7 July Review Committee

Volume 4: follow-up report

August 2007
Introduction

We published our report on the response to the London bombings of 7 July 2005 in June 2006. In that report we made 54 recommendations aimed at ensuring the lessons to be learned from the response to the 7 July attacks on London were acted upon. Many of our recommendations would apply equally to any type of major or catastrophic incident. We pointed out that we did not consider the publication of the report to be the end of the process, and we invited anyone who read our report, especially London’s emergency, transport and health services, to respond to our findings and recommendations. All the responses we received have been published on the London Assembly’s website. As well as hearing from responding organisations, we also received information from a range of stakeholders wishing to make us aware of alternative solutions and technologies. Where appropriate, we have referred these to the relevant service. This report summarises the progress that has been made in implementing our recommendations and where necessary we make recommendations for further action to address the issues we identified.

Overall, there has been significant and welcome progress in implementing our recommendations and addressing the issues we raised in our report. London is now even better prepared to respond to major incidents and we continue to be well served by emergency planners and responders who are world leaders in their respective fields.

Among the key improvements that have been made are those relating to communications within and between the emergency and other responding services in the initial stages following an incident.

- Progress has been made, albeit more slowly and problematically in some cases than is ideal, in implementing digital radio communications within the London Ambulance Service, London Fire Brigade and Metropolitan Police Service (the British Transport Police and City of London Police already have digital radios).

- New driver communications are on schedule to be in place across the Underground network by the end of 2007.

- The project to enable Airwave radios to operate below ground-level on the Underground network will be completed by August 2008.

- The London Fire Brigade has introduced a new coding system to enable them to identify the precise location of incidents on the Underground network. The London Ambulance Service now has access to this system and the Metropolitan Police Service is working with the London Fire Brigade to gain access to the system. This will facilitate a more accurate and therefore more rapid deployment of emergency resources to the scene of any future major incident on the network.

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1 Report from the London Assembly 7 July Review Committee, June 2006. Available at www.london.gov.uk/assembly
2 www.london.gov.uk/assembly
• The London Underground Emergency Response Unit has gained the right to travel in TfL bus lanes. This will help them to respond rapidly to emergencies in the future. The Unit has also been granted a 100 per cent discount on the congestion charge.

• The emergency and transport services have identified a number of measures to improve communications between managers at the scenes of incidents and their control rooms, including an improved system for gathering and communicating key information via the Metropolitan Police Service to other responding services and authorities.

• The London Ambulance Service has taken significant steps to improve its ability to deliver equipment to the scenes of major incidents and to address the communications problems it faced on 7 July. This will enable it to put in place a more rapid and effectively organised and coordinated response to major incidents in the future.

• London Underground has provided mass casualty first aid kits at key locations on its network. In addition to this the NHS has supplied emergency dressing packs to 35 Underground stations and a number of Network Rail stations across the country, and there is a much increased capacity to deliver further supplies to the scene.

• London Underground has installed new passenger safety notices inside underground train carriages, and has reviewed its emergency lighting provision. In addition to the existing torches provided to drivers and stations, hands-free torches have been installed on stations and are to be installed in drivers’ cabs. These provide a light source whilst allowing staff to execute emergency procedures effectively.

• The NHS has undertaken to inform non-acute hospitals in the vicinity of major incidents, although we believe that further work is necessary to ensure that those hospitals are effectively advised about what to do when they receive such notifications.

• The London Ambulance Service and Metropolitan Police Service have improved the effectiveness of their systems for recording the details of patients and tracking patients once they are taken to hospital. The London Ambulance Service has trained staff on the importance of this function alongside the provision of clinical care. The Metropolitan Police Service has provided laptops to be taken to hospitals in order to record patient details and pass them to the Casualty Bureau.

• The Metropolitan Police Service has developed a standard public information notice, including advice on the use of mobile telephones, and sources of information and advice in addition to the Casualty Bureau (which is a mechanism for the Police to gather information rather than functioning as a public information line).

There has also been a welcome recognition of the points raised by the survivors who gave us their views. Plans are now in place to ensure that the needs of survivors of major or catastrophic incidents and those who are bereaved will be met more effectively than was the case following 7 July 2005.

• Following discussions within the Emergency Services Liaison Panel, the London Ambulance Service has taken lead responsibility for communicating with injured people following a major incident. Individual officers, equipped with loudhailers, will take on
this responsibility. The Metropolitan Police Service will remain responsible for communications with the uninjured. We welcome this acknowledgement of the issues raised in our report and expect working arrangements to be put in place to ensure that this division of roles works in practice.

- The responding organisations have acknowledged the need to establish survivor reception centres close to the scenes of major incidents, but further work may be required to ensure that this will be done in the event of a future major incident. This will enable survivors’ details to be collected, which will help to ensure that they receive the immediate and ongoing support they need.

- Improvements have been made to the way in which the Casualty Bureau will operate, in order to manage more effectively the potentially enormous volume of calls that will be placed within the first hours following a major incident.

- More sophisticated and detailed plans have been developed to provide support to survivors and bereaved people following a major incident, incorporating the lessons from 7 July and responding more fully to the likely needs of individuals caught up in an incident. This should ensure that in future survivors and bereaved people will receive appropriate and effective advice and support from the outset and on an ongoing basis.

There has been media coverage recently suggesting that survivors of the 7 July attacks are still awaiting compensation payouts. This is not within the scope of our review and we have not collected views and information on this issue. We therefore do not comment on the question of compensation for survivors in this report. There may also be other ongoing issues affecting survivors of the 7 July attacks but it is not within our power to investigate or comment upon individual cases. We would refer any survivors or bereaved people with ongoing concerns to the 7 July Assistance Centre.

There are some areas where more work is needed. This is to some extent inevitable – putting in place effective emergency plans is a painstaking and time-consuming process, especially when it involves the installation of new infrastructure and equipment, but also when several thousand people must be trained in new processes and procedures. In this report we make a number of recommendations for further work and ask for further updates by 31 October 2007. We will consider progress in these areas at our next review in November 2007. In particular, we will be following up our concerns relating to the rollout of digital radio communications in the Metropolitan Police Service, London Fire Brigade and London Ambulance Service. Whilst the authorities are clearly making considerable efforts to address problems as they arise, some of the problems that have arisen, especially within the Metropolitan Police Service, do give us cause for concern. We consider that further public democratic oversight of these projects will be beneficial to their speedy and effective completion.

Many of the responses to our report acknowledged the tremendous value of the survivor testimonies we published. We would like to pay tribute again to those survivors who

3www.7julyassistance.org.uk - contactable by telephone from within the UK on 0845 054 7444 or from outside the UK on +44 20 7222 2195
contributed to our review, and reiterate the recommendation that in future there should be plans in place to gather feedback from those directly affected – their insights and perspectives revealed key lessons that will improve the response in the future.
Communications with passengers and others affected by emergencies

1. We recommend that London Underground, Tubelines and Metronet, as part of the review of the Public Private Partnership to be completed in 2010, negotiate a more rapid rollout of facilities for passengers and train drivers to be able to communicate in the event of an emergency.

We would draw the attention of the Public Private Partnership Arbiter to this recommendation and others relating to the review of the Public Private Partnership.

NOT ACCEPTED BUT ISSUE ADDRESSED

Transport for London (TfL) did not accept this recommendation. TfL told us that all trains have facilities for drivers to communicate with passengers, but these were disabled by the blasts on 7 July. Some trains on the Northern, Jubilee, Piccadilly, Central and Waterloo & City lines have ‘talkback’ facilities to enable passengers to talk to drivers. TfL told us that, ‘this facility will be introduced on all trains as they are upgraded, so by 2015 all trains except the Bakerloo Line, which is programmed for upgrade by 2020, will have the talkback facility. We could not justify accelerating this programme purely to provide a talkback facility, and in any event it would be virtually impossible to do so due to the logistics involved in the provision of new or refurbished trains’.

We were disappointed by this response. However, we acknowledge Transport for London’s response that this recommendation is not possible to implement given the logistics of procuring new trains. Transport for London has taken steps to provide information or advice for passengers during the initial stages of an incident involving a train being stopped underground (see recommendation 23, below).

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4 TfL update, February 2007 (All written responses to the Committee can be found on the London Assembly website: www.london.gov.uk/assembly)
**Driver communications with line controllers**

2. *We recommend that, as part of the review of the PPP to be concluded in 2010, London Underground, Metronet and Tubelines seek to speed up the rollout of the new radio system to enable train drivers to communicate with their line controllers.*

**NOT ACCEPTED BUT ISSUE ADDRESSED**

3. *In the meantime, we recommend that Transport for London conduct a study of possible interim solutions to increase the reliability and resilience of radio communications between train drivers and line controllers. We request that Transport for London provide us with an update on progress in time for our November 2006 follow-up review.*

**IMPLEMENTED**

New driver radio communications will be put in place across the Underground network as part of the CONNECT project by the end of 2007.

By the end of 2006, 50 per cent of the infrastructure was in operation, covering 40 per cent of London Underground operations. There have been technical issues on some lines but we understand these have now been resolved. The rollout of the new radios is already complete on the District, Circle, Hammersmith & City, East London, Metropolitan and Victoria lines, and CONNECT radio infrastructure is due to be rolled out on the remaining lines (Bakerloo, Piccadilly, Jubilee, Northern, Waterloo & City and Central) by the end of 2007.5

We understand that the results of the rollout so far have been very positive, with the communications being clearer and more reliable using CONNECT radios than was previously the case. A particular benefit of the new system is that drivers are equipped with portable hand-held units, rather than radios fixed in the driver’s cab, so they can carry their radios into the carriages. This has reportedly been welcomed by drivers, and will contribute to increased safety for drivers and passengers alike. We were very pleased to hear from Tim O’Toole in November 2006 that the CONNECT project was progressing and that the management of the project had improved over the preceding year, and it appears to us that London Underground is making efforts to roll out the new radio systems as quickly as possible.6

The RMT union told us about the weaknesses of the existing radio system on the Underground, referring to examples of radio failures resulting in severe service disruptions and potential safety hazards. RMT argues that there ought to be a ‘no radio, no train’ policy on the Underground.7 We put RMT’s points to Tim O’Toole, Managing Director of London Underground, and he explained the policy that was introduced following 7 July 2005. In the event of a radio failure, the train is emptied and checked to ensure there are no remaining passengers or suspect

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5 TfL update, 6 June 2007  
6 Transcript of Committee meeting, 22 November 2007  
7 Written submission from RMT
packages, and the train proceeds on its journey until the radio is working again. This new policy replaces the old practice of using various ‘workarounds’ in order to maintain the service, which resulted in trains sometimes being out of radio contact.8 On the basis of Tim O’Toole’s explanation, and assuming this policy is implemented consistently and effectively in practice, we are satisfied that passenger safety is not being compromised as a result of trains continuing to carry passengers when their driver does not have access to radio communications.

In our report of June 2006, we recommended that TfL consider putting in place alternative interim radio communications, pending the full rollout of the CONNECT project, which could then be used as a back-up system once the CONNECT radios have been activated. The purpose of this recommendation was to increase the resilience of radio communications between drivers and line controllers so that in the event of an emergency drivers would be able to inform their line controllers and request assistance as quickly and efficiently as possible.

Transport for London did not accept this recommendation, saying that there was no ‘off-the shelf’ system available that would provide an interim solution because any new radio system would require new infrastructure to be installed in order for it to function. However, Tim O’Toole also told us that in fact an interim solution has already been rolled out on above ground sections of the network, whereby drivers on some lines are provided with Airwave radios during existing radio failures. These radios do not work underground but they are functional on the open areas of the network.

New radio systems will be in place across the entire Tube network by the end of 2007, and Airwave radios have been distributed to drivers on some lines in the meantime. We are satisfied that Transport for London is making significant steps towards a much improved radio system for drivers.

8 Transcript of Committee meeting, 22 November 2006
Underground radio communications for the emergency and transport services

4. We recommend that Transport for London provide an update on progress in rolling out the CONNECT project in November 2006, May 2007 and November 2007, so that we can monitor the delivery of the contract. The timely completion of this project is essential to enable all London’s emergency services to communicate underground.

IMPLEMENTED

Transport for London has confirmed that the CONNECT project is proceeding according to plan, as discussed in relation to recommendations 2 and 3, above. Ninety-eight per cent of the infrastructure in stations is already in place and the system has been activated along several lines enabling the new drivers’ radios to be operational across 40 per cent of the network. Alongside the CONNECT project, work is underway to enable Airwave radios to work underground using the CONNECT infrastructure. The contract was signed in December 2006, and it is expected that Airwave will be operational underground on all lines by August 2008.9

We are satisfied with the progress that has been made in rolling out the CONNECT project in terms of timing.

However, we understand that some issues have arisen relating to the coverage of the new system – there are apparently some areas underground where Airwave radios will not work.10 Transport for London has told us that reviews are being undertaken to consider the risk areas in the CONNECT system and determine what measures can be taken to improve the availability of the radio system still further. We will be considering this issue further when we conduct our next follow-up review in November 2007.

Recommendation 4A

We request that Transport for London provide us with a full update on the rollout of CONNECT and Airwave on the underground, with details of any problems with coverage or other issues and how they are being addressed, by 31 October 2007.

9 Report 9 to Metropolitan Police Authority, 25 January 2007, ‘C3i / Airwave programme update’, paragraph 31
Digital radios within the emergency services

5. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service, London Fire Brigade and London Ambulance Service provide us with an update on the rollout of digital radio systems within their services in November 2006, May 2007 and November 2007, so that we can monitor progress towards full implementation of TETRA-based radio communications across London’s emergency services.

RECOMMENDATION IMPLEMENTED, BUT OUTSTANDING CONCERNS

There has been a lack of clarity over the timing of the implementation of digital radios across the emergency services in London, with different timetables provided by the Home Office, the London Resilience Forum and the emergency services. For the purposes of clarity, the following table shows the current timetables for each of London’s emergency services.

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<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Timetable</th>
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<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Police Service</td>
<td>September 2007</td>
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<td>London Ambulance Service</td>
<td>September 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority</td>
<td>November 2008</td>
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<td>British Transport Police</td>
<td>Implementation completed</td>
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<tr>
<td>City of London Police</td>
<td>Implementation completed</td>
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The Metropolitan Police Service is rolling out Airwave radios at a rate of one borough every two to three weeks. By the end of June 2007, 27 boroughs had migrated to Airwave, with the remaining five due for completion by September 2007.

The national contract for the provision of Airwave radio communications within police forces was procured by the then Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) which has now become the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA). Under the contract, individual forces were required to procure their own equipment, and the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) approved the procurement of equipment for the rollout of Airwave in July 2001. The target date for implementing Airwave has slipped since that time. In December 2003 the MPA received a report stating that Airwave had been conditionally accepted as ready for service in October 2003. The Authority noted that full implementation would take place by March 2006. By December 2004 this date had slipped to December 2006. The target date now is September 2007. There are lessons to be learnt about the procurement of Airwave nationally, including the technical provisions and management of the contracts. In hindsight the contracts could have been better managed.

There have been some problems experienced with the implementation of Airwave in recent months, ranging beyond the staff training issues mentioned by Commander Bob Broadhurst at our meeting in November 2006. A report to the Metropolitan Police Authority in January 2007

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11 Report 23 to the Metropolitan Police Authority, 19 July 2001, paragraph 1
12 Report 10 to the MPA, 9 December 2003, and minutes of the meeting.
13 Report 5 to the MPA Corporate Governance Committee, 2 December 2004
reported risks and issues. These were elaborated upon in a response to questions from this Committee in May 2007. The problems included potential risks relating to exposure to radiation through use of the handsets and proximity to masts, which are not considered to be significant. They also included limitations in coverage in some buildings; difficulties preventing officers being able to talk across zones and talkgroups; capacity issues; software and hardware issues; and training issues. The Metropolitan Police Service has told us that it has put in place measures to address problems as they emerge, as discussed in the following paragraphs.

The Metropolitan Police Service has told us that the coverage of Airwave at ground level is greater than the coverage provided by the legacy radio system, MetRadio: ‘a few small and isolated areas of poor coverage have been identified. These are, however, within the allowable parameters of the nationally agreed coverage criteria’. However, we note that this assessment of Airwave coverage refers only to coverage in open air at ground level provided for within the contract. The Metropolitan Police Service has also told us that the national contract, tendered and managed by PITO, provides only for open air coverage. Any coverage within vehicles or buildings is referred to as ‘incidental’ in the contract.

During the rollout, the contractors have been required to rectify some of the open air coverage limitations, and where coverage is unavailable inside buildings, “such actions as are possible are implemented to improve the situation”. The Metropolitan Police Service has purchased additional coverage within London at significant sites, “where public order and events at Stadia justify the additional cost above the core contract”. In cases of particular strategic importance or need (the National Stadium, Wembley, Walworth Road Police Station, and Heathrow Airport), special schemes have been put in place to provide coverage equivalent to that provided at ground level. In the case of Heathrow, the special scheme cost £2.4 million.

The MPS is conducting two reviews of in-building coverage. One of the reviews seeks to identify non-police buildings that would benefit from improved Airwave coverage with a view to putting forward proposals for further funding. Buildings will be categorised according to operational need and officer safety, and the MPS will then consider ‘how if at all capability can be delivered in those buildings’. A second review will consider capability in police-owned or controlled buildings. The MPS tells us that ‘a recent visit to an international congress revealed similar problems in other European and other countries, with no obvious solutions’.

We were surprised to learn that the national contract for Airwave for police forces only extended to open air coverage, given that a significant proportion of police activities take place within vehicles and buildings. Coverage limitations were first identified during pilots in Lancashire in 2000, but the contract was awarded on a conditional basis despite PITO’s reservations at the time. We are concerned about the apparent limitations in Airwave

14 Update from Metropolitan Police Service, 9 February 2007, Appendix A, paragraph 3
15 Update from Metropolitan Police Service, 9 February 2007
16 Update from Metropolitan Police Service, 9 February 2007, Appendix A, paragraph 1
17 Update from Metropolitan Police Service, 9 February 2007, Appendix A, paragraph 4
18 Report 5 to Metropolitan Police Authority Finance Committee, 23 November 2006, paragraph 20
19 Metropolitan Police Service update, 4 July 2007
20 Metropolitan Police Service update, 4 July 2007
coverage and the potential impact this could have on police operations in London. We are not in a position at this stage to assess the extent of the limitations of coverage of Airwave inside buildings. We will be asking further detailed questions and seeking further information and explanation about this issue at our follow-up review in November 2007.

We were also surprised to learn that coverage on the London Underground was not included in the original national plans and business case for Airwave radios,22 and that the issue was only considered well into the process of implementing Airwave within the MPS. The MPS (which is not responsible for Underground radio communications) lobbied the Government to take action to put in place radio communications on the Underground. For example, a report to the Metropolitan Police Authority in December 2003 raised the issue, noting that ‘a separate project has been set up by the Home Office and PITO to develop urgently a solution for interconnection with the London Underground’.23 A report to the MPA’s Corporate Governance Committee in December 2004 noted that, ‘coincidentally [London Underground] has chosen the same radio infrastructure supplier as O2 Airwave; therefore the opportunity exists to provide a compatible solution’. Had this not been the case, the report notes, the overall additional costs of extending Airwave into Underground stations would have been £130 million to £140 million, which was not included in the MPS budget. Progress was slow to non-existent, according to MPA reports, until in April 2005 it was reported that the Home Office now ‘fully recognizes’ the importance of underground communications for the MPS.24

There have been problems in enabling officers to talk across Airwave zones and ‘talkgroups’. The MPS has told us that, ‘strict adherence to talkgroup management policies will be essential to allow us to make the best use of the Airwave capacity available to us’.25 The problem arises from the design of the system rather than a fault with the service. It cannot therefore be solved until a technical solution becomes available. In the meantime, the MPS has told us that it is having to place ‘restrictions on patching talkgroups together which represents a degradation in our ability to communicate between pan London units, local units and Central Communications Command during a critical incident’.26 This is, we are told, ‘managed by a corporate risk assessment and agreed control measures’.27

There are also capacity issues arising from increases in the number of police officers within the MPS. As a result, the MPS has to arrange temporary capacity at additional cost for events such as the Notting Hill Carnival. It is also ‘imposing some restrictions on the non-essential use of talkgroups and the use of Airwave telephony in order to reduce the likelihood of officers finding an operationally critical talkgroup busy’.28 A number of critical upgrades due to take place in September 2007 will ‘mitigate most of the current MPS concerns’.29

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22 Report 5 to the MPA Corporate Governance Committee, 2 December 2004, paragraph 3
23 Report 10 to the MPA, 9 December 2003, paragraph 10
24 Report 7 to the MPA Corporate Governance Committee, 8 April 2005
25 MPS update, 4 July 2007
26 MPS update, 4 July 2007
27 MPS update, 4 July 2007
28 MPS update, 4 July 2007
29 MPS update, 4 July 2007
Other problems experienced during the rollout of Airwave within the Metropolitan Police Service have included software issues such as radios unexpectedly resetting themselves and backlight functions not working properly; failure of the emergency activation function resulting from incorrect activation or being out of coverage when the button is pressed; hardware issues including limitations in battery life; and difficulties in achieving the appropriate level of training amongst officers using the new radios. The MPS has told us that these problems are closely monitored and causes are analysed and corrective actions agreed (including the development and discharge of interim arrangements and guidance). For instance, software problems could initially only be solved through lengthy, costly and disruptive interventions. The Metropolitan Police Service has now introduced a multi-programming facility to enable handsets to be re-programmed remotely.

The Metropolitan Police Service has put in place various measures to supervise the rollout of Airwave and to resolve problems as they arise. It is our impression that the implementation of Airwave has picked up momentum in terms of the numbers of units now equipped with Airwave radios. What concerns us is the fact that problems we now hear about in relation to coverage and operations should be encountered in relation to a national contract first signed in 2002 and which has been rolled out in other forces before the Metropolitan Police Service. We do not doubt that the Metropolitan Police Service is making every effort, working with the National Policing Improvement Agency and Airwave contractors, to address these problems, and we commend them for their efforts. However, we are concerned about the problems associated with the new system and we are asking the Metropolitan Police Service and other relevant bodies to provide us with comprehensive reports on the rollout of Airwave by 31 October 2007. This will be the main focus of our follow-up review in November 2007.

**Recommendation 5A**

We request that the National Policing Improvement Agency, Airwave providers and the Metropolitan Police Service provide us with a comprehensive report on the rollout of Airwave by 31 October 2007.

The implementation of Airwave radios within the London Fire Brigade is being carried out as part of the national Firelink contract signed in 2006, having first been discussed in 2002. Once fully operational, Firelink is contractually guaranteed to reach 99.94 per cent of landmass in London, the highest proportion of any Firelink region. In November 2005, London Fire Brigade told us that they expected to have Airwave radios within a year to 18 months (ie by May 2007). In November 2006, this was revised to a completion date of the third quarter of 2008. The most recent projection provides a completion date of November 2008. The London Fire Brigade has told us that these delays are necessary in order to ensure the system meets the ambitious targets and expectations. In the Brigade’s judgement, the new system is robust and the public should have full confidence in it. In the meantime, the London Fire Brigade has taken delivery of 69 Airwave terminals in order to enable key staff and specialist officers to use the service and access inter-agency talkgroups.

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The **London Ambulance Service** is also obtaining Airwave radios as part of a national project. Like the London Fire Brigade, the London Ambulance Service has taken an initial delivery of 200 Airwave radios for use by officers responsible for managing incidents. These would now be the primary method of communication between the scene, ambulance control, and hospitals. There has been some delay in the timetable for implementing Airwave across the service. At our meeting in November 2005 we were told that the London Ambulance Service was expecting to begin distributing Airwave radios in 2006 and complete the rollout in 2007. We were then told, in November 2006, that the rollout would begin in summer 2007 and be completed by the first quarter of 2008. In its update to the Committee in June 2007, the London Ambulance Service tells us that rollout will start in September 2007 and be completed by September 2008.

The London Ambulance Service has told us that the delays are the result of ‘a number of contractual and technical changes and problems that have led to some delay (despite the considerable effort to minimise this)’. The London Ambulance Service informed us in June 2007 that ‘there is some risk to the rollout dates. There are significant concerns related to Airwave capacity in London. To provide the contracted Airwave Service capacity for the London Ambulance Service, it will be necessary to upgrade a significant number of base stations across London. This must be completed before the next contractual milestone which allows us to start the vehicle installations in September. Additionally there is a review of the current status of the national programme and Trust milestones being conducted by the [Department of Health] programme team. This may well result in some changes to the London programme’. In August 2007 the London Ambulance Service confirmed that the rollout was still on schedule to be completed by September 2008.

We are concerned about the delays that have occurred in establishing digital radio communications within the emergency services in London, especially the London Ambulance Service (which is part of a national project), and by the emergence of significant problems relating to coverage. We intend to focus on this issue in our next follow-up review.

**Recommendation 5B**

We request that the London Ambulance Service and the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority provide a comprehensive update on the rollout of digital radios within their services, including information about any difficulties that have been encountered and how they are being addressed, by 31 October 2007. We request that these reports include an account of what has been done to share lessons across the emergency services in London so as to minimize the recurrence of the same problems in different services.

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31 Update from London Ambulance Service, 11 June 2007  
32 Update from London Ambulance Service, 11 June 2007
Personal Role Radios and other available technologies

6. We recommend that Transport for London conduct a feasibility study to assess the costs and effectiveness of Personal Role Radios and other available technologies to enable communications for emergency and transport services in underground stations and tunnels. We request that Transport for London provide an update on work in this area by the time of our follow-up review in November 2006.

CONSIDERED BUT NOT ACCEPTED

The emergency services have given some limited consideration to the potential for using alternative technologies as an interim measure pending the full rollout of Airwave and as a back-up system once Airwave is rolled out. However, the Airwave on the Underground Project Board has now rejected this option. Instead, the emergency services will rely on the provision of leaky feeders,\(^{33}\) as was done on 7 July at Russell Square. There is an increased capacity to deliver leaky feeders – there are now four to seven trucks around London containing the equipment needed. This will provide a back-up system in the event that the existing leaky feeders are damaged in an incident. However, these leaky feeders cannot be assumed to be available for rapid deployment within the first hour following an incident. We therefore recommended looking at back-up solutions that could be deployed more rapidly in the initial stages of a response.

Transport for London rejected this recommendation on the basis that any new technology would require new infrastructure to be installed. In fact, Personal Role Radios and other similar technologies do not require any permanent infrastructure to be installed – they rely on small ‘repeaters’ being placed several hundred metres apart, and these can be deployed as required. Tim O’Toole told us that Personal Role Radios were tested during the Osiris exercise at Bank Station, and were ‘found to be wanting’\(^{34}\).

Following the publication of our report, and our follow-up meeting in November 2006, the project board for Airwave on the Underground has considered whether radios such as Personal Role Radios could provide any additional functionality that could help the work of the emergency services during the first hour after the start of an incident underground. BTP tells us that the project board decided not to pursue this further, having decided instead to concentrate on the rollout of Airwave radios.

We are concerned that London’s emergency services are putting all their eggs in one basket by relying on Airwave radios. If Personal Role Radios and / or other similar technologies are not a viable option then clearly they should not be used. But we are not convinced that serious consideration has been given to their potential use, and this gives us cause for concern.

\(^{33}\) See glossary
\(^{34}\) Transcript of Committee meeting, 22 November 2007
Recommendation 6A

We remain concerned about the need for a range of effective back-up systems for use in the event of a breakdown in digital communications. We request that the emergency services provide us with a report by 31 October 2007 outlining what measures are in place to provide such back-up systems. We request that these reports include evidence of serious consideration of alternative back-up communications technologies, as well as details of what is being done within existing communications systems to maximize their resilience.
Deployment of emergency services to incidents on the Underground

7. We recommend that emergency plans be amended so that, when an incident takes place in an Underground tunnel, the emergency services are deployed to the stations closest to the train in either direction.

**SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS**

The purpose of this recommendation was to ensure that in future, the location(s) of an emergency in an Underground tunnel would be quickly and easily identified and an appropriate emergency response to the nearest stations could be dispatched without delay.

In response to our report, the London Fire Brigade and London Ambulance Service explained that a split attendance is standard practice, so that fire engines are deployed to the stations closest to the incident in either direction. However, it is sometimes difficult to tell in the early stages of the incident, when passengers are emerging from a station, which line is affected. This is particularly problematic at stations where several lines pass through, such as King’s Cross.

The London Fire Brigade, in collaboration with London Underground, has developed an improved system for identifying the location of incidents on the Underground network. The Unique Reference Numbers for locations on the Underground system will enable a more precise and rapid identification of the location of any incident. At the time of our meeting in November 2006, the London Ambulance Service was not aware of this new system. We found this surprising, since the issues affect them as much as they affect the London Fire Brigade. The London Ambulance Service has told us that it now has access to the system, and the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority has told us that discussions have now started with the Metropolitan Police Service so that they may also benefit from access to the system.

The introduction of a new system to identify the location of an incident on the underground network is a welcome step; it will greatly assist the emergency services in enacting rapid, accurate and effective responses to emergencies underground. We welcome the fact that the London Ambulance Service now has access to this system and the Metropolitan Police Service is now working to ensure that it has access to the system so that the location of any future incident can be identified and known by all the relevant emergency services as soon as possible following an incident.
Emergency Response Unit

8. We recommend that Transport for London lobby the Government to obtain blue light status for Emergency Response Unit vehicles. This would, amongst other things, exempt Emergency Response Unit vehicles from bus lane restrictions and the Congestion Charge.

NOT ACHIEVED

9. We recommend that, in the meantime, Transport for London grant the Emergency Response Unit automatic access to bus lanes and an automatic exemption from the Congestion Charge.

FULLY IMPLEMENTED

10. We recommend that the Emergency Response Unit obtain Airwave radios to be able to communicate underground once the CONNECT project is completed.

FULLY IMPLEMENTED

11. We recommend that the Emergency Response Unit consider the feasibility of obtaining an interim/back-up solution to enable its staff to communicate underground, such as Personal Role Radios.

SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS

The RMT wrote to us supporting the recommendation that the London Underground Emergency Response Unit should have blue light status, and we continue to believe that this would enable the Unit to respond more rapidly to emergencies on the Underground on a daily basis. The Emergency Response Unit has continued to lobby for blue light status and this remains under review by the Government, the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Metropolitan Police Service. The Emergency Response Unit is gathering information about the impact of traffic delays on their response times to specific incidents. This information will feed into the debate. In the meantime, Transport for London has told us, ‘the Emergency Response Unit can be escorted by police vehicles where required and where practicable’.35

However, there has been progress in implementing the other recommendations we made relating to the Emergency Response Unit.

The Congestion Charge Principal Order has been amended to provide a 100 per cent discount to the Emergency Response Unit when attending major incidents.

The Emergency Response Unit now has access to TfL bus lanes, but is awaiting final sign-off from London Councils on a decision to permit Emergency Response Unit vehicles to use

borough bus lanes. In the meantime, a standard letter is sent in response to penalty notices, and this has always resulted in them being waived.

The Emergency Response Unit has obtained Airwave radios and CONNECT radios, and is trialling two different types of Personal Role Radios. This represents a significant improvement in their communications capacity.

We welcome the significant progress that has been made in implementing our recommendations about the Emergency Response Unit. These measures will help to ensure that Emergency Response Unit vehicles are not unnecessarily delayed in responding to incidents on the Underground.
Declaration of major incidents across the emergency services

12. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum review the protocols for declaring a major incident to ensure that, as soon as one of the emergency services declares a major incident, the others also put major incident procedures in place. This could increase the speed with which the emergency services establish what has happened and begin to enact a co-ordinated and effective emergency response.

This recommendation reflected the existing principle set out in the London Emergency Service Liaison Panel Major Incident Procedure Manual. Our concern was that the evidence suggested that the principle was not put fully into practice on 7 July, when each emergency service separately declared major incidents at each site. The new version of the manual reiterates this principle.36

We appreciate the fact that each emergency service will need to activate its own major incident procedures. We are concerned to ensure that this happens as quickly as possible once it becomes clear that there is a major incident likely to require attendance by more than one emergency service. The emergency services have assured us that the current protocols are adequate for this purpose. We are not convinced that this is the case – for instance, at Edgware Road, the London Fire Brigade did not declare a major incident until twenty minutes after the London Ambulance Service had reported an explosion causing up to a thousand casualties. The London Fire Brigade acknowledges this but has told us that this did not affect the Brigade’s response to the incident and sufficient resources were in place to respond.

Recommendation 12A

We request that the emergency services provide us with evidence by 31 October 2007 that there has been full consideration of the potential for improving communications between the emergency services during the first minutes following declaration by one service of a major incident, whether by reviewing the protocols for declaring a major incident, or by improving the speed and efficiency with which the emergency services inform each other of major incidents.

Communications between managers at the scene and their control rooms

13. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum, as a matter of priority, co-ordinate a review across London’s emergency services of communications between managers at the scenes of major incidents, their respective control rooms and the Strategic Co-ordination Centre. We request that the London Resilience Team provide us with the results of this review in November 2006.

SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS

The London Resilience Forum acknowledged the issues we raised in our report, citing a ‘lack of accurate, collated information to pass on to all the responding agencies in the initial stages of the response’, and setting out three linked actions to be taken to address this gap in the future:

- Government to review the flow of information during an emergency at a national level;
- London Resilience Team to develop a specification and protocols for a London extranet for the London Resilience Partnership; and
- Metropolitan Police Service to develop a joint multi-agency cell to collate and manage the flow of verified factual information to service the needs of partners.

We welcome the identification of actions to improve the flow of information between managers during a major incident. However, we have not received any evidence to confirm that these actions have been implemented. Whilst the publication of the London Resilience Forum’s report in September 2006 was a welcome step, demonstrating to the public that some of the lessons to be learned from the response to the 7 July attacks had been acknowledged by those responsible, it is equally important that the public can see evidence over time that the identified actions have been taken.

Recommendation 13A

We recommend that the London Resilience Partnership publish a progress report by 31 October 2007, outlining what progress has been made in implementing the actions identified in its lessons learned report of September 2006, and any other work carried out since then to improve London’s preparedness for disasters.

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Access Overload Control (ACCOLC)

14. Members of the London Resilience Forum should put in place regular checks to ensure that key senior officers are equipped with ACCOLC-enabled mobile phones. We request that the emergency and transport services provide us with details of their plans to conduct such reviews, showing what will be done, and how frequently, to ensure that the technology can actually be effectively used if necessary.

15. The protocols which require mobile telephone operating companies to verify instructions to activate ACCOLC should be amended, so that any instructions are verified with the Gold Co-ordinating Group rather than the authority issuing the instructions. We recommend that the London Resilience Team review these protocols and report back to us by November 2006.

16. All the authorities involved in the response to a major or catastrophic incident must operate within the established command and control structure. This is essential for the effective strategic management of the response. The City of London Police must provide the Committee with assurances that, in future, it will operate within the agreed command and control structures in the event of a major or catastrophic incident in future.

FULLY IMPLEMENTED

Since 7 July significant steps have been taken to reduce the reliance of the emergency services on mobile telephones. Once digital radios are available to all the emergency services, this should significantly reduce the need to use mobile telephones – digital radios can be used for secure one-to-one communications as well as for broadcasting to many users at the same time.

Given the large scale of public reliance on mobile telephones, the potential to cause panic and distress, the costs and the potential logistical difficulties involved, it seems highly unlikely that ACCOLC will ever be invoked on a large geographical scale. Nevertheless, it is considered to be worth retaining as a measure of last resort. The Home Office report on the response to the 7 July attacks, published in September 2006, stated that the Cabinet Office was undertaking a review to see how take-up and awareness of ACCOLC might be improved among responders.

We have been given clear assurances by the emergency services that they have reviewed or are in the process of reviewing, and will continue to review, the distribution of ACCOLC-enabled telephones within their services.

Our key concern in relation to ACCOLC was that on 7 July the City of London Police activated it around Aldgate station without proper reference to the Gold Coordinating Group. Alex Robertson, Chief Superintendent, City of London Police, told us in November 2006 that, ‘as a result of your Committee’s report, and our own debrief, I personally reviewed the standard operating procedures that the officer worked under, and faced with the circumstances that he had at the time, they were somewhat ambiguous. I have made sure that the ambiguity has

38 ‘Addressing the lessons from the emergency response to the 7 July 2005 London bombings: what we learned and what are doing about it’, Home Office, 22 September 2006 – hereafter referred to as ‘the Home Office report’
been removed, and that we will abide by the LESLP protocols, which we were fully signed up to before 7 July, and would still seek to support at every available opportunity’. 39

We welcome the City of London Police’s renewed commitment to operate within the established command and control structure in relation to ACCOLC, and the steps that have been taken to ensure that the relevant officers within the emergency services have ACCOLC-enabled telephones.

39 Transcript of Committee meeting, 22 November 2006, page 13
London Ambulance Service communications improvements

17. We request that the London Ambulance Service provide us with an update on progress in reviewing and improving its communications systems in time for our follow-up review in November 2006.

FULLY IMPLEMENTED

We are pleased to report that the London Ambulance Service has acknowledged the issues we raised in our report, and has undertaken a considerable amount of work to improve its communications systems.

The key improvements that have been made include:

• The Service’s emergency plans have been revised to include the principle that in the event of a major incident on the Underground network, resources will be sent to the nearest station in either direction
• London Ambulance Service has gained access to the new coding system (developed and introduced by the London Fire Brigade) to identify underground locations and access points
• All operational managers now have pagers
• 200 Airwave radios with basic functionality were issued to managers in October 2006 for the purposes of managing the scenes of major incidents
• Each Underground station now holds two radios for use by the London Ambulance Service to communicate from tunnels to ground level
• A new incident control room has been opened, making it technologically and practically easier to manage multiple simultaneous major incidents
• A new command suite with enhanced communication facilities has been opened
• A back-up system of satellite phones has been put in place
• A pre-determined response to major incidents will now be deployed automatically
• A policy has been developed to use motorcycles as runners between scenes and the control room if necessary in the event of radio communications difficulties
• Training and guidance has been improved in order to provide managers with the information they need in order to manage an incident in the absence of communications

We commend the open and constructive way in which the London Ambulance Service responded to and acted upon our report and recommendations.
London Ambulance Service delivery of supplies and equipment to the scenes of major incidents, and storage of medical equipment at key stations on the transport network

18. We request that the London Ambulance Service provide us with details of its plans to increase its capacity to deliver supplies and equipment to the sites of major incidents, in time for our follow-up review in November 2006.

FULLY IMPLEMENTED

19. We recommend that the London Ambulance Service and London Underground review the potential for storing rescue and medical equipment at stations. We request that they report back to us by November 2006 telling us what progress has been made in conducting this review, and what options are under consideration.

FULLY IMPLEMENTED

The London Ambulance Service has put in place an automatic deployment of 20 ambulances to the scene of future major incidents in order to ‘front load’ equipment and support. NHS equipment pods are available at ambulance stations to take to the scene, and emergency dressing packs have been put in place at key rail termini and at 35 locations across the Underground network. Multi-casualty first aid kits are also stored at 170 locations within the Underground system. This issue has been taken up nationally as well – the Home Office report stated that the Government is ‘looking at making medical supplies available at all major rail stations’.40

The London Ambulance Service now has four large Equipment Support Vehicles which can re-supply mass equipment to the scene. There are a further 25 vehicles in place across London which can re-supply equipment, as well as a facility to supply mass-delivery oxygen to the scene.

We welcome the significant improvement in the London Ambulance Service’s capacity to deliver equipment to incidents resulting in large numbers of casualties. We particularly welcome the cooperation that has taken place between the NHS, Network Rail and London Underground to identify locations for storing mass casualty equipment on the rail and Underground networks.

40 Home Office report, page 19
Maintaining accurate records of the response

20. We recommend that the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel review its emergency plans with a view to identifying a lead agency for maintaining accurate records of the response to major incidents. At each scene, there should be a nominated individual who is responsible for carrying out this task.

ISSUE ADDRESSED

The records of the response to the 7 July attacks were incomplete, which made it difficult to assess accurately the speed and adequacy of the initial emergency response. This recommendation was intended to address this issue, whilst acknowledging that recording details of the response will not be the first priority of those directly involved in saving lives. This is a second-order but important priority for the purposes of transparency, accountability and learning lessons from responses to major incidents.

London’s police services and the London Fire Brigade rejected this recommendation on the basis that it is operationally unworkable. The London Ambulance Service undertook to emphasise the importance of record-keeping as part of its refresher training for managers. The new London Emergency Liaison Panel Major Incident Procedure Manual includes a clear requirement to maintain records of meetings and decisions taken, and we have received some assurances (from the London Fire Brigade) that this will be done in the future.
Notification of hospitals in the vicinity of a major incident

21. We recommend that emergency plans be amended to provide for the notification of all hospitals in the vicinity of a major incident, even if they are not designated hospitals with major accident and emergency departments.

IMPLEMENTED BUT FURTHER WORK REQUIRED

The approach of the responding agencies to ‘self-responders’ is somewhat split. On the one hand, self-responders will inevitably come forward, especially if a major incident takes place close to a hospital, even if it is not an accident and emergency facility. Self-responding staff from Great Ormond Street Hospital on 7 July undoubtedly saved lives and made a massive contribution to the response, setting up a field hospital and helping to rescue and treat the injured at Russell Square Station. On the other hand, as the London Ambulance Service has pointed out, the attendance of hospital staff at the scene of an incident could compromise the command of the scene, as well as the individuals’ own safety being compromised if they are not trained, equipped and prepared to work in that environment. In our view, given that self-responders can be expected to arrive at a scene, it is important to plan for their involvement so that the risks can be minimised and any benefits maximized by using their skills in an appropriate and effective way.

The London Resilience Forum, London Ambulance Service and NHS London have acknowledged the significant contribution made by staff from non-acute hospitals, especially Great Ormond Street Hospital, on 7 July. Work has been undertaken to ensure that all hospitals in London are notified of major incidents in the city, not just the designated receiving hospitals. They will be directed to a website within the NHS Intranet, and dedicated telephone numbers will be set up for hospitals seeking further advice or information. However, it is still not clear how the NHS will deal with the question of how non-acute hospitals will be expected to respond to this information; the London Resilience Forum report suggests that the new Strategic Health Authority for London is working with specialist hospitals to try to agree an approach.

Recommendation 21A

We request that NHS London provide further details of its plans relating to non-acute hospitals and self-responders by 31 October 2007.
22. We recommend that London’s emergency plans be revised to include an explicit provision for communication with people affected by a major incident as soon as possible after the arrival of emergency or transport service personnel at the scene.

IMPLEMENTED

This recommendation was accepted by all the emergency services, and they have now included provision for communications with those affected by an emergency in the revised London Emergency Services Liaison Panel Major Incident Procedures Manual. The London Ambulance Service has taken lead responsibility among the responding services for communication with multiple casualties. There will be a specific ‘patient liaison’ officer, equipped with a loud-hailer. The police will continue to be responsible for communication with the uninjured. This may well be the most obvious way of dividing up these responsibilities from the point of view of the emergency services. However, there is a clear potential for confusion to arise in a situation where it is not yet clear who is injured and who is not. The London Ambulance Service has told us that this issue will be easily addressed through communication between police and ambulance services at the scene.

We welcome the action taken by the Metropolitan Police Service and London Ambulance Service to plan communications with those immediately affected by major incidents. We expect working arrangements to be put in place to ensure that the new plans work effectively in practice.
23. We recommend that Transport for London review the communications systems that are in place to enable station staff and/or the emergency services to communicate with passengers on trains that are trapped in tunnels. We request that Transport for London provide us with a report on how it plans to take forward this work, in time for our follow-up review in November 2006.

NOT ACCEPTED – FURTHER WORK REQUIRED

Transport for London has advised us that loud-hailers are available at all stations, though we understand that they were not used on 7 July to communicate with passengers trapped in tunnels - uninjured and walking wounded survivors suggested to us that this would have been useful as a means of conveying advice and information before they were evacuated from the trains.

This issue arose again recently on the Docklands Light Railway on the day of the London Marathon – passengers told the London Assembly Transport Committee that they did not receive any official instruction or information following the suspension of the service.\(^41\) This issue is clearly not yet resolved.

RNID wrote to us to point out the importance of communication for deaf and hard of hearing passengers trapped on trains.\(^42\) The explosions on 7 July 2005 resulted in hearing loss for those in the vicinity, and this must also be taken into account in communications planning. Transport for London has told us that London Underground operational staff ‘receive regular training designed to ensure they understand the needs of deaf / hard of hearing customers’.\(^43\) In the longer term, new rolling stock will include visual displays that complement audible announcements.\(^44\)

**Recommendation 23A**

We request that Transport for London provide us with further details of its plans to improve communications with passengers trapped in trains for any period of time ahead of their evacuation, by 31 October 2007. This should include plans for communication with people who are deaf or hard of hearing, and those who are blind or partially sighted.

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\(^41\) Transcript of Transport Committee meeting, May 2007  
\(^42\) Written response from RNID, page 3  
\(^43\) Update from Transport for London, May 2007  
\(^44\) Update from Transport for London, May 2007
Emergency lighting in tunnels

24. We recommend that Transport for London conduct a feasibility study on alternative forms of emergency lighting for new/refurbished rolling stock, and report back to us by May 2007. We recommend that Transport for London review the potential for providing torches in drivers’ cabs for use in the event of loss of lighting and failure of emergency lights.

FULLY IMPLEMENTED

Transport for London has undertaken an emergency equipment review which included consideration of emergency lighting. All drivers are required to carry torches (the Bardic lamp) with them at all times. Stations are also equipped with torches and portable lights. As a result of the equipment review, all stations and emergency equipment pods in train cabs will be equipped with a hands-free torch – the rollout is currently under way. TfL has also considered the use of ‘snap wands’, but has not found a suitable model which provides sufficient light and complies with fire regulations.

We welcome the steps taken to increase the provision of torches and hands-free lamps on trains and at stations. Assuming that this has been accompanied by appropriate training so that staff know where to find them and how to use them, the availability of this equipment on trains could be of great value during the initial stages of an emergency in an underground tunnel.

Recommendation 24A

RMT wrote to us to suggest, in the long term, the installation of emergency lighting strips in train carriages, similar to those installed on passenger aircraft. We recommend that Transport for London consider this proposal and tell us the outcome by 31 October 2007.
**First aid kits on public transport and at stations**

25. Transport for London/London Underground should produce a plan for provision of basic first aid kits on trains and at stations, in time for the 2007/08 budget-setting process.

26. Transport for London should also consider whether it would be practicable to carry basic first aid kits on buses, and Network Rail operators should produce plans for provision of first-aid kits for public use (and for use by qualified first-aiders) at mainline railway stations and on trains. We recommend that Transport for London and Network Rail report back to us on this issue by November 2006.

**SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS**

Transport for London has subsequently informed us that it has taken action to implement both of these recommendations.

Key London Underground locations are now equipped with 35 NHS emergency dressing packs and multi-casualty first aid kits are now available at 170 locations across the Underground network. Network Rail, in conjunction with the NHS, has trialled the provision of medical ‘pods’ at four stations and there are now plans to roll this out to 48 other key rail termini across the UK.

We welcome the steps taken to ensure the availability of emergency first aid equipment at Network Rail stations and on the Underground.
Safety notices on Underground trains

27. We recommend that Transport for London install clearly visible safety notices inside the carriages on all Tube trains, instructing passengers what to do in an emergency. We request that Transport for London provide us with a plan, by November 2006, showing the timescale for the installation of safety notices in all carriages on Tube trains.

FULLY IMPLEMENTED

Transport for London accepted and acted upon this recommendation, and new emergency notices have now been installed on Underground trains. This will help to communicate and explain the important differences between emergency advice on overground trains and the advice for passengers trapped on Underground trains.

Royal National Institute for the Deaf (RNID) welcomed this recommendation, and additionally pointed out the importance of including advice for disabled passengers, providing advice in plain English, and placing the signs in obvious positions.

Recommendation 27A

We welcome the installation of emergency notices on Underground trains. We recommend that Transport for London conduct research to assess the impact of these notices on passengers’ awareness of the basic messages contained in the notices, and on that basis consider whether any further work is necessary. We request that Transport for London provide us with an update on this work by 31 October 2007.
Establishment of survivor reception centres at the sites of major incidents

28. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum identify a lead agency for the establishment of survivor reception centres at the sites of major incidents in the initial stages before handover to local authorities. We believe this task would most appropriately fall to the Metropolitan Police Service, which is already responsible for the collection of personal details of survivors.

29. We invite the London Resilience Forum to report back to us in November 2006 to tell us which agency will take the lead, and what plans have been put in place to ensure that survivor reception centres are set up close to the scene of any major incident in future.

30. We recommend that London Underground Limited, train operating companies and Transport for London identify, in consultation with local authorities and the emergency services, at least two potential survivor reception centres close to Tube stations, overground rail stations and major bus stations in central London. They should then liaise with the owners/occupiers of those sites and involve them in emergency planning processes and exercises.

31. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service establish protocols for ensuring that personal details are collected from survivors at the scene of a major incident. We request that the Metropolitan Police Service report back to us on what action it has taken by November 2006.

ISSUES ACKNOWLEDGED BUT FURTHER WORK REQUIRED

The establishment of survivor reception centres close to the scene of major incidents was not an original suggestion – the national guidance on responding to emergencies requires that it should be done. These recommendations were intended to help put that guidance into practice, so that survivors may be directed to an area where the appropriate support and assistance can be provided and their details may be collected. This serves three important purposes. First, those in the vicinity of a major incident may have been witnesses to a crime. Secondly, the police will swiftly begin to receive enquiries from concerned members of the public looking for their loved ones – responding to these requests will be much easier if survivors’ details are collected at the scene. Thirdly, survivors, as was the case on 7 July, may not have sustained immediately apparent physical injuries, but may need significant emotional, psychological and other support following a major incident. Should any health impacts become apparent (such as post-traumatic stress disorder, or the ingestion of noxious substances not necessarily known about at the time), it is important that survivors are known to the authorities so they can receive advice and ongoing support.

The responses of the emergency services to these recommendations tended to acknowledge the importance of establishing survivor reception centres. However, the emergency services also point out that it is practically impossible to achieve.
The Home Office report acknowledges the difficulties involved in setting up survivor reception centres in the vicinity of major incidents, but, ‘the fact that they were not established at all had repercussions for the provision of support’. The report states, ‘we are establishing better data collection methods – particularly by making sure that immediate reception centres are established’.

The London Resilience Forum Report states that the failure to look after survivors and collect their details at the scenes had been accepted by the Metropolitan Police Service (the lead agency responsible). The Forum ‘agreed that in future there is a need to record the details of those present in the immediate vicinity of the incident, so that any risk of exposure to harmful substance can be registered’.

The Metropolitan Police Service initially responded by saying that, ‘the comments about the need and use of personal details illustrate the lack of understanding of initial response challenges. The Service considers these to be most unhelpful’. The MPS response did later include a more positive and constructive approach: ‘it is recognised that the setting up of a fully staffed survivor reception centre is best practice. The events of 7 July 2005 were particularly difficult due to the multiple sites and the numbers of people leaving the Underground network. Together with our partners, the Local Authorities and transport operators, the MPS is looking at ways to address the requirements of this recommendation’. In November 2006, the three London police services told us that, ‘the need for survivor reception centres is included in the LESLP Major Incident Manual. In light of this recommendation it is intended to extend this section of the manual to stress the importance of this facility. However this has to be considered in an environment where those that have been involved will wish to leave the scene. It should be accepted that in the initial stages of the response phase, when the responders will be focusing on dealing with the rescue of the injured, details may not be collected from survivors’.

Transport for London rejected our recommendation on the identification in advance of potential reception centres, on the basis that it would be operationally unworkable to identify such a large number of potential sites, and there is a risk of such sites being vulnerable to secondary devices.

It is recognised by responders that there is a need to develop generic plans for the establishment of reception centres, and it is clear that the MPS should take the lead on the day in identifying sites and directing survivors to these sites. The MPS has identified associated issues, such as the need for signage to direct people to the reception centres, and the need to

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45 Home Office Report, page 4
46 Home Office Report, page 9
47 London Resilience Forum report, page 19
48 London Resilience Forum report, page 11
49 MPS response, September 2006
50 Joint police response, 20 November 2006, pages 2-3
51 Joint police response, 20 November 2006, page 4
communicate with those who leave before the cordon and reception centre are established to let them know where to go or what number to call to register their details.  

In the event of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) attack it would be of crucial importance that those in the vicinity of the incident remain there until they have received appropriate medical attention and decontamination. The MPS acknowledges this issue and tells us that there is work underway to develop and improve guidance on how to respond in the event of a CBRN attack. The key difficulty is that it is not possible immediately to determine whether there are CBRN elements to a major incident – it requires at least some initial analysis, during which time people will leave the scene unless the cordon has been established and a nearby reception area identified.

The establishment of survivor reception centres may not be the immediate priority for the first emergency services to arrive at the scene – they will be concerned with identifying and rescuing those who are seriously injured. That is why it is important to identify an agency and individuals within that agency who will be responsible for fulfilling the important task of establishing reception centres for the walking wounded and uninjured. MPS representatives at our follow-up meeting acknowledged this point. We do not underestimate the logistical and practical difficulties involved, and the speedy and effective establishment of reception areas is a particularly difficult task in an incident in an urban setting (where individuals can more easily walk away from the scene and go home).

Recommendation 28A

Further serious thought must be given by the emergency services as to how to establish reception areas for survivors close to the scene of a major incident as soon as possible after the event. We request that the Metropolitan Police Service provide us with details of what further work has been done to identify a range of potential solutions and how emergency plans, training and protocols have been revised, by 31 October 2007.

52 Transcript of Committee meeting, 22 November 2006, page 29
53 Transcript of Committee meeting, 22 November 2006, page 32
54 Transcript of Committee meeting, 22 November 2006, page 30
Tracking injured and deceased people after they have been taken to hospital

32. We recommend that the London Ambulance Service review its mechanisms for finding out and recording the identity of seriously injured patients who are able to give their names and any other details at the scene of a major incident. We request that the London Ambulance Service come forward with possible solutions in time for our follow-up review in November 2006.

33. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum coordinate a review across the emergency services of protocols for identifying survivors of major incidents and ensuring that their names, once taken, are passed on to the Casualty Bureau and receiving hospitals.

ISSUE ACKNOWLEDGED BUT FURTHER WORK REQUIRED

On 7 July there were people who gave their details to the authorities, sometimes on several occasions, but they were not recorded or passed on to the receiving hospitals and / or the Casualty Bureau. This issue has been acknowledged, and the London Ambulance Service has included material accordingly in its refresher training courses.

Improvements have also been made to the way in which details of patients are passed from hospitals to the police Casualty Bureau. For example, the MPS now has more laptops available to be taken to hospitals so that patients’ details can be collected there and communicated directly to the Casualty Bureau.

RNID has recommended that, ‘distinct provisions are made to provide appropriate communication support for deaf and hard of hearing people in instances where their personal details and / or information needs to be collected. This includes the deaf awareness of all staff liaising with deaf or hard of hearing people in instances where their personal details and / or information needs to be collected. This includes the deaf awareness of all staff liaising with deaf and hard of hearing people and appropriate communication support in the immediate aftermath and over the following weeks’.55

In response to our report we received information about an alternative triage system that might improve accuracy and reliability in the collection and tracking of the details of patients. We brought this to the attention of the London Ambulance Service, though we are sure this is not the only alternative available on the market. Martin Flaherty, Director of Operations for the London Ambulance Service, told us that he would look at the alternatives available.56 In May 2007 the London Ambulance Service told us that it had reviewed alternatives and concluded on balance that its existing systems met the service’s needs.57

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55 Response from RNID, page 4
56 Transcript of Committee meeting, 22 November 2006, page 34
57 Update from London Ambulance Service, May 2007, paragraph 1.7.2
We welcome the steps taken by the London Ambulance Service and Metropolitan Police Service to address the concerns raised by survivors about the tracking of patients once they have left the scene of a major incident.
Inclusion of media representatives in resilience exercises

34. We recommend that future resilience exercises include senior representatives from the media as participants rather than simply as observers.

FULLY IMPLEMENTED

We are pleased to note that, despite the concerns initially raised by the Mayor and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, this recommendation has been accepted.
Communicating with the public

35. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service, in consultation with the London Media Emergency Forum, revise its plans to provide basic advice, as opposed to detailed information, for the public within an hour of a major incident if at all possible.

IMPLEMENTED

36. We recommend that in the event of major incident in London, the Metropolitan Police Service should appoint a senior officer, with appropriate skills, to act as the police spokesperson throughout the day. That person’s primary responsibility would be to communicate with the public, via the media, to pass on accurate and timely advice and information.

IMPLEMENTED

Government-funded researchers at the University of Sussex supported recommendation 36, pointing to the benefits of having a single spokesperson throughout the day. The Metropolitan Police Service has told us that its protocols include provision for this to take place, and we understand that work is taking place to use multiple communications channels to communicate with the public through the media, on the transport network and in other public places in the event of a major incident.
Casualty Bureau

37. We request that the Metropolitan Police Service provide us with an update on the implementation of the new ‘Casweb’ Casualty Bureau technology, and any other measures that might be identified to manage the initial high volume of calls to a Casualty Bureau, in time for our follow-up review in November 2006.

38. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service:

   review the technical protocols for establishing a Casualty Bureau to ensure that errors and technical problems do not delay the establishment of a Casualty Bureau in the future.

   ensure the use of a free-phone number for any future Casualty Bureau that may be set up.

   prepare standard public information about a Casualty Bureau, to include instructions as to its purpose and information about sources of advice and information for people who do not need to report missing persons.

39. We request that the Metropolitan Police Service report back to us on progress against these recommendations, in time for our follow-up review in November 2006.

40. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum develop plans to establish a public information line as well as a Casualty Bureau in the event of a major incident. The plans should provide for the information line to be integrated with the Casualty Bureau and any support services that are set up in the immediate aftermath of an incident, so that callers can be transferred on to an information or support services having called the Casualty Bureau.

FULLY IMPLEMENTED

The Metropolitan Police Service has accepted these recommendations and acted upon them.

Improvements have been made to the way in which calls are distributed, and caller options have been developed so that callers will be directed according to the purpose of their call. Whilst this may be technically more efficient, we do have some concerns about the likely response of members of the public if they call the Casualty Bureau and are unable to reach a ‘real person’. For those who are frantically worried about loved ones, this is likely to be a profoundly frustrating experience. Having said that, this must be balanced against the frustration that was experienced by those who dialled repeatedly for hours on 7 July, unable to get through at all. Given the volume of calls likely to be generated in the aftermath of a major incident in a densely populated urban area and the length of time taken with each call, it may not ever be technically feasible to provide an instant service with the necessary capacity to respond to all calls in person.

The caller options will direct callers wishing to register their involvement in the incident; those trying to find out if a loved one has been involved; and those wishing to obtain information such as travel advice.
As we stated in our report, there is a mismatch between public expectations of the Casualty Bureau and the purpose of the Bureau from the point of view of the police. The Casualty Bureau, from the police point of view, exists to collate information about the incident and establish who has been involved. It forms part of the police investigation into the incident. It is not a public information line.\(^5^8\)

**We welcome the steps taken by the police to implement technical solutions to the issues we raised in our report relating to the Casualty Bureau.**

However, there is other work that could be done to provide a better service to members of the public trying to track down their loved ones, and to make it easier for the police to carry out their task of identifying who is involved in the incident.

We received information about an American initiative called ‘find our folks’.\(^5^9\) This is a web-based scheme, where individuals can register themselves using their mobile telephone numbers and leave messages for their loved ones. Such a system could have been very useful on 7 July, when people had difficulties getting in touch with loved ones via mobile telephones because of the network congestion. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service consider the information we received to assess the feasibility of establishing a similar web-based system here. This could alleviate the pressure on the Casualty Bureau, and help members of the public not affected by the incident to make contact with each other.

There is also a need for better public information about the sources of information available, and the purpose of the Casualty Bureau, so as to minimise the numbers of calls made to the Casualty Bureau that are not relevant to its purpose, whilst providing alternative sources of information for the public about travel, safety advice, and other advice and information. The Metropolitan Police has developed a standard format public information notice for this purpose.

RNID has highlighted the importance of providing and advertising a textphone number as well as a telephone line.

**We welcome the action taken by the Metropolitan Police Service to improve the operation of the Casualty Bureau for future major incidents. We would draw their attention to the points made by the RNID about the need for a textphone service as well as a telephone line.**

**Recommendation 38A**

We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service consider whether a website similar to the USA ‘find our folks’ website would be feasible and / or useful in the UK context.

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\(^{58}\) Transcript of Committee meeting, 22 November 2006, page 35  
\(^{59}\) Written response from Mobile Data Association
**Time-limiting news statements**

41. We recommend that the MPS establish a process whereby advisory messages are explicitly time-limited, and updated on an hourly basis, even if there is no change in the basic advice.

42. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service liaise with the Media Emergency Forum to establish a protocol for communicating publicly the time-limited nature of news statements during the response to a major incident.

**ACCEPTED – FURTHER WORK REQUIRED**

The Metropolitan Police Service has accepted these recommendations, whilst pointing out that the media will continue to use statements until provided with more detail. Discussions are taking place between the MPS and the Media Emergency Forum as to how this issue can be effectively addressed so that the public is not given information or advice that is out-of-date.

**Recommendation 41A**

We request that the Metropolitan Police Service publish details of the outcome of its discussions with the Media Emergency Forum on the provision of time-limited statements in the hours following a major incident.
Role of Metropolitan Police Service in providing advice on issues such as mobile telephone use

43. We recommend MPS news statements include key pieces of advice and information relating to broader issues, including advice on the use of mobile phones in the event of network congestion. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service, in consultation with resilience partners, develop a standard list of issues to be covered in early news conferences in the event of a major incident. We request that the Metropolitan Police Service report back to us in November 2006 to tell us what action has been taken towards this end.

FULLY IMPLEMENTED

The Metropolitan Police Service Department of Public Affairs has developed a standard format public information notice, including advice on the Casualty Bureau and information about the use of mobile telephones.
44. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service, in consultation with the London Media Emergency Forum, produce a guidance document on the establishment and running of an effective media centre that meets the needs of the media, building on the lessons to be learnt from their experience on 7 July.

INCOMPLETE RESPONSE

The MPS response to this recommendation was incomplete – it re-iterated the position in relation to the media centre that was established on 7 July, rather than addressing the points made about any media centre to be established in the future. We understand that extensive debriefings have taken place, but we cannot judge from the response we received whether these de-briefings have resulted in a satisfactory resolution of the issues raised in our report.

Recommendation 44A

We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service publish its revised plans for the establishment of a media centre so that they can be discussed fully with media representatives.
Communications between local authorities and businesses

45. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum work with local authorities and business organisations to produce a standard communications package to facilitate effective communications between local authorities and businesses. We request that the London Resilience Forum provide us with an update on progress by November 2006.

PARTIALLY IMPLEMENTED - MORE WORK REQUIRED

London First is leading on work in this area. According to the London Resilience Forum, this work has been well-received by businesses. The Assembly has recently approved the establishment of a separate project to review issues relevant to this recommendation.60

60 See http://www.london.gov.uk/assembly/bmac/2007/jul19/item05.pdf
Assistance for bereaved people, survivors and their loved ones

46. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum review its emergency plans to ensure that they include provision for the establishment of a reception centre for people looking for missing loved ones following a major incident. This should provide for their basic needs, including up-to-date information on progress in locating missing people, and practical assistance, such as help in finding accommodation if necessary. We believe that this function could be fulfilled by the Family Assistance Centre – its role should be expanded and developed to include explicitly these roles as well as its police evidence-gathering role.

SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS

47. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum identify one lead agency responsible for collating details of survivors and maintaining a definitive list. This lead agency should then act as the main channel of communication with survivors. We consider that the Assistance Centre would be the most appropriate body to collate and manage this information. In particular, plans must be put in place to address any data protection issues that are likely to arise in relation to the sharing of details among relevant authorities.

FULLY IMPLEMENTED

48. In future, any Assistance Centre that is set up following a major incident should have explicitly within its remit the provision of tools and guidance for setting up survivor groups, and where requested should act in a supporting / facilitating role. In particular, it would be useful to provide advice and support in the following areas:

a. How to establish and run a secure internet site;

b. How to ensure that survivor groups are not infiltrated by journalists, conspiracy theorists, or voyeurs;

c. Practical advice on sources of information and support available to survivors;

d. Guidance on health risks to be aware of, including post-traumatic stress disorder and any other conditions likely to be experienced by survivors of the incident in question;

e. Support in the form of counselling and advice for people who emerge as leaders of the group.

INCOMPLETE RESPONSE BUT WORK HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN

49. We recommend that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport conduct a review of the lessons to be learnt from King’s Cross United, by talking to those involved, with a view to developing guidance for people who may want to set up survivor groups in the future. We request that this guidance be published by November 2006 so that we can consider it as part of our follow-up review.
50. The London Resilience Forum should invite NHS trauma services to join its meetings. Having done that, the London Resilience Forum should develop detailed plans for the care of survivors in the immediate aftermath and the months following any future major incident. These should include plans for making survivors aware of the support services that are available through a variety of channels. They should also include explicit plans for caring for those who live outside the city (this element of the plans should be drawn up in consultation with the Association of Chief Police Officers and other relevant partners). We request that the London Resilience Forum report back to us on progress that has been made in this regard by November 2006.

51. Any assistance centre that is set up in response to a major incident in the future should simply be named ‘[date or location of incident] Assistance Centre’. The name ‘Family Assistance Centre’ was misleading and resulted in survivors not coming forward for assistance.

52. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum urgently find a way to resolve the problems that have prevented the NHS trauma service from having access to details of survivors, so that those who are known to the police or other authorities can be contacted by the NHS trauma service. We request that the London Resilience Forum report back to us in July 2006 to tell us what action has been taken.

53. The Assistance Centre should take on the role from the outset of being the main channel of communication with survivors. It should provide regular updates, including information and advice about any ongoing monitoring of health impacts of the incident.

54. We recommend that the London Resilience Team, in consultation with all the members of the London Resilience Forum and with survivors of 7 July, produce a guidance document setting out how the needs of survivors of a major incident will be addressed both during, immediately after, and in the months that follow. We request that the London Resilience Team provide us with a progress report by November 2006.

Significant work has been undertaken by the Government and other authorities to make sure that survivors and bereaved people are properly supported following a major incident in the future.

New guidance has been developed on humanitarian assistance in emergencies, and work is ongoing nationally to develop and refine the plans for establishing assistance centres for survivors and for friends and families. From what we have seen, the lessons from 7 July have been incorporated into those plans.
New guidance has been issued on sharing information between relevant agencies about the individuals affected by a major incident. Following 7 July, there was an over-zealous interpretation of data protection legislation. This prevented survivors’ details from being passed on to key organisations that were supposed to be contacting and helping them. From the perspective of survivors, it seemed ridiculous that having provided their name to one organisation this was not passed on to other relevant organisations with the result that those in a position to provide support to survivors did not know who they were and they were not contacted with information or advice about the support that was available. We are pleased that this new guidance has been issued, and we hope it will mean that the same mistakes will not be made again in the future.

All the feedback we received on our report acknowledged the tremendous contribution made by those survivors who gave us their views during our review. There are lessons to be learned from this about the value of asking members of the public what they think about the services they have received and how they could be improved for the future.
### Summary of progress

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Progress</th>
<th>Further recommendations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communications with passengers and others affected by emergencies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. We recommend that London Underground, Tubelines and Metronet, as part of the review of the Public Private Partnership to be completed in 2010, negotiate a more rapid rollout of facilities for passengers and train drivers to be able to communicate in the event of an emergency.</td>
<td>Not accepted but issue addressed</td>
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<tr>
<td>We would draw the attention of the Public Private Partnership Arbiter to this recommendation and others relating to the review of the Public Private Partnership.</td>
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<td>2. We recommend that, as part of the review of the PPP to be concluded in 2010, London Underground, Metronet and Tubelines seek to speed up the rollout of the new radio system to enable train drivers to communicate with their line controllers.</td>
<td>Not accepted but issue addressed</td>
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<td>3. In the meantime, we recommend that Transport for London conduct a study of possible interim solutions to increase the reliability and resilience of radio communications between train drivers and line controllers. We request that Transport for London provide us with an update on progress in time for our November 2006 follow-up review.</td>
<td>Implemented</td>
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<td>Recommendation</td>
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<td><strong>Underground radio communications for the emergency and transport services</strong></td>
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<td>4. We recommend that Transport for London provide an update on progress in rolling out the CONNECT project in November 2006, May 2007 and November 2007, so that we can monitor the delivery of the contract. The timely completion of this project is essential to enable all London’s emergency services to communicate underground.</td>
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<td><strong>Digital radios within the emergency services</strong></td>
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<td>5. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service, London Fire Brigade and London Ambulance Service provide us with an update on the rollout of digital radio systems within their services in November 2006, May 2007 and November 2007, so that we can monitor progress towards full implementation of TETRA-based radio communications across London’s emergency services.</td>
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<td><strong>Progress</strong></td>
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<td>Implemented, but outstanding concerns</td>
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<td><strong>Further recommendations</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Recommendation 4A</strong></td>
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<td>We request that Transport for London provide us with a full update on the rollout of CONNECT and Airwave on the Underground, with details of any problems with coverage or other issues and how they are being addressed, by 31 October 2007.</td>
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<td><strong>Recommendation 5A</strong></td>
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<td>We request that the National Policing Improvement Agency, Airwave providers and the Metropolitan Police Service provide us with a comprehensive report on the rollout of Airwave by 31 October 2007.</td>
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</table>
**Recommendation 5B**

We request that the London Ambulance Service and London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority provide a comprehensive update on the rollout of digital radios within their services, including information about any difficulties that have been encountered and how they are being addressed, by 31 October 2007. We request that these reports include an account of what has been done to share lessons across the emergency services in London so as to minimise the recurrence of the same problems in different services.
<table>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Role Radios and other available technologies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. We recommend that Transport for London conduct a feasibility study to assess the costs and effectiveness of Personal Role Radios and other available technologies to enable communications for emergency and transport services in underground stations and tunnels. We request that Transport for London provide an update on work in this area by the time of our follow-up review in November 2006.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Deployment of emergency services to incidents on the Underground</strong></td>
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<td>7. We recommend that emergency plans be amended so that, when an incident takes place in an Underground tunnel, the emergency services are deployed to the stations closest to the train in either direction.</td>
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<td><strong>Emergency Response Unit</strong></td>
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<td>8. We recommend that Transport for London lobby the Government to obtain blue light status for Emergency Response Unit vehicles. This would, amongst other things, exempt Emergency Response Unit vehicles from bus lane restrictions and the Congestion Charge.</td>
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<th>Progress</th>
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<td><strong>Considered but not accepted</strong></td>
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<th>Further recommendations</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Recommendation 6A</strong></td>
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<td>We remain concerned about the need for effective back-up systems for use in the event of a breakdown in digital communications. We request that the emergency services provide us with a report by 31 October 2007 outlining what measures are in place to provide such back-up systems. We request that these reports include evidence of serious consideration of alternative back-up communications technologies, as well as details of what is being done within existing communications systems to maximise their resilience.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Significant progress</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Not achieved</strong></td>
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<td>Recommendation</td>
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<td>9. We recommend that, in the meantime, Transport for London grant the Emergency Response Unit automatic access to bus lanes and an automatic exemption from the Congestion Charge.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10. We recommend that the Emergency Response Unit obtain Airwave radios to be able to communicate underground once the CONNECT project is completed.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11. We recommend that the Emergency Response Unit consider the feasibility of obtaining an interim/back-up solution to enable its staff to communicate underground, such as Personal Role Radios.</td>
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</table>
**Recommendation**

**Declaration of major incidents across the emergency services**

12. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum review the protocols for declaring a major incident to ensure that, as soon as one of the emergency services declares a major incident, the others also put major incident procedures in place. This could increase the speed with which the emergency services establish what has happened and begin to enact a co-ordinated and effective emergency response.

**Communications between managers at the scene and their control rooms**

13. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum, as a matter of priority, co-ordinate a review across London’s emergency services of communications between managers at the scenes of major incidents, their respective control rooms and the Strategic Co-ordination Centre. We request that the London Resilience Team provide us with the results of this review in November 2006.

**Progress**

Not accepted

**Further recommendations**

**Recommendation 12A**

We request that the emergency services provide us with evidence by 31 October 2007 that there has been full consideration of the potential for improving communications between the emergency services during the first minutes following declaration by one service of a major incident, whether by reviewing the protocols for declaring a major incident or by improving the speed and efficiency with which the emergency services inform each other of major incidents.

**Recommendation 13A**

We recommend that the London Resilience Partnership publish a progress report by 31 October 2007, outlining what progress has been made in implementing the actions identified in its lessons learned report of September 2006 and any other work carried out since then to improve London’s preparedness for disasters.
Access Overload Control (ACCOLC)

14. Members of the London Resilience Forum should put in place regular checks to ensure that key senior officers are equipped with ACCOLC-enabled mobile phones. We request that the emergency and transport services provide us with details of their plans to conduct such reviews, showing what will be done, and how frequently, to ensure that the technology can actually be effectively used if necessary.

15. The protocols which require mobile telephone operating companies to verify instructions to activate ACCOLC should be amended, so that any instructions are verified with the Gold Co-ordinating Group rather than the authority issuing the instructions. We recommend that the London Resilience Team review these protocols and report back to us by November 2006.

16. All the authorities involved in the response to a major or catastrophic incident must operate within the established command and control structure. This is essential for the effective strategic management of the response. The City of London Police must provide the Committee with assurances that, in future, it will operate within the agreed command and control structures in the event of a major or catastrophic incident in future.
London Ambulance Service communications improvements

17. We request that the London Ambulance Service provide us with an update on progress in reviewing and improving its communications systems in time for our follow-up review in November 2006. Fully implemented

London Ambulance Service delivery of supplies and equipment to the scenes of major incidents, and storage of medical equipment at key stations on the transport network

18. We request that the London Ambulance Service provide us with details of its plans to increase its capacity to deliver supplies and equipment to the sites of major incidents, in time for our follow-up review in November 2006. Fully implemented

19. We recommend that the London Ambulance Service and London Underground review the potential for storing rescue and medical equipment at stations. We request that they report back to us by November 2006 telling us what progress has been made in conducting this review, and what options are under consideration. Fully implemented
Maintaining accurate records of the response

20. We recommend that the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel review its emergency plans with a view to identifying a lead agency for maintaining accurate records of the response to major incidents. At each scene, there should be a nominated individual who is responsible for carrying out this task.

Notification of hospitals in the vicinity of a major incident

21. We recommend that emergency plans be amended to provide for the notification of all hospitals in the vicinity of a major incident, even if they are not designated hospitals with major accident and emergency departments.

22. We recommend that London’s emergency plans be revised to include an explicit provision for communication with people affected by a major incident as soon as possible after the arrival of emergency or transport service personnel at the scene.

23. We recommend that Transport for London review the communications systems that are in place to enable station staff and/or the emergency services to communicate with passengers on trains that are trapped in tunnels. We request that Transport for London provide us with a report on how it plans to take forward this work, in time for our follow-up review in November 2006.

Recommendation 21A

We request that NHS London provide further details of its plans relating to non-acute hospitals and self-responders by 31 October 2007.

Recommendation 23A

We request that Transport for London provide us with further details of its plans to improve communications with passengers trapped in trains for any period of time ahead of their evacuation by 31 October 2007. This should include plans for communication with people who are deaf or hard of hearing, and those who are blind or partially sighted.
Emergency lighting in tunnels

24. We recommend that Transport for London conduct a feasibility study on alternative forms of emergency lighting for new/refurbished rolling stock, and report back to us by May 2007. We recommend that Transport for London review the potential for providing torches in drivers’ cabs for use in the event of loss of lighting and failure of emergency lights.

First aid kits on public transport and at stations

25. Transport for London/London Underground should produce a plan for provision of basic first aid kits on trains and at stations, in time for the 2007/08 budget-setting process.

26. Transport for London should also consider whether it would be practicable to carry basic first aid kits on buses, and Network Rail operators should produce plans for provision of first-aid kits for public use (and for use by qualified first-aiders) at mainline railway stations and on trains. We recommend that Transport for London and Network Rail report back to us on this issue by November 2006.

Recommendation 24A

RMT wrote to us to suggest, in the long term, the installation of emergency lighting strips in train carriages similar to those installed on passenger aircraft. We recommend that TfL consider this proposal and tell us the outcome by 31 October 2007.

Fully implemented

Significant progress

Significant progress
Safety notices on Underground trains

27. We recommend that Transport for London install clearly visible safety notices inside the carriages on all Tube trains, instructing passengers what to do in an emergency. We request that Transport for London provide us with a plan, by November 2006, showing the timescale for the installation of safety notices in all carriages on Tube trains.

Recommendation 27A

We welcome the installation of emergency notices on Underground trains. We recommend that Transport for London conduct research to assess the impact of these notices on passengers’ awareness of the basic messages contained in the notices, and on that basis consider whether any further work is necessary. We request that Transport for London provide us with an update on this work by 31 October 2007.

Establishment of survivor reception centres at the sites of major incidents

28. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum identify a lead agency for the establishment of survivor reception centres at the sites of major incidents in the initial stages before handover to local authorities. We believe this task would most appropriately fall to the Metropolitan Police Service, which is already responsible for the collection of personal details of survivors.

29. We invite the London Resilience Forum to report back to us in November 2006 to tell us which agency will take the lead, and what plans have been put in place to ensure that survivor reception centres are set up close to the scene of any major incident in future.

Recommendation 28A

Further serious thought must be given by the emergency services as to how to establish reception areas for survivors close to the scene of a major incident as soon as possible after the event. We request that the Metropolitan Police Service provide us with details of what further work has been done to identify a range of potential solutions and how emergency plans, training and protocols have been revised, by 31 October 2007.
30. We recommend that London Underground Limited, train operating companies and Transport for London identify, in consultation with local authorities and the emergency services, at least two potential survivor reception centres close to Tube stations, overground rail stations and major bus stations in central London. They should then liaise with the owners/occupiers of those sites and involve them in emergency planning processes and exercises.

31. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service establish protocols for ensuring that personal details are collected from survivors at the scene of a major incident. We request that the Metropolitan Police Service report back to us on what action it has taken by November 2006.

Tracking injured and deceased people after they have been taken to hospital

32. We recommend that the London Ambulance Service review its mechanisms for finding out and recording the identity of seriously injured patients who are able to give their names and any other details at the scene of a major incident. We request that the London Ambulance Service come forward with possible solutions in time for our follow-up review in November 2006.

33. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum coordinate a review across the emergency services of protocols for identifying survivors of major incidents and ensuring that their names, once taken, are passed on to the Casualty Bureau and receiving hospitals.
Inclusion of media representatives in resilience exercises

34. We recommend that future resilience exercises include senior representatives from the media as participants rather than simply as observers. Fully implemented

Communicating with the public

35. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service, in consultation with the London Media Emergency Forum, revise its plans to provide basic advice, as opposed to detailed information, for the public within an hour of a major incident if at all possible. Implemented

36. We recommend that in the event of major incident in London, the Metropolitan Police Service should appoint a senior officer, with appropriate skills, to act as the police spokesperson throughout the day. That person’s primary responsibility would be to communicate with the public, via the media, to pass on accurate and timely advice and information. Implemented
Casualty Bureau

37. We request that the Metropolitan Police Service provide us with an update on the implementation of the new ‘Casweb’ Casualty Bureau technology, and any other measures that might be identified to manage the initial high volume of calls to a Casualty Bureau, in time for our follow-up review in November 2006.

38. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service:

- review the technical protocols for establishing a Casualty Bureau to ensure that errors and technical problems do not delay the establishment of a Casualty Bureau in the future.
- ensure the use of a free-phone number for any future Casualty Bureau that may be set up.
- prepare standard public information about a Casualty Bureau, to include instructions as to its purpose and information about sources of advice and information for people who do not need to report missing persons.

39. We request that the Metropolitan Police Service report back to us on progress against these recommendations, in time for our follow-up review in November 2006.

40. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum develop plans to establish a public information line as well as a Casualty Bureau in the event of a major incident. The plans should provide for the information line to be integrated with the Casualty Bureau and any support services that are set up in the immediate aftermath of an incident, so that callers can be transferred on to an

Recommendation 38A

We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service consider whether a website similar to the USA ‘find our folks’ website would be feasible and/or useful in the UK context.

Fully implemented
information or support services having called the Casualty Bureau.

41. We recommend that the MPS establish a process whereby advisory messages are explicitly time-limited, and updated on an hourly basis, even if there is no change in the basic advice.

42. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service liaise with the Media Emergency Forum to establish a protocol for communicating publicly the time-limited nature of news statements during the response to a major incident.

43. We recommend MPS news statements include key pieces of advice and information relating to broader issues, including advice on the use of mobile phones in the event of network congestion. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service, in consultation with resilience partners, develop a standard list of issues to be covered in early news conferences in the event of a major incident. We request that the Metropolitan Police Service report back to us in November 2006 to tell us what action has been taken towards this end.

44. We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service, in consultation with the London Media Emergency Forum, produce a guidance document on the establishment and running of an effective media centre that meets the needs of the media, building on the lessons to be learnt from their experience on 7 July.

Recommendation 41A

We request that the Metropolitan Police Service publish details of the outcome of its discussions with the Media Emergency Forum on the provision of time-limited statements in the hours following a major incident.

Recommendation 44A

We recommend that the Metropolitan Police Service publish its revised plans for the establishment of a media centre, so that they can be discussed fully with media representatives.
Communications between local authorities and businesses

45. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum work with local authorities and business organisations to produce a standard communications package to facilitate effective communications between local authorities and businesses. We request that the London Resilience Forum provide us with an update on progress by November 2006.

Partially implemented - more work required

Assistance for bereaved people, survivors and their loved ones

46. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum review its emergency plans to ensure that they include provision for the establishment of a reception centre for people looking for missing loved ones following a major incident. This should provide for their basic needs, including up-to-date information on progress in locating missing people, and practical assistance, such as help in finding accommodation if necessary. We believe that this function could be fulfilled by the Family Assistance Centre – its role should be expanded and developed to include explicitly these roles as well as its police evidence-gathering role.

Significant progress

47. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum identify one lead agency responsible for collating details of survivors and maintaining a definitive list. This lead agency should then act as the main channel of communication with survivors. We consider that the Assistance Centre would be the most appropriate body to collate and manage this information. In particular, plans must be put in place to address any data protection issues that are likely to arise in relation to the sharing of details among relevant organsations.

Fully implemented
authorities.

48. In future, any Assistance Centre that is set up following a major incident should have explicitly within its remit the provision of tools and guidance for setting up survivor groups, and where requested should act in a supporting / facilitating role. In particular, it would be useful to provide advice and support in the following areas:

a. how to establish and run a secure internet site;
b. how to ensure that survivor groups are not infiltrated by journalists, conspiracy theorists or voyeurs;
c. practical advice on sources of information and support available to survivors;
d. guidance on health risks to be aware of, including post-traumatic stress disorder and any other conditions likely to be experienced by survivors of the incident in question;
e. support in the form of counselling and advice for people who emerge as leaders of the group.

49. We recommend that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport conduct a review of the lessons to be learned from King’s Cross United, by talking to those involved, with a view to developing guidance for people who may want to set up survivor groups in the future. We request that this guidance be published by November 2006 so that we can consider it as part of our follow-up review.
50. The London Resilience Forum should invite NHS trauma services to join its meetings. Having done that, the London Resilience Forum should develop detailed plans for the care of survivors in the immediate aftermath and the months following any future major incident. These should include plans for making survivors aware of the support services that are available through a variety of channels. They should also include explicit plans for caring for those who live outside the city (this element of the plans should be drawn up in consultation with the Association of Chief Police Officers and other relevant partners). We request that the London Resilience Forum report back to us on progress that has been made in this regard by November 2006.

51. Any assistance centre that is set up in response to a major incident in the future should simply be named ‘[date or location of incident] Assistance Centre’. The name ‘Family Assistance Centre’ was misleading and resulted in survivors not coming forward for assistance.

52. We recommend that the London Resilience Forum urgently find a way to resolve the problems that have prevented the NHS trauma service from having access to details of survivors, so that those who are known to the police or other authorities can be contacted by the NHS trauma service. We request that the London Resilience Forum report back to us in July 2006 to tell us what action has been taken.

53. The Assistance Centre should take on the role from the outset of being the main channel of communication with survivors. It should provide regular updates, including information and advice about any ongoing monitoring of health impacts of the incident.
54. We recommend that the London Resilience Team, in consultation with all the members of the London Resilience Forum and with survivors of 7 July, produce a guidance document setting out how the needs of survivors of a major incident will be addressed both during, immediately after, and in the months that follow. We request that the London Resilience Team provide us with a progress report by November 2006.
Glossary

**A&E:** Accident and Emergency

**ACCOLC:** Access Overload Control – the system whereby mobile telephone service providers can limit access to their respective networks and permit emergency services, local authorities, and other users with specially enabled telephones to have exclusive access to available channels.

**ACPO:** Association of Chief Police Officers

**Airwave:** A secure digital radio network (using TETRA technology – see separate glossary entry) for the exclusive use of the UK’s emergency and public safety services.

**ATOC:** Association of Train Operating Companies

**Operation Benbow:** Joint working arrangements between Metropolitan Police, City of London Police and British Transport Police. These arrangements are frequently invoked, and were in place on 7 July.

**Bronze:** Within each service, the person responsible for operational implementation of the tactics set by Silver – see also separate annex giving explanation of command and control structure

**BTP:** British Transport Police

**CAD:** Computer-aided despatch – technical term for communications systems used by City of London and Metropolitan Police

**Call gapping:** Technical intervention which limits the number of calls passing through a local switch or exchange to prevent overload, giving a proportion of callers an ‘engaged’ tone or ‘all lines are busy’ message.

**Casualty Bureau:** The role of the Police Casualty Bureau is to provide a central contact for those seeking or providing information about persons who might have been involved in an incident.

**Catastrophic Incident:** a Major Incident (see separate glossary entry) where following the advice of the emergency services, the Designated Minister is of the opinion that it is of such magnitude that it will require a specific, or exceptional response from members of the London Regional Resilience Forum. Their strategic priorities will be to assist with both the immediate issues and achieving a return to normality. In doing so it is recognized that full Government involvement will be required.

**CBRN:** Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and/or Nuclear

**Centrecomm:** London Buses Command and Control Complex

**CICA:** Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority

**CLP:** City of London Police

**COBR:** Cabinet Office Briefing Room – the contingency mechanism in central government used to manage and coordinate responses to civil emergencies – sometimes referred to as COBRA

**CONNECT:** A secure, inter-operable digital radio system (using TETRA technology – see separate glossary entry) planned for installation on London Underground

**Countdown:** Computerised display system at bus stops used by Transport for London

**DCMS:** Department for Culture, Media and Sport

**DTI:** Department of Trade and Industry

**FAC:** Family Assistance Centre – later replaced by the 7 July Assistance Centre

**FCO:** Foreign and Commonwealth Office

**FLO:** Family Liaison Officer

**FRU:** Fire Rescue Unit

**GLA:** Greater London Authority
**Gold command:** Within each service, the person responsible for determining strategy – see also separate annex giving explanation of command and control structure

**GPRS/GSM:** General Packet Radio Service/Global System for Mobile Communications – standard systems for mobile telephone communications (does not include third generation – 3G – technology)

**HAC:** Honourable Artillery Company – used as the location for the resilience mortuary

**Half-rate encoding:** Technical fix which doubles the capacity of mobile phone networks by reducing call quality. O2 applied this across central London on 7 July.

**HEMS:** Helicopter Emergency Medical Service

**HPA:** Health Protection Agency

**ISP:** Internet Service Provider

**JESCC:** Joint Emergency Services Control Centre

**LA Gold:** Local Authority ‘Gold’ officer for London

**LALO:** Local Authority Liaison Officer

**LAS:** London Ambulance Service

**Leaky Feeder:** A type of cable which can be used to provide two-way radio traffic inside tunnels and buildings

**LEA:** Local Education Authority

**LED:** Light Emitting Diode – high-brightness, durable, low-power lighting system as used in aircraft emergency lighting

**LESLP:** London Emergency Services Liaison Panel

**LFB:** London Fire Brigade

**LFEPA:** London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority

**LRT:** London Resilience Team

**LUL:** London Underground Limited

**Major Incident:** Any emergency that requires the implementation of special arrangements by one or all of the emergency services and will generally include the involvement, either directly, or indirectly, of large numbers of people.

**Media Emergency Forum:** A national (or regional) forum of media representatives, made up of regional forums, which are facilitated by the Government News Network under the Cabinet Office.

**MDT:** Mobile Data Terminal – communications equipment used to connect London Ambulance Service ambulances to the control suite.

**MetroComm:** Control centre for Metropolitan Police Service Traffic and Transport Branch

**MIMMS:** Major Incident Management and Support – a UK-wide NHS training programme

**MIO:** Medical Incident Officer – doctor to be deployed to manage emergency care at the scene of a major incident. The MIO has managerial responsibility for the deployment of medical and nursing staff at the scene and will liaise closely with the Ambulance Incident Officer to ensure effective management of resources. The London Ambulance Service maintains a Medical Incident Officer Pool and will invariably deploy doctors from this group when the need for an MIO and support becomes apparent.

**MPA:** Metropolitan Police Authority

**MPS:** Metropolitan Police Service

**Network Operations Centre:** London Underground’s operations centre

**ODPM:** Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (now Department for Communities and Local Government)

**Operation Atlantic Blue:** Exercise run by London Resilience to test out scenarios of
multiple attacks on the London Underground.

**PITO:** Police Information Technology Organisation

**Project Griffin:** City of London Police training on security issues for businesses within the City.

**PTSD:** Post-traumatic stress disorder

**RCN:** Royal College of Nursing

**RVP:** Rendezvous Point

**SCC:** Strategic Coordination Centre

**Silver:** Within each service, the person responsible for determining tactics – see also separate annex giving explanation of command and control structure

**SIM:** Subscriber Identity Module – as in SIM cards for mobile phones

**SMEs:** Small and medium-sized enterprises

**SMS:** Short Message Service – mobile phone text messaging

**TETRA:** Terrestrial Trunked Radio – a secure, inter-operable digital radio system, operated under such names as ‘Airwave’ and ‘CONNECT’ (see separate glossary entries)

**TfL:** Transport for London

**TIEPF:** Telecommunications Industry Emergency Planning Forum

**TOCs:** Train Operating Companies

**UHF:** Ultra High Frequency – used for radio transmissions

**VHF:** Very High Frequency – used for radio transmissions

**VMS:** Variable Message Signs – traffic control devices used by Highways Agency and Transport for London to give real time messages to drivers.
List of those who attended meetings of the Committee

22 November 2006

**Transport for London**
Tim O'Toole, Managing Director, London Underground
David Brown, Managing Director, Surface Transport

**City of London Police**
Chief Superintendent Alex Robertson

**British Transport Police**
Deputy Chief Constable Andy Trotter
Jo Bird, Head of Media and Marketing

**Metropolitan Police Service**
Commander Bob Broadhurst, Metropolitan Police Service
Commander Chris Allison, Metropolitan Police Service

**London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority**
Assistant Commissioner Ron Dobson

**London Ambulance Service**
Martin Flaherty, Director of Operations
David Jervis, Director of Communications

**NHS London**
John Pullin, Head of Emergency Planning
Web resources

London Assembly – www.london.gov.uk/assembly
Home Office – www.homeoffice.gov.uk
MI5 – www.mi5.gov.uk
Metropolitan Police Service – www.met.police.uk
City of London Police – www.cityoflondon.police.uk
British Transport Police – www.btp.police.uk
London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority – www.london-fire.gov.uk

NHS Trauma Service – www.londondevelopmentcentre.org
7 July Assistance Centre – www.7julyassistance.org.uk
Disaster action – www.disasteraction.org.uk
London Recovers – www.londonrecovers.com
Red Cross – www.redcross.org.uk
St John Ambulance – www.stjohnambulance.org.uk

London First – www.londonfirst.co.uk
London Chamber of Commerce and Industry – www.londonchamber.co.uk
Terms of reference and membership of the Committee

At its meeting on 8 September 2005, the London Assembly resolved to establish an ad hoc committee, the London Resilience Scrutiny Committee, as an ordinary Committee of the Assembly. To avoid confusion with the London Resilience Forum, the Committee was subsequently referred to as the 7 July Review Committee.

The terms of reference of the Committee are:

To review and report with recommendations on lessons to be learned from the response to 7 July bomb attacks:

- How information, advice and support was communicated to Londoners,
- How business continuity arrangements worked in practice,
- The role of Broadcasting Services in communication,
- The use of Information and Communication Technology to aid the response process.

Membership

Richard Barnes AM, Chairman (Conservative)
Sally Hamwee AM, Deputy Chair (Liberal Democrat)
Joanne McCartney AM (Labour) until July 2007 / Len Duvall AM (Labour) from July 2007
Peter Hulme Cross AM (One London)
Darren Johnson AM (Green)

Previous work

The Committee published its first report in June 2006. It is available from www.london.gov.uk/assembly or in hard copy from the London Assembly Secretariat (see contacts below). All the written submissions to the Committee including responses to its first report and transcripts of the Committee’s meetings are also available from the website or on request from the Secretariat.

Committee contacts

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Dale Langford, Committee Administrator: dale.langford@london.gov.uk / 020 7983 4415

Mark Demery, Head of External Relations mark.demery@london.gov.uk / 020 7983 5769
Orders and translations

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For further information on this report or to order a copy, please contact Janet Hughes, on 0207 983 4423 or email to janet.hughes@london.gov.uk You can also view and download a copy of this report from http://www.london.gov.uk/assembly/publications.jsp

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