation. It is simply more difficult to acquire or import weapons into this country than, for example, mainland Europe.

3.17 It is important, though, that we are not complacent about the protection offered by our border, particularly in London where St Pancras International, Heathrow and London City Airports, and the River Thames bring that border directly into the capital.
Historically airports and aircraft have been major targets for terrorists. The largest terrorist attack in the UK was the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 which blew up over Lockerbie, killing 270 people. In recent years hijacking, which had previously been a fairly regular global occurrence in the 1970s and 80s, has become less common, while attempts to bomb aircraft in flight have continued.

In 2006 the police and security agencies prevented a plot to blow up seven transatlantic flights, using liquid explosives, and, more recently, in 2015 a flight from Sharm el-Sheikh to Saint Petersburg was blown up mid-flight, in an attack for which the so-called Islamic State claimed responsibility. Concerns have also been expressed in the past about the use of rocket launchers or other weapons to take down aircraft in-flight.

Recent attacks in Istanbul and Brussels (see Box 3) have also shown that airports themselves, like all crowded places, can be targets for terrorists carrying out bomb or gun attacks.

There is considerable security at airports, and I have been broadly reassured by the policing presence, and plans in place, in the event of an attack. Dedicated resources are provided, with specific protocols drawn up for both Heathrow and London City airports. However, the recent incursion at London City by the Black Lives Matter group does raise serious questions about the perimeter security, and access from the river. Given this, a full review of perimeter security at London City should be conducted by the MPS and airport management. (Recommendation 3)

Recently, concerns have been expressed about the potential for drones – either accidentally or with malicious intent – to disrupt flights. In order to address this risk, the Civil Aviation Authority should, building on the work of the House of Lords review into the civil use of drones, ensure that the current legislation relating to the use of drones is suitable. Government should also explore technological options to improve the capacity to restrict drone use or disable them. (Recommendation 4)
THE ROLE OF THE MAYOR

3.22 A further London-specific element is the unique governance arrangements in the capital. We have a directly elected Mayor with a suite of powers, including oversight of the police, and a strong democratic mandate. While this arrangement is currently unique, as other areas such as Manchester elect metro mayors with similar powers, some of the recommendations relating to the mayoralty in this report will be relevant to those areas.

3.23 The Mayor largely exercises his responsibilities for the police through the Mayor's Office for Policing And Crime (MOPAC). However there is currently no dedicated counter-terrorism advice available to either this office or the Mayor which sits outside the police. Given the complexity and sensitivity of these issues, MOPAC should have a specific resource to support effective oversight of the MPS' counter-terrorism work. Consideration should be given to the appointment of a counter-terrorism adviser to the Mayor and Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime (Recommendation 7) to support them in this role. There may be an opportunity to use this appointment as a formal link between the oversight function provided in the Home Office by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT).

3.24 It has also become clear through this review that there is no clearly defined role for the Mayor in the event of a major incident taking place. While Londoners will rightly look to the capital's civic leader, who symbolises London government, for leadership, support, advice and reassurance, the procedures to support this do not currently exist in a sufficiently robust format. I will provide further thoughts on this issue later in this report when the issue of structures and joint-working is discussed in Chapter 13, but it is clear that the role of the Mayor in an attack needs to be more clearly considered by all partners. (Recommendation 8) This is not about duplicating existing roles, and must not create additional complications or confusion, but is merely a reflection of the status the Mayor now has which, perhaps, did not even exist in the 2005 London Bombings when the Mayoralty was still a comparatively new institution.

3.25 For example, there is a clear need for a protocol to cover Mayoral attendance at COBR meetings – the monitoring and coordinating function that central government uses in crisis situations. The current Mayor has a personal mandate bigger than any politician in British history. It is inconceivable, then, that in the event of a major terrorist attack or, indeed, any other significant emergency in the capital, that he should not routinely and automatically be invited to attend COBR meetings, yet no such clear protocol exists. The Cabinet Office should urgently update their guidance on COBR attendees to unequivocally include the Mayor in all meetings about incidents affecting, or potentially affecting, London. (Recommendation 9)

LONDON'S POLICE

3.26 Another specific London dynamic is the nature of our police force. Despite cuts to policing budgets, the number of officers in the MPS has remained high at around 32,000. This means that the Mayor is able to meet his commitment to restore real neighbourhood policing, and keep the neighbourhood service at the heart of London’s policing.

3.27 The great strength of the Peelian model of policing is that link between the neighbourhood officer and the community they serve. It is often said, but remains true, that neighbourhood policing when done properly has policing as an intrinsic part of communities. Listening to community concerns and working with the community, noticing warning signs, and identifying emerging problems is vital for the prevention of terrorism – just as it is for the detection and prevention of crime and anti-social behaviour.

3.28 That thread that runs from community policing through to specialist counter-terrorism policing is essential, and anything that undermines that would be detrimental to London’s safety. I was struck, in my own locality, that when the Finsbury Park Mosque was raided in 2003, police officers were outside Finsbury Park station on the morning of the raid, handing out leaflets explaining what had happened and why. This was recognition that the same service that had raided the mosque also had to manage the consequences in the local community, and ensure that trust and confidence were maintained.
3.29 With a separation between counter-terrorism and community policing, this understanding and sensitivity that our current model generates would be lost both in London but also in the rest of the country. While nationally it is the case that the MPS lead on counter-terrorist policing, counter-terrorism units are housed in local police forces, embedding a local link and direct connection between local and neighbourhood policing and the more specialised work of counter-terrorism throughout the country.

3.30 As will be seen in the rest of this review, local policing also has a critical role to play in protecting the capital from an attack, and ensuring a good response in the event of one taking place.

3.31 For these reasons, the Mayor and the Metropolitan Police Service should strongly resist any attempts by central government to move the counter-terrorism function and wider counter-terrorism policing network from the MPS to the National Crime Agency. (Recommendation 10)

3.32 That is not to say, however, that there should not be effective joint working between the MPS and the NCA. In fact, as above, this should be strengthened, with particular attention paid to effective joint working in areas such as the movement of firearms, border control, movement of people, financial support for terrorism and radicalisation in prisons.

3.33 Finally, this review cannot ignore the recent referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union. Currently through our membership of a range of EU Justice and Home Affairs measures, we have access to increasingly sophisticated information sharing arrangements. In addition to these, we are a full member of Europol and undertake significant collaboration with other member states. It is essential, in the EU exit negotiations, that UK policing is able to maintain the required international arrangements that currently work to keep us safe. (Recommendation 11)
4. A CHANGING AND PROPORTIONATE RESPONSE

4.1 As set out above, the nature of the terrorist threat facing London and the UK has changed in recent years. While our intelligence and police services had become used to dealing with the ongoing threat from Irish dissident terrorism, attacks such as the London Bombings of 2005 and the Mumbai attacks in 2008 demonstrated that the threat had changed and continues to change as attack methodology has developed.

4.2 Critical to delivering an appropriate response as the threat alters has been to learn the lessons that previous attacks have taught us. Boxes 5, 7 and 8 set out some of the most significant attacks on UK soil, and some of the lessons that have been learnt from them, but that process for learning cannot be taken for granted.

4.3 Clearly, then, when a major incident takes place, the police and others will come together to learn lessons, and this was most obviously demonstrated following the 7 July London Bombings. The reviews by the coroner, Lady Justice Hallett, and the London Assembly set out a series of very clear recommendations of areas for improvement, and it is reassuring that these have now been implemented or superseded.

4.4 A key recommendation from the public inquest was to improve the interoperability between emergency services. This led to the introduction of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) which has seen over 12,000 police, fire and ambulance service personnel trained to improve joint decision-making in major incidents.

4.5 During the course of this review the appalling attack in Nice took place. I was encouraged by the MPS response to this, and the plans that they put in place to learn the lessons from that attack and ensure that any similar attacks here were, as far as is reasonably possible, able to be mitigated.

4.6 Just weeks later, on 3 August there was the appalling incident when Darlene Horton was murdered, and five other people injured, in a knife attack in Russell Square. Initially considered as a potential terrorist attack, the police were on the scene of the incident within four minutes of the first call being made. The attacker had been identified, and then detained using a Taser, within six minutes of the initial call.

On the morning of 7 July 2005, during rush hour, four Islamist extremist suicide bombers blew themselves up in various parts of London’s transport network. Seven people were killed on a train at Aldgate station, seven were killed at Edgware Road, twenty-four were killed at King’s Cross/Russell Square, fourteen were killed on a No. 30 bus at Tavistock Square and 700 people were treated for injuries. It was the worst terrorist attack in Britain since the Lockerbie bombing in 1988.

Although there had been warnings of an attack on UK soil, this was the first time that new emergency plans, which had been significantly amended after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US, had been tested.

As the report into the attacks produced by the London Assembly stated:

“Putting in place an emergency response to rescue and treat the injured, care for survivors, and ensure the safety of the public, was an enormously complicated and difficult undertaking. It involved hundreds of individuals at the scenes, at hospitals, and within the emergency, transport and other services. It required the co-ordination of numerous different agencies under circumstances where communications were difficult when the causes of the emergency were unclear, and when future events were uncertain.”

Following the attacks, the London Assembly and the coroner, Lady Justice Hallett – by means of a public inquest – both produced reports making recommendations for improvements in the response to terrorist attacks. Central to these recommendations was a recognition of the extraordinary work done by the emergency services, transport staff and others whose countless acts of bravery and compassion undoubtedly saved lives.

The public inquest made recommendations about intelligence improvements to MI5, along with recommendations about emergency planning and training to TIL and the London Ambulance Service. The London Assembly made an overarching recommendation about the need for emergency plans to consider the needs of individuals caught up in an attack, rather than just the emergency services.

They also made a number of specific recommendations for TIL, the London Resilience Forum, the London Ambulance Service, the MPS, and the NHS which focused on communications, equipment, procedures and the services provided to victims.
4.7 While the police have subsequently stated their view that this attack was more likely the result of mental health problems, rather than an act of terrorism, lessons can, and should, still be learnt from the initial response. In all cases where terrorism is considered in the initial phase of an operation, and the counter-terrorism protocols are, or should have been, implemented, there should be a thorough review of the operation to ensure any lessons can be learnt. (Recommendation 12)

4.8 After the Mumbai attack in 2008, the Home Office, the police and the other emergency services worked together to prepare a strong police-led capability to deal with similar large-scale firearms attacks in the UK.

4.9 Firearms police are now trained and equipped to respond to an MTFA and there are fire and ambulance teams trained and equipped to manage casualties in higher risk environments. This multi-agency capability is deployable from key locations in London, and around the UK. This can be augmented with support from the military.

4.10 The attacks in Paris in November 2015 were a clear reminder of this threat, and following them, the Government took the decision to provide extra funding to uplift the armed policing capability and capacity to respond. For 2016/17 this funding uplift will total £35 million, with £144 million provided over the next five years for policing in England and Wales. The MPS will receive £10.3 million in year one and £5.4 million in the subsequent four years.

4.11 Around the country, this uplift will mean that the number of armed officers will increase by over 1,000 over the next two years. In London, the MPS will increase armed officers by 600. Chapter 5, below, sets out more detail about the specific implications for London.

4.12 This armed uplift poses some important questions about the nature of policing in London, and the type and level of security with which we are comfortable. As discussed above, the Peelian approach, with an unarmed police force of civilians in uniform policing by consent, is fundamental to our model of policing. As soon as officers are armed, the public reaction to them changes and they can move from being a force that is doing policing with the community, to one that is perceived as doing policing to the community.

4.13 Even with these additional officers, though, the nature of an MTFA is such that within the first few minutes many people could be killed or injured. Police response times are generally good in the capital and, as will be seen below, the extra resources available and the plans that are in place have given me confidence that the police response will be good. But we all have to accept that for those directly involved in an MTFA or other serious attack, ‘good’ will still be extremely frightening and may lead to serious injury and death, possibly within a few minutes. That is why it is so important to consider the role of other emergency services, particularly the ambulance service, in reducing the consequences of such injuries.

4.14 These injuries are likely to be significantly different to those routinely encountered by those working in the emergency services, and some of the normal instincts and training to treat injuries may need to be curbed in the interests of safety. This will particularly be the case in Warm Zones (see Box 6), where emergency services personnel will be operating at some considerable risk to their own safety.

4.15 Ultimately the decisions made about the level of armed response available come down to choices based on community acceptability and the resources available. With substantial extra resources, additional firearms officers could be trained and deployed. This might incrementally improve the response times, but would be extremely expensive and would risk undermining the police-public relationship. There is also an important issue about the capacity to train and recruit over and above the existing uplift programme, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 below. In addition, more officers with firearms routinely patrolling London risks creating a sense of tension and fear in the public, rather than the sense of security and reassurance that would be desired.

4.16 At the moment the balance between a proportionate response to the threat we face and the preservation of our policing model feels broadly right. Central to this, though, is good communication to the public by the police. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 14.

4.17 In addition to the change in policing tactics, other emergency services and partners have needed to revise their protocols, training and structures in order to provide the necessary response to a major incident. As above, this has largely focused on improving the cooperation and interoperability between agencies, but it has also included procuring the right equipment, giving the right training to deal with certain injuries or scenarios and ensuring the right number of staff are on standby.
4.18 Much of this enhanced response is generic and could be rolled out to any major incident whether a terrorist attack, major traffic accident, fire or other disaster. In preparing for a terrorist incident, including an MTFA, it is right to understand the specific bespoke elements of response that are required and work to meet them, but it is equally important not to reinvent the wheel and produce a parallel process that simply gets in the way of an effective response.

4.19 For example, the London Resilience Forum’s Minimum Standards for London, which ensure local authorities have the appropriate procedures and policies in place, include a number of areas such as shelter, identification of vulnerable people, evacuation and warning and informing. All of these would be just as useful during and after an MTFA as they would in response to a flood.

4.20 Any decision about the allocation of resources needs to be taken on the basis of the intelligence available, and I am satisfied that the police have access to the most up to date and robust intelligence via the intelligence services, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre and others. However, given that no intelligence picture can ever be complete, it is important that a full assessment is made of the risk and impact of certain events, even where intelligence does not necessarily indicate it is a likely occurrence. A lack of specific intelligence should not be used as a reason for the police to close their minds to other possibilities.

4.21 For example, the intelligence picture might not suggest a particular tactic, albeit conceivable, by terrorists is likely. But the consequences of such a tactic, if used, might be so catastrophic that mitigation should still be considered regardless of that intelligence picture. So, in choosing how to allocate resources, the MPS must strike a reasonable balance between the intelligence picture and a sensible assessment of other tactics which terrorists might use and, above all, there should be a readiness to expect the unexpected.

(Recommendation 13)
5. THE POLICE SERVICE

5.1 In the event of a major terrorist attack, the lead agency responsible for coordinating and delivering a response is the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). As mentioned above, the MPS plans for the response to attacks, particularly MTFA, have been significantly improved in recent years, learning from attacks elsewhere as well as internal exercises. I have reviewed in detail the plans that are in place and, in general, believe them to be detailed, well developed, tested and well understood throughout the service, giving a reasonable degree of confidence that in the event of such an attack the right response will be delivered.

5.2 Given the nature of the threat, this chapter focuses in detail on the response to MTFA, although many of the processes will be generic with a similar response to other types of terrorist attack.

RESPONSE TO A MARAUDING TERRORIST FIREARMS ATTACK

5.3 When an MTFA is identified, a number of pre-agreed protocols are triggered both within the MPS and other agencies under plans set out in Operation Plato. Telecommunications links will be established between service control rooms and the specialist counter-terrorism policing units will be deployed. If required, a Tactical Coordinating Group, made up of emergency service commanders, will be established to oversee the operational response.

5.4 As a result of new planning and an increase in resources, the MPS now has more specialist officers available. In addition to the Specialist Firearms Officers deployed across the capital, there is now a 24-hour immediate response team of the most highly trained Counter-Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officers. These officers are the very best trained and most experienced and would be deployed to resolve the most severe attacks, operating in the air, on the river, and using armoured vehicles and motorcycles if needed.

5.5 In situations that require it, the Strategic Coordination Group comprising the emergency services and other members of the London Resilience Forum will meet. Throughout the operational response, oversight of the police on the ground will be given by specially trained and tasked senior officers who, if necessary, will be located in the Special Operations Room (SOR). More information about the organisations involved can be found in Chapter 13 and Box 10.

5.6 In MTFA situations, it is also likely that a COBR meeting will take place, with senior police, military and other emergency service leaders along with politicians, the security services and senior officials. As in Recommendation 9 above, it is important for attacks in, or affecting, London that the Mayor is included in these discussions.

The JESIP diagram below shows the emergency service deployment and response to an MTFA in the various zones of an attack.6
5.7 In the event of a prolonged attack, or a move to the CRITICAL threat level either as a result of intelligence or during and following an incident, the MPS are able to draw on resources from other police forces and the military.

5.8 What was once a last resort of involving the military has now moved to a more sensible approach which recognises the considerable value and skills that military personnel can bring to a situation of this kind and deploys them accordingly. As such, they are embedded in the planning process, for example sitting on the London Resilience Forum along with other emergency services, and attending meetings of the Security Review Committee.

5.9 None of this, though undermines the seriousness of deploying troops on the streets of the capital. For that reason, it is important that proper communication takes place with the public, led by senior politicians and police and military leaders, to provide reassurance and give confidence to Londoners and visitors to the city. (Recommendation 14)

5.10 When needed, the military would deploy under Operation Temperer which would see potentially hundreds of troops deployed to backfill armed police roles, or deployed alongside British Transport Police, to increase the operational capacity and capability of specialist counter-terrorism and armed policing. These personnel will, within a matter of hours, deploy alongside the police, under their instruction, with a centrally located Military Operations Centre established. This process should be fully tested during one of the regular counter-terrorism response exercises. (Recommendation 15)

5.11 In addition, specialist troops can be authorised to take part in a direct operation to confront and neutralise a terrorist threat if required. This increases the police capacity and capability to respond, for example, if there were multiple attacks on different sites of the kind seen in Paris in November 2015. In the light of developing threat assessments, the military and police must keep the level and availability of this type of support under constant review. (Recommendation 16) I have been broadly reassured that reviews of this type take place, but it is important that it is maintained.

5.12 The Ministry of Defence Police also have a presence in London and at nearby locations, including a significant presence at their training centre in Essex and at the Atomic Weapons Establishment near Reading, which could be used to support policing under the same Operation Temperer plans. This would see MOD police backfilling for the MPS, providing an increased police presence in high-risk locations.

5.13 Given the current threat to military personnel, however, any deployment would need to ensure that existing commitments to the protection of MOD buildings and personnel was maintained, so, for example – and reflecting on recent media reports suggesting removal of armed policing from certain sites – a permanent armed policing presence should be maintained at the MOD headquarters on Whitehall. Any attempt to reduce this resource, with an expectation that the MPS will provide policing cover, should be accompanied by the appropriate transfer of funds. (Recommendation 17)

5.14 In addition to military support, it is worth noting that arrangements are in place to allow neighbouring forces to provide support to London where this is required, and where the intelligence picture believes it would be appropriate.

5.15 While they do not have any armed officers based in London, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC) could have a part to play should an attack take place. They currently provide the vital protection for the country’s nuclear sites. The CNC is an armed service that has, in recent years, moved to take on the same standards for firearms training and capability as Home Office Forces. This means that they are now able to operate alongside other police forces.

5.16 Should an attack occur, the CNC has plans to release armed officers to provide support to other police forces, these will initially come from officers not engaged in security, for example CNC firearms trainers, and then when back-filled by the military, further officers will be released. Once sent to where they are needed, they will come under the direction of the local force and be deployed according to need. The CNC are also playing an important role in supporting the armed officer uplift through the provision of extra training capacity.
ARMED UPLIFT

5.17 Much of the improvement in police response has been focused on the uplift in armed capability. This uplift will see an increase of an additional 600 Firearms Officers and additional Armed Response Vehicles (ARVs). While in this public report it would not be appropriate to go into detail about the numbers available across London, or their locations, I am confident that this uplift is significant and will lead to an improved response.

5.18 Operation Hercules, launched on 3 August, gives operational effect in the MPS to the uplift in armed officers, albeit before the full uplift is available. Under Hercules, the MPS is visibly deploying more armed officers on proactive operations and targeted patrols, both in vehicles and on foot, at locations across London. The operation has seven key strategic objectives, which support wider efforts to prevent a terror attack, and ensure a swift response in the event of one:

- Provide a security presence within communities and at locations deemed at more risk of attack.
- Deter terrorists from attempting to commit an attack in London.
- Through a visible and sustained presence, attempt to deny terrorists the opportunity to plan attacks in the public domain.
- Work with other MPS departments and partners to deliver uniform policing into bespoke counter-terrorism protective security operations.
- Provide a coordinated response to incidents during the hours of operation.
- Reassure the public.
- Ensure the operation is sustainable within existing funding and resource constraints.

5.19 The deployment is not based on any specific intelligence, so the locations, the types of tactics and the number of officers deployed at once will continually change to maximise the effect of the deployment and avoid any predictability that could be picked up by hostile reconnaissance.

5.20 It is worth noting the response times in the Russell Square incident, where an Armed Response Vehicle was on the scene within 4 minutes of the initial call to the police. While not ultimately determined to be a terrorist attack, it is an indication of the impressive speed that firearms officers can be deployed to an incident. Notwithstanding this, however, even at this speed of response, in an MTFA there would likely be many casualties.

5.21 One tactic the MPS now has access to through Operation Hercules, which was not previously available, is motorcycles capable of carrying firearms officers to the scene of an attack. In London, where the traffic can be a significant obstacle to emergency services travelling, this is an important tool. The MPS should review the number of motorcycles and trained drivers available to ensure an adequate response is still available should the road network around an incident - as is likely - become heavily congested. (Recommendation 18) Transport for London also have mechanisms in place to manage traffic in an emergency.

5.22 In order to meet the commitment to increase the number of armed officers, it is essential that there are sufficient resources available to train these officers. Some concerns have been expressed to me that, while there has been a reasonable uptake in the number of officers wanting to volunteer to become firearms officers – and it is important to note that these are officers who volunteer, and do not receive special payments – there are considerable pressures on training which could risk introducing delays in the uplift of officers. The lack of qualified instructors, both nationally and within the MPS, is the single biggest risk to the delivery of the Armed Uplift Programme.

5.23 I am satisfied that the Commissioner and his senior leadership team have identified this risk and are carefully monitoring the situation. Having sat in on the Commissioner’s regular meeting overseeing the uplift, I am encouraged that the issue is being taken seriously and note the measures in place to increase the number of firearms instructors and training capacity in the immediate short-term. It is clear, though, that there should be consideration given to wider measures to increase the number of firearms instructors (Recommendation 19), particularly given that these trainers are also needed to train ambulance and fire personnel who operate in high-risk environments.

5.24 In addition, it should be ensured that the fullest use is made of all available providers of training, such as the City of London Police and the MOD Police (Recommendation 20), who both have the same requirements to train. The Home Office and National Police Chiefs’ Council should review firearms training to generate a national picture of training capacity to see if further resources are needed in the short-term. (Recommendation 21)

5.25 Another option that should be pursued, in any event, is to prevent the loss of officers who retire after 30 years’ service. The pension conditions for many serving firearms officers mean that there is a financial incentive to retire at this point. The officers can take their lump sum and draw their pension straight away. Until a few years ago, such officers were able, under the ‘30plus’ scheme to draw their lump sum at the 30-year mark and continue serving without any tax disadvantages. This scheme has, though, now been withdrawn.
5.26 Reinstating such a scheme at this time would be advantageous for the MPS both in terms of retaining instructors, but also more generally for firearms officers as this would reduce wastage which otherwise continues to reduce officer numbers just at the time we are seeking substantially to increase them. The '30plus' scheme should, then, be reintroduced to help to ensure that there is a pool of suitably qualified and experienced instructors and firearms officers maintained and enhanced within the Service. (Recommendation 22)

5.27 Work is also underway, partly supported by the Home Office Transformation Fund, to consider if officers who leave the force, either at the end of their career or if they move on to other roles, to continue serving as reservists. This has the potential to increase flexibility and resources at times of higher demand and should be explored thoroughly. (Recommendation 23)

5.28 While it is important to ensure the speed of recruitment is continued and, if possible, increased, it is important that the MPS does not lose focus on improving the diversity – in terms of both gender and ethnicity – of the cadre of firearms officers. (Recommendation 24)

5.29 It is accepted that the current threat of terrorist attack may last for many years: it will not simply evaporate. Consequently, the need for an increased number of armed officers will remain, and the MPS must ensure that the understandable drive to get more firearms officers trained now does not militate against itself and lead to high wastage, and that there are suitable plans in place to ensure the long-term supply of such officers.

5.30 One of the dilemmas facing the service is that we need to train more officers while hoping that they will not be required. This, of course, means that officers are not available for other tasks. So, the MPS must plan how best to use these officers so that they are ready if needed but are productively deployed when on duty. Firearms officers, like all officers, need job satisfaction otherwise they may well simply move back into other policing roles. This can particularly be the case for officers who transfer in from other Forces who could easily return to their originating Force. While focusing on the recruitment of firearms officers the MPS needs to develop an appropriate retention strategy to reduce wastage levels of these officers. (Recommendation 25)

5.31 There is also some discussion within the Independent Police Remuneration Review Body about special payments to firearms officers. This is worthy of some consideration, but if any such recommendation were made, there must be a mechanism that ensures this does not add to existing funding pressures within the MPS. (Recommendation 26)

POLICE FUNDING AND EQUIPMENT

5.32 Beyond training, it is essential that police officers have the equipment and resources they need to provide the most effective response. This can be both in terms of the kit required in an operation, or the resources needed in support of an activity. Critical to this is sufficient funding. The Commissioner and his senior leadership team are actively monitoring any supply-side problems that may be in procuring and obtaining the necessary kit, but the Home Office should stand ready to support any initiatives that may be necessary to ensure this.

5.33 Currently, the MPS receives a specific funding stream, the National and International Capital Cities Grant (NICC), which is designed to fund those activities directly linked to London’s position as capital of the United Kingdom and one of the world’s most significant global cities. While, in addition, there is a separate counter-terrorism grant to fund that work, it is practically very difficult to delineate activity to prevent crime in an iconic location, or deter terrorism, and there is significant overlap.

5.34 Despite the importance of this funding, the NICC has never been fully funded by the Home Office. In the last year, the MPS identified around £340 million of spending on NICC activity, of which £281 million was agreed by the Home Office’s independent panel. However, the funding ultimately provided was just £173.6 million. This forces the MPS to either reduce this activity or compensate by removing funding from other areas.

In future, the Home Office should fully fund the NICC to ensure that London is properly protected and London’s communities are not having to subsidise national functions. (Recommendation 27) The full funding of the NICC must not lead to a commensurate reduction in general grant, and must be a genuine increase in resources to recognise the additional work of policing the capital.

5.35 With regard to equipment, as we saw in the recent Russell Square attack, the police can use less lethal force to bring a highly dangerous situation under control. As the attack was initially considered a potential terror attack, and was worryingly similar to other terror attacks using knives in Germany and elsewhere, this is an important factor in our preparedness. Where possible we should want to avoid lethal force and see terrorists stand trial for their actions, as was also the case in the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby.
In the Leytonstone and Russell Square attacks, Tasers (more formally known as Conductive Energy Devices (CED)) were used effectively by police to subdue the attackers. It is, then, concerning that the new model has not yet been approved, particularly when the existing approved model is out of production and so there is a shortage of those available for British policing. As such, action should be urgently taken to approve the new device as a less lethal option for policing. (Recommendation 28)

In addition to approving the new model, the Mayor and the Commissioner should give joint consideration to whether there is a case for equipping more, properly trained and supervised, officers with CEDs (Recommendation 29), given the threat from lone actors using bladed weapons. The additional number should be limited as I do not believe the case has been made, either operationally or to the public, for equipping all frontline officers with CEDs. However, there is a case for moving beyond the relatively small proportion of officers - around 14% - who currently have access to them. As well as being adequately trained these officers should continue to have a high level of supervision, with adequate independent oversight of the use of CEDs, including the continued publication of data through the MOPAC Intrusive Tactics Dashboard.

There is other equipment that the MPS should be able to access in order more effectively to carry out their work in the event of a terrorist attack. In all cases, particularly when the costs are relatively low, the Home Office should have a clear, light-touch, approach to agreeing funding that operational leaders believe is important in keeping the public safe. (Recommendation 30)

One such example is the procurement of hostile vehicle mitigation mobile barriers for the Government Secure Zone. Following the lessons of the Nice attacks, these could allow more effective mitigation of similar attacks here than the expensive systems that are currently in place. A business case for these flexible barriers has previously been considered by the Home Office, but may be revisited. They should review this urgently and move to fund a solution. (Recommendation 31)

Consideration should also be given by the GLA and relevant local authorities to the wider installation of protective bollards in areas of vulnerability around London and to explore the case for retractable bollards in certain areas. (Recommendation 32)

Another area is the provision of police dogs, which carry out useful passive and active work to detect crime. The MPS are currently reviewing the use of dogs in a range of scenarios with the possibility for expanding their role in the field of counter-terrorist activities. This activity should continue with the support, where needed, of MOPAC.

Finally, a major terrorist attack might, in the most extreme circumstances, be prolonged for several days, with a long period of the threat level being moved to CRITICAL. As mentioned above, this will require a significant deployment of officers onto the streets. Given the issues raised in Chapter 3 above about the volume of officers who don't live in London, there will be a need to house officers in temporary accommodation.

It has been put to me that property currently used by the UK Armed Forces Reserve Force could be used for these purposes, which should be considered as part of any discussions about making changes to this estate.

On the afternoon of 22 May 2013, Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale, armed with a meat cleaver, knives and an unloaded revolver ran down Fusilier Lee Rigby in Woolwich, close to the Woolwich Barracks. After they had knocked him down with their car, Adebolajo proceeded to attempt to decapitate him before both were filmed telling passers-by of the apparent motivation for their attack. The first police response arrived nine minutes after the first 999 call was made, with armed police arriving around 5 minutes later, at which point they shot the attackers with live ammunition and Taser, before administering first aid. Both Adebolajo and Adebowale survived and were sentenced to a whole-life term and 49 years respectively.

On the evening of 5 November 2015, Muhaydin Mire, armed with a knife, attacked three people – one seriously – at Leytonstone Tube Station. Police arrived on the scene and had resolved the incident, by Tasering Mire, within 8 minutes of the initial call.

It subsequently transpired that Mire had a history of mental illness, including a period of hospitalisation. The MPS have said that the violence was most likely a result of his acute mental health problems, although there was evidence he was inspired by so-called Islamic State propaganda that he had downloaded onto his phone. He was convicted of attempted murder, and sentenced to life.
5.44 As discussed in Chapter 6 below, London has a large and complex transport network that carries millions of passengers every day. This network is largely policed by the British Transport Police (BTP) who have a considerable presence in London and the South East, with 1,600 officers in the region. In the event of an attack on the underground system or on the mainline network and stations, it is generally the BTP who will be the first to respond.

5.45 The overall aim of the BTP is to reduce crime on the transport network, increase confidence among the travelling public and keep the network running. With regard to counter-terrorism policing specifically, they have a cadre of highly trained Specialist Firearms Officers, and work with the Department for Transport and others to identify possible targets. Like the MPS, they are increasing the number of Armed Response Vehicles as part of the armed policing uplift.

5.46 Training, equipment and protocols are all interoperable with those used by the MPS, and the BTP also benefit from Operation Temperer, which would see military personnel deployed alongside BTP officers. There are, though, some particular challenges that face those policing the transport network, particularly the underground.

5.47 Many stations are large and complex, and so it is encouraging that the BTP are improving the tools available to them for situational awareness and ensuring that officers on the ground have access to the relevant plans and maps that would allow them adequately to search stations to confront terrorists within them. The MPS should learn from the mapping technology being developed by the BTP and introduce similar systems for major sites in London such as shopping centres, large entertainment venues and even museums and galleries. (Recommendation 33)

5.48 As technology progresses, new ways of providing information to officers in real-time are emerging. For example, the technology now exists to provide live feeds from CCTV cameras onto the portable devices used by officers responding to the incident. In the event that a building or train station needs to be entered, this technology could make a significant difference, and BTP are currently exploring this technology. Similar technology has also been developed by organisations such as Facewatch to allow private CCTV cameras to feed into police systems in real-time. The MPS should work with BTP, and others, to see how live CCTV streaming could be introduced to all parts of London where it might have value. (Recommendation 34)

5.49 Another important piece of learning for the MPS from BTP operational practice is the use of Project Servator when deploying armed officers. As the BTP describe it:7

We use Project Servator to deter, detect and disrupt a wide range of criminal activity on the rail network while providing a reassuring presence for the travelling public.

Project Servator deployments are unpredictable and highly visible. They are designed to deter, detect and disrupt a range of criminal activity, from pickpocketing and theft to terrorism.

They involve uniformed and plain clothed officers together with other specially-trained officers. They are supported by other resources, such as police dogs and a network of CCTV cameras. Rail staff also support our deployments through continuous vigilance and regular communication with our officers.

We will turn up unannounced at railway stations to carry out patrols. They will be unpredictable, so they could happen at any time, last for different amounts of time and involve varying numbers of officers and assets.

You could see us at your station more than once a day or not see us for a week or more. The key to the deployments being successful in deterring, detecting and disrupting criminal behaviour is that they are unpredictable.

Don’t be surprised or alarmed if you see a Project Servator deployment being carried out at your railway station. Our officers are there to keep you safe. You may also see or meet officers who are there to explain to passengers what we are doing and answer any questions you have. Feel free to talk to them if you want to find out more.

5.50 Analysis of Project Servator by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) shows that it is a valuable programme, particularly in order to ensure that deployments of armed officers reassure the public, rather than disturb them. As such, the MPS should, as quickly as possible, begin the implementation of Project Servator as part of the existing armed uplift programme in the Metropolitan Area, using the full range of tactics associated with the Project, and adhering to its principles and practice as closely as possible. (Recommendation 35)

5.51 The fact that much of London’s transport network is underground also poses a specific communications challenge that was a considerable issue in the 7 July 2005 London Bombings, see Box 9.

5.52 In Chapter 8, below, the role of Transport for London and Network Rail is discussed in more detail, but it is vital to the security of our transport system that these organisations work closely with policing. Decisions about when to close or evacuate stations must be taken collectively, on the basis of security advice from the police.
In 2005, the radio system in operation did not operate effectively on the underground network. This failure hampered rescue efforts, and may have prolonged the time injured people waited before they were rescued. It was a key recommendation from the Report into the bombings that Airwave should be enabled to operate in this environment. This has been achieved.

Next year will see the start of the introduction of a new radio system for the emergency services: the emergency services network (ESN). This system is based on very different technology to Airwave, the current emergency services system. It will run on 4G and is stated by the Home Office to provide many advantages over Airwave, such as being able to carry data. The intention is for all users to have transitioned onto the new network by 2020, but there remains a substantial amount of development still to do and the technology being used has not been used in this manner, on this scale, before.

Most of the senior people that I spoke to in the emergency services were sceptical as to whether the system will deliver within the timescales planned. However, the Home Office remain bullish about the prospects of achieving the rollout, although they have arrangements in place for the Airwave system to be kept running – at a cost – while any problems with the new system are ironed out should that prove necessary, and to allow interoperability while Forces transition. In my view, such arrangements are an essential precaution.

I remain very concerned that this new system may not operate effectively on the underground system. Currently the Home Office, who are leading the new ESN programme, are working with TfL and police forces to see whether they can make the ESN system work on the underground using existing networks which are themselves approaching the end of their natural lives. The technology should be capable of this but the timescales to test and to install the system are challenging. There is a transition schedule agreed with suppliers, with the original intention having been for London to begin transitioning to this new system in December 2017. As with any major programme, milestones are kept under review. In the longer-term, for the ESN to work underground, 4G connectivity will be required which might bring other benefits to passengers, including the ability to call 999 in any emergency.

The recent National Audit Office review into the ESN\(^8\) has raised similar concerns, including about the pace of the programme and the risk of a solution that does not provide adequate coverage underground.

The Police Service has made it clear that the coverage of the ESN must be at least as good as Airwave. I fully endorse this position and stress that this must include the underground network. Londoners would find it unforgivable if the authorities were so quickly to step away from the learning taken from the tragedy that befell London in 2005. As the process of replacing the existing Airwave radio system continues, policing, and particularly the BTP, must be fully engaged and any concerns they have should be considered carefully. The Airwave network should not be switched off until it can be shown that the new ESN works adequately everywhere and, in particular, underground, to the satisfaction of the MPS, the BTP and TfL. (Recommendation 36)
5.53 Given the huge amount of synergy between the BTP and the MPS, I am broadly confident in their ability to respond to a terror attack on the transport network. However, regardless of best efforts and sophisticated protocols, when two separate organisations exist there is always the potential for gaps to emerge and problems to arise. This could be a particular challenge in the event of a multi-site attack which includes both underground and street-level events.

5.54 The Home Office are currently exploring options for merging certain national policing functions, including the BTP, Civil Nuclear Constabulary, MOD Police and elements of highways policing. It is outside the remit of this review to take a view on the benefits or otherwise of such a wholesale merger, but there would be significant upheaval and disruption should such a reorganisation go ahead. However, if such changes are being considered, it is important that the benefits of fully integrating the MPS and the underground policing functions of the BTP are considered at the same time.

5.55 Any integration would need to preserve the special skills that the BTP have developed, particularly around community engagement, dynamic risk-assessment of suspect packages and bomb threats, and the ability they have to swiftly resolve situations and allow the network to continue running. They would also need the continuing specialist knowledge of, and familiarity with, the system, and operators, that BTP have developed.

5.56 I do not, however, believe this is a challenge that is unsurmountable. In fact, as Police Scotland take over the functions of the BTP in Scotland under the Smith Commission recommendations, there is a need, and perhaps an opportunity, to explore the reorganisation of the BTP south of the border too to ensure that removing Scotland from the force doesn’t destabilise the organisation.

5.57 While I would not wish to diminish or undermine the excellent work that the BTP carry out, it simply cannot be efficient or effective for two police forces to operate in broadly the same place, with the same tactics and equipment, and to achieve the same aims. Already, outside central London it is common for MPS officers to arrive first at the scene of incidents, and to deal with them prior to the arrival of BTP. This was clearly evident in the Leytonstone attack. Bringing the policing of the underground network under the control of the MPS would allow greater integration of response and more oversight by the Mayor, on behalf of Londoners, of their activity.

5.58 Should the Home Office continue with plans to merge certain national policing functions, such as the MOD Police and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, they should undertake a full assessment of the benefits of bringing the MPS and BTP underground network together. (Recommendation 37)

5.59 If terrorist targets are generally well-populated iconic locations, then the City of London has a high concentration of these targets. As with the BTP, the City of London Police (CoLP), who police the ‘square mile’, operate to the same standard and protocols as the MPS and are largely inter-operable in terms of response and also benefit from the armed uplift programme. Again, given this, I am broadly satisfied at their ability to respond to a major terrorist attack in the City supported by the MPS.

5.60 I was interested in the ability the CoLP will have to implement a contingent Anti-Terrorism Traffic Regulation Order (ATTRO)9 which they regard as a potentially valuable tool. An ATTRO can be implemented for the purpose of avoiding or reducing the likelihood of danger connected with terrorism, or preventing or reducing damage connected to terrorism. Under an ATTRO access by vehicular and pedestrian traffic can be controlled. Following the CoLP example, and in discussions with them about their learning from the process, the MPS should consider whether a contingent Anti-Terrorism Traffic Regulation Order would be valuable in other parts of the capital. (Recommendation 38) While the MPS have utilised ATTROs for a number of specific events, primarily in Westminster, they do not have a contingent ATTRO in place which can be implemented in a dynamic situation.

5.61 Notwithstanding the successes of the CoLP, as with the BTP there is obviously a potential incoherence in having a small section of the capital carved out from the area covered by the MPS, with responsibility given to a separate police force. It is at least likely that interoperability and response might be improved if a single force covered the policing, particularly for counter-terrorism purposes, of the whole of London. As such, the Home Office should undertake a full assessment of the benefits of merging the MPS and the CoLP, perhaps with the national financial and fraud functions moving to the National Crime Agency. (Recommendation 39) I do not underestimate the complexity and resistance that there will be to such a merger, however, in my view these are not sufficient reasons to outweigh the value of there being an assessment of the operational benefits of having a single force overseeing policing across the capital.

5.62 If no decision is taken to integrate the CoLP into the MPS, then both forces must work together to ensure that MPS officers who might be deployed into the City during an attack have a very good working knowledge of the area and the significant buildings that might become targets. (Recommendation 40)
POLICE TACTICS

5.63 In the event of an MTFA, police tactics will appear very different to those previously seen at armed incidents. In the past, the normal tactics would have been to contain the threat and to place a cordon around whatever was happening. This might then be followed by an extended period of stand-off, perhaps with negotiations being attempted. In an MTFA, however, the objective of the terrorists is probably to kill as many people as possible. This means that the tactic of containment would not work. Indeed, such an approach would be likely to mean that most, if not all, of those within the cordon will become the victims of the terrorists. That is why the response to such an incident will now involve the first armed officers on the scene moving forward to confront the terrorists. Thus, the immediate objective will be to neutralise the threat as swiftly as possible, often using lethal force.

5.64 These tactics will look and feel very different to the type of response we are used to from the police. Officers will be required to move into premises very quickly, making snap judgements to shoot suspected terrorists, which could have adverse consequences for victims if things go wrong. This would see them moving over dead and injured bodies to neutralise the threat, rather than stopping and helping victims. It is believed that this approach will lead to more lives being saved overall.

5.65 While it is always preferable that those engaged in terrorist activity should be apprehended without the use of lethal force so that they can be charged and brought before the courts, this may well be impossible under the circumstances of an MTFA.

THE INDEPENDENT POLICE COMPLAINTS COMMISSION

5.66 In all circumstances where there are police shootings or deaths following police contact, it is right that a thorough, and independent review takes place. This is the role of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) who will undertake an investigation to determine the circumstances of the death and assess the actions of the police officers involved.

5.67 As we have seen, however, an MTFA is unlike any other police activity, and as such the IPCC process needs to be sufficiently flexible to take the differences into account. Ultimately, officers involved in shooting dead a terrorist engaged in an MTFA are protecting innocent victims. They are exercising the most important function of the state: to keep the public safe, including from death and serious injury, and including using lethal force in order to achieve this. This is entirely consistent with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights: the right to life. In these circumstances officers are taking ECHR compliant action to end the life of a terrorist assailant in order to protect others from unlawful violence or death.

5.68 Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998 sets out the Convention rights. Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides for the right to life:

2.1 Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.

2.2 Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:

(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;

(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;

(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection.

5.69 The current law states that officers may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime. This test seems to me to be appropriate and I see no need for the law governing the police use of lethal force to be changed.

5.70 Police officers, and the Police Federation, have raised their concerns about the burden of IPCC investigations and the length of time these investigations can take. There is anecdotal evidence that some officers will not consider careers as firearms officers given the risk of IPCC censure, or the impact of prolonged investigation, after an incident. While I have seen no direct evidence that this is so far affecting recruitment, it is a sense that cannot be allowed to persist if we wish police officers to volunteer for these most dangerous of roles.
A national MOPAC survey of firearms officers’ opinions of post-incident procedures, albeit in 2014, showed that officers felt a considerable amount of pressure in their roles, and that the post-incident procedure would add to this after any event. Overall, the officers were strongly negative about the then proposed changes to post-incident procedures, particularly around segregation of officers after an incident which is still under active consideration. MOPAC should consider repeating the survey with MPS officers to ascertain whether the recent armed uplift, concerns about an MTFA, or further changes to the post-incident procedures have added to, or reduced, concerns. (Recommendation 41)

There is currently draft statutory guidance on general IPCC investigations into deaths following police contact (i.e. not specifically about an MTFA). These have been developed by the IPCC, after extensive consultation, and they are currently awaiting sign-off from the Home Secretary. While it is important to get this guidance right, it is also important to move quickly. As such, I would urge the Home Secretary to consider and reach a view on this guidance as soon as possible, and certainly by the end of the year. (Recommendation 42) Central to the guidance – whether currently included in the draft or not – should be measures to speed up investigations, and the Home Office should consider additional resources to the IPCC if needed to deliver this. (Recommendation 43)

Additionally, the draft protocol that the IPCC have developed with the police, specifically on responding to a major terrorist incident, should be finalised and agreed swiftly. (Recommendation 44) I would hope that agreement can rapidly be reached about the way forward building on the Approved Professional Practice produced by the College of Policing. This should make it clear – and this should go without saying – that given the significant requirement for speed in the police response and the possibility of multiple sites, the IPCC should undertake no action during, or shortly after, an incident that would in any way compromise the ongoing response.

In order for the IPCC to fully understand the likely process and implications of investigating an event as complex as an MTFA, and in order for them to develop protocols to ensure that the complexity of the operation does not overly burden individual officers, the IPCC must, at a senior and operational level, be fully involved in future full exercises of MTFA response. (Recommendation 45) It is not sufficient to rely on table-top exercises, rather they must have a full role in future large-scale exercises, as well as looking at MTFA in other countries and considering how they would investigate a similar attack here.

In order to make the work of the IPCC and other post-incident reviewers easier, there should be audio-recording of all command decisions taken by senior tactical and strategic leads in the command centres during an incident. (Recommendation 46) While there can be difficulties with this, including the quality of the audio in a dynamic and complex situation, it is, in my view, better to have a poor-quality recording that provides some insight than no recording at all.
6. LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

6.1 The London Fire Brigade (LFB) plays a vital role in responding to any major disaster in the capital, and a major terrorist attack, including an MTFA, would be no exception. While the response to an attack would be led by the MPS, the LFB can provide essential support and are integral to the process of preparation and resilience building prior to any event taking place. For example, the coordination function of the London Resilience Forum is currently managed from LFB headquarters.

6.2 In an attack, LFB commanders will co-locate with their MPS and London Ambulance Service (LAS) counterparts in the Special Operations Room (SOR), in order to work together to coordinate and support the delivery of the tactical response. Plans are in place to ensure that proper operational oversight and decision-making takes place while commanders make their way to the SOR.

6.3 Following the 7 July 2005 London Bombings, the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA) took the decision to improve the LFB’s casualty care provision by implementing a new system, the Immediate Emergency Care (IEC) programme. This aims to support the LAS in providing emergency care to those who have been injured in a terrorist, or other, incident. The IEC is designed by the LAS, who run the training syllabus and clinical practice programme, as well as providing clinical governance for the practice of casualty care by LFB crews.

6.4 As part of the IEC programme, all front-line pumping appliance, fire rescue units (FRU) and LFB fireboats are equipped with an IEC equipment pack which includes an Automated External Defibrillator and oxygen resuscitation system for providing medical oxygen to casualties. All the equipment is, crucially, interchangeable with that carried by the LAS which means both LFB and LAS personnel can interchange supplies if required.

6.5 In addition to this relatively basic IEC training, the LFB have recently been undertaking a co-responding pilot in Merton, Newham, Lambeth and Wandsworth. This pilot sees LFB and LAS resources co-responding to RED 1 calls: those where a patient’s condition is immediately life threatening as a result of cardiac or respiratory arrest. Despite some initial concerns about training and call management, this pilot is generally considered to have been a success, with over 700 incidents attended by the LFB, and is being extended in those boroughs. This scheme provides important resilience to the LAS, particularly in the event of an emergency, such as a terror attack, which might draw LAS resources to the scene, but where business as usual needs to continue as much as possible. It is important that agreement is rapidly reached for the current co-responding pilot to be expanded to all London boroughs as quickly as training resources allow. (Recommendation 47)

6.6 It is important in the light of co-responding, the other hazards that fire-fighters face and learning from terrorist attacks elsewhere, that the equipment and training provided to fire-fighters is continually assessed and refreshed to ensure that it is appropriate for the kinds of injuries which might be faced. It is encouraging that the LFB are currently discussing this issue with the LAS and will be seeking to procure further equipment, and provide further training at the earliest opportunity. There should be no delay in implementing the new training for LFB personnel, and there should be a strategic approach to this training to ensure that the training is rolled out to those officers most likely to find themselves on the scene of an attack, based on assessments by the police and others, before other officers are trained subsequently. (Recommendation 48)
6.7 With regard to MTFA capability specifically, there have been some moves to use fire and rescue service personnel to support the response, where LFB staff deploy into a warm zone (see Box 6) in order to save lives. These officers are given specialist training and equipment – including ballistic protection – to enable them to operate in these circumstances. Officers deployed in these operations will continue to be covered under existing pension and injury compensation arrangements, with additional insurance provision by the LFB of £500,000 to the employee’s estate should an employee die attending an MTFA incident. There is also a sliding scale of payments dependent on the type of injury incurred. It has been put to me that there can be delays in the payment of compensation. This should, wherever possible, be avoided.

6.8 Currently in London there are several parts to the LFB response. The command element is provided by the national inter-agency liaison officer cadre and the fire hazards management by the dedicated specialist entry recovery team, the only such team in the country. With regard to casualty management, where the fire and rescue service personnel support the response of the ambulance services, this provision is limited, and operates on a voluntary basis in advance of a formal agreement with Fire Brigades Union.

6.9 Given the significant value that LFB personnel could add in an MTFA situation, and the potential to save lives, it is important that agreement is reached as soon as possible between the fire service and the FBU to require all relevant fire officers to have the special training to enable them to crew Fire Rescue Units with the appropriate equipment so that they are able to respond to MTFAs. I would hope that this agreement could be reached by the end of this year. (Recommendation 49)

6.10 Assuming agreement can be reached, the cost of equipment and training will be considerable, and the Home Office should give consideration to supporting the costs associated with increased MTFA capability, or at least match-funding the provision with the LFB/Mayor. (Recommendation 50)

6.11 My impression is that the current resources that the LFB have at their disposal to deal with a major terrorist incident, and even exceptional fire demand, are sufficient. This, however, will be examined in detail by the independent review that the Mayor has commissioned from Anthony Mayer. That review should look at the number of FRUs and the possibility of an attendance standard for these specialist units. Reallocation of existing resources should be considered in order to provide this. (Recommendation 51)
7.1 As is noted earlier in this report, the London Ambulance Service (LAS) has been placed in special measures by the Care Quality Commission (CQC). This in no way should take away from the long-standing service they have given to London over many years and through some of the worst moments in our history, such as on 7 July 2005, when the action of ambulance staff self-evidently saved lives, as they do every day of the year. The health services in London are, by all measures, facing unprecedented demand and I am reassured that progress is being made within the LAS to address the concerns of the CQC, and I appreciate the evident passion and drive shown to improve the service for Londoners.

7.2 At the heart of many of the challenges facing the LAS is resources. The LAS is a commissioned service, with a commissioning lead through the North West London Clinical Commissioning Groups.

7.3 Although outside the remit of this review, I am not convinced that this is the best arrangement for funding such a strategic London-wide service. The Mayor may wish to raise both the level of funding and the funding arrangements with the relevant Ministers.

7.4 In particular, it would appear that the funding by government fails to recognise the extent of the demands placed on the LAS by London’s place as the nation’s capital and as a major global city, for example, the number of visitors to the city, and the level of protests that take place here. London’s unplanned events, including protests or demonstrations, then, are effectively an unfunded demand on the LAS. Whereas in policing the MPS is at least in part, albeit insufficiently, funded through the National and International Capital Cities Grant, there is no similar mechanism in place for the LAS. I would recommend that the Department of Health examines how extra resources can be provided to the LAS to reflect the additional demands placed on it as the provider of services to our capital city. (Recommendation 52)

7.5 The LAS has a strong operational relationship with the police, and the other emergency services. This has undoubtedly been helped by the fact that all the emergency services now use Airwave, and assisted by the work of JESIP, covered in more detail below, which has worked to further develop and enhance the level of interoperability between the emergency services. This has involved adopting the same methodology in dealing with disasters, and extensive joint training and exercising. The LAS were heavily involved in the Strong Tower and in Unified Response exercises (see Box 12).

7.6 It is also encouraging to note that there are already examples of joint working occurring on the ground, with joint response units well established in several boroughs, and co-response being developed.

7.7 It is evident that the leadership in the LAS has a good understanding of the current threat and has put in place measures to enable the Service to respond adequately to the threat should the worst happen. However, the likely nature and scale of a major terrorist incident has the potential to overwhelm the four NHS Trauma Centres for London and place additional demands on the other already-stretched facilities around the city. This would inevitably have an adverse effect on the ‘normal’ response to Londoners’ health needs.

7.8 The training given to front-line staff, from paramedics to call handlers, is thorough and covers responding to a terrorist atrocity on the scale feared. There are dedicated resources tactically located around London ready to deal with such an incident. These resources include staff who have been specifically trained to operate effectively in these conditions. Providing medical interventions of the highest standards, they have the equipment to operate in areas of danger, and have the logistical support to deal with mass casualties.
7.9 The Department of Health currently provides special additional funding through the commissioning agency for two Hazardous Area Response Teams (HARTs). However, in light of the new post-Paris planning assumptions concerning the scale of attacks that might occur in London, I do consider that the number of teams and logistical equipment available should be reviewed with an aim to increase the number of HARTs to four in London, with a similar increase in the logistical support vehicles – Mass Casualty Vehicles – that can bring equipment to the scenes of such incidents. I recommend that there should be four dedicated 24/7 Hazardous Area Response Teams in London and a similar number of Mass Casualty Vehicles. These should be strategically located around London. (Recommendation 53)

7.10 Funding for MTFA activity is provided to the LAS by NHS England (London) on a non-recurrent basis. This means that no funding is currently in place for 2017/18, with an urgent need for the clinical commissioning groups and NHS England (London) to reach an agreement. Agreement on future MTFA funding for the LAS should be reached quickly, with the NHS adequately funding LAS’ requirements. (Recommendation 54)

7.11 One area also worthy of note is the response available to deal with Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) attacks. While these have become less of a focus in recent years, it is important that the facility to deal with such attacks is maintained. Currently the LAS have both CBRN trained staff and packages of training for other front-line staff which focus on providing advice about removing clothing and wiping down affected people. These measures can reduce the need for dedicated CBRN officers.

7.12 I remain concerned, though, that decisions have been taken to reduce the number of CBRN trained personnel. Clearly, these were taken in light of a review of intelligence and, although justifiable on that level, one must not lose sight of what the terrorists seek to achieve: mass casualties and civil panic. Given the power of CBRN weapons to achieve these aims, I see it as only prudent to prepare for their use.

7.13 I recommend that the number of CBRN-trained LAS staff should be reviewed with a view that it should return to the higher levels previously seen in London over the past few years. (Recommendation 55) The Home Office should also review the provision of CBRN-equipped response vehicles operated by the London Fire Brigade to ensure their numbers are sufficient. (Recommendation 56)

7.14 Linked to this, I recommend that personal radiation monitors, which should be available to fire, ambulance and police personnel, should routinely be used. (Recommendation 57) This is a sensible precaution to ensure that those going in to rescue people are not exposed to an unnecessarily high risk.

7.15 The speed of any response to a major attack is at least in part led by the manner in which the information coming into the organisation is received and assessed. Call handlers and their front-line managers play a pivotal role in this. The LAS deals with a high volume of calls and also has the capability to stay on the line with callers to assist them in providing first aid to those ill or injured. This is commendable and at normal times appropriate. The risk is that during a marauding attack call centres could become overwhelmed and working practices would need to change rapidly to meet the challenges of high demand.

7.16 The LAS has a national buddy site agreed with neighbouring Trusts which would assist. The service has trained a cohort of support services staff to take calls and the control room would curtail the numerous functions within the Emergency Operations Centre to focus people resources to the two core functions of call handling and dispatch.

7.17 A Special Incident Team is also deployable at short notice and trained managers will get to the scene of an incident quickly. A senior manager who has been suitably trained will authorise appropriately trained and equipped ambulance staff to enter the warm zone, operating behind armed police officers. To facilitate this, good communications are essential, and the comments in Box 9 about the Emergency Services Network are important for the LAS as well. In order to test the readiness of the Ambulance Service, it is of the highest importance that the challenges of a multi-site attack are regularly practiced and tested. I recommend that a full testing and exercise programme should be developed to test the readiness of the LAS Control Room, including with no-notice exercises. (Recommendation 58)
7.18 The chiefs of the three emergency services meet on a regular basis to discuss joint working and I am aware that relationships between the individuals and services are good. I welcome this and I would encourage these tri-service meetings to continue, with perhaps a greater focus on dealing with the attacks considered in this review, as well as the important matter of on-going collaboration. (Recommendation 59) It will be up to the Mayor to decide what role he wishes to play in this work, but I consider that his enthusiasm and active involvement can only be beneficial to them and the collaborative effort.

7.19 There are four major trauma centres in London which would deal with the most seriously injured patients, while others would be sent to other hospitals, which all have good alerting systems to ensure they are prepared and there are adequate numbers of staff available. There is also an ability, because of national structures, to move patients to other parts of the country if necessary. In the event of unusual or unexpected injuries there is provision to get advice from specialists from around the country.

7.20 The whole process is managed by the London Health Incident Command Team who have exercised the processes and would feed directly into the Strategic Coordinating Group who oversee the full operation. This ensures that Health are at the table when vital decisions are made, as well as in the planning stages ahead of any attack.

7.21 I have been assured by the Department of Health and NHS England that the wider health service in London has undertaken thorough pre-planning for how they would manage the number of seriously injured casualties who would be likely following an MTFA. This work is in line with the national guidance which the Department of Health and NHS England has produced on emergency response. However, others close to the process have suggested to me that for the worst incidents currently envisaged, the four trauma centres would be overwhelmed and other hospitals in London, already fully-stretched, would be hard-pressed to cope. I recommend that this is reviewed further in the light of the latest planning assumptions and, in any event, it would be helpful if this could be exercised thoroughly to ensure that the assumptions used are sufficiently robust. (Recommendation 60)

7.22 Given that health services in other parts of the world have had to deal with the aftermath of attacks, and dealt with significant levels of injuries of the type seen in MTFAs, there would be value in NHS England working closely with those countries’ health agencies – for example France and Belgium – to ensure that lessons are learnt from their response and best practice can be shared. (Recommendation 61)

7.23 Although not strictly within the remit of this review, I have noted through a number of discussions, that there is concern about community mental health provision in London. We know from other attacks around Europe and elsewhere that volatile individuals with complex mental health needs can be vulnerable to radicalisation. At the moment, community mental health services in London are stretched, with an insufficient ability to effectively manage existing caseloads. This needs to be urgently addressed for a range of health reasons beyond the need to tackle radicalisation but, it has been put to me, there is a specific need to bolster community mental health services in London to support vulnerable people who might be at risk of radicalisation. (Recommendation 62)

7.24 On a connected issue, and again slightly outside this review’s remit, there is currently a gap in the safeguarding work that takes place in local partnerships which means that the new statutory Prevent duty11 does not extend to General Practitioners. This is a surprising gap in that GPs might be expected to be the health professionals who know their patients best. The Home Office should work with the Department of Health to ensure that this gap is filled. (Recommendation 63)

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11 The Prevent duty is the duty in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 on specified authorities, in the exercise of their functions, to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.
8. TRANSPORT

8.1 As was seen during the London Bombings on 7 July 2005 and the failed attack two weeks later, London’s transport system has been an attractive target to would-be attackers. Since these attacks, though, a significant amount of work has been done to improve security and safety on the underground and other parts of London’s transport network.

8.2 London’s transport system is vast. Nearly five million journeys take place every single day on the Underground alone, with more than 500 people per minute entering the busiest stations at the busiest times of day. This presents a huge challenge to the police and TfL in terms of keeping people safe and secure, even before consideration is given to a major terrorist attack.

8.3 I am confident, having reviewed both the TfL and BTP (see Chapter 5 above) approach to preparing for a terrorist attack that good plans are in place to protect locations from attack, identify would-be attackers and respond in the event the worst happens.

8.4 TfL have good incident command and oversight structures, with an impressive control room integrating and co-locating their senior management, BTP, the MPS, Network Rail and others to ensure there is a joined-up and effective response. They, like the BTP and MPS, follow the JESIP principles and procedures and are trained to the same standard of response management as the emergency services. This means that relationships are good and, in responding to day-to-day events, they have good opportunities to enhance and foster those relationships and ways of working.

8.5 They already have good coverage of the network with CCTV, but are enhancing this by connecting more cameras to the relevant control centres, which will give operational commanders excellent situational awareness which can be passed to those on the ground, including through the use of innovative technology such as that discussed in Chapter 5. It is important that CCTV is also available on all underground and mainline trains, and options for ensuring a suitable system, enabling operational commanders to have access in the event of an emergency, should be explored. (Recommendation 64)

8.6 All of TfL’s London Underground activity, including the prevention of, and response to, a major terrorist attack, is also closely regulated by the Department for Transport (DfT), which means that there is external oversight and scrutiny to ensure that training, management and physical infrastructure is up to the national standard. These standards are regularly reviewed and are linked to the JTAC risk assessment. The DfT also have a role in ensuring lessons are learnt from attacks elsewhere.

8.7 Across the transport network there are a series of key decision makers as people make their way around the system. They include underground, train and bus drivers; gate-line and station staff. In the event of an attack, it is essential that all of these people know what to do and, crucially, what information to give to passengers who will look to them to help. All staff are trained in the general response to emergencies, and a programme is now underway of full training to ensure staff know what to do in an MTFA.

8.8 One of the most important decisions that operational commanders, particularly of the Underground, will face is whether, and to what extent, to keep the network operating. It is my view, having listened to the advice of experts, that in every situation as much of the network should be kept running as possible. (Recommendation 65) While there are clearly risks of further attacks, as seen in Brussels, it is generally better for people to be able to move around the city to travel home or get to work, unless there is a very specific threat. This is particularly important given that many parts of London are served only by a single service, for example, where the District Line runs to Wimbledon, Putney and other parts of South West London, or those areas served by the Docklands Light Railway.

8.9 Further to this, TfL and the BTP should provide advice to passengers – based on discussions and decisions taken by the Strategic Coordination Group – that goes beyond the provision of information. (Recommendation 66) Rather than just telling people what has happened, clear advice on the best course of action for the public to take should be given. This could include advice to travel on, or avoid, certain elements of the network, or even potentially to avoid the entire network. It has to be acknowledged that sometimes this advice may turn out to be wrong as the incident develops. However, in almost all circumstances it is better that some advice is given rather than no advice at all.
8.10 TfL also have responsibility for surface transport. Again, I am confident that there are good processes in place to deal with attacks that might damage our road transportation, and that TfL will, where possible, keep the city running.

8.11 TfL have a wider regulatory role and this should be used to improve the resilience of the capital. For example, TfL should work with taxi and private hire companies – including Uber – to ensure that drivers have a good level of awareness about how to prevent a terrorist attack through a clear understanding of what constitutes suspicious behaviour (Recommendation 67), including what warning signs to look for amongst those who might use their vehicles. Critical to this, as discussed in Chapters 9, 11 and 12 below, will be the provision of accurate information about threats and what the warning signs might be.

8.12 TfL should also work with the MPS to ensure that there are sufficient processes in place to prevent the use of taxis or licensed minicabs by would-be terrorists. (Recommendation 68) Given that these vehicles are often given slightly more latitude than other drivers about where they go and where they stop, for example around airports, it is important to ensure that all measures necessary are in place to provide protection.

8.13 Network Rail also has an important role to play, as they maintain and run the rail infrastructure over which the train operating companies operate. In London, they also run and manage 15 of the busiest stations, with other stations owned by them but run by train operating companies.

8.14 It is clear from discussions with them that, as with TfL, safety is a key focus, not only with regard to running the network, but also in terms of being prepared for a terrorist attack. As such, they have a strong relationship with BTP, in particular to ensure that they plan for, and have the appropriate response to, a terrorist attack. All staff receive briefings on a regular basis and exercise, for example, to clear stations when appropriate. This extends not just to the training their staff receive, but to agency staff who work at the stations.

8.15 Network Rail values the openness and candour of its relationship with BTP, and I have been impressed by the level of thinking that had gone into dealing with a terrorist threat. In particular, a good deal of thought has gone into considering how to make a judgement about whether the network should remain open, or when a total shut down would be best. As with the Underground network, it is important to note that any decision to shut the network down will leave large numbers of people stranded, who will need careful management in order to ensure that they are not made more susceptible to a further attack. Further, a decision to shut the network makes the decision to reopen much more challenging. Exercises are regularly organised to test the staff and system’s preparedness.

8.16 TfL and Network Rail actively support and participate in Projects Griffin and Argus and they work with Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers to build security into all new sites and those subject to development. Their control room is fully integrated with the Underground system and BTP, so ensuring good communication and coordination is the norm. There are also plans in place for communicating with the public at times of difficulty. The DfT is active in overseeing the running of the Rail and Underground network and has a strong focus on ensuring the network is safe and secure. Clearly, I would urge this work to continue.
9. LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN LONDON

9.1 Once an incident is over, and the immediate emergency response has ended, there is an essential period of recovery which, although less immediate, is essential in order for people, and the city, to return to normality. The aim of terrorists is to fundamentally undermine the way we live and the structure of our society. Only by effectively recovering from an attack can we fulfil our often-stated aim to ‘not let the terrorists win’. Critical to this recovery phase is the role of local authorities across London.

9.2 The range of issues that local authorities might be faced with is huge. If their borough is the site of an attack, then there will be a significant physical impact leading to closures of streets, major clean-up activity and the closure or evacuation of buildings. This, in turn, may create a demand for temporary housing, which will need to be met through emergency accommodation, bedding, clothing and food. Even local authorities not directly affected by an attack may have some of these issues to contend with if a specific threat to particular premises emerges, necessitating evacuation or lock-down procedures.

9.3 Given the nature of London, even those boroughs with no direct activity of the type mentioned above will be faced with residents who might have been directly affected by an attack, or will see other knock-on impacts. There will be an acute need for social and humanitarian assistance, potentially on a large scale. In addition to these requirements, there will be unforeseen demand which will need to be met, and the procedures and processes local authorities have in place need to be robust, flexible and quick, in order that people are looked after and protected. There needs to be a clear recognition that this recovery phase itself goes through a number of stages as the post-event experience goes from hours to days and into weeks.

9.4 There is currently a significant amount of guidance that exists for local authorities to follow in order that they can meet their obligations under the Civil Contingencies Act, and their wider responsibilities to the communities they serve and represent. This central government guidance, led by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) working with the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives, is also supplemented by London-specific work.

9.5 Across the 32 boroughs and the City of London, a great deal of work has been done to make sure that each area can respond to emergencies they might face, and that coordination and assistance across the capital is effective. The most significant of this activity is the London Local Authority Gold Resolution, which ensures that there is always a Chief Executive on-call as a senior decision maker – on behalf of other local authorities, where necessary – and that there is a general principle of collective and coordinated response. Many local authorities I spoke to, or provided representations to this review, expressed their confidence in these arrangements, which are regularly tested and regularly used.

9.6 This Resolution was established in 2004 and refreshed in 2010, and deals with the whole range of emergencies that authorities might face. Local authorities should ensure that it is kept continually up to date, and is able to anticipate the kind of demand they will face as terrorist tactics evolve. MTFA and other major terrorist attacks should be explicitly covered in the annual training given.

9.7 In addition to these arrangements, I was encouraged to learn about the memorandum of understanding covering mutual aid. In any major attack, particularly if it affects a borough that historically might not have considered themselves a potential target, it is unlikely that any one borough will be able to respond by themselves.

9.8 There is, though, a clear challenge for local authorities in meeting the requirements and challenges that they face in this area because of the significant reduction in budgets that they have faced since 2010. While this review is not, and cannot be, a full audit of provision across the 33 authorities in London, it is apparent to me that there is a mixed picture of provision. While some local authorities have full teams of specialist resilience officers, there are others who are taking a de minimis approach. While Minimum Standards for London are meant to ensure that what is provided is at least adequate, the Standards themselves are monitored through self-assessment and peer review. It has been put to me that, in some parts of London, the resource is so denuded as to be unfit to respond to a major disaster of this type.
As there is no realistic prospect of central government increasing funding for local authorities, or of a significant re-prioritisation in boroughs that would move resources from existing expenditure into resilience and emergency planning and response, there is a need for other arrangements to be made to ensure a consistent approach. One option would be that DCLG should ring-fence budgets for local resilience teams and introduce a small inspectorate, sitting either within the Cabinet Office or DCLG, to monitor performance. If central government will not introduce such a review mechanism, the London Resilience Forum should consider its role here. (Recommendation 69)

Two local authorities have introduced a shared civil protection service, and it has been put to me that moving to sub-regional resilience groups might be a way to ensure that a good range of expertise can be developed, with a service that is able to function as more than the sum of its parts. This would enable those boroughs with good facilities and plans in place to share the best practice with those who have challenges, and improve cover across the capital.

While there is an attraction for this type of approach, particularly given the budgetary pressures, it would be a mistake to lose the vital community links and knowledge which are essential to delivering an effective recovery operation and support to residents, businesses and others. It is, then, my view that local authorities should work with the London Resilience Forum to consider where effective partnerships might be built at a sub-regional, but supra-borough, level, ensuring that local knowledge and connections can be retained. (Recommendation 70) It may be that these are most effective as loose and informal arrangements in some areas, while others might benefit from more formal arrangements.

One benefit of good local arrangements is the ability to share information effectively between agencies, particularly from the police to local partners. The need for more information sharing with business is covered in Chapter 11 below; however, it is worth mentioning here in relation to local authorities. For effective planning, local authorities need as much information as the police and security agencies are able to provide safely, but currently the approach from the police is too cautious and restrictive. The police and security agencies should ensure that timely and detailed information about the threat – including changes in police and terrorist tactics – is provided to their local authority partners to enable effective resilience planning to take place. (Recommendation 71)

In turn, local authorities need to communicate effectively with their communities. I note that some councils are considering introducing alert systems for key partners, using technology such as WhatsApp. Any attempts, such as these, to improve the flow of information are to be encouraged, and should be supported.

Finally, and only tangentially linked to this review, the issue of local authority disinvestment in CCTV has been raised with me as a concern. CCTV plays an important role in the prevention and detection of crime, including terrorism, and is supported by communities. It is worrying that some local authorities are making decisions which would reduce CCTV coverage, or its effectiveness. I understand that the MPS and MOPAC are working with local authorities to resolve these issues, but local authorities should be prioritising this type of activity, as it is essential that an effective functioning CCTV network is available for the detection and prevention of terrorist (or indeed other criminal) activity across the capital in the interests of public safety. The level and functionality of CCTV provision should be kept under review by the Mayor’s Office. (Recommendation 72)
10. THE RIVER THAMES

10.1 In addition to the underground, rail and road network in London, a major transport artery runs right through the city, used by business, tourists and citizens every day: the River Thames.

10.2 The River, as well as supporting business and tourism, is subject to significant development along its banks as new apartments, retail and business premises are built in support of the modern desire to live and work along the water. These new developments will sit alongside some of the capital’s most significant landmarks, such as the Palace of Westminster, the London Eye and Tower Bridge, along with potential targets such as the MI6 building and the new US Embassy currently being constructed.

10.3 The coincidence of heavily populated areas with major landmarks can, as shown above, become a draw to terrorists. The water can also provide a means of transport to would-be attackers; this is exactly what happened in the Mumbai attacks in 2008, when 10 attackers used inflatable speedboats to access their targets.

10.4 So it is clear that good security in London depends on good security on the River. Between them, then, the Port of London Authority and the MPS Marine Policing Unit have a significant responsibility, and they need adequate resources and the right powers to do this work.

10.5 The Metropolitan Police Marine Policing Unit (MPU), the unit that polices the River, has a history which can be traced back to before the MPS was formed. The River, its use and economic significance to London have changed beyond recognition in that time. However, the geography of the River and its connectivity to London remains the same, and for many the Thames is the heart of the city. Consequently, although the work of the police on the River has changed from keeping a major trading port secure to keeping today’s leisure and transport route safe, its importance should not be overlooked.

10.6 The MPU ensures that the River has some coverage at all times. This cover can use special boats to facilitate the rapid deployment of firearms officers to a location on or by the River where they are needed.

10.7 All members of the MPU are well trained in boat skills, have solid knowledge of the River and engage effectively with the community who live and work on the Thames, including other agencies such as the Royal National Lifeboat Institution and Port of London Authority. Liaison with officers who work in boroughs adjacent to the River is also good. Officers on the Unit fulfil various other functions including dive and underwater search.

10.8 The challenge of policing a river from Teddington Lock down to Dartford, though, is significant. The sheer distance and time to get from A to B will always inhibit some of the MPU’s work. Although the coverage on the River is always maintained, the demands of the Unit’s other work, and training commitments, means that this must always be a challenging task, and that does not take account of the normal policing demands that are placed on them. Sadly the recovery of bodies from the River is a necessary task and, dealing with crimes and anti-social behaviour on the River has to be attended to. Intelligence from the Border Force about the potential illegal entry of people along the River requires follow-up action.

10.9 The River itself is a largely unregulated place. While there are rules, these mainly apply to navigation, and the public are generally free to travel on the River. In many ways, this freedom is to be celebrated, and should be preserved, however, during the Olympics a different model operated. Given that the security threat is now higher than at that time in 2012, I consider that there is a strong argument in favour of putting in place a stricter regime that ensures the River is a safer and more secure place and this should be considered. (Recommendation 73) This could include a system of registration for boats using the River in central London, with accompanying powers to enable the police to enforce them. The registration system would be about knowing who owns and who operates boats on the River and would be no more onerous than the systems that currently operate for anyone who wishes to use a car on the roads.
10.10 The other key agency that operates on the Thames is the Port of London Authority. They provide a valuable service to the River and all users of it, but their principal responsibility is one over the proper navigation of the River, rather than having any powers that could be used effectively in making the River more secure and less susceptible to exploitation by those who might wish to attack us. The Authority operate a number of boats along the river and do have powers, as the harbour master, to stop boats. They are also the prosecuting authority for the River but this appears to be used only on a limited number of occasions.

10.11 I recommend that consideration should be given to widening the remit of the Authority to give them a formal interest in the security of the River. (Recommendation 74) By this I do not mean that they should take on the policing. Rather, in their oversight of the River, navigation and how the River is used in addition to considering safety of the River and users they should have a duty to consider the security of the River. This would undoubtedly draw them into a much wider remit, but they are in the best position of any agency to take on this work. Their knowledge of the River and its users is second to none and to separate security from navigational oversight would appear to be perverse.

10.12 While preparing this Report I have been pleased to note that with the introduction of Operation Hercules, the MPS has been eager to exercise and demonstrate its ability to rapidly deploy firearms officers on to the Thames. This is an important area and should not be overlooked.

10.13 In their report ‘Police Encounters with the Public: Vehicle Stops’, the London Policing Ethics Panel (LPEP) briefly explored the issue of MPS powers to stop boats on the River12 – a power that they do not currently have, but that rests with the Port of London Authority. During the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, this power was temporarily transferred to the MPS and, it was put to LPEP, this should be a permanent arrangement. While the police do have powers under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act, there may be times where more general stop and search powers on the River are more appropriate.

10.14 It is, then, encouraging that the Policing and Crime Bill currently going through Parliament addresses this issue. Clause 86 of the Bill introduces a new power to stop, board, divert and detain a ship. I trust that this satisfactorily addresses the concerns that have been raised, and that it is implemented as quickly as possible on the Thames.

10.15 In general, though, there is always more that could be done to improve security on the River, notwithstanding the considerable efforts that the MPS and Port of London Authority currently make. It has been 27 years since the Marchioness Disaster, and 15 years since the report of a public inquiry into the disaster was published. Since then there has been no comprehensive review of safety and security on the River, despite a recent increase in use of the River, and TfL’s stated aim to see 12 million passenger journeys on the river by 2020.13 As such, there should be a comprehensive review of safety and security on the River, commissioned by the Mayor, to report by May 2017. (Recommendation 75)

10.16 The new review should be carried out by the Mayor, in conjunction with the Department for Transport and other government departments. It should look, in particular, at the safety of party boats on the River and the requirements that the Maritime and Coastguard Agency place on these pleasure and party boats operating on the Thames.

10.17 In addition, the London Resilience Forum should establish a sub-group of partners to consider resilience on the Thames. (Recommendation 76) This should be made up of a range of existing members who have an interest in the river such as TfL, the MPS, the Port of London Authority and riparian councils.
11. LONDON’S BUSINESSES

11.1 London is home to around half a million businesses, all of whom have a strong interest in ensuring London is a safe and secure place to invest, trade and employ people. In the event of an attack, they have an important role to play in keeping their staff safe, supporting the resilience of the city and communicating to others.

11.2 As discussed in Chapter 3, above, businesses can themselves be the targets of attacks, or the settings of an MTFA. Shopping centres, music venues, cafés and restaurants have all been targeted in attacks overseas in recent years. It is important that, should the worst happen, these businesses and their employees know what to do to make themselves, and their customers, safe. Chapter 15, below, covers in more detail the type of preparedness measures that businesses should consider.

11.3 In my discussion with businesses, though, it is clear that there is a concern about the amount of information that is passed to them about the level and nature of the threat we face, particularly when evidence emerges about changes in tactics used by terrorists elsewhere. While generic messages are given out by the police and other security services asking people to report anything suspicious, with some specific advice given about, for example, noticing changes in behaviour or those purchasing large amounts of chemicals, there is a case for providing more.

11.4 One of the most important aspects of preventing an attack is making that attack harder for a terrorist to carry out. If businesses, and the public, had a clearer sense of the tactics a terrorist might use, then it follows that there is more chance of thwarting an attack. While it is obviously the case that some information cannot be released, currently the culture in the UK errs too much on the side of restricting information. This builds on the recommendations relating to local authorities in Chapter 9, above.

11.5 As an example of the type of information that businesses, and others, might find useful, following the Brussels attack in March 2016, the Department for Homeland Security in the United States provided guidance on the warning signs to look out for to identify those who might be attempting to make homemade explosives using a compound known as TATP. This advice went much further than the type of information that is routinely given in the UK.

11.6 Intelligence sharing is extremely effective with airlines, where it is vital to provide information about new methods of attack, and can be done well without providing classified information or undermining covert counter-terrorism work. A similar approach should be taken by the security agencies to business in general.

11.7 The MPS and National Coordinator for Protect and Prepare (NCPP) do currently send out messages, particularly after attacks elsewhere, through the Cross-Sector Safety Security and Communications (CSSC) business messaging system to representatives from 33 industry sectors. The messages are then cascaded by those representatives to individual businesses. These representatives include large companies and representative bodies such as the Federation for Small Businesses. There is also a facility where those representatives are able to join a conference call in order to receive a verbal briefing from a senior MPS and/or NCPP officer.

11.8 However, I have reviewed some of the messages sent out through the CSSC system and they were of such a level of generality as to be of limited value to the recipients. There is an urgent need to ensure that the system meets the needs of those it is supposed to serve.

11.9 This desire for better, and more timely, information must be urgently met. The police and security agencies should consider producing a regular newsletter – perhaps once a fortnight – put together with business in order to ensure that it meets their needs, which can provide up to date, and specific, guidance. This can then be distributed to heads of security in businesses, business groups and placed online for others. (Recommendation 77) London First have proposed that a small unit be established, funded by business but extensively supported and briefed by the police and security agencies, that could take responsibility for the production of such advice and information. I recommend that the Mayor convenes a small group to take this forward. (Recommendation 78)
In the event of an attack, it will be important to get people to safety, and keep them safe for the duration. Given that previous attacks have involved multiple locations and have lasted for prolonged periods of time, having places of safety is particularly important.

Many premises in London have trained security guards, regulated by the Security Industry Authority (SIA), and there are around 100,000 SIA-licensed security operatives in London – roughly three times the total number of police officers. In the event of an attack, depending on its location, security guards may be the first on the scene and, as uniformed members of staff, the public may look to them for advice and protection. At the very least, then, security staff need to be adequately trained in how to respond in the event of an MTFA or other terrorist attack.

There is though, in my view, an opportunity to make much more use of these people in the event of a terrorist attack. This is also the view of both the SIA and the National Counter Terrorism Police HQ, who have explored options. This work needs to progress further, with a range of important components in place to deliver a successful response. It is, then, important that:

Communication is improved with security operatives, via the SIA. This includes both communications of the threat in advance, and effective communication during an attack. This should include single points of contact in the key organisations. (Recommendation 79)

Effective training is given to SIA-licensed security operatives that goes beyond the Griffin and Argus training already conducted. There should be a tailored package available to all SIA-licensed personnel. (Recommendation 80)

As the menu of tactical options for responding to an MTFA or other terrorist attack are developed, there should be specific consideration given to the role that SIA-licensed operatives can play. (Recommendation 81)

In addition to SIA-licensed security guards, many businesses employ in-house security personnel who are not licensed by the SIA. Where possible, the same support should be given to in-house security, assuming assurances can be gained about their security credentials. (Recommendation 82)

Similarly, a package of support, to extract the most value in the event of an attack, should exist for those security personnel working in sports stadia and airports (Recommendation 83), who are governed by separate regulations. While these regulations cover a range of possible emergency situations, some of the guidance published by NaCTSO is somewhat out of date. NaCTSO should review the published guidance given to crowded places, including stadia, to ensure it is up to date with relevant police and potential terrorist tactics. (Recommendation 84)

Finally, it is important that the voice of business is heard strongly in preparations for responding to a terrorist attack. For this reason, the London Resilience Forum business group, which currently exists, should be renewed with a broader spectrum of businesses and business groups added to it to ensure a genuine cross-section of London’s business community. The Metropolitan Police should ensure that a senior officer acts as the point of contact with this group and takes responsibility for ensuring that the issues that arise from their discussions are properly pursued. (Recommendation 85)
12. FAITH AND COMMUNITY GROUPS

12.1 As mentioned in Chapter 3 above, London is one of the most diverse cities in the world, with people living and working here representing nearly every faith, community and culture on the planet. In the event of an attack, there is a huge opportunity to bring groups together in defiance of those seeking to disrupt our way of life, but at the same time there are those who would seek to exploit our diversity and turn communities against each other.

12.2 Having spoken to a range of London’s communities, and drawing on my experience of working in London government for many years, I am reassured that those community and faith groups likely to be most affected by a terrorist attack have, by and large, a good understanding of the risks they face and the type of action needed to mitigate against them. This preparedness to deal with the aftermath of an attack is extremely important.

12.3 There is, though, more work that can be done to improve the resilience of faith and community groups during an attack, and following an incident. The MPS should work with faith and community leaders to ensure that the current Argus and Griffin (see Chapter 15) training packages are appropriately tailored to their needs, and ensure that adequate training is given. (Recommendation 86) This should include providing a good and up to date intelligence picture, including the kinds of warning signs groups should look out for, of the kind discussed for businesses in Chapter 11.

12.4 In order to make sure that proper training takes place, each faith organisation in London should ensure that a member of their management structure takes an interest in security, including how to respond after an attack takes place. There is an opportunity to learn much from organisations such as the Community Security Trust, and the MPS should consider their example when developing packages of support for faith and community groups.

12.5 Any terrorist attack in London, regardless of the target or perpetrators, is an attack on all London and all Londoners. In the event of an attack, this message needs to be communicated clearly and quickly, along with the message that supposed reprisals will not be tolerated by the police or society at large.

12.6 The MPS are in the process of developing a group of Muslim community and faith leaders – the Muslim Communities Forum – to provide a line of communication between the police and London’s diverse Muslim population. This group can also come together to send a clear message to Londoners on counter-terrorism issues. The Mayor should build on the creation of this group and create a separate pan-London, multi-faith, reference group who can provide advice, guidance and, most importantly, a unified voice to London in the event of a terrorist attack of whatever kind. (Recommendation 87)

12.7 In addition to this pan-London group, it is important that there are good networks at a borough level to allow borough commanders and others to get important messages swiftly out to their communities, even in boroughs not directly affected by an incident. Currently communication of this type is coordinated by borough commanders and sent out via Key Individual Networks (KINs). In addition to the KIN, boroughs have Independent Advisory Groups (IAGs) who provide a critical friend function to the police on a range of issues.

12.8 At a borough level, the MPS need to ensure that the right people are part of their formal and informal engagement structures. Each borough leadership team should know who the key partners are to both send messages to, and also to engage with, to ensure the correct work is being done, for example in relation to community tension. This must also include the provision of more timely and detailed information, including as a situation emerges. This might involve putting some members on standby when little information is known, but more is expected.

12.9 The police and local authority chief executive and leader should annually review the membership of these engagement groups to ensure that they comprise the right members, and that they are regularly refreshed. (Recommendation 88)

12.10 In addition to faith and community groups, London has access to a range of charitable and voluntary organisations that would have a role – including a formal responsibility – in the aftermath of an attack. For example, the British Red Cross, who have 25,000 volunteers across the UK – albeit a lower proportion in London than elsewhere – have sophisticated arrangements with London’s emergency services to support in the event of an attack and provide a useful example of the type of work the voluntary sector can do well.

12.11 Similarly, St John Ambulance have hundreds of first aiders, medical professionals and ambulance crew at their disposal in London, with extensive stocks of response equipment at ready standby.

12.12 In the event of a major emergency, the British Red Cross and St John Ambulance can provide ambulances, with volunteer staff, capable of back-filling the standard LAS service to allow LAS crew to respond to a disaster. This means that business as usual can continue as much as possible and that the general emergency response is not totally denuded. They can also manage, or help, stock survivor centres; provide family and friend support and, working with The Salvation Army, provide food and clothing to those in need.
12.13 In addition, the British Red Cross have an agreement with the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) to provide a support line for those affected. This supplements the service provided by any Casualty Bureau run by the police and coordinated by the NPCC. The Casualty Bureau can concentrate on its work of reuniting loved ones and passing on information about casualties, while the British Red Cross provides the necessary emotional support. It is important that these two services are effectively linked and work well together.

12.14 Despite this impressive offer from the British Red Cross, St John Ambulance and others, there is more that the London Resilience Forum can do to ensure that the role of the voluntary sector is maximised. Key members of the LRF, including the police, fire and ambulance services, along with the Mayor’s office should work together with London’s voluntary sector to ensure they are being used effectively and that the lines of communication are sufficient in the event of an attack or other emergency. When the response to an MTFA and other terror attacks is exercised, the role of the voluntary sector should be properly rehearsed. (Recommendation 89)

12.15 Victim Support, another largely voluntary organisation, also told this review their work has demonstrated that it is vital that victims and witnesses have access to immediate and free psychological assistance that continues for as long as they need it. As a result, I recommend that in the event of a significant terrorist attack all those who are registered as victims or survivors have access to a dedicated source of information and advice. (Recommendation 90) This should be established within a week of the incident and the necessary psychological services should be resourced adequately so that they can be made available under the NHS in a timely and effective manner. Victim support organisations should be involved in the design of these arrangements.

12.16 In the event of a major incident, it is often the first instinct of many to offer practical help. Box 10 (r) sets out the recommended process for a charitable response after a major terrorist attack, learning the lessons from the 7/7 London bombings.

12.17 But, as was seen after the 2011 London riots, many people wanted to offer practical help. The London Resilience Forum should define, for all situations of civic emergency, which organisations are responsible for marshalling and directing volunteers, or dealing with those who might have the best intentions, but whose energy and time could be better directed elsewhere. (Recommendation 92)

12.18 This work should be done in conjunction with the British Red Cross who are working with the Cabinet Office on the management of spontaneous volunteers. They are currently trialling a new approach to the management of these people, for example by identifying those who might be interested in volunteering in advance. This work, and the forthcoming Cabinet Office guidance, will be useful in determining the correct approach in London.

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When an attack of the type considered by this review takes place, it is the natural response of many to want to help. Civil society has a vital role to play in supporting those affected once the incident has faded in the minds of the public at large. The impacts of attacks can be physical or psychological, and can be long-lasting for many of the affected and the bereaved. While our public services have an important role to play in the ongoing support of those affected, there is also a vital role for charity.

Getting this right is important to ensure the response is quick and effective. A good model exists in the response to the 7/7 attacks in London, with the creation of the London Bombings Relief Charitable Fund (LBRCF).

The LBRCF was established within days of the bombings in 2005, as an independent body, but working as a partnership between the Mayor, the British Red Cross and the GLA. In the year it actively operated, it made payments of almost £12 million to more than 325 people who had been injured, bereaved or otherwise significantly affected by the attack.

A recent report highlighted some of reasons why the LBRCF was so successful: quick establishment; independence, but with support, from the mayoralty; recruitment of experienced grant-makers; and a clear purpose and focus.

Of course, in the 11 years since the London bombings much has changed, not least with the rise of social media and a dramatic expansion in the ways and means of both establishing funds and contributing to them. In the event of another significant emergency, a fund will need to be ready to make a difference almost immediately, with significant buy-in from the Mayor, the GLA, the media and wider society.

Fortunately, in future we will not have to wait for an emergency to take place for the wheels to start moving. Using their experience of LBRCF, some of those involved have established the London Emergencies Trust which can exist in shadow form until it is needed. In the event of an incident that the Mayor determines is of sufficient severity, this Trust should be immediately stood up to become the official, but independent, vehicle to provide charitable support for those affected. (Recommendation 91)

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**BOX 10 – CHARITABLE RESPONSE**
13. COLLABORATION ARRANGEMENTS

13.1 None of the processes or procedures that have been covered by this review happen by accident. Rather, they are the product of a huge amount of preparation and effort by all the agencies involved in responding to a major terrorist attack. There are a number of important forums and structures that all work effectively in the preparation of the response to a major attack, these are outlined in Box 11 below.

JESIP
The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme is primarily about improving the way the Police, Fire & Rescue and Ambulance services work together when responding to major multi-agency incidents. JESIP’s interoperability framework sets out a standard approach to multi-agency working, along with training and awareness products for organisations to train their staff. JESIP focuses on all services integrating the JESIP ways of working and models into all policies and procedures.

London Resilience Forum/Partnership
The London Resilience Forum/Partnership provides those involved in emergency preparation and response (as defined by the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act) with the means to collaborate in planning and preparing for emergencies. The forum is accountable for ensuring London’s preparedness in the event of emergencies (where London is defined as the Metropolitan Police and City of London Police Service boundaries). It is responsible for coordinating a range of agencies to achieve this objective. More than 170 organisations are members of the Partnership. To make sure the views of all organisations can be represented at the London Resilience Forum, organisations are grouped into sector panels which report into the main forum.

LESLP
The London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) was formed in 1973 and consists of representatives from the Metropolitan Police Service, City of London Police, British Transport Police, the London Fire Brigade, the London Ambulance Service, and local authorities. The Port of London Authority (PLA), Marine Coastguard, RAF, Military and voluntary sector are also represented. The ‘Major Incident Procedure Manual’ produced by LESLP provides summaries of the responses and responsibilities of each of the emergency services at a major incident in London, as well as an outline of the support role offered by local authorities.

Strategic Coordination Group (SCG)
The strategic representatives of the full London Resilience Partnership, formed, where the size and nature of an event is far greater than a conventional major or disruptive incident.

Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC)
A specially equipped facility available to house the Strategic Coordination Group and its support teams, if required.

Security Review Committee (SRC)
The Security Review Committee is the national coordinating body for protective security, excluding personal protection (but maintains an oversight of this). The SRC meets fortnightly, bringing together 71 partners and agencies, including the national counter-terrorism police headquarters and MPS departments, from across the UK. It provides a link into Prevent, Pursue and Prepare, maintains an overview of threats from international terrorism and domestic extremism and coordinates the national response to this. The SRC also identifies emerging issues, monitors the impact of terrorism, hate crime and policing responses on communities and coordinates national learning.

SRC(E)
The Extraordinary Security Review Committee is triggered by an upward change to the UK threat level, an imminent, actual or perceived terrorist attack in the UK or a significant terrorist attack elsewhere in the world that has impacted on the UK, or UK interests overseas, or has the potential to do so. The SRC(E) deploys any MPS resources that might be required to support a protective security operation, subject to this not adversely impacting on other objectives established. While it can also recommend the same for elsewhere in the UK, it does so without executive authority. The SRC(E) appoints a command team to oversee the development of protective security operations and directs the development of national and pan-London protective security messaging.

Special Operations Room (SOR)
The primary MPS SOR facility is sited at the Lambeth HQ and provides a Command and Control capability to manage more than 500 of the larger or more contentious events and operations annually, from small scale operations or events up to large public events, such as the Notting Hill Carnival or London Marathon. State visits, sporting events and spontaneous riots or demonstrations are also handled within the room. Partners and other Agencies regularly work within the facility and a smaller ‘back-up’ facility is sited at the Hendon Command and Control Centre.

BOX 11 – INTEROPERABILITY ARRANGEMENTS: MECHANISMS AND STRUCTURES
Having had the opportunity to review, in some detail, these arrangements I am broadly confident in their operation. It is certainly the case that since the 7 July 2005 London Bombings a significant amount of work has been done to ensure all the agencies can work effectively together, understand each other’s roles and are trained in the same procedures, to the same standard.

It is clear to me, for example, that the introduction of the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP), has made a significant difference to our response to emergencies by ensuring that there is an agreed framework of activity for any given disaster – albeit with flexibility to accommodate the specific circumstances – and a clear outline of which agency is responsible for the huge diversity of activity that needs to take place.

Training to these principles is essential, and the work of organisations such as the College of Policing, through their Multi Agency Gold Incident Command training course (MAGIC), which trains senior commanders from across the emergency services, local authorities and others, is vital. Without collaborative training, even with the same package, different agencies would inevitably be trained differently, and the invaluable experience of meeting and training with fellow agency leads would be lost. I heard countless times during the course of this review that arrangements work so well because all the relevant people know each other, work together regularly and have trained together. Personal relationships cannot be a substitute for protocols and proper training, but they are an important added bonus. Given this importance, the College of Policing should consider whether it is currently devoting sufficient resources to the provision of MAGIC training, particularly when demand for the course is currently outstripping the ability to provide places. (Recommendation 93)

Linked to this training requirement, is the need to ensure that all front-line personnel are adequately trained to deal with the types of injury that might be seen in an MTFA. (Recommendation 94) Beyond this, as new and novel tactics are deployed internationally by terrorists, we need to ensure that there is sufficient ability to incorporate lessons from elsewhere into training.

In addition to joint training, it is important that the structures designed to facilitate effective joint working in the event of an attack, as well as coordination for preparedness in advance of any attack, are effective. As mentioned above, having received substantial briefing I am broadly confident that they are effective, although there are a few areas where improvement could be made.

The London Resilience Forum currently has a large number of members, albeit operating through representative groups. As already mentioned in Chapter 10, there should be a separate group created to consider preparedness and resilience on the River, and the business membership should be recast to become more representative. In addition, the LRF should give consideration to how it can improve representation by faith groups, and of groups representing the interests of commuters and tourists. (Recommendation 95)

Given the nature of London, any attack here would undoubtedly involve visitors to the capital being affected, whether commuters or tourists. While these are, by their nature as visitors to the capital, difficult groups to capture, some effort should be made, possibly by working with organisations such as London and Partners, to ensure they are considered in resilience planning. As visitors, they will have very specific needs which will need to be catered for and should be considered in the planning.

I would also like to see a greater role for TfL in the preparation work, particularly as the new LESLP guidance, which is expected shortly, is being produced. It is important that TfL are not considered just an adjunct to the LESLP guidance process; rather, as it is rewritten they should be engaged with directly, rather than simply consulted following the publication of draft guidance. (Recommendation 96)

I would also like to see the LRF given greater political support, in order to make it even more effective. The appointment of a Mayoral adviser on resilience is discussed in more detail in Chapter 15 below, but there would also be value in ensuring that the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime sits on the LRF, along with the new Deputy Mayor for Fire, when the relevant elements of the Policing and Crime Bill are passed, and the Deputy Mayor for Transport. (Recommendation 97)
13.11 The LRF should be the point where all elements of London’s resilience meet, and should be the repository for best practice in ensuring we are prepared for a major terrorist attack. As such, the LRF should have a bigger role in ensuring that lessons are learnt following any incidents and that, with the added political weight behind them, they are able to use the power of the Mayoralty to ensure that agencies across London implement any changes required to improve preparedness. (Recommendation 98)

13.12 Currently, in the event of an incident, all the utility providers are represented by a single representative. While it is right to keep the numbers of people in attendance at a Strategic Coordination Group (SCG) to a minimum to ensure effective discussion, given the importance of communications during an incident, there should be consideration given to giving a place on the SCG to a representative of the telecoms and mobile phone network providers. (Recommendation 99)

13.13 It is when an attack takes place that the collaboration arrangements are really tested. As has been discussed above, the emergency services have good plans in place, which include a high-degree of cooperative working. As with all plans, though, they are only as good as the processes and structures that stand behind them.

13.14 During an event, and in the aftermath, there is an essential coordinating function to be carried out by the SCG. In the first instance, this group will be chaired by the police, who will be taking the operational lead in a situation. However, as we move into the recovery stage of an incident there is a need to have different skills in the chair. As such, work is underway to extend the cadre of chairs, including trained local authority chief executives, with adequate support, who could fulfil this function. This work to develop specially trained chairs for the SCG should continue urgently with agreement reached quickly on who they are and training and communication begun as soon as possible. (Recommendation 100)

13.15 In order to support the work of the LRF and the SCG, a situational awareness tool is currently being created. This will be useful in order to ensure that all partners have a good picture of an event, with the relevant amount of information being passed to agencies. It is important that this process continues at speed, and that the tool is tested quickly and regularly to ensure that it is fit for purpose in the event of an incident. (Recommendation 101)

13.16 There has been a recent preoccupation amongst some agencies about the future of the Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC), the place where the SCG and its support teams meets in the event of an emergency. Currently the SCC is located in the Empress State Building in West London. With a limited lease left on the building, and an expectation that the MPS will not extend, there have been discussions about the creation of a new location. It is, though, my understanding that the current SCC has never been used.

13.17 I am not currently convinced, given the creation of the new situational awareness tool, modern communication methods, and an ability to use a number of existing police and fire service buildings, that a new physical Centre needs creating. By using existing property there is the ability to build more resilience into the system as one single site is not solely relied on.

13.18 There is, though, a need to ensure that the MPS is able to manage its estate in such a way as to allow it to carry out its functions. This means ensuring that a state-of-the-art Special Operations Room is available (see Box 10). I am satisfied that this currently exists within the MPS estate.

13.19 Regardless of whether a new permanent home is found for the SCC, I am clear that wherever the main operational decision-making centre is located, there should be space for the Mayor or his representative to be co-located. (Recommendation 102) This is not in order to interfere in operational decision – and he should not be located in the actual control room – rather it is to ensure that he has a proper oversight of the response to an attack and is able adequately to be briefed and able to reassure Londoners. One idea put to me during the review was the creation of a COBR equivalent for London, chaired by the Mayor. I have not, however, been convinced that this is would do anything other than add another layer of confusion to a difficult situation and do not recommend it, assuming a proper place for the Mayor can be found in existing structures.

13.20 The interconnected response to a major terrorist attack is, by its nature, complex, and we cannot be fully confident about how it will work until it is tested in a real situation. However, there is an opportunity to undertake exercises, both ‘real’ and table-top, which can get us close to understanding how the processes and procedures work in practice.
Exercise Unified Response (EUR) was held between 29 February and 3 March 2016. It is believed to be the largest and most complex emergency service exercise ever held in the UK, and potentially Europe. EUR involved 70 organisations from across London and the UK, as well as European teams from Italy, Hungary and Cyprus.

The overall aim of EUR was to show that the organisations which make up the London Resilience Partnership can deliver a coordinated response to a large-scale emergency by working effectively with each other and with national and international partners.

EUR was also designed to test the UK’s ability to activate the EU Civil Protection Mechanism by promoting improved understanding of the mechanism and ensuring appropriate arrangements are in place to support it. Another key aim was to upskill participants (both responders and facilitators) through the provision of a unique learning opportunity.

It is worth noting that this exercise was part-funded by the EU. It is vital, once this source of funding is lost, that alternative funding is secured.

Strong Tower

Strong Tower was a Tier 1 National Counter Terrorism (CT) Exercise held in London and Surrey on 30 June and 1 July 2015. It was commissioned by the Home Office national programme board and developed by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) in conjunction with Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) and 25 partner agencies.

The scenario centred on a two day, multi-site incident involving marauding terrorist firearms attacks and concurrent sieges at three central London locations and a connected residence in Surrey. The exercise was delivered within six months and supported by three major preparatory events. Strong Tower was set against a high operational tempo of CT activity and then late alteration due to the attack in Tunisia.

13.21 Throughout this review I have made a number of recommendations about the improvements to the exercise process that I believe would be beneficial to all involved, such as a formal role for the IPCC (Chapter 5), greater involvement by the media (Chapter 14) and the involvement of the voluntary sector (Chapter 12). In general, though, I believe there should be clearer external oversight of the exercise programme to ensure it is comprehensive.

13.22 When any one agency has the lead on developing an exercise, it is understandable that it would focus on the needs of that organisation. In order to ensure that as many parts of the system can extract as much value from an exercise – which are expensive and organisationally complex events – there needs to be some external oversight. For example, in the Strong Tower exercise there was a feeling amongst some that extending the exercise would have allowed some of the recovery-phase preparedness to be tested. It is disappointing that this opportunity was missed.

13.23 I would like to see the members of the London Resilience Forum have a greater role in the testing and exercising programme, and a subgroup of the LRF should be set up, comprising the MPS, LAS, LFB and others, to consider the future exercise programme. (Recommendation 103) There should also be a clear role for the Mayor and the relevant Deputy Mayors in overseeing the exercises in London, and ensuring that remedial action to address lessons learnt is taken very quickly. (Recommendation 104)
14. COMMUNICATIONS

14.1 As has been discussed at various points so far in this review, communications are essential prior to, and during, a major terrorist attack. Whether it is the issue of communications to and between emergency services, discussed in Box 9 or communications with businesses and the public, good communications can aid preparedness and, ultimately, save lives.

14.2 The police and other emergency services need to recognise that good communication needs to begin before any attack takes place. Indeed, it should be part of the fabric of the steady-state of normal policing. In addition to communicating what to do in the event of an attack, which is covered in Chapter 15 below, good communication is essential when terrorists develop new methods of attack and when new tactics are developed by the police and the emergency services which are designed to reassure the public, but could risk causing concern.

14.3 In Chapter 5, above, I have made recommendations about the value of Project Servator, and the importance of an holistic approach to overt deployment of armed resources. The recent MPS Operation Hercules is another example of the type of operation where a robust and comprehensive communications strategy is necessary.

14.4 When Operation Hercules was introduced in early August, there was a significant amount of media attention that focused on the overt armed and armoured officers who would now be more visible on London’s streets. As would be expected, the media was particularly interested in pictures of masked officers with significant weaponry, largely in contrast to the more traditional image of the British police officer.

14.5 Since part of the remit of Operation Hercules is to provide reassurance to the public, it is important that this is evidence led and properly followed-up through deployment. Simply increasing the number of armed officers may provide reassurance to some Londoners, but may also alarm others. To achieve effective and sustained reassurance, such measures must be accompanied by good communication.

14.6 Simple lessons from Project Servator, such as clear instructions to all armed officers to engage with members of the public, the provision of public information leaflets and the use of basic behavioural detection should be embedded in the training of officers. (Recommendation 105) This behavioural detection can include both covert observation during deployment of armed officers, or the overt engagement with the public to engage and reassure. As the evidence from Servator shows, with good engagement the public will feel more reassured about the tactics being used.

14.7 This will be particularly important if the UK threat level ever rises to CRITICAL either as a result of the intelligence picture or an ongoing attack taking place. At this point, significantly more officers will be deployed onto London’s streets, and may, potentially, include military personnel. Without proper communication of this at a personal and city-wide level, the public’s understandable concern and worry will only be exacerbated.

14.8 Operation Hercules is a perfect opportunity to test the public’s views on the greater presence of armed officers, and pilot ways of engaging the public that might lead to greater levels of reassurance and confidence. The regular Public Attitude Survey (PAS) survey commissioned by MOPAC, should be adapted to include specific questions on public perception of the threat and the public attitude to the measures being taken to counter this threat. (Recommendation 106)

14.9 As I will outline in more detail in the next chapter, ensuring the public have a clear understanding of what is required of them in the event of an attack is essential. The ‘Run, Hide, Tell’ messages central to the required public response are still not as embedded in the public consciousness as they should be, and more needs to be done to prepare people.

14.10 Regardless of how much preparation is done, though, the most important communications will take place during an incident, when the public will need to be told what, specifically, to do to keep themselves safe, including what action to take and where to avoid.

14.11 As we saw in the attacks in Paris and Orlando, social media plays a significant role in the event of an attack. While it can be used by emergency services and government to communicate with the public, it can also be used – often not deliberately – to spread misinformation or confuse an already confusing picture as the media, members of the public and, sometimes, those caught up in an event seek to provide information.

14.12 It is essential that civic agencies are able to provide a swift, authoritative voice during these events, including rebutting misinformation and ensuring the media is fed with regular information to relay to the public themselves. It is encouraging that the MPS, having learnt the lessons of recent attacks, have in place a plan to provide information through their official Twitter account. In addition, the Directorate of Media and Communications chairs the London Resilience Forum communications group to ensure a consistent message.
14.13 Speed of communication is essential, but this desire to be quick needs to be balanced with the desire for accuracy. On the whole, and where reasonable, the MPS should aim to provide information quickly, even if corrections subsequently need to be made. This should go beyond the generic messages that are currently part of the prepared output. (Recommendation 107) In order for this to happen the generally non-bureaucratic system which is currently in place needs proper testing to understand the boundaries and how that balance can be struck.

14.14 The recent attack in Russell Square, which was initially considered as a potential terror attack, is a good illustration of the importance, and effectiveness, of good communication. At a senior level, and quickly, information was given to the public, even though it took place relatively late in the evening and information emerged over night. This meant that much of the information vacuum that could be filled with rumour was saturated with official statements.

14.15 However, it was clear that, while effective, the process followed in this incident was not the one specifically set down in the internal MPS guidance. This highlights the tension between planning for an event and the dynamic nature of such a catastrophic event in real life. This can only be resolved by proper testing and exercising. In all major exercises the MPS Directorate of Media and Communications should have a central role and, where possible, specific members of the media should be invited to participate. (Recommendation 108) This involvement of the media would build on table-top exercises carried out by the MPS with media to explain the importance of responsible journalism. These table-top media exercise sessions should continue, adequately resourced, and should involve both home affairs specialists, broadcast and print editors and sub-editors, and representatives of social media companies. (Recommendation 109)

14.16 In some countries, such as Australia, the United States and the Netherlands, there are systems in place to alert the public about emergency situations taking place. These can range from apps through to automated alert systems which provide information directly to mobile phones.

14.17 The UK Government have previously explored this technology with trials in North Yorkshire, Glasgow and Suffolk in 2013. As the Cabinet Office explained, the strengths of the system were that “it would not require the government or local responders to know individual personal numbers. It would also not require people to sign up to receive messages. Instead, the idea is that if you are in an area where an emergency occurs then you will be sent a location-based alert which will convey important protective action for you to take”.16

14.18 A final report on the trials was published in April 201417 which found popular support, high likely compliance with advice, and confidence that the technology could deliver text message alerts within 15 minutes of a decision being made. A series of recommendations were made, including further piloting in an urban area. It is not, though, clear now what work has taken place since the original trials. Given its popularity amongst the public and emergency service workers, and the need to provide timely advice to Londoners, the Mayor should quickly work with the Cabinet Office to introduce a London-wide pilot of this public alert technology. (Recommendation 110)

14.19 In addition to improving communication with the public, it is vital that there is effective communication between the police and local politicians who, in turn, can communicate with their communities. It is, then, important, as mentioned in Chapter 12 above, that the MPS introduce sufficiently clear protocols on their own internal communications to ensure that information is disseminated effectively and speedily within the organisation. In particular, it is important that borough commanders are rapidly informed of relevant activity so that they can brief their local Members of Parliament, Assembly Members, and councillors. This process should be tested during exercises. (Recommendation 111)

14.20 Finally, throughout this review it has been clear that the police and security agencies need to rethink the way they provide information to others, including businesses (Chapter 11) and local authorities (Chapter 12). I have made specific recommendations relating to these areas of work, but there should be a more general attitude of sharing with others through effective communications. As the Home Office revise the CONTEST Strategy, they should place effective communication and the provision of timely and detailed information to others at the heart of the strategy. (Recommendation 112)
15. BUILDING A CULTURE OF SECURITY AND RESILIENCE IN LONDON

15.1 As discussed in Chapter 5, if an MTFA takes place in London the consequences for those involved will be very serious, regardless of how impressive the response from the police and other emergency services. If we can build a culture of resilience and security in the capital, though, the consequences of an attack can be mitigated. Put simply, people involved knowing the right thing to do, and acting quickly, can save lives.

15.2 The bulk of the responsibility for preventing and responding to terrorist threats will always rest with the police, security agencies and our emergency services. But that work can be significantly enhanced, and made easier, by building a well of resilience in society so that we all know how to respond should we be caught up in an attack.

15.3 Currently, the principal means of educating the public is through the work of the police and the Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSAs) and Counter-Terrorism Awareness Advisers (CTAAs) that they employ. CTSAs provide advice on specific events, projects and buildings, or to individual people considered at risk, they also deliver Project Griffin and Project Argus training (see Box 12). CTAAs principally support CTSAs and deliver training.

15.4 There are 171 posts – 145 CTSAs and 26 CTAAs – in England and Wales, but despite making up around 25% of UK policing, and representing the most significant terrorist target, London has just 22 of the CTSAs and 4 CTAAs. This is 15% of the national provision which, while aligned to London's population, appears on the low side. I am assured, however, that considerable thought has gone into the allocation of resources around the country. Nevertheless, this is an important resource and the Home Office should urgently look again at the total number of CTSAs and CTAAs that it funds around the country with a view to enhancing the resource. (Recommendation 113)

PROJECT GRIFFIN

Project Griffin is the national counter-terrorism awareness initiative for business produced by NaCTSO to protect our cities and communities from the threat of terrorism.

The level of threat is complex and ranges from crudely planned attacks to sophisticated networks pursuing ambitious and coordinated plots.

The aim of Project Griffin is to:
- Help understand the threat from terrorism to the UK;
- Guide individuals on what to do if they find themselves involved in a terrorist incident or event that leads up to a planned attack; and
- Enable people to recognise and report suspicious activity.

Project Griffin holds briefing events to increase public and staff awareness of how best to reduce, and respond to, the most likely types of terrorist activities. The events are presented by trained police advisers delivering a range of CT awareness modules.

Events are free and can last between one and six hours depending on the time available and number of modules covered. The modules are reviewed and updated regularly and currently cover topics including the current threat, firearms and weapons attacks, suspicious items, hostile reconnaissance and bombs.

In the rest of the UK, Project Griffin is delivered by CTSAs or CTAAs, but the MPS also uses Police Officers working on CT Focus Desks to increase coverage. Last year, the MPS CT FDs delivered 620 Griffin presentations to over 17,000 people.

PROJECT ARGUS

Project Argus is a NaCTSO counter-terrorism testing and exercising initiative, delivered by CTSAs and CTAAs. Participants from business and other organisations are asked to consider their preparedness for a terrorist attack through a series of simulated multi-media scenarios. The aim is to support senior and middle management to identify measures to help their organisation to prevent, manage and recover from a terrorist incident.

Project Argus explores what is likely to happen in the event of a terrorist attack. It highlights the importance of being prepared and having the necessary plans in place to help safeguard staff, visitors and assets. All events include a module on a terrorist firearm or weapons attack.

The events are free of charge and last for approximately three hours. They are interactive and require some audience participation. An expert group will be in attendance at most events consisting of members from the emergency services, local authority and other specialist agencies to answer any queries. There are currently nine Project Argus topics.
15.5 With more advisers, the MPS would be able to provide an increase in Project Griffin and Argus, meaning more people can be trained in how to respond to an MTFA and more advice can be given to events and businesses. This would support the wider ambition to train one million people in the principles of Run, Hide, Tell and how to respond, either directly or indirectly through appropriately supported in-house security and training providers to cascade the training through employee groups. This is an important target, and the police should continue their aim to train one million people nationally, seeking to expand this in future years with explicit stretch targets set for London. (Recommendation 114)

15.6 This work is not aimed at making people protective security experts, rather it is designed to tell them how to react and ensure they are situationally aware in the workplace and beyond. Indeed, if people are trained in the principles, with specific reference to their workplace, that training will go with them into their wider life. This means that the more people who are trained, the more likelihood there is that should there be an attack at least some of those caught up in it will have had this training.

15.7 The provision of advice to venues and events is essential to ensure that every possible mitigation has been put in place. While I would not wish to make the current licensing or permission regimes significantly more onerous, I do believe consideration should be given to requiring that counter-terrorism advice be brought into the process of obtaining a licence and that appropriate assurances are given about staff training. The Mayor, together with the police and London Councils should consider how this can be done. (Recommendation 115) This could include a requirement for CTSAs to provide advice before an event is licensed. In addition, there should be discussions with the insurance industry, so that businesses and venues are required to obtain and act on advice in return for lower premiums or making take-up of advice and training compulsory for certain businesses or establishments. (Recommendation 116)

15.8 It is particularly challenging to give advice to small businesses, given the significant time pressures they face, and the inability to free staff for training for long periods of time. I welcome efforts being taken by the MPS to develop a short form of the advice that can be given to small and micro businesses in a short amount of time by CT Focus Desk officers. This short-form advice on CT matters for small and micro businesses should be signed off quickly, and then rolled out, including utilising local authority and neighbourhood policing networks. (Recommendation 117)

15.9 Given the specific threat to places which have large crowds of people, it is important that music venues, even those with small capacities, have access to training. It is encouraging that the MPS is making themselves available to organisations such as the Small Venues Trust to ensure best practice is passed on. In order to ensure that all such venues are reached the MPS should make use of the venue mapping work that is being led by the GLA to identify appropriate places to whom training should be offered. (Recommendation 118)

15.10 Similarly, owners and operators of shopping centres and landside retail at airports (see Box 4) should, as many do, make sure that basic Project Griffin training is given, possibly via in-house security managers, at regular enough intervals to cope with the high staff turnover that these businesses experience. (Recommendation 119)

15.11 We should also consider the opportunities for teachable moments when there are attacks in other parts of the world. For example, following the Orlando shootings at the Pulse nightclub, the MPS began a programme of engagement with the management and staff of LGBT venues across London, which I have been encouraged to hear was well received. Engagement with relevant premises and communities should be routine whenever a terrorist attack takes place outside the UK in order to improve awareness and security, along with awareness of the risk of copycat attacks. (Recommendation 120)
While, as far as I am aware, there is no current threat directed specifically at schools, it is important that they too are prepared in the event of an attack. To that end, the Department for Education should build on the model of having a designated governor responsible for safeguarding and ensure that all schools in London appoint a governor responsible for ensuring security and terrorism preparedness. They should require all schools to have full preparedness plans in place, with requirements that they are tested. If the Department for Education do not consider this valuable nationally, the Mayor should ensure it is implemented in London’s schools. (Recommendation 121)

As well as ensuring resilience in the public and in businesses and venues, other buildings need to be constructed with resilience at the heart of their design. The Government should consider the case, with police, CPNI and others, for the introduction of a statutory obligation for resilience to be designed into new buildings. (Recommendation 122) This could require major new construction works to have their plans scrutinised by the MPS and LFB (or the equivalent outside London). In addition, a phased programme of assessing the resilience of existing buildings should be considered. (Recommendation 123)

The resilience of our most iconic locations should also be a priority. While there is good protection in place, and reviews are regular and thorough, we must not be complacent and these issues must remain at the forefront of planning. For example, when discussions are taking place about increasing the opening hours of the Palace of Westminster in order to provide more access for tourists and enhanced commercial use during recess, the implications for counter-terrorism policing should be carefully considered and discussed with the relevant authorities. (Recommendation 124)

There are other measures that can be taken to improve general security that have been raised with me during the review, which might have a utility in the event of a major terrorist attack but are not directly linked to the issue. One such measure was the shot detection systems that have operated in some parts of the world, including the United States. These systems can be set up around an area and use sound, and sometimes light, triggers to identify immediately when a gun has been fired.

I note that the track record of this type of detection system has been mixed, they are expensive to install and maintain and there is relatively low level of gun crime in the capital. As such, I do not currently think that there is value in further work exploring this system. The technology should, though, be kept under review.

In addition, during the course of the review I have been concerned to ensure that the number of firearms available illegally does not increase and that those held legitimately do not fall into the hands of terrorists or other criminals. Firearms licensing should be tightened up. For example, the law should be changed to ensure that in every case where an individual with a firearms licence negligently allows a weapon to be lost or stolen they have their licence removed permanently. (Recommendation 125)

There is a significant opportunity to improve the resilience of London across all areas with the appointment of a new mayoral adviser on resilience, who would cover the issues referred to in this review, amongst other issues of resilience. As well as advising the Mayor, they could work with the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime and the new Deputy Mayor for Fire to ensure that a cross-cutting approach is developed without the issues falling into silos within the two organisations supporting their Deputies. (Recommendation 126)

While this function could be carried out by either Deputy Mayor, it is more likely to get the time needed devoted to it, the joined-up oversight and the required political buy-in if it is a standalone appointee of the Mayor. Depending on the remit, this could be a full or part time position. As such, consideration should be given to appointing a Mayoral Adviser on resilience. (Recommendation 128)

The new Mayoral Adviser should be supported by a Chief Resilience Officer for London, who would report directly to the Adviser and the Mayor. (Recommendation 127) Both the Mayoral Adviser and the Chief Resilience Officer should have a central role in the London Resilience Forum. Consideration should be given to whether this role could be funded through the successful Rockefeller 100 Resilient Cities bid that the Mayor’s Office for Policing And Crime made in 2014.
Annex 1: Recommendations

Recommendation 1.
The Mayor should ask the Chair of the London Resilience Forum to consider how London’s preparedness to deal with a major incident may be impacted by a majority of the three main ‘blue light’ emergency services workers living outside London.

Recommendation 2.
The Mayor should consult the London boroughs and the Corporation of London on an alteration to the London Plan to formally identify the need for specialist emergency services worker housing as an important planning issue for London.

Recommendation 3.
A full review of perimeter security at London City Airport should be conducted by the MPS and airport management.

Recommendation 4.
The Civil Aviation Authority should, building on the work of the House of Lords review into the civil use of drones, ensure that the current legislation relating to the use of drones is suitable. Government should also explore technological options to improve the capacity to restrict drone use or disable them.

Recommendation 5.
The Mayor should seek, nationally, assurances that the routine screening and searching of cars and freight entering the country is being significantly enhanced, with an uplift in land-based and sea-based border force coverage. In addition, the aerial surveillance capacity available to the Border Force, the National Crime Agency (NCA) and the police enabling them to monitor and control the border needs to be enhanced given that existing capacity is already fully utilised.

Recommendation 6.
Joint intelligence hubs should be established between the NCA and MPS to tackle the illegal importation of firearms with regular reports to Ministers and to the Mayor’s Office on the progress being made.

Recommendation 7.
Consideration should be given to the appointment of a counter-terrorism adviser to the Mayor and Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime.

Recommendation 8.
The role of the Mayor in an attack needs to be more clearly considered by all partners.

Recommendation 9.
The Cabinet Office should urgently update their guidance on COBR attendees to unequivocally include the Mayor in all meetings about incidents affecting, or potentially affecting, London.

Recommendation 10.
The Mayor and the Metropolitan Police Service should strongly resist any attempts by central government to move the counter-terrorism function and wider counter-terrorism policing network from the MPS to the National Crime Agency.

Recommendation 11.
It is essential, in the EU exit negotiations, that UK policing is able to maintain the required international arrangements that currently work to keep us safe.

Recommendation 12.
In all cases where terrorism is considered in the initial phase of an operation, and the counter-terrorism protocols are, or should have been, implemented, there should be a thorough review of the operation to ensure any lessons can be learnt.

Recommendation 13.
In choosing how to allocate resources, the MPS must strike a reasonable balance between the intelligence picture and a sensible assessment of other tactics which terrorists might use and, above all, there should be a readiness to expect the unexpected.

Recommendation 14.
When deploying the military, it is important that proper communication takes place with the public, led by senior politicians and police and military leaders, to provide reassurance and give confidence to Londoners and visitors to the city.

Recommendation 15.
The Operation Temperer process should be fully tested during one of the regular counter-terrorism response exercises.

Recommendation 16.
The military and police must keep under constant review, in the light of developing threat assessments, the level and availability of specialist troops used to confront or neutralise a terrorist threat.

Recommendation 17.
A permanent armed policing presence should be maintained at the MOD headquarters on Whitehall. Any attempt to reduce this resource, with an expectation that the MPS will provide policing cover, should be accompanied by the appropriate transfer of funds.

Recommendation 18.
The MPS should review the number of motorcycles and trained drivers available to ensure an adequate response is still available should the road network around an incident – as is likely – become heavily congested.
Recommendation 19.
Consideration should be given to wider measures to increase the number of firearms instructors.

Recommendation 20.
It should be ensured that the fullest use is made of all available providers of firearms training, such as the City of London Police and the MOD Police.

Recommendation 21.
The Home Office and National Police Chiefs’ Council should review firearms training to generate a national picture of capacity to see if further resources are needed, in the short-term.

Recommendation 22.
The ‘30plus’ scheme should be reintroduced to help to ensure that there is a pool of suitably qualified and experienced instructors and firearms officers maintained and enhanced within the Service.

Recommendation 23.
Work to introduce a reservist programme has the potential to increase flexibility and resources at times of higher demand and should be explored thoroughly.

Recommendation 24.
It is important that the MPS does not lose focus on improving the diversity – in terms of both gender and ethnicity – of the cadre of firearms officers.

Recommendation 25.
While focusing on the recruitment of firearms officers the MPS needs to develop an appropriate retention strategy to reduce wastage levels of these officers.

Recommendation 26.
If any recommendation about special payments to firearms officers is made by the Independent Police Remuneration Review Body, there must be a mechanism that ensures this does not add to existing funding pressures within the MPS.

Recommendation 27.
In future, the Home Office should fully fund the National and International Capital Cities Grant to ensure that London is properly protected and London’s communities are not having to subsidise national functions.

Recommendation 28.
Action should be urgently taken to approve the new Conductive Energy Device as a less lethal option for policing.

Recommendation 29.
The Mayor and the Commissioner should give joint consideration to whether there is a case for equipping more, properly trained and supervised, officers with CEDs.

Recommendation 30.
The Home Office should have a clear, light-touch, approach to agreeing funding that operational leaders believe is important in keeping the public safe.

Recommendation 31.
A business case for flexible hostile vehicle mitigation barriers has previously been considered by the Home Office, but may be revisited. They should review this urgently and move to fund a solution.

Recommendation 32.
Consideration should also be given by the GLA and relevant local authorities to the wider installation of protective bollards in areas of vulnerability around London and to explore the case for retractable bollards in certain areas.

Recommendation 33.
The MPS should learn from the mapping technology being developed by the BTP and introduce similar systems for major sites in London such as shopping centres, large entertainment venues and even museums and galleries.

Recommendation 34.
The MPS should work with BTP, and others, to see how live CCTV streaming could be introduced to all parts of London where it might have value.

Recommendation 35.
The MPS should, as quickly as possible, begin the implementation of Project Servator as part of the existing armed uplift programme in the Metropolitan Area, using the full range of tactics associated with the Project, and adhering to its principles and practice as closely as possible.

Recommendation 36.
As the process of replacing the existing Airwave radio system continues, policing, and particularly the BTP, must be fully engaged and any concerns they have should be considered carefully. The Airwave network should not be switched off until it can be shown that the new ESN works adequately everywhere and, in particular, underground to the satisfaction of the MPS, the BTP and TfL.

Recommendation 37.
Should the Home Office continue with plans to merge certain national policing functions, such as the MOD Police and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, they should undertake a full assessment of the benefits of bringing the MPS and BTP underground network together.

Recommendation 38.
Following the COLP example, and in discussions with them about their learning from the process, the MPS should consider whether a contingent Anti-Terrorism Traffic Regulation Order would be valuable in other parts of the capital.

Recommendation 39.
The Home Office should undertake a full assessment of the benefits of merging the MPS and the COLP, with the national financial and fraud functions moving to the National Crime Agency.

Recommendation 40.
The COLP and MPS must work together to ensure that MPS officers who might be deployed into the City during an attack have a very good working knowledge of the area and the significant buildings which might become targets.

Recommendation 41.
MOPAC should consider repeating the survey of firearms officers with MPS officers to ascertain whether the recent armed uplift, concerns about an MTFA, or further changes to the post-incident procedures have added to, or reduced, concerns.
Recommendation 42.
I would urge the Home Secretary to sign off the guidance on IPCC investigations into deaths following police contact as soon as possible, and certainly by the end of the year.

Recommendation 43.
Central to the statutory guidance to the IPCC – whether currently included in the draft or not – should be measures to speed up investigations, and the Home Office should consider additional resources to the IPCC if needed to deliver this.

Recommendation 44.
The draft protocol that the IPCC have developed with the police specifically on responding to a major terrorist incident, should be agreed swiftly.

Recommendation 45.
The IPCC must, at a senior and operational level, be fully involved in future full exercises of MTFA response.

Recommendation 46.
There should be audio-recording of all command decisions taken by senior tactical and strategic leads in the command centres during an incident.

Recommendation 47.
It is important that agreement is rapidly reached for the current co-responding pilot to be expanded to all London boroughs as quickly as training resources allow.

Recommendation 48.
There should be no delay in implementing the new training for LFB personnel, and there should be a strategic approach to this training to ensure that the training is rolled out to those officers most likely to find themselves on the scene of an attack, based on assessments by the police and others, before other officers are trained subsequently.

Recommendation 49.
It is important that agreement is reached as soon as possible between the fire service and the FBU to encourage all relevant fire officers to have the special training to enable them to crew Fire Rescue Units with the appropriate equipment so that they are able to respond to MTFAs. I would hope that this agreement could be reached by the end of this year.

Recommendation 50.
The Home Office should give consideration to supporting the costs associated with LFB increased MTFA capability, or at least match-funding the provision with the LFB/Mayor.

Recommendation 51.
The Mayer review into the London Fire Brigade should look at the number of FRUs and the possibility of an attendance standard for these specialist units. Reallocation of existing resources should be considered in order to provide this.

Recommendation 52.
The Department of Health should examine how extra resources can be provided to the London Ambulance Service (LAS) to reflect the additional demands placed on it as being the provider of services to our capital city.

Recommendation 53.
There should be four dedicated 24/7 Hazardous Area Response Teams in London and a similar number of Mass Casualty Vehicles. These should be strategically located around London.

Recommendation 54.
Agreement on future MTFA funding for the LAS should be reached quickly, with the NHS adequately funding LAS’ requirements.

Recommendation 55.
The number of CBRN trained LAS staff should be reviewed with a view that it should return to the higher levels previously seen in London over the past few years.

Recommendation 56.
The Home Office should review the provision of CBRN equipped response vehicles operated by the London Fire Brigade to ensure their numbers are sufficient.

Recommendation 57.
Personal radiation monitors, which should be available to fire, ambulance and police personnel, should routinely be used.

Recommendation 58.
A full testing and exercise programme should be developed to test the readiness of the LAS Control Room, including with no-notice exercises.

Recommendation 59.
I would encourage the tri-service chiefs meetings to continue, with perhaps a greater focus on dealing with the attacks considered in this review, as well as the important matter of on-going collaboration.

Recommendation 60.
The capacity of London’s major trauma centres should be reviewed further in the light of the latest planning assumptions and, in any event, it would be helpful if this could be exercised thoroughly to ensure that the assumptions used are sufficiently robust.

Recommendation 61.
There would be value in NHS England working closely with other countries’ health agencies – for example, France and Belgium – to ensure that lessons are learnt from their response and best practice can be shared.

Recommendation 62.
There is a specific need to bolster community mental health services in London to support vulnerable people who might be at risk of radicalisation.

Recommendation 63.
The Home Office should work with the Department of Health to ensure that the Prevent duty applies to GPs.

Recommendation 64.
It is important that CCTV is also available on all underground and mainline trains, and options for ensuring a suitable system, enabling operational commanders to have access in the event of an emergency, should be explored.
Recommendation 65.
It is my view, having listened to the advice of experts, that in every situation as much of the transport network should be kept running as possible.

Recommendation 66.
TIL and the BTP should provide advice to passengers – based on discussions and decisions taken by the Strategic Coordination Group – that goes beyond just the provision of information.

Recommendation 67.
TIL should work with taxi and private hire companies – including Uber – to ensure that drivers have a good level of awareness about how to prevent a terrorist attack through a clear understanding of what constitutes suspicious behaviour.

Recommendation 68.
TIL should also work with the MPS to ensure that there are sufficient processes in place to prevent the use of taxis or licensed minicabs by would-be terrorists.

Recommendation 69.
DCLG should ring-fence budgets for local resilience teams and introduce a small inspectorate, sitting either within the Cabinet Office or DCLG, to monitor performance. If central government will not introduce such a review mechanism, the London Resilience Forum should consider its role here.

Recommendation 70.
Local authorities should work with the London Resilience Forum to consider where effective partnerships might be built at a sub-regional, but supra-borough, level, ensuring that local knowledge and connections can be retained.

Recommendation 71.
The police and security agencies should ensure that timely and detailed information about the threat – including changes in police and terrorist tactics – is provided to their local authority partners to enable effective resilience planning to take place.

Recommendation 72.
Local authorities should be prioritising an effective functioning CCTV network for the detection and prevention of terrorist (or indeed other criminal) activity across the capital in the interests of public safety. The level and functionality of CCTV provision should be kept under review by the Mayor’s Office.

Recommendation 73.
There is a strong argument in favour of putting in place a stricter regime that ensures the River is a safer and more secure place and this should be considered.

Recommendation 74.
I recommend that consideration should be given to widening the remit of the Port of London Authority to give them a formal interest in the security of the River.

Recommendation 75.
There should be a comprehensive review of safety and security on the River, commissioned by the Mayor, to report by May 2017.

Recommendation 76.
The London Resilience Forum should establish a sub-group of partners to consider resilience on the Thames.

Recommendation 77.
The police and security services should consider producing a regular newsletter – perhaps once a fortnight – put together with business in order to ensure that it meets their needs, which can provide up to date, and specific, guidance. This can then be distributed to heads of security in businesses, business groups and placed online for others.

Recommendation 78.
I recommend that the Mayor convenes a small group to take forward discussions about how further information can be provided to business.

Recommendation 79.
Communication should be improved with security operatives, via the SIA. This includes both communications of the threat in advance, and effective communication during an attack. This should include single points of contact in the key organisations.

Recommendation 80.
Effective training should be given to SIA-licensed security operatives that goes beyond the Griffin and Argus training already conducted. There should be a tailored package available to all SIA-licensed personnel.

Recommendation 81.
As the menu of tactical options for responding to an MTFA or other terrorist attack are developed, there should be specific consideration given to the role that SIA-licensed operatives can play.

Recommendation 82.
Support should also be given to in-house security, assuming assurances can be gained about their security credentials.

Recommendation 83.
A package of support, to extract the most value in the event of an attack, should exist for those security personnel working in sports stadia and airports.

Recommendation 84.
NaCTSO should review the published guidance given to crowded places, including stadia, to ensure it is up to date with relevant police and potential terrorist tactics.

Recommendation 85.
The London Resilience Forum business group, which currently exists, should be renewed with a broader spectrum of businesses and business groups added to it to ensure a genuine cross-section of London’s business community. The Metropolitan Police should ensure that a senior officer acts as the point of contact with this group and takes responsibility for ensuring that the issues that arise from their discussions are properly pursued.

Recommendation 86.
The MPS should work with faith and community leaders to ensure that the current Argus and Griffin training packages are appropriately tailored to their needs, and ensure that adequate training is given.
Recommendation 87.
The Mayor should build on the creation of the MPS Muslim Communities Forum and create a separate pan-London, multi-faith, reference group who can provide advice, guidance and, most importantly, a unified voice to London in the event of a terrorist attack of whatever kind.

Recommendation 88.
Local police and local authority chief executives and leaders should annually review the membership of the police engagement groups to ensure that they comprise the right members, and that they are regularly refreshed.

Recommendation 89.
Key members of the LRF, including the police, fire and ambulance services, along with the Mayor’s office should work together with London’s voluntary sector to ensure they are being used effectively and that the lines of communication are sufficient in the event of an attack or other emergency. When the response to an MTFA and other terror attacks is exercised, the role of the voluntary sector should be properly rehearsed.

Recommendation 90.
In the event of a significant terrorist attack all those who are registered as victims or survivors should have access to a dedicated source of information and advice.

Recommendation 91.
In the event of an incident that the Mayor determines is of sufficient severity, this London Emergencies Trust should be immediately stood up to become the official, but independent, vehicle to provide charitable support for those affected.

Recommendation 92.
The London Resilience Forum should define, for all situations of civic emergency, which organisations are responsible for marshalling and directing volunteers, or dealing with those who might have the best intentions, but whose energy and time could be better directed elsewhere.

Recommendation 93.
The College of Policing should consider whether it is currently devoting sufficient resources to the provision of MAGIC training, particularly when demand for the course is currently outstripping the ability to provide places.

Recommendation 94.
There is a need to ensure that all front-line personnel are adequately trained to deal with the types of injury that might be seen in an MTFA.

Recommendation 95.
The LRF should give consideration to how it can improve representation by faith groups, and of groups representing the interests of commuters and tourists.

Recommendation 96.
It is important that TfL are not considered just an adjunct to the LESLP guidance process; rather, as it is rewritten they should be engaged with directly, rather than simply consulted following the publication of draft guidance.

Recommendation 97.
There would be value in ensuring that the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime sits on the LRF, along with the Deputy Mayor for Fire and the Deputy Mayor for Transport.

Recommendation 98.
The LRF should have a bigger role in ensuring that lessons are learnt following any incidents and that, with added political weight behind them, they are able to use the power of the Mayoralty to ensure that agencies across London implement any changes required to improve preparedness.

Recommendation 99.
Given the importance of communications during an incident, there should be consideration given to giving a place on the SCG to a representative of the telecoms and mobile phone network providers.

Recommendation 100.
The work to develop specially trained chairs for the SCG should continue urgently, with agreement reached quickly on who they are and training and communication begun as soon as possible.

Recommendation 101.
It is important that the process of creating a situational awareness tool for the SCG continues at speed, and that the tool is tested quickly and regularly to ensure that it is fit for purpose in the event of an incident.

Recommendation 102.
Wherever the main operational decision making centre is located, there should be space for the Mayor or his representative to be present.

Recommendation 103.
A subgroup of the LRF should be set up, comprising the MPS, LAS, LFB and others, to consider the future exercise programme.

Recommendation 104.
There should be a clear role for the Mayor and the relevant Deputy Mayors in overseeing the exercises in London, and ensuring that remedial action to address lessons learnt is taken very quickly.

Recommendation 105.
Simple lessons from Project Servator, such as clear instructions to all armed officers to engage with members of the public, the provision of public information leaflets and the use of basic behavioural detection should be embedded in the training of armed officers.

Recommendation 106.
The regular Public Attitude Survey commissioned by MOPAC should be adapted to include specific questions on public perception of the threat and the public attitude to the measures being taken to counter the threat.
Recommendation 107.
On the whole, and where reasonable, the MPS should aim to provide information quickly, even if corrections need to be made. This should go beyond the generic messages that are currently part of the prepared output.

Recommendation 108.
In all major exercises the MPS Directorate of Media and Communications should have a central role, and, where possible, specific members of the media should be invited to participate.

Recommendation 109.
Table-top media exercise sessions should continue, adequately resourced, and should involve both home affairs specialists as well as broadcast and print editors and sub-editors, along with representatives of social-media companies.

Recommendation 110.
The Mayor should quickly work with the Cabinet Office to introduce a London-wide pilot of public alert technology.

Recommendation 111.
The MPS should introduce sufficiently clear protocols on their own internal communications to ensure that information is disseminated effectively and speedily within the organisation. In particular, it is important that borough commanders are rapidly informed of relevant activity so that they can brief their local Members of Parliament, Assembly Members, and councillors. This process should be tested during exercises.

Recommendation 112.
As the Home Office revise the CONTEST strategy, they should place effective communication and the provision of timely and detailed information to others at the heart of the strategy.

Recommendation 113.
The Home Office should urgently look again at the total number of CTSAs and CTAAs that it funds around the country with a view to enhancing the resource.

Recommendation 114.
The MPS should continue their aim to train one million people nationally, seeking to expand this in future years with explicit stretch targets set for London.

Recommendation 115.
Consideration should be given to requiring that counter-terrorism advice be brought into the process of obtaining venue or event licences and that appropriate assurances are given about staff training. The Mayor, together with the police and London Councils should consider how this can be done.

Recommendation 116.
There should be discussions with the insurance industry, so that businesses and venues are required to obtain and act on advice in return for lower premiums or making take-up of advice and training compulsory for certain businesses or establishments.

Recommendation 117.
Short-form advice on CT matters for small and micro businesses should be signed off quickly, and then rolled out, including utilising local authority and neighbourhood policing networks.

Recommendation 118.
The MPS should make use of the venue mapping work that is being led by the GLA to identify appropriate places to whom training should be offered.

Recommendation 119.
Owners and operators of shopping centres and landside retail at airports should, as many do, make sure that basic Project Griffin training is given, possibly via in-house security managers, at regular enough intervals to cope with the high staff turnover that these businesses experience.

Recommendation 120.
Engagement with relevant premises and communities should be routine whenever a terrorist attack takes place outside the UK in order to improve awareness and security, along with awareness of the risk of copycat attacks.

Recommendation 121.
The Department for Education should build on the model of having a designated governor responsible for safeguarding and ensure that all schools in London appoint a governor responsible for ensuring security and terrorism preparedness. They should require all schools to have full preparedness plans in place, with requirements that they are tested. If the Department for Education do not consider this valuable nationally, the Mayor should ensure it is implemented in London’s schools.

Recommendation 122.
The Government should consider the case, with police, CPNI and others, for the introduction of a statutory obligation for resilience to be designed into new buildings.

Recommendation 123.
A phased programme of assessing the resilience of existing buildings should be considered.

Recommendation 124.
When discussions are taking place about increasing the opening hours of the Palace of Westminster in order to provide more access for tourists and enhanced commercial use during recess, the implications for counter-terrorism policing should be carefully considered and discussed with the relevant authorities.

Recommendation 125.
The law should be changed to ensure that in every case where an individual with a firearms licence negligently allows a weapon to be lost or stolen they have their licence removed permanently.

Recommendation 126.
Consideration should be given to appointing a Mayoral Adviser on resilience.

Recommendation 127.
The new Mayoral Adviser should be supported by a Chief Resilience Officer for London, who would report directly to the Adviser and the Mayor.
ANNEX 2: TERMS OF REFERENCE

AIM
Undertake an independent review of London's preparedness for a major terrorist incident, and provide assurance to the Mayor that London is as ready and organised it can be in case of a major incident, and has the resources and expertise needed to cope and where necessary and appropriate to advise on what steps might be taken to mitigate any weaknesses.

OUTLINE
The review will be a strategic, London-wide look at how the city is prepared to cope in light of terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels. It will look at the working relationships and cooperation between all of the agencies involved, ability to cope with multiple simultaneous incidents and highlight gaps between agencies or shortages of expertise and resources, and propose actions to address this.

REMIT
In developing this advice, the Review will consider the capacity of:
- The Metropolitan Police Service (including its armed response capability);
- Other police services operating in London (including the British Transport Police, and the City of London Police) and what support might be available from elsewhere in the country;
- The London Fire Brigade;
- The London Ambulance Service;
- Local Government in London;
- Other agencies including Transport for London and the Port of London Authority;
- Community organisations (such as British Red Cross, RNLI and the St John Ambulance) and faith groups.

The Review will consider the implications of multi-site attacks, including the implications of those occurring simultaneously in other parts of the country. The Review will consider the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel, the London Resilience Forum, the effectiveness of collaboration between the emergency services, the interoperability of services (including radio communications), and the programme of joint planning and exercising.

TIMESCALES
The review will report in the summer and will be phased with advice being produced on the various elements possibly as follows:
- Phase One: Police (and in particular firearms) capability
- Phase Two: Capacity of the other emergency services
- Phase Three: Capacity of other agencies and sectors, collaboration arrangements etc.

OUTPUT
There will be no running commentary during the review given the likely handling of sensitive material which cannot find its way into the public domain, but the aim is to produce a report at the end of the process containing as much of the outcomes as can be made public.
ANNEX 3: MEETINGS AND SUBMISSIONS

In writing this review, I met with a large range of people. The following is a list of those individuals or organisations who contributed to the review.

POLICING IN LONDON

Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe QPM, Commissioner of the Police of the Metropolis
Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley QPM, Specialist Operations
Assistant Commissioner Patricia Gallan QPM, Specialist Crime and Operations
Deputy Assistant Commissioner Helen Ball QPM, Specialist Operations, Senior National coordinator
Deputy Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu QPM, Specialist Operations
Deputy Assistant Commissioner Maxine de Brunner, Met Change
Deputy Assistant Commissioner Fiona Taylor, Professional Standards
Commander Matt Twist, Armed Policing and Taskforce
Commander Dean Haydon, Specialist Operations, Counter Terrorism Unit
Ed Stearns, Head of Media, MPS Directorate of Media and Communications
Specialist Firearms Command
Public Order and Resources
National Coordinator, Protect and Prepare
Pan-London Taskforce
Aviation Policing
Ken Marsh, Chairman, Metropolitan Police Federation
Assistant Commissioner Sutherland et al, City of London Police

NATIONAL POLICING

Sara Thornton CBE QPM, Chair, National Police Chiefs Council
Deputy Chief Constable Simon Chesterman QPM, National Police Chiefs Council, Firearms Lead
Lynne Owens CBE QPM, Director-General, National Crime Agency

Alf Hitchcock QPM, Chief Constable, Ministry of Defence
Mike Griffiths, Chief Constable, Civil Nuclear Constabulary
Nazir Afzal, Chief Executive, Association of Police and Crime Commissioners
Paul Crowther OBE, Chief Constable, British Transport Police
College of Policing

LONDON AMBULANCE SERVICE

Dr Fionna Moore MBE, Chief Executive, London Ambulance Service
Heather Lawrence OBE, Chair, London Ambulance Service
Liam Lehan, Assistant Director of Operations – Resilience, London Ambulance Service
Kevin Bate, Deputy Director of Operations – Central Operations, London Ambulance Service

LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

Ron Dobson CBE QFSM, Commissioner, London Fire Brigade
Tim Cutbill, Assistant Commissioner – Operational Resilience, London Fire Brigade
Fire Brigades Union

TRANSPORT

Steve Burton, Director of Enforcement and On-Street Operations, Transport for London
Richard Jones, Head of Network Operations and Resilience, Transport for London
Nick Owen, Head of Strategic Co-ordination Unit, Transport for London
Nigel Furlong, Head of Resilience Planning, Transport for London
Kevin Clack, Network Security Manager, Transport for London
Bob Baker, Chief Harbour Master, Port of London Authority
Sir Peter Hendy, Chairman, Network Rail
LOCAL AND CITY GOVERNMENT

Mayor Sadiq Khan
Sophie Linden, Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime
Joanne McCartney, Deputy Mayor
Fiona Twycross AM
Val Shawcross CBE, Deputy Mayor for Transport
Gareth Bacon AM
Kemi Badenoch AM
Unmesh Desai AM
Steve O’Connell AM, Chair, Police and Crime Committee
Cllr Lib Peck, Leader, Lambeth Council
Cllr Claire Kober, Chair of London Councils and Leader, Haringey Council
John Barradell, Town Clerk and Chief Executive, City of London
Haringey Resilience and Community Safety Team
John O’Brien, Chief Executive, London Councils

LONDON RESILIENCE PARTNERSHIP MEMBERS

Steve Hamm, London Resilience Forum
Nicki Smith, Regional Lead for Emergency Preparedness, Resilience and Response at NHS England London Region

MILITARY

Major General Ben Bathurst CBE, General Officer Commanding London District, UK Army
Col Crispin Lockhart, Chief of Staff, London District, UK Army
Lt Col Sarah Streete, Joint Regional Liaison Officer, UK Army

FAITH, VOLUNTARY AND COMMUNITY GROUPS

British Red Cross
Community Security Trust
The Venerable Luke Miller, Archdeacon of London
United Reformed Church
Faith Matters (Tell MAMA)
Faith Forum
Al-Khoei Foundation
Maimonides Interfaith Foundation
Pan-London Stop and Search Community Monitoring Network
Shomrim

OTHER

Lord Alex Carlile, Chair, London Policing Ethics Panel
Anthony Mayer, Reviewer of London’s Fire Service
Stewart Goshawk, London Emergencies Trust
Brian Dillon, Rubicon Resilience
Stephen Greenhalgh, former Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime
Steve Yates
Cressida Dick CBE QPM, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Dame Anne Owers and Sarah Green, Independent Police Complaints Commission
MI5
Sir Stephen House
Paul Martin, Director of Security for Parliament

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS

Department of Transport
Department of Health
NHS England
Ministry of Defence
Department for Communities and Local Government
Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat
Office for Security and Counter Terrorism, Home Office
Crime, Fire and Policing Group, Home Office
Emergency Services Mobile Communication Programme, Home Office

BUSINESS ORGANISATIONS

Elizabeth France CBE, Chair, Security Industry Authority
Robert Hall, Security & Resilience Network, London First
Matt Maer, Director of Group Security and Resilience, Canary Wharf Management,
Sean McKee, Director of Policy and Public Affairs, London Chamber of Commerce and Industry
Music Venue Trust
MEETINGS

I also attended a number of meetings, including:

Security Review Committee
London First Advisory Board
Joint MPS/MOPAC London at Critical event
London Resilience Forum Members

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS

I was grateful to receive a number of written submissions, from a range of organisations, including:

London Borough of Sutton
Waltham Forest Council
Haringey Council
Victim Support
St John Ambulance
Eusoof Amerat, Hackney Independent Advisory Group
Rt Hon Justine Greening MP
Security Institute
Nuclear Security Services Ltd
Mr Simon Smith
Sports Grounds Safety Authority
Galop, the LGBT+ anti-violence charity
Facewatch

In addition, London MPs, Council Leaders, Executive Mayors, Local Authority Chief Executives, Assembly Members and Peers were invited to contribute
AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF LONDON’S PREPAREDNESS TO RESPOND TO A MAJOR TERRORIST INCIDENT

LORD TOBY HARRIS ■ OCTOBER 2016