## Critical Information

### Introduction

In the event of a Mass Evacuation within London, Mass Invacuation into London or the need to shelter tens of thousands of stranded persons, the London Resilience Partnership will be required to provide a coordinated, multi-agency response. This Framework is intended to provide guidance to responders at all levels on the way in which the sheltering of large numbers of people can be achieved. In the event there is a need to evacuate large numbers of people to areas outside of London, liaison with relevant LRFs, through MHCLG RED, will be essential.

### First steps

In the event of a Major Incident requiring provision of mass shelter:

- Where possible, estimate the numbers displaced and the status of the transport network, and make a decision on the most appropriate location for sheltering.
- Establish an Evacuation and Shelter Coordination Group (ESCG) or appropriate equivalent to support the work of the Gold Coordination Group, Strategic Coordinating Group or Gold Commanders if those groups are not sitting.
- Alert all London Local Authorities that there may be a need to open Shelters, using the London Local Authority Coordination Centre (LLACC), giving as much relevant information as possible.
- Ensure that all agencies are aware that they may be required to support the sheltering process appropriate to their organisational role and responsibilities.

### How to use this Framework quickly

This Framework is divided into three sections:

- For legal and general information, and for details of the risks and planning assumptions, please see Section 1.
- For Concept of Operations, activation and communication information and shelter types, please see Section 2.
- For operational considerations, please see Section 3.

### Principles

An incident requiring the opening of mass shelters is likely to be disruptive and challenging, with long-term impacts and a need for central coordination. This Framework is based on the planning assumption that the significant majority of those displaced will make their own arrangements for shelter, whilst recognising that this may vary considerably based on the nature of the initiating incident and the areas affected.
Executive Summary

The purpose of this framework is to offer guidance to responders providing emergency Shelter to large numbers of displaced persons and, where appropriate, other living creatures. In this context, the term “shelter” may take a range of forms dependent on the level of need. The underlying principle is that those who are able to make their own private arrangements must be encouraged to do so allowing the resources of responding agencies to be allocated primarily to those most in need.

The framework has been developed by the Multi-Agency London Resilience Partnership Mass Shelter Group. In addition to providing guidance, it is intended to support decision-making and expectation management across all multi-agency partners and stakeholders. The content facilitates a flexible, scalable and coordinated approach to shelter provision.

This document is not intended to be prescriptive, as every incident is different; rather, its aim is to capture the core principles of shelter provision to enable key organisations to respond consistently and with a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities.

This Framework should be read in conjunction with the London Local Authority Emergency Centres Plan which provides guidelines for the setting up, staffing and management of emergency centres.

Membership of the Multi-Agency Group

- London Local Authority
- Metropolitan Police Service
- City of London Police
- Voluntary Sector Panel
- Transport for London
- MHCLG Resilience and Emergencies Division
- NHS England
- London Resilience Group
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1. OVERVIEW AND RISK

1.1 Background

1.1.1 The provision of emergency shelter is primarily the responsibility of Local Authorities, supported by other Category 1 and Category 2 responders. This framework is provided to support the multi-agency strategic and operational response to emergency shelter needs in excess of the capability of routine local authority shelter provision having utilised all available mutual aid.

1.1.2 This framework is designed to be compatible with the London Local Authority Emergency Centres Plan which contains guidelines for the establishment and management of emergency centres in all London boroughs.

1.1.3 Please note that the term “Police” is used throughout. This may refer to the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) or the City of London Police (CoLP). Where the British Transport Police (BTP) are referenced, this will be specified.

1.1.4 This document should be read in conjunction with the Evacuation and Shelter Guidance issued by the Cabinet Office, which can be accessed via www.gov.uk.

1.2 Aim and Objectives of the London Mass Shelter Framework

1.2.1 The aim of this Framework is to provide the agencies that make up the London Resilience Partnership, and relevant responders in neighbouring LRFs, with a strategic framework and operational guidelines to support the shelter of those persons evacuated from an area or areas of London.

1.3 The objectives of this framework are:

1.3.1 Support the Strategic Coordinating Group to respond effectively to an event that requires the shelter of large numbers of people by providing a framework of shelter options and operational advice;

1.3.2 Provide responding organisations with the necessary information to allow them to effectively implement their shelter roles and responsibilities in support of an evacuation;

1.3.3 Provide the process by which appropriate information is supplied to all responding agencies, the public and businesses, at the start of and throughout the shelter process; and

1.3.4 Provide the process by which appropriate information will be distributed to the public and to businesses in advance of any shelter operation, to enable them to understand the concept and to plan for their own response.
1.4 Scope of Framework

1.4.1 This framework is intended for use by multi-agency responders when the numbers displaced and in need of emergency shelter exceeds local capability. It is not intended to supersede or replace Local Authority Borough-specific Emergency Rest Centre plans or Borough-level multi-agency arrangements.

1.4.2 The Mass Shelter Framework will not give consideration to the movement of, or provision of shelter to, those displaced from closed communities. Every effort would be made to support any evacuees from a closed community on a best endeavours basis and any facility would be made available to them if appropriate. However the specific needs and arrangements required to support known vulnerabilities would be expected to be provided by the organisation responsible for the community through their own business continuity arrangements. Closed communities include but are not limited to: detention centres, hospitals, nursing homes, or enclosures hosting animals. Such communities are expected to have emergency sheltering arrangements in place commensurate with the specific needs or restrictions of that community. Further information regarding planning for the evacuation of closed communities can be found in Chapter 4 of the National Evacuation and Shelter Guidance available at www.gov.uk.

1.4.3 The scope of this framework does not include the provision of shelter to displaced persons beyond an initial 72-hour period. Strategic decision-making on medium to long term accommodation provision will be scenario-specific, informed by the numbers of persons displaced, the wider geographical impact and the resources available. It may be necessary to form a sub-group of the Strategic Coordinating Group to focus on this issue.

1.5 Equalities

1.5.1 When determining the roles and responsibilities of all agencies and staff involved in the provision of a shelter, due consideration should be given to fairness, equality and diversity, regardless of disability, ethnic origin, race, gender, age, religious belief, or sexual orientation. Issues to be considered include:

- Access to the Shelter
- Access to information
- Consideration of separate quiet area, child friendly areas, mother and baby areas and a prayer room where possible to cater for all ages, faiths and cultures.

1.5.2 This framework assumes that all agencies will carry out their responsibilities in accordance with current Equalities legislation. Further information regarding equalities can be found in the Partnership Strategy for Disability Equality. This document is produced by the London Resilience Group and can be found on the London Prepared website.

1.6 Financial Considerations

1.6.1 Initial costs will need to fall where they lie with affected and host boroughs and be recorded clearly for future claims or reimbursement. Decisions about final allocation of costs will need to be agreed by London Local Authority Gold in partnership with the relevant Local Authority Chief Executive(s). Application may be made through Central Government schemes to recover some or all of the costs incurred.

1.6.2 The Belwin Scheme is a discretionary scheme which exists to give special financial assistance to Local Authorities which would otherwise be faced with an undue financial burden as a result of taking immediate action to safeguard the life or property of, or prevent severe inconvenience to, inhabitants of the Local Authority area. There is no automatic
entitlement to assistance and the funding only applies to the finances incurred during the response phase of the incident.

1.7 Risks and Planning Assumptions

1.7.1 A range of risks (as outlined in the London Risk Register) could result in a scenario requiring mass shelter. To provide an indication towards the scale of a Mass Shelter operation the current reasonably foreseeable worst case planning assumption for London is based on a major surface water flooding event:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evacuees with up to 25,000 people requiring assistance with evacuation</td>
<td>314,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People flooded</td>
<td>110,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People without shelter for 12 months or more</td>
<td>160,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households without suitable shelter for 12 months of more</td>
<td>59,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People stranded away from home for a 36 hour period</td>
<td>9,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People not accounted for, over 48 hours</td>
<td>1,730</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.7.2 It is recognised that, whilst flooding would be significant and is a credible known risk for London, other unknown scenarios may lead to the emergency evacuation of large numbers of people and a subsequent need for the establishment of mass shelters.

1.8 General Planning Assumptions

1.8.1 For a large-scale incident, a coordinated pan-London approach is likely to be required.

1.8.2 Responders planning for mass shelter provision should assume that between 20-30% of those evacuated will require shelter. This figure is derived from experience of smaller scale shelter operations. The numbers requiring shelter may vary significantly according to the location of the initiating incident, time of day and the demographic of those affected.

1.8.3 The opening of large-scale emergency shelters may be delayed after a “sudden onset” incident, due to the likely time needed to establish a Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) and to secure the use of appropriate venues.

1.8.4 These planning assumptions are intended only as a guide. Any mass shelter response will require a dynamic and flexible approach from all partners, to deliver an effective and successful resolution.
1.9 Links to Other plans

1.9.1 The Mass Shelter Framework should be used in conjunction with the following accompanying partnership Plans

- London Local Authority Emergency Centres Plan
- London Local Authorities Concept of Operations for Emergency Response & Recovery
- Strategic Coordination Protocol
- Mass Evacuation Framework
- Communicating with the Public Framework
- Humanitarian Assistance Plan
- Recovery Management Protocol
- London Emergency Services Liaison Panel / Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme doctrine

1.10 Document Ownership and Review

1.10.1 This Mass Shelter Framework was produced by the Mass Shelter Group on behalf of the London Resilience Forum.

1.10.2 This Framework will be subject to a 3 year review as directed by the London Resilience Forum. The Framework will be reviewed following a major exercise or any incident requiring Mass Shelter.

1.11 Protective Marking

1.11.1. This document is unclassified.

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1 The LLA Emergency Centres Plan is referenced throughout the document. The plan is due to be signed off and available in November 2018
2. ACTIVATION AND SHELTER TYPES

2.1 Framework Trigger

2.1.1 The decision to activate The London Mass Shelter Framework will normally be taken by the Strategic Coordinating Group. If required the decision to activate the framework can be made collectively between London Local Authority Gold and the Police Gold in advance of an SCG.

2.1.2 Due to the potential impact a large-scale evacuation could have on the capital, it may be necessary for the Chair of the Strategic Coordinating Group to engage with COBR (if sitting) to reach a final decision owing to the potential for long term and/or national support to rehouse significant numbers of the population.

2.1.3 The following two statements are intended to support the SCG in deciding whether an evacuation is required:

2.1.4 Following a risk assessment, is the risk to life of remaining in situ assessed to be greater than the risk of evacuation; and

2.1.5 The incident requires a level of pan London strategic coordination and response to cope with the number of people requiring shelter

2.1.6 If both statements have been met then it is likely that the London Mass Shelter Framework will be activated at its most appropriate scale to support an evacuation. It is unlikely, but should remain an option that the Mass Shelter framework can be activated in isolation of the Mass Evacuation Framework to support large numbers of evacuees from an area outside of London. In this scenario London Local Authority Gold will hold the decision to activate the protocol in conjunction with MHCLG and the affected area.

2.2 Shelter Activation

2.2.1 The above criteria may be met in sudden onset or rising tide incidents leading to considerations which are shown in the respective diagrams on the following pages.

2.2.2 When activated in conjunction with the Mass Evacuation framework the Evacuation and Shelter Coordination Group (ESCG – described in detail in section 2.5) will be a single group to coordinate all aspects of the evacuation and shelter operations.

2.2.3 It is advised that when the decision is made to activate an evacuation, a Recovery Management Cell is set up at the same time, if not already sitting as part of the Strategic Coordination Centre.

2.3 Sudden Onset Incident

2.3.1 Also referred to as “Immediate Impact” incidents, this will occur with little or no prior warning and the impact will be felt immediately. It should be noted that initial evacuation, dispersal and potentially some shelter will have to be initiated at the tactical level by on-scene commanders.

2.3.2 The following diagram depicts the decision making and subsequent information flow within the coordination structure.
2.4 Rising Tide Incident

2.4.1 A “Rising Tide” incident may have a lead-in time allowing a more coordinated response to be arranged. What can be achieved will depend on the lead-in time and the response resources available.

2.4.2 The diagram below reflects the likely steps taken prior to the decision to evacuate and shelter the public in advance of a anticipated major incident and the subsequent information flows.
Evacuation and Shelter Coordination Group (ESCG)
The ESCG coordinates the evacuation and shelter aspect of the response, based on information received from all partners.

- **Police Coordination Arrangements as appropriate to the incident**
- **LLACC**
- **BECCs (Host Local Authorities)**
- **Shelter(s)**
Closed Communities – individual agency arrangements

EEC (there may be more than one EEC)

1. Self Evacuation
   Individuals will make their own arrangements to move from a place of danger or threat of danger to a safe place using existing public transport or their own mode of transportation. They require no assistance from the responder community beyond the general warning and informing communications.

2. Assisted Evacuation
   Individuals are capable of transporting themselves but require support through way finding and directions/identification and communication of a safe place to go or need to utilise extraordinary transport provided for the public to move them from a place of danger or threatened danger to a place of safety.

3. Fully Supported Evacuation
   Individuals require greater support from the emergency services and public authorities to move from the place of danger or threat of danger. This is likely to have been preceded by the identification of the vulnerable. Support could be in many forms and is likely to require special transport arrangements to cater for the vulnerable.

4. Direct movement to an Emergency Rest Centre (ERC)
   In some circumstances where individuals are identified with specific vulnerabilities they can be moved directly to an ERC to ensure the provision of adequate support for their vulnerabilities. The decision to move them directly to an ERC should be taken at the earliest point of identification either at the scene or at an EEC.

5. Emergency Evacuation Centre (EEC)
   A facility offering short term shelter for those who cannot make alternative arrangements. An EEC will make basic food.
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Emergency Rest Centre (ERC)</td>
<td>A facility offering basic feeding, washing and dormitory provision for those without alternative accommodation options.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Self Supported Shelter</td>
<td>Individuals making their own alternative shelter arrangements for the period of the incident and not reliant on support from the public authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Closed Communities</td>
<td>An independent or self-sufficient community that will take action through pre determined plans to manage their own evacuation. They may require support from the emergency services and or public authorities – this should be agreed prior to any incident occurring. e.g., Prisons, Hospitals, Care Homes, Zoos, etc. If evacuees from a closed community utilise any of the shelter venues or facilities they should do so supported by their own organisations to meet the specific needs of those persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Shelter Support</td>
<td>Potential for shelter support to be provided by neighbouring counties or other organisations under prior agreements, MOUs or contracts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.5 The Evacuation and Shelter Coordination Group (ESCG)

**2.5.1.** Either the Metropolitan Police Service of City of London Police is likely to take the lead in coordinating the evacuation element of an incident (where this is of a scale to require activation of this document).

**2.5.2.** Invoking the Framework will create significant challenges for the partnership and the SCG. To assist in this process an ESCG will be convened with multi-agency representation (either in person or virtually). This group will directly manage the evacuation process and liaise with the relevant organisations to provide information and operational direction.

**2.5.3.** Set out in Appendix A are the role and proposed membership of the ESCG. A draft agenda for the first meeting of the ESCG has also been developed with the MPS.

**2.5.4.** The timing of the setting up of the ESCG will be dependent on the nature of the evacuation whether it relates to a rising tide or sudden onset incident. What is set out in this Framework is the ideal situation but it should be recognised that for a sudden onset event not all the key personnel will be available at short notice.

**2.5.5.** The location of the ESCG will be decided by the SCG (if one has been established) or by agreement with key partners. The location should enable close liaison with the emergency services tactical group and provide the necessary facilities to ensure effective coordination of the evacuation.

**2.5.6.** The ESCG will provide central, multi-agency coordination of the evacuation and shelter elements of incident response.

**2.5.7.** Membership of the ESCG (beyond the core shown in Appendix A) will be decided, based on circumstances and informed by discussions with partners.

**2.5.8.** There will be a time delay before all the required representatives can attend the ESCG. Until representatives are able to attend, liaison should be made directly with the relevant contact or operation centre as detailed in the London Resilience Partnership Contacts Directory.
2.5.9. Individual agencies have different internal command and control mechanisms. The purpose of the ESCG is not to bypass or replicate these structures, but to provide a single point of multi-agency coordination at an appropriate tactical level. Representatives on this group should be able to liaise effectively with their home organisations to provide the information required by the group and, as part of the group, take tactical decisions based on that information.

2.5.10. It is each individual agency’s responsibility to consider how this group should link into its command structure and make the necessary arrangements to ensure the ESCG is provided with the information it needs.

2.5.11. The diagrams at the end of this section reflect the likely steps taken prior to the decision to evacuate and shelter the public in advance of an anticipated major incident and when an incident has already occurred.

2.5.12. The setting up of the ESCG and how it might operate has already been identified as a key aspect of the Framework to be addressed through training and exercising.

2.6 Shelter Types

2.6.1 Examples of the types of venues which could be used to shelter large numbers of evacuees are provided below. Local resilience partners should consider the options for such venues within their general planning for emergencies and record a list locally. Local authorities, in conjunction with their partners, would be expected to make known suitable venues at the time the Mass Shelter framework is activated.

2.6.2 The majority of venues listed are privately-owned and venue availability cannot be guaranteed. Venue selection and approach to venue owners/operators will be determined on the day by an appropriately senior representative of the partnership.

2.6.3 Local Authorities will be asked to identify venues that could be used as EECs. This information will held in an Official Sensitive Annex to this Framework and, when available it will be uploaded to Resilience Direct for selected partners.

2.6.4 An Emergency Evacuation Centre is defined as a facility offering short term shelter for those who cannot make alternative arrangements. An EEC will make basic food provision but is unlikely to provided dormitory facilities. All efforts will be made to register occupants where possible, in order to identify welfare requirements.

2.6.5 An Emergency Rest Centre is defined as a facility offering basic feeding, washing and dormitory provision for those without alternative accommodation options. Please note that the terms “Emergency Rest Centre” and “Rest Centre” are interchangeable throughout this Framework and other London Resilience documents.

2.7 Venue Identification

2.7.1 The following definitions have been developed for an EEC. Although numbers should be taken as approximate, the following is a guide to the number of people expected to be held in shelters.
Shelter type | Considerations for suitability | Possible Examples
---|---|---
Emergency Evacuation Centre 5,000+ persons | Shelter from the elements  Provision to communicate with large numbers of people (tannoy, messaging screens etc)  Good local transport infrastructure  Places for people to sit / rest  Provision to supply refreshments  Known point that is signed and easily identifiable | Suggested building types include large exhibition halls and large nightclub venues, large sports centres, hotels with large conference facilities, fully-roofed sports stadia, shopping centres, large multiplex cinemas.

Emergency Rest Centre  For typically no more than 200 persons | As per local arrangements and detailed within the Local Authority Minimum Standards for London. | As per local arrangements and detailed within the Local Authority Minimum Standards for London.

### 2.8 Emergency Evacuation Centres

#### 2.8.1 EEC Core Principles

- An EEC may be opened to provide basic shelter for up to 5000 people.
- An EEC is primarily intended for use by people awaiting transfer to Borough-level Emergency Rest Centre (ERC) accommodation, or as a safe place to wait whilst their private arrangements come into effect.
- Due to the potentially large numbers of people at an EEC, there will be no provision of dormitory facilities, i.e. beds, cots, inflatable mattresses or other similar equipment. Basic food provision will be made but this will also be dependent on resourcing and circumstances. The limits to what can be provided at an EEC mean that, for humanitarian reasons, time spent there should be kept to a minimum.
- Registration of those being sheltered will be limited to ascertaining accuracy of numbers and home Boroughs, and will take place only if shelter staffing levels and resources permit.
- The intended maximum stay at an EEC is 72 hours. This is to allow Boroughs to establish sufficient Emergency Rest Centre sites. It may be necessary to establish a network of multiple EEC and ERC sites.

#### 2.9 EEC Activation

#### 2.9.1 The activation of an EEC is likely to be ordered by the on-call London Local Authority Gold in consultation with the Evacuation and Shelter Coordination Group (ESCG).

#### 2.9.2 Considerations prior to the opening of an EEC should include:

- Selection of the most appropriate venue from a pre-prepared list of possible venues. Location and the availability of functioning transport infrastructure nearby, and accessibility for provision of equipment and resources should be considered. This is crucial to facilitate the movement of people both to the shelter and onwards to their eventual destinations.
• Consideration should be given to factors such as the weather conditions. Where possible, fully-covered venues should always be used in preference to those which are partially-covered. Due to the size of the building required, it is possible that the EEC chosen will be in a different Borough to the initiating incident.

• The early and continued availability of Local Authority staff in the host Borough to manage the shelter, in conjunction with partner agencies. Please note that it may be necessary to supplement Local Authority staff with staff from other Boroughs if the incident is protracted.

• Availability of Local Authority and other partner agencies to provide staffing.

• The means of coordination with other functioning shelters.

2.10 EEC Command, Control and Management

2.10.1 The EEC will be managed by a Shelter Manager (SM) from the hosting Local Authority, or another London Local Authority if circumstances require it. The SM will be supported by the Shelter Management Team (SMT). Membership of this group should be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Required on-site</th>
<th>May be required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local Authority Shelter Manager (SM), Local Authority staff / volunteers</td>
<td>Public Health England (PHE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>Other Local Authority services as deemed necessary by SM, i.e. Child Protection Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAS</td>
<td>Police Casualty Bureau representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Sector responders</td>
<td>Local Health Service providers / Representatives of NHS Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner / Operator representative</td>
<td>Transport for London (TfL) and other transport operators appropriate to location.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.10.2. Please note that this list is not intended to be exhaustive and should be approached flexibly, in response to the specific incident circumstances. See below for a list of the Roles and Responsibilities of the key agencies within an EEC.
## EEC Core Agency Roles and Responsibilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
<th>Suggested on-site presence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Local Authority** | To lead on shelter management and distribution of vulnerable evacuees to smaller shelters as appropriate. | To provide shelter manager and additional Local Authority staff  
To lead the shelter management team and co-ordinate other agencies on-site  
To liaise with partners to arrange onward transportation of evacuees where necessary  
Basic Refreshments (likely to be sourced from MoU with supermarkets or wholesale food suppliers)  
The provision of information regarding the shelters in use, approximate numbers being sheltered and any issues to the ECSG via the LLACC  
To provide mutual aid to affected boroughs or those hosting EEC venues by non-affected boroughs | Staffing should include a Shelter Manager. The number of additional staff should be commensurate with the number of evacuees in the shelter  
**NOTE:** Staff may be drawn from more than one Local Authority. In this instance the SM from the host Borough has the management lead. |
| **Owner/Operator representative** | To provide guidance on venue operations | To support Shelter Manager and management team  
To provide access / control to venue facilities and services as appropriate on a best endeavours basis | Facilities manager or similar; as many experienced venue staff as can be made available. |
| **Police** | To support the safe and secure functioning of the shelter | To provide security and reassurance at the venue  
To be an information link to the wider Police incident response | As permitted by available resources |
| **LAS Local Health Service Providers** | To provide urgent medical care  
To support Local Authority staff | To assist in the sourcing of urgently needed medication  
To assist in the assessment of medical needs | As determined by NHS England, which will co-ordinate the overall Health sector response. |
| **Voluntary Sector responders** | To support the Local Authority and medical response. | To provide support to LAS by delivering First Aid  
To provide Humanitarian Assistance where needed | As permitted by available resources.  
**NOTE:** Voluntary sector responders will be coordinated by the Shelter Manager. This may be delegated by Shelter Manager to another Local Authority member of the Shelter Management Team. |
| **Transport for London (TfL)** | To support the flow of evacuees to and from the EEC and to ERC | To liaise with TfL and other transport operators to gain an accurate picture of available transport resources. With SM, to co-ordinate the onward movement of evacuees | Determined by TfL management in consultation with ESCG. |
2.11 Emergency Rest Centre

2.11.1 London Local Authorities have a standardised Emergency Centres plan which sets out the standard procedures for opening, operating and closing down of Emergency Rest Centres. Plans are well established, tried and tested within boroughs. Therefore there is little detail in this document to minimise confusion between existing arrangements and those suggested in this framework to support Mass Shelter requirements. Emergency Rest Centre facilities will provide the backbone of the supported shelter of those displaced and requiring short term accommodation in the days following an evacuation.

2.11.2 In the event of a large-scale displacement of people, multiple ERCs with dormitory capability across several London Boroughs may be required.

2.12 Role of ERCs in a mass sheltering incident

2.12.1 In the event of displacement of large numbers of Londoners from their homes, it is not anticipated that ERC accommodation across London will be sufficient.

2.12.2 The ERC is only intended for use by those who cannot make private arrangements, either because they cannot afford them or have no family or friends able to support them.

2.12.3 This means that those sheltering in rest centres may require a level of additional support. The demographic likely to be in this category may already have a level of engagement with relevant statutory services. ERC staff will need to be aware of this and need to seek the appropriate support in a timely way.

2.13 Recovery and Longer-Term Accommodation

2.13.1 In accordance with the London Recovery Management Protocol, a Recovery Management Cell (RMC) should be set up as soon as practicable after the establishment of a Strategic Coordinating Group. The RMC functions as a sub-group of the SCG and is Chaired by a nominee of London Local Authority Gold (LLAG).

2.13.2 At the point at which it is felt by members of the SCG that the balance of work leans more naturally towards recovery than response, the Chair of the SCG and the Chair of the RMC will formally agree this and the RMC will become the Recovery Coordination Group (RCG). The RCG will be Chaired by the most appropriate Local Authority Chief Executive and will direct partnership recovery efforts.

2.13.3 It may be necessary to have shelters remain open despite a move to the recovery phase of the incident. In this case, the ESCG should become a sub-group of the RCG, maintaining an overview of the status of shelters and providing updates as required on the numbers still being sheltered. The ESCG has a coordinating role in supporting the return of people to their homes and the return of shelter venues to their owners / operators.

2.13.4 The recovery from an incident requiring mass evacuation and the provision of mass shelter is likely to be complex and prolonged. Temporary or permanent alternative accommodation may be required for significant numbers of displaced residents. Given the potential numbers, this will need to be centrally coordinated and should be considered by the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) and / or the Recovery Management Cell (RMC), specifically to address the issue of accommodation during the response phase.

2.13.5 The concept of an Accommodation Coordination Group is specific to an incident involving mass shelter and therefore is not generically listed as a sub group within the Recovery Coordination Protocol.
3. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

3.1. Overview

3.1.1. The following sections are provided as guidance to responders seeking information on key considerations when dealing with a mass shelter requirement.

3.1.2. The information listed below is not intended to be prescriptive and may not be appropriate in every instance.

3.1.3. Responders should assess their available resources, the circumstances and impact of the initiating incident and the direction being provided by the SCG (if sitting) when making decisions about their approach to resolving an emergency shelter need for large numbers of people.

3.1.4. The following sections are provided as guidance to responders seeking information on key considerations when dealing with a mass shelter requirement. Each section will contain an overview of:

- Key agencies and other partners
- The resources that may be required
- Financial considerations
- Variations to expect, by Shelter type
- Listing of other pan-London plans and workstreams that are relevant at the operational or strategic level
- Key issues facing responders
- Guidance for responders, with signposting or suggested actions where appropriate.

3.2. Transport between shelter venues

3.2.1. The transport between types of shelter should be considered separately to the transport used for the evacuation phase. Where possible best use of existing transport routes and means should be utilised, it may be necessary to provide bespoke transport solutions with additional provision for vulnerable persons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead and Partner Agencies</th>
<th>Local Authority, with support from relevant transport providers and the Voluntary Sector.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources required</td>
<td>Passenger carrying vehicles not already engaged with the evacuation or existing transport provision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variations per Shelter type</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Linked Plans / Workstreams
Existing arrangements between transport providers and emergency responders. London Local Authority Emergency Centres Plan
3.3. Key Issues

- The availability of additional transport resources over and above those required for the evacuation or being used to maintain business as usual transport provision to London.
- The need to prioritise transport to those most vulnerable in the first instance.
- The need to clearly control and manage the use of the transport and potential for disorder due to the demand.
- Consideration for the accessibility of large passenger vehicles to pick up and drop off passengers close to shelter venues, particularly when servicing smaller venues such as ERCs.
- Effective coordination of the transport resources to maximise the efficiency of its use.
- Consideration to minimise the number of times an evacuee is transported between facilities. It will be important to communicate clearly the reasoning behind the different types of shelter facility and the requirement for such journeys.

3.4. Guidance for Responders

- It is likely that demand for additional transport will be high, consideration should be given to engaging with private hire companies, existing local authority transport provision and Voluntary Sector transport capability.
- Where possible crowd control arrangements should be put in place to control the access to the arranged transport between shelter types.
- Where possible people should be encouraged make their own arrangements for onward transportation between shelter venues.

3.5. Arrivals and reception

3.5.1. The numbers of people evacuated to EEC shelter-types mean that the emphasis of staff managing those venues should be on crowd management and identification of those who will not be able to make private arrangements for shelter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead and Partner Agencies</th>
<th>Local Authority, Voluntary Sector, with support from relevant Police Service if appropriate. Wherever possible assistance should be sought from premises staff due to their familiarity with the venue.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources required</td>
<td>Tables and chairs, loud hailers or PA systems, stationery, display boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variations per Shelter type</td>
<td>Quantity of equipment / staff needed and length of time required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.6. **Key Issues**

- Crowd Management and directing in larger shelters which may have multiple entrances and exits and which may already be in use for unrelated purposes
- The level of available Local Authority and Voluntary Sector staffing to provide direction and respond to public enquiries
- Time taken to open the shelter and management of the public whilst a shelter management team is being established and resources put in place
- Coordination of transport to and from the shelter with relevant partner agencies and maintenance of an overview of the current and projected crowd numbers
- Effective identification of those who will require additional support from Local Authority Teams and partner agencies
- Provision of consistent information to the public across all agencies and potentially at multiple sites
- It is likely that those being sheltered will use mobile telephones to call relatives or friends, to access the internet to seek information, and to use social media. This may place stress on the telecommunication network and may cause outages or delays to the service, particularly if the network is already experiencing heavy usage as a result of the initiating incident.

3.7. **Guidance for Responders**

- It is likely that demand for staffing resources will exceed those available. Establish an effective command and coordination structure as a priority to make best use of staff, and make early requests for additional support / mutual aid where necessary.
- Wherever possible, make use of venue staff and stewards for appropriate roles, i.e. directions within venues, management and monitoring of entrances and exits and arrival numbers versus venue capacity. Venue capacities must not be exceeded. If a venue is likely to exceed its licensed capacity, this must be communicated to all partners within the shelter, those working remotely, i.e. within a Borough Emergency Control Centre (BECC), on scene responders directing evacuees and the ECSG as a matter of urgency.
- Identify an appropriate and accessible source of information on the status of the transport network as a matter of urgency
- Designate specific staff from an appropriate agency to collect and manage information and notifications on those identified as vulnerable, i.e. unaccompanied children, those with disabilities etc.
- Ensure that you have access to an alternative means of communication should the telecommunications network be compromised.
- Where possible persons already in the shelter venues should be used to support the Authorities in administrative duties, translation or to support those with identified vulnerabilities.
3.1 Registration and Documentation

3.8.1. The process of registration of persons evacuated to a Local Authority rest centre is documented in the London Local Authority Emergency Centres Plan. It is usually carried out by Borough staff members or, in partnership with the British Red Cross.

3.8.2 Information gathered during the registration process should be shared with other Local Authority teams where appropriate, usually those dealing with Social Care. External agencies receiving information may include the health sector and emergency services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead and Partner Agencies</th>
<th>Local Authority and Voluntary Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Stock of appropriate stationary, trained staff members to support or carry out the registration process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variations per Shelter type</td>
<td>Registration will only be carried out at an EEC if resources permit it, but the number of persons at the shelter may preclude registration. Those moved to Local Authority Emergency Rest Centres should be fully registered.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Linked Plans / Workstreams
Humanitarian Assistance Framework, London Local Authority Emergency Centres Plan

3.9. Key Issues

- The nature of the information being taken on Council or Voluntary Sector forms and the level of detail required varies from Borough to Borough. Forms may take up to 30 minutes to complete in some Boroughs. This is impractical in a shelter containing up to 5000 people.
- If a decision is taken that partial or full registration of those sheltering in an EEC is required, despite the large numbers, there may be significant logistical issues with the amount of stationary required, and its delivery to the shelter.

3.10 Guidance for Responders

- Responders should refer to the London Local Authorities Emergency Centres Plan for protocols and procedures relating to registration process guidance.

3.11. Provision of information in Shelters

3.11.1. Any Shelter operation will be dependent on successful communication with the public and responders at all levels must be mindful of the challenges and opportunities posed by social media platforms and the speed by which informal messaging will occur. Messaging must be accurate, clear and consistent.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead and Partner Agencies</th>
<th>Local Authority, in conjunction with relevant emergency services Transport for London and Voluntary or community groups.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Digital and fixed displays, vocal amplification equipment such as loudhailers, PA systems and signage. Consideration must be given to accessibility of information to all, i.e. information to those who are visually or audibly impaired or who do not speak English as a first language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variations per Shelter type</td>
<td>Venues large enough to be used as EEC Shelters are likely to have a range of options for visual and audio information-sharing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Plans / Workstreams</td>
<td>Warning and Informing; Communicating with the Public &amp; London Local Authority Emergency Centres Plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.12. Key Issues

- Members of the public in shelters are likely to make continuous demands for information about the venue and about the incident. The larger the number of evacuees, the less likely it is that the Shelter Management Team will be able to provide two-way communication with the public.
- It may be difficult to source accurate information from official sources at times, especially early into a response while pan-London arrangements are being stood-up.
- Responders must find ways to communicate key generic messages to large numbers of people whilst also considering more targeted communication towards particular groups. As the numbers being sheltered increases, capacity to communicate with a large number of people must increase correspondingly. This may reduce the capacity of responders to successfully carry out more targeted communication.
- Information will flow into Shelters from external sources, i.e. friends and family, and online, and this may influence the behaviour of the those within the shelter.

### 3.13. Guidance for Responders

- Wherever possible, make use of a member of venue staff:
  - To provide information to the Shelter Management Team on available communications equipment on-site
  - To operate that equipment, as they will be familiar with it
  - To provide information to evacuees on the building facilities, i.e. location of toilets, smoking areas
- If appropriate, agree within the responding staff on-site a nominated representative / agency to deliver messages to evacuees. This provides a clear (visual) authoritative voice.
- Have regular staff or agency briefings to ensure information is consistent throughout the shelter
• Briefings to evacuees should be given regularly, with indications given if possible on when the next briefing will be. This is intended to limit the questions asked, allowing shelter staff to focus on the most vulnerable evacuees

• Set up “Information Stations” and sign-post them clearly. Consider designating some of those stations for specific purposes, i.e. a station for those reporting medical issues

• The Shelter Manager or designated individual should maintain regular contact with their respective BECC to ensure information is current and passed to the ESCG through the LLACC to maintain situational awareness.


3.14.1. The provision of medical support to shelters is the responsibility of NHS England (London). Specialist Voluntary Sector organisations may be able to offer support.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead and Partner Agencies</th>
<th>NHS England (London) (lead) - includes Primary Care Commissioners, all CCGs and providers of NHS funded care, London Ambulance Service. Support may be required from NHS 111 and the appropriate Voluntary Sector organisations, by invitation.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources required</td>
<td>Dependent on numbers being sheltered and the number of shelters operating.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variations per Shelter type</td>
<td>EEC: Those with moderate medical or nursing needs will be cared for as necessary if those needs are considered minor and short term. Those with more complex needs or who will require prolonged interventions will be transferred to appropriate alternative accommodation. ERC: Evacuees will be redirected to appropriate alternatives as soon as practically possible as per the NHS England (London) existing arrangements to provide medical support to ERCs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.15. Key Issues:

• A wide variety of conditions with varying degrees of needs and complexity including long-term and short-term medical and surgical problems, pharmacy requirements, medical equipment including oxygen requirements, nursing needs such as dressings, mental health conditions (possibly exacerbated by evacuation) and changes in all types of condition bought about by an evacuation.

• Requires experienced health care professionals who can quickly identify what the issues are on an individual basis and determine the most appropriate course of action.

• The number of health care professionals required will depend on the numbers being sheltered and the type of shelter. Resources will be obtained from a variety of providers including primary care and community services.

• There is likely to be a very high demand on the NHS staff due to demand at A&E, Clinics, Urgent Care Centres and other facilities dealing with victims of the incident.
3.16. **Guidance for Responders:**

3.16.1. Those whose medical needs are urgent and require immediate care will be transferred directly to an Emergency Department by LAS.

- Where an EEC is in operation an assessment system will need to be put in place. This will look at individual’s current needs and what they are likely to need over the next 72 hours. If an ERC is not a suitable environment to meet those needs then transfer will be arranged.
  - An EEC assessment team might comprise of a GP, a nurse and an Ambulance Liaison Officer – the number of teams would depend on the numbers being sheltered and further examination of the respective roles of the team members needs to be undertaken.
  - NHS England would liaise with providers (primary care and community service providers – adult, child and mental health) to source suitable practitioners to provide this service.
  - NHS England will coordinate information regarding availability of alternative accommodation in conjunction with providers of NHS care and communicate that availability to practitioners working in the EEC. Transfers to accommodation will be communicated to NHS England who will maintain a log of actions taken by the NHS. In the event of Mass Evacuation or Shelter Frameworks being activated the NHS England (London) Incident Coordination Centre would open to coordinate the London wide NHS response.
  - Where an individual is deemed to be able to stay in an EEC or ERC but requires simple medical or nursing intervention, NHS England (Primary Care Commissioning) will arrange for a provider to accommodate that need. It is envisaged that those working in an EEC or ERC would be drawn largely from the nursing workforce.
  - NHS England (Primary Care Commissioning) will liaise with local pharmacies to provide an emergency dispensing service where an individual has left his or her medication behind on evacuation.

3.17. **Security and Safeguarding**

3.17.1. It is likely that there will be persons present within any form of shelter that could either pose a threat to security or may require safeguarding intervention due to their vulnerability.

3.17.2. Every effort should be made to ensure there are appropriately resourced staff to manage potential security issues or close liaison with the police services should be made to ensure that potential security issues do not escalate. It should be noted that police resources are likely to be in great demand to respond to the incident causing the evacuation and potentially to assist in the evacuation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Lead and Partner Agencies</strong></th>
<th>Local Authority, Police services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resources required</strong></td>
<td>Security officers if available, Social Care representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variations per Shelter type</strong></td>
<td>In larger shelters it will be considerably more difficult to identify those with safeguarding needs due to the numbers of persons present. Consideration should be made to provide a facility for persons to self present to and all staff made aware of the process for referring anyone with safeguarding issues to the appropriate officers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Linked Plans/Workstreams
London Local Authority Emergency Centres Plan

3.18. Key Issues

- Potential for disorder due to large numbers trying to access finite resources and uncertainty following an incident.
- Venues may require searching prior to their use to assure the safety of evacuees using the facility if there is a heightened security threat.
- Provision of Police staff and security officers are likely to be scarce due to the response to the incident causing the evacuation.
- Many people will be made vulnerable due to the displacement from their home and may require safeguarding intervention, particularly children or persons with learning disabilities or mental health needs. This is likely to put unprecedented demand upon social care staff.

3.19. Guidance for Responders

- Social Care staff from both adult and children’s services should be present in shelters initially or a mechanism to obtain effective support from them should be put in place to support those with safeguarding issues.

3.20. Catering and Feeding

3.20.1. The provision of food to evacuees at shelters will be determined by the number of persons and the shelter type. Food will be limited to what can reasonably be provided at EEC venues.

3.20.2. Food provision is an issue that carries considerable reputational risk and it will be essential to employ a level of public expectation-management. The identification and securing of a reliable source of appropriate catering should be a key strategic priority, given the likely level of cost and the short timeframes for sourcing and preparation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead and Partner Agencies</th>
<th>Local Authorities, with support from the Voluntary Sector and private companies.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources required</td>
<td>Catering for up to 5,000 evacuees per shelter for 72 hrs. Note that multiple EEC and ERC shelters may be opened simultaneously in a number of host Boroughs, increasing demand and the need for a coordinated approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variations per Shelter type</td>
<td>Emergency Evacuation Centres and Emergency Rest Centres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.21. Key Issues

- It is unlikely that Local Authority contractors will have sufficient stock at short notice to supply all the shelters being hosted in their Boroughs without significantly compromising their normal service levels.
- Although local supermarkets may be approached to support a response, they are stocked according to typical local demand and may not be able to provide the...
amount of food required for a larger shelter. Gathering food from a number of different sources may be logistically difficult.

- Food preparation, refrigeration and hygiene regulations will need to be followed and this may be difficult to do at venues and without appropriately trained staff. Food provided must be safe and meet the dietary requirements of those evacuated.
- Money, foodstuffs and other goods including clothing donated by the public and other agencies will need to be effectively managed and consideration given to storage, distribution and disposal during the planning, response and recovery stages of the incident.

3.22. Guidance for Responders

- A number of schemes exist at a strategic level under corporate social responsibility schemes to allow for the sourcing of food. Supermarkets may be able to supply shelters direct from warehouses under existing Emergency Response MoUs with the major supermarkets.
- Consider an approach made at the appropriate level to providers such as airline catering companies, who may be able to supply large numbers of meals, at relatively short notice. There is likely to be a significant cost implication associated with this and practical issues such as the delivery, preparation (i.e. heating), issue and waste management subsequent to meal delivery.
- Where possible make use of appropriate community representatives and voluntary sector agencies to seek advice on the needs of specific sections of the community.
- Consideration must be given to the waste disposal of unused food supplied and the maintenance of fresh supplies over the period of the shelter operation.

3.23. Animal Welfare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead and Partner Agencies</th>
<th>Local Authorities, RSPCA and other animal welfare organisations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources required</td>
<td>Animal Hospitals, Ambulances and Temporary kennelling facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variations per Shelter type</td>
<td>It is important to gather information from owners evacuated to rest centres and / or from the scene to decide on the level of assistance that will be required by residents in caring for their animals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Animal numbers and needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• What support if possible will be required for those needing accommodation with their pets at Rest Centre or other shelter provision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Consideration in advance for the needs of animals abandoned in their homes or community and how this need will be addressed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some animals may be too ill or injured to be transported from the scene and veterinary advice should be sought at the earliest possible stage to alleviate any suffering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linked Plans</td>
<td>London Local Authority Emergency Centres Plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.24. Key Issues

- Key legislation to consider is the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Prior to this legislation people had a duty to ensure that an animal didn't suffer unnecessarily. This act broadens the duty of care on anyone responsible for animals to take reasonable steps to ensure that the animal's needs are met. This includes food, water and medical care and applies to the owner or anyone in charge of an animal even on a temporary basis.

- If the incident has affected a residential area then it is probable that any subsequent evacuation will involve animals. Encouraging residents to plan for the safety and care of their pets ahead of any evacuation can be considered as part of warning and informing messages, for example, in pre-emptive activity in advance of forecast floods. By giving animal owners information in advance they can consider contingency arrangements and prepare for an evacuation, keeping animal welfare in owner's hands.

- Provision will need to be made for assistance dogs when required in any shelter type.

3.25. Guidance for Responders

- It is important that animal welfare is considered during evacuation situations. Even if an agency's concern is not primarily an animal’s safety, the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina proved the lengths that pet owners will go to, to ensure their pet is safe. As a result, this area of concern becomes linked to human safety. It is evident people will stay with their pet and will not leave premises even under serious threat whatever that threat is, or even under instruction from emergency responders, local authorities etc. This could then lead to a person putting themselves at more risk and potentially increasing loss of human life in an emergency situation.

- A pet animal is seen as part of the family, a loved one, a life companion. A pet owner will not leave their animal behind, or if they have to, they must be safe in the knowledge the animal will be safe, cared for and needs met.

- When considering planning, it is essential animals are included. Plan for facilities that can take an animal, ensure they are safe and secure places for animals to be kept and that owners of the animals know where the animal is and that they are able to access and care for their animal. Not having this access to a pet or not having the knowledge their pet is safe will cause more stress in a very stressful situation. The knowledge that the pet is safe, secure and cared for is a major part of reducing the emotional impact on a person or family.

- It may be possible to leave certain animals such as snakes and reptiles in the home environment if they are in a tank or secure environment with enough food and water to survive. Responders may wish to seek specialist advice if this option is being considered.

3.26. Dormitory Provision

3.26.1. Dormitory provision in this context refers to the provision of equipment intended for sleep, including but not limited to: camp cots, sleeping mats, inflatable mattresses and other similar items. London Local Authorities are required through the terms of the Minimum Standards for London to be able to provide sleeping facilities for a maximum of 200 people per Borough.

3.26.2. Dormitory facilities are unlikely to be provided in EEC venues due to the resources required and the potential number of persons. It is suggested that those sheltering in EEC venues who cannot return to their homes or who require additional support be moved to Borough-
level ERCS. If the numbers requiring this facility exceed the spaces available a central decision will need to be taken on the most appropriate solution. Decisions on the appropriate provision and management of dormitory facilities will be incident specific and should be made at SCG level based on information provided by local responders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead and Partner Agencies</th>
<th>Local Authorities in partnership with the Voluntary Sector.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Sleeping bases and blankets, pillows suitable for adults, children and infants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variations per Shelter type</td>
<td>Primarily for use in ERCs. Use in STS venues to be decided on a case by case basis.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Linked Plans / Workstreams
London Local Authority Emergency Centres Plan

#### 3.27. Key Issues
- The sourcing and delivery of the necessary amount of equipment. This will require accurate assessment of the number of people being sheltered in each venue, which in turn requires registration.
- An assessment should be made of the best use of the available space based on the population of the shelter and the need to offer a level of safety and privacy to all.
- Those using mobility equipment such as wheelchairs and walking frames and those with disabilities, the elderly and other vulnerable people may require more space and alternative equipment as they may not be able to use the sleeping bases provided.

#### 3.28. Guidance for Responders
3.28.1. It is suggested that a coordinated approach to this issue be taken via the LLACC, which can support mutual aid provision and coordinate voluntary sector support.

#### 3.29. Psychosocial and Spiritual Support
3.29.1. A large-scale evacuation and exclusion from the home is likely to be traumatic for those displaced, especially if there is a perceived lack of available information on when a return home will be possible.

3.29.2. Local Authorities have a responsibility to make arrangements to meet the welfare needs of the public, in addition to making provision for food and shelter. This includes the provision of immediate practical and emotional support. The level of need even at a local Emergency Rest Centre level may exceed the capacity of the hosting Local Authority, and so the voluntary sector plays an important role in providing support and services in this area. If significant need becomes evident the London Humanitarian Assistance Framework should be activated.

3.29.3. Several of the major national Voluntary Sector Organisations are specified. Category 1 responders should also consider the support that can be provided by smaller, locally-based volunteer groups and the Faith Community.
3.30.  Key Issues

- Members of the public may be very distressed, and this will be challenging for staff managing a shelter operation. The level of personal distress may be significantly influenced by the nature of the initiating incident.

- It is unlikely that a Local Authority will have sufficient staff to manage this aspect of a Shelter incident without significant assistance.

- It is unlikely that even the largest voluntary sector organisations will be able to wholly meet the need of hosting Local Authorities, especially if multiple shelters are opened in a single or in a range of Boroughs. It is the responsibility of the lead Local Authority (per host Borough) to co-ordinate this response.

3.31.  Guidance for Responders

- It is recommended that requests for support from the voluntary sector are made early, to maximise the level of support available.

- If a pan-London approach is being taken, hosting Local Authority staff will be required to provide and receive information on available resources centrally, to allocate support to where it is most needed.

- The following organisations may be able to provide support to Local Authority colleagues by deploying staff to shelters:
  - British Red Cross
  - RVS (Royal Voluntary Service)
  - The Salvation Army
  - St John Ambulance
  - Faith Communities
  - The Samaritans
  - CRUSE (Bereavement Care)
  - Their contact details are available through the Partnership Contacts directory.

3.32.  Handover

3.32.1. The likely duration of shelter operations mean that shelter management teams will need to carry out handovers between staff. It will be essential to ensure that these are comprehensive whilst kept to a manageable length.
Lead and Partner Agencies

| Local Authority (Shelter Manager) in conjunction with relevant emergency and voluntary services supporting mass shelter venues. If evacuees are being transferred onto other Boroughs, representatives of that Local Authority and their local partners should be included. |

Resources required

| General handover checklist, vulnerable persons handover checklist, registration data, telephone, email, contact directory, meeting room / quiet area. |

Variations per Shelter type

| General handover may be supplemented with bespoke handovers for groups or individuals who require additional support from social services, schools, housing, health partners and other organisations which may be providing support. |

3.33. Key Issues:

- The most appropriate type of handover must be selected: face to face, verbal or written. Future investigation and audit needs should always be considered.
- Preparing and carrying out comprehensive handovers may take time and place a strain on limited resources, particularly if the shelter is busy and all staff are changing over simultaneously.
- Handover resourcing, collation and storage may be challenging during shelter operations. Written handover materials must be retained and securely stored in accordance with data management principles, to facilitate debriefing and lessons-learned work.

3.34. Guidance for Responders

- Agreed handover checklists for general operations and vulnerable / individual users may be useful, using the same format for paper or electronic copies
- Carry out regular staff & partner briefings throughout shifts to record information, keep staff information current and allow an overview of the whole shift to be maintained.
- Designate a role within the Shelter Management Team to manage the handover process and be responsible for data management.
- Consider overlapping shifts or staggering changeovers
- For audit purposes, records of completed handovers must be kept. These should be signed by each party to confirm the areas covered, outstanding work areas and priorities and a horizon-scan, at minimum.

3.35. Shelter Staffing: Roles, Welfare and Safety

3.35.1. It is likely that shelters will be challenging work environments and employers from all agencies likely to be involved in Shelter operations will need to consider the welfare needs of their staff.
Lead and Partner Agencies
Local Authority Shelter Manager retains an overview but all agencies are primarily responsible for the welfare of their staff and the allocation of oncoming replacements.

Resources required
Communication equipment, information on the progress of the incident and current strategies, availability of transport etc.

Variations per Shelter type
The larger venues are likely to be the most demanding environments to work within. Differing roles may be required in shelter types, and this will require coordination of multiple staff.

Linked Plans/Workstreams
Warning and Informing, Humanitarian Assistance, Mass Evacuation, Command and Control, LESLP, London Local Authority Emergency Centres Plan

3.36. Key Issues:
- Staff may feel overwhelmed by dealing with large numbers of staff.
- If the incident is local, some staff may be personally affected by the incident, which may limit their availability to respond.
- Staff may have varying levels of training in emergency response and may be unsure of their responsibilities.
- Health and safety arrangements and liability for staff working at a shelter. Individual organisations will need to risk assess the deployment of staff based upon their contractual agreements.

3.37. Guidance for Responders:
- Ensure that plans are in place to replace staff within an appropriate amount of time.
- Shelter managers and others working in supervisory capacity should be aware of the symptoms of stress and monitor staff and themselves for them.

3.38. Shelter Venue Stand-down

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lead and Partner Agencies</th>
<th>Local Authority, volunteer agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources required</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variations per Shelter type</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.39. **Key Issues:**

- Clear Authorisation must be received from an appropriate source that the shelter is to be closed.
- Remaining members of the public sheltering in the venue must be transported onwards.
- Cost recovery / payment is likely to be an immediate issue as the incident progresses through the Recovery stage.
- Debriefing of those working in the shelter (from all agencies) must take place as quickly as possible.

3.40. **Guidance for Responders:**

- Ask staff to retain evidence of costs e.g. food bills, taxi fares, local equipment purchases etc., as well as any written agreements made with venues or partner agencies.
- The host Borough should appoint an appropriate Single Point of Contact (SPOC) that venue owners can contact regarding payment for cost of hosting evacuees, reinstatement of facilities to original condition, etc.
- The host borough might be asked to give support to evacuees with their onward journey to home or otherwise, receiving support from partner agencies and mutual aid from other Boroughs if needed.
- The Local Authority or Local Authorities from which the majority of evacuees were moved should consider the establishment of a Humanitarian Assistance Centre to provide post-incident information and on-going support to the community.
- Coordination with the relevant Local Authority Housing Service(s) will be needed to facilitate the movement of evacuees to temporary accommodation and to provide long-term support to any evacuees who cannot return to their properties.
APPENDIX A: EVACUATION & SHELTER COORDINATION GROUP

1. Role

1.1 Individual agencies have different internal command and control mechanisms. The purpose of the ESCG is not to bypass or replicate these structures, but to provide a single point of multi-agency coordination at an appropriate tactical level. Representatives on this group should be able to liaise effectively with their home organisations to provide the information required by the group and, as part of the group, take tactical decisions based on that information.

1.2 The ESCG will provide central, multi-agency coordination to an evacuation and to meeting shelter requirements. Specifically, but not exclusively, the group will be responsible for:

- Coordinating the overall evacuation of persons, as safely as is reasonably practicable, from places of danger to places of safety
- Coordinating those evacuees who are able to self-evacuate by providing relevant information
- Identify the approximate population requiring assistance with evacuation
- Identify suitable locations for sheltering people (using information supplied by BECCs via the LLACC)
- Identify suitable transport methods (through liaison with transport operating companies), taking into consideration any impacts on transport from the trigger incident
- Identify a traffic management strategy
- Coordinate multi-evacuations should this be necessary in an incident that requires evacuation from more than one location to coordinate those evacuations
- Provide operational direction to agencies on how to manage those needing to be evacuated and/or sheltered form their areas
- Provide regular information to Tactical and the SCG on the status of the evacuation.
- Provide information to SCG to inform the strategic public information messages to be disseminated by communications teams and,
- Provide advice to the Recovery Coordinating group.

2. Membership

2.1 In the event of a sudden impact event requiring a mass evacuation it will take some time for the full membership of the ESCG to be in place. The ideal membership of the ESCG is likely to include:

- Police
- London Fire Brigade
- London Ambulance Service
- Local Authorities
- Network Rail (representing Train Operating Companies)
- TfL and other transport operators (as appropriate)
- London Resilience Communication Group Liaison Officer
3. First Meeting Draft Agenda
3.1 The below draft agenda is supplied for the information of the ESCG Chair. The nature of the agenda items will vary according to the event.

**First Meeting Draft Agenda**

1. Any urgent business
2. Introductions
3. Apologies for absence/substitutes
4. Roles of those present (who they are representing)
5. Briefing: Current Situation: Feedback from SCG or Policer Strategic Commander
6. Briefing: Command and Control arrangements
7. Stage of evacuation
8. Situation report from responders
9. Key messages: Evacuation input to:
   - Warning and informing
   - Communication / media strategy
   - Specific audience eg those impacted by the event, general messaging across partnership, public and business
10. Shelter update
11. Recovery
12. Composition of the ESCG
13. Stand down arrangements
14. Any other business
15. Date and time of next meeting
16. Invitees and organisations attending
APPENDIX B: SHELTER MANAGEMENT TEAM AGENDA

The demands upon staff from all agencies at an EEC will preclude lengthy meetings, but it is recommended that a supervisory level representative from each agency attend meetings at one-hourly intervals to allow an up to date information picture to be maintained. The meeting will be chaired by the Shelter Manager or another delegated Local Authority staff member. Key information should be logged by a designated individual and relayed to the coordinating Local Authority BECC for onward transmission to coordinating groups ie to London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) via the London Local Authority Coordination Centre (LLACC).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shelter Management Team Agenda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Situational Overview</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Incident details and expected duration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Estimated numbers at shelter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Estimated numbers displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair / Police rep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Critical Issues</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Feedback on agency-specific issues</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Staffing and resource availability:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Current Situation / issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Anticipated in 4 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. Onward Travel</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource availability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated numbers requiring transport to other shelters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TfL rep / Police / Local Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. Any other business / time of next meeting</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair / All agencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C: LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT

Housing Legislation

Although any incident leading to the requirement for Shelter provision is likely to require a multi-agency response, it is primarily Local Authorities which have a statutory duty to provide temporary shelter for people who have been temporarily evacuated from their homes because of an emergency. The House Act (1996) Part 7, and the Homeless Act (2002) delegate the statutory duty/responsibility to assist people who are homeless or likely to become homeless to the borough housing authority.

Local Authority duties in relation to homelessness are complex and dependent on a number of factors, including normal eligibility for housing. Certain categories of foreign National are not eligible and the provision of support may be dependent on whether persons are “homeless” under the UK statutory definition. The statutory definition includes provision for those who have accommodation but cannot secure entry to it, or if the circumstances are such that it is not reasonable for them to occupy it.

If a person is eligible and is homeless the Local Authority should consider whether he/she is a “priority need” as defined in the Housing Act (1996) Section 189. The definition of “priority need” includes those who are homeless or threatened with homelessness as a result of an emergency, and where this is relevant to the provision of shelter as the result of an incident. Local Authorities are required to establish whether any duty (and if so what duty) is owed to an applicant under the Housing Act (1996) Part 7. While those enquiries are being made, if the LA has reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless, eligible for assistance and have a priority need they will have a duty to provide interim accommodation. They may also make enquiries to establish if the applicant has a local connection with the district of another housing authority in England. A person has a local connection with the district of a housing authority if he or she has a connection with it due to:

- residence
- employment
- family associates
- other special circumstances

Referrals to another Local Authority are discretionary and can only be made to those eligible for the main housing duty and at least one member of the applicant’s household has a local connection with the other Local Authority. While these enquiries are on-going the Local Authority must accommodate the person until they are able to notify them of whether the conditions for referral of their case to another Local Authority are met.

In the context of emergency shelter provision it should be noted that, due to the time required to make the necessary enquiries and the number of individuals displaced, the emergency situation may have been resolved. In short, Local Authorities do not have a longer term duty to house people without a local connection, but do have an initial duty to make enquiries and offer temporary accommodation to eligible, homeless people who had a priority need as a result of fire, flood or other disaster.

For further information on the status and eligibility of Foreign Nationals, please refer to the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG).

The Children and Educational Acts

Local Authorities and other responding agencies have duties arising from the Education Act (2002) and the Children Act (2004) to safeguard and promote the welfare of children.

Animal Protection
The Animal Welfare Act (2006) requires Local Authorities and other responding agencies to work to prevent suffering or distress to animals through their actions or failure to act.

Employment Legislation

Health and Safety at work legislation, which is based on the twin concepts of risk assessment and reasonable practicality, requires employers and other to ensure, as far as reasonably practicable, a safe place of work and working practices. There is no expressed exemption for terrorist activity or emergencies in general.

Staff provided by neighbouring London Boroughs will be covered by insurance policies as per standing Mutual Aid arrangements. Voluntary Sector responders from nationally recognised Voluntary Sector organisations such as St John Ambulance or British Red Cross will be covered by their corporate organisational insurance. If volunteers from smaller, locally based groups seek to support Shelter work, enquiries should be made by the lead Local Authority as to the level of their personal or group insurance. Failure to demonstrate adequate insurance may restrict the activities in which smaller, locally based voluntary groups can participate, due to liability issues.

General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR)

Consideration must always be given to the principles of GDPR (2018). Confidentiality is of prime importance, and due care should always be taken when recording information. Transparency regarding the purpose of data collections is also vital.

Data collection may be requested from those who are displaced in order to assist in tracing other displaced persons, and to help assess their needs whilst present in a Shelter. This information will be shared with other agencies if required.
APPENDIX D: EXERCISING AND REVIEW

All responders should have a clear understanding of their role and responsibility throughout and incident where the procedures are outlined in this document have been invoked. This should be achieved through training and exercising at all levels. Training should take place prior to exercising the plan. The experience from exercises and incidents should contribute to reviews of the document.

The London Resilience Group maintains a list of lessons identified through exercises and incidents on behalf of the wider partnership. These are identified, recorded and implemented in accordance with the partnership lessons learned policy. The status of these lessons is reported to the London Resilience Programme Board and the London Resilience Forum.

Responsibilities for Training and Exercising

Individual Agencies are responsible for ensuring that they are able to carry out the roles and duties described in this document. It is expected that this will include role specific training and an appropriate level of knowledge of multi-agency procedures.

Partnership wide the following will support a consistent approach to multi-agency cooperation approach across the Partnership:

A Capability Awareness Package accompanies the document. This is prepared by the Lead Agency responsible for developing the capability. The package provides basic information about the capability for all responders.

The LRF Training and Exercising Group will coordinate:

- Briefings and workshops hosted by the London Resilience Group
- Partnership wide exercises at the sub-regional and pan-London level.

Agencies are to maintain records of their training programmes as evidence. The LRF will, from time to time, carry out and audit of multi-agency training across the partnership to ensure a consistent approach. The Lead Agency for each Partnership workstream is to document the development of the capability through the record of exercises, testing and activation attached to this document.
For information, please contact:

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**LONDON RESILIENCE GROUP**

The London Resilience Group is jointly funded and governed by the Greater London Authority, London Local Authorities and the London Fire Commissioner. We are hosted by the London Fire Brigade. Our work, and that of the London Resilience Partnership, is overseen by the London Resilience Forum.