London Resilience Partnership

Communicating with the Public Framework

Version 1

NOT PROTECTIVELY MARKED

June 2014
## Record of Exercises, Testing or Activations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed Exercise / Training</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>What will be tested/Covered</th>
<th>Validation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>e.g. Professional Partner Training</em></td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>Roles and responsibilities; flood warning procedures</td>
<td>Evaluation sheets/feedback from Participants.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### London Resilience Partnership Communicating with the Public Framework

Version 1 (June 2014)

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Section 1: Introduction

Background and purpose

1.1 Communicating with the public is a core element of the London Resilience Partnership Strategy\(^1\), and a capability which is required in all incidents.

1.2 Category 1 responders also have a duty under the Civil Contingencies Act to “maintain arrangements to warn the public, and to provide information and advice to the public, if an emergency is likely to occur or has occurred”\(^2\).

1.3 Established multi-agency arrangements to warn and inform the public are in place at a local and regional level between London Resilience Partners. The purpose of this document is not to replace or supersede these arrangements, but to draw together a coordinated overview of the multi-agency approach to communicating with the public in an emergency. This may assist in developing effective communication strategies in the response and recovery from an incident, to ensure the public have a coherent, coordinated picture of what has happened and what they need to do based on information from multiple agencies.

1.4 This framework also aims to go further than just pushing messages out to the public (one-way communication) in encouraging members of the London Resilience Partnership to consider how they can enter into a two-way dialogue, to communicate effectively with the public during and after an incident.

Aim

1.5 To provide a common understanding across the London Resilience Partnership of the channels available and processes for communicating with the public immediately prior to, during and after an emergency.

Objectives

1.6 The Framework has the following objectives:

- Synthesise existing research and best practice information to give a holistic overview of how we should aim to communicate with the public
- Provide an overview of communication tools available to London responders
- Outline how messages to the public are coordinated at a local, regional and national level
- Outline how London responders may work with the media during emergencies
- Give an overview of the roles and responsibilities of key groups of people who have a specific role in communicating with the public during an emergency.

Scope

1.7 This Framework focuses on communicating with the public in an emergency, including warning messages prior to a known potential incident, during an emergency and after an emergency. Communicating with the public in a more generic, community resilience context

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\(^1\) Available from [www.londonprepared.gov.uk](http://www.londonprepared.gov.uk)

is not covered by the scope of this document, although some of the same communication tools may be applicable.

1.8 The Framework looks at the coordination of messaging at different levels of the London Resilience Partnership, from local to regional, and linking in with national messages. It does not cover detailed arrangements for warning and informing at a local borough level.

1.9 The Framework outlines generic processes and procedures for coordinating communications to and with the public across London Resilience Partnership organisations. Detailed messages or tools used in relation to individual risks and capabilities should be detailed, where appropriate, in plans and policies relating to those risks / capabilities.

Links to other plans

1.10 There are close linkages between this Framework, the London Resilience Strategic Coordination Protocol and the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) Manual. Latest versions of both these documents are available from www.londonprepared.gov.uk.

1.11 This Framework may also be used to help inform and develop operational individual and multi-agency plans to communicate with the public.
Section 2: Context – how should we communicate with the public?

Introduction

2.1 As part of the development of this Framework a substantial literature review was undertaken of existing academic and other literature on communicating with the public. This section takes some of the key relevant findings from the research – the full report will be made available on the London Prepared website or from the London Resilience Team. Individual references haven’t been made in this document but are included in the full report.

Who do we need to talk to?

2.2 London is home to a hugely diverse population; forty-two per cent of Londoners identify themselves as from a group other than White British and more than 300 community languages are spoken in London’s schools\(^3\). In addition, more than a million people commute into London to work, and as an international tourist destination and centre of finance and business, London attracts a huge number of foreign visitors. Section 3 discusses in more details ways of communicating with specific groups of people.

2.3 Target audiences in emergencies may also be defined in terms of the impact of the incident on a group of people. The information provided, tone of messaging and the communication channels used to communicate these messages must be considered for each of the audiences identified in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Audience types

| Group A: Survivors – those in the immediate vicinity of the incident who have been directly affected (including casualties) | Those directly affected by the emergency (including casualties) |
| Group B: Those close by who may need to take action to avoid further harm | Local people, friends and relatives |
| Group C: Those in the area who may be disrupted by the consequences of an emergency and the clean-up process | Wider audience |
| Group D: Those who are related to, or know people who have, or might have been affected | |
| Group E: People who are not affected by the incident, but are interested in it, or concerned or alarmed about wider implications | |
| Group F: The news media | |

2.4 Although the needs of Groups A and B should take precedence in the immediate response to an incident, all these groups should be considered when developing messages to the public in the response and recovery phases. Although the audiences in Table 2.1 may be defined slightly differently in a rising-tide scenario, the same groupings broadly apply.

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\(^3\) London Councils website - [http://www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/londonfacts/default.htm?category=2](http://www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/londonfacts/default.htm?category=2)
Process of crisis communications

Message receipt

2.5 Individuals go through a seven stage process before deciding to act on a message; an eighth stage is commonly added to this to suggest that people typically seek confirmation of this message from other sources (typically the internet or through friends, family or community contacts) before taking action:

- Receive information
- Understand information
- Understand the message applies to them
- Understand they are at risk if do not act
- Decide they need to act on information
- Be able to take action
- Understand what actions need to be taken
- Seek confirmation of message

2.6 Messages to the public should be developed, taking into account target audiences, to ensure the public not only understand the message, but that they feel it to be personally relevant to them and that they believe it. Use of multiple communication channels (including community networks) and ensuring consistency of message across channels can help support this process.

Behavioural response

2.7 An individual’s perception of risk will influence the action they take upon receipt of a message. This perception may vary depending on cultural and demographic factors and previous experiences, and may differ from the actual risk. Communications with the public must be based on the social perception and understanding of risk to ensure appropriate behavioural responses.

2.8 Panic is a rare response in emergencies, and what is perceived as panic may instead be lack of choice (rather than poor decision making) or a rational choice based on the information, knowledge and experience an individual has. A lack of information can result in people either under or over-estimating the risk they face.

2.9 During an emergency up to a fifth of people are likely to demonstrate rational thought and reasoning abilities and a small number of people who will display hyperactive or manic behaviours and have difficulty following instruction. The majority of people (around 75%), may be fearful and unsure of what to do, requiring clear direction and possibly additional support.

2.10 It cannot be assumed that people instinctively know what action to take with the information they’re given. They are more likely to take action which they see as logical and appropriate; hence messages should be clear and unambiguous.
Barriers and solutions to ensure effective communication

2.11 Table 2.2 outlines some of the barriers when communicating with the public, and how we can overcome them.

Table 2.2: Barriers and Enablers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BARRIER</th>
<th>ENABLER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Different perceptions of risk between professionals and the public can limit public understanding of warning messages. Professionals focus on quantitative factors whilst the public prefer qualitative factors.</td>
<td>Messages should provide information on risk in a style that is clearly understood by the public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withholding information can create a vacuum of information; preventing the public from taking protective action and creating opportunity for misinformation.</td>
<td>Information should be provided in a timely manner and at regular intervals to provide the public with the latest information available and information that can support the public in making informed decisions. The first source of information can often become the preferred source.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The diversity within a large city provides a complex and large variety of needs when communicating information in an emergency. Variations between communities result in differences in the way members of the public receive information and which agencies are trusted.</td>
<td>The provision of clear and simple messages and, where appropriate, use of appropriate images facilitates message understanding. Messages should be disseminated through a wide variety of channels and platforms to ensure individuals have the greatest chance of receiving and believing the message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of contradictory information will limit the effectiveness of response and may result in additional pressures for responders.</td>
<td>The CCA (2004)(^4) states that organisations are required to work together and share information. There is a need for multi-agency coordinated communications to provide the public with clear guidance on the risks and the recommended actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The provision of inadequate communication messages with insufficient detail or guidance can limit the public’s ability to respond.</td>
<td>The public should be given information about local risks, the desired response and the method and style of message prior to the incident to ensure that when they receive a message for an incident they understand the message and respond.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The development of new technologies (e.g. social media) can provide organisations with additional resource pressures in factors such as understanding the technology, resources for implementation and challenges in developing appropriate procedures and guidelines for their use.</td>
<td>Organisations should be encouraged to embrace developing technology with support at a national and regional scale to facilitate the effective incorporation of these technologies into emergency response.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message may not reach the members of the public that require the message.</td>
<td>Crisis communication messages should interrupt individual’s daily life to alert the community about a risk and multiple sources provide the public with an opportunity to seek confirmation in a message.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Encouraging trust and action

2.12 Trust in the source(s) of information is an essential factor influencing an individual’s risk perception and likelihood of taking appropriate action. Factors influencing public trust include:

- **Message source** – building public trust and familiarity with communication sources before an incident means these sources are more likely to be ‘trusted’ in an incident

- **Trust and diversity** – trust and cooperation may not extend across different forms of communications and cultures. Identifying and utilising particular communication channels trusted by certain audiences may help ensure trust in the message

- **Accuracy and clarity** – information should be presented clearly using clear language, and be specific to the target audience. Establishing certainty (or lack of certainty if applicable) may positively influence behavioural responses, and ensure that future messages are trusted

- **Multiple sources** – message recipients will seek confirmation of the information from other sources; hence consistency in messaging across communication channels is vital.
Section 3: Communication Tools

Introduction

3.1 Emergency responders in London have a wide range of tools available to them to communicate with the public. Many of these are common to multiple organisations (e.g. media, websites, social media), whilst others may be specific to local areas (e.g. within individual Boroughs) or target audiences.

3.2 Utilising a broad range of communication tools will increase the number of people that can be reached, particularly when rapid communication is required. However, even when using multiple channels of communication, organisations are unlikely to be able to reach everyone directly. Encouraging the use of ‘word of mouth’ communication, by asking individuals to pass information on to their friends, family and neighbours, may help to fill this gap, particularly when considering groups of people who may not access standard communication channels. The use of specific mechanisms to communicate with these groups of people should be considered at an early stage.

3.3 Table 3.1 (below) outlines some of the generic tools available to responders in London to communicate with different audiences.

Table 3.1: Communication tools summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>TOOL</th>
<th>TARGET AUDIENCE(S)</th>
<th>ONE WAY / TWO WAY</th>
<th>REACH</th>
<th>ACTIVATION</th>
<th>COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1a  | Print media                           | All (use of free daily newspapers may reach lower income groups, and commuters; delivered publications may reach those without internet access) | One way           | Dependent on publication         | Press offices hold relevant contacts – multi-agency coordination via LRGCG   | - May be local, borough-level, London-wide or national or target specific communities  
- Costs may be incurred for advertisements  
- Useful for wide dissemination of information in Recovery phase                                                                 |
<p>| 1b  | Radio (a list of radio stations covering) | All (some stations target specific age or ethnic)  | One way           | Extensive | Press offices hold relevant contacts – multi-agency                        | - Most popular listening times between 06.00 and 11.00 (peak at 08.00)                                                                 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>TOOL</th>
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</tr>
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</table>
|     | London can be found [here](http://www.radioinlondon.com/stationguide/alphabetical.htm) | groups) | | | coordination via LRGCG | - Local / community radio stations should be considered in addition to national stations, particularly when looking to reach key community groups  
- Limited two-way communication via interviews or listener input |
| 1c  | Television | All | One way | Extensive | Press offices hold relevant contacts – multi-agency coordination via LRGCG | - In the event of a major emergency, some channels may suspend normal broadcasting to cover the incident  
- Peak viewing times 18.00 – 23.00 |

**NEW / SOCIAL / DIGITAL MEDIA**

| 2a  | Media websites and social media | All | Limited two way | Extensive | Press offices hold relevant contacts – multi-agency coordination via LRGCG | - ‘Comments’ sections on website allow for public feedback |
| 2b  | Websites | All / individual Boroughs | One way | Dependent on organisation | Via web teams (link to press offices)  
(see 2d for information on London Prepared website) | - Use of local authority websites for local, borough-specific information  
- LRGCG to ensure coordination in messaging  
- Specific website(s) may be set up to collate information to the public on behalf of multiple organisations (e.g. the London Recovers website was set up following the 2011 London Disorder). The need for this should be considered by the SCG / RCG and LRGCG |
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</table>
| 2c  | Social media (incl. Twitter, Facebook, YouTube etc.)                | All – social media users cover wide range of demographics, however may be particularly useful in accessing young (16-25) users who may not access other info sources | Two way           | Dependent on organisation, but collectively extensive | Through individual users – varies between organisations as to who runs corporate accounts, but link through press offices in first instance | - Websites may be a source of information to assist in horizon scanning for low level issues that could escalate  
- Ref section 5.25 for principles of social media messaging  
- For wide sharing of information encourage staff to promote messages through their own ‘official’ or personal accounts  
- Analysis of social media channels may help determine whether public are taking action on messages put out and how to refine communications |
| 2d  | London Prepared website and social media                            | All                                                                                                                                                                                                            | Limited two way  | Moderate           | Via London Resilience Team                     | - Dependent on resources of LRT during incident to update  
- Collation of messages / tweets put out by other agencies  
- Can be used as central source of information for organisations to reference |

**TRADITIONAL COMMUNICATION CHANNELS**

| 3a  | Face to face communication                                         | Specific individuals and communities                                                                                                                                                                      | Two way           | Limited – moderate (depending on scale)       | Through organisations who have public facing staff (e.g. service centres, reception desks, police etc.)                                                                                                           | May be used for:  
1) Door-knocking (e.g. for urgent evacuations)  
2) Information at specific locations (e.g. staff at transport hubs) or through call centres  
3) Contacting and assisting known vulnerable individuals |
<table>
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| 3b  | Leaflets | Those directly affected and / or unlikely to access digital communication channels | One way | As determined | Through relevant lead responder (may be particularly useful if extended warning phase and during Recovery phase) | 4) Specific communities (e.g. housing association sites)  
5) Gathering on-the-ground information  
- Cost and resource associated with production, printing and delivery  
- Targeted delivery likely to be most effective as people more likely to take note of information  
- May be developed in advance for specific situations (e.g. rest centre advice) |
| 3c  | Aural alerting systems (sirens, loudhailers, tannoy systems etc.) | People in a specific geographical area | One way | Limited | Through organisations with necessary tools (likely to be activated through incident command structure) | - Some COMAH sites have systems in place  
- Only likely to be used as an urgent means of communication as of limited use to communicate detailed information |
| 3d  | Telephone / mobile alert systems | People signed up to system in specific area | One way | Limited | Through organisations with systems in place (generally local authorities) – control of systems may lie with emergency planners, communications officers or senior managers | - Environment Agency have established system for flood warnings (automated)  
- Some boroughs have SMS messaging systems in place with varying level of sign up  
- Need to signpost people to further information in text (e.g. website/phone line) |
| 3e  | Variable matrix signs (e.g. on roads, in transport hubs) | People traveling around London (e.g. commuters, delivery drivers, tourists) | One way | Limited – Extensive (depending on coordination) | Via relevant agency (Highways Agency, Transport for London, Network Rail) | - Limited messaging capability for drivers on major roads  
- Signs at transport hubs likely to be used in conjunction with tannoy announcements |
<table>
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</table>
| 4a  | CSSC | Business community (local to international) | Two way (via nominated leads) | Extensive (up to 7 million people) | Via London Resilience Team (or directly by MPS, CoLP and BTP) | - Email cascade network to businesses – reliant on business contacts circulating to networks  
- Two way communication with industry sector reps through bridge call system and/or CSSC Hub team |
| 4b  | Borough-level networks | Local businesses | Depending on system | Limited | Via relevant Borough | - Some Boroughs have developed relationships and networks with local businesses and have systems in place to communicate information in emergencies  
- Communication systems (often radio based) may also exist between businesses in a geographical area |

**COMMUNITY GROUPS AND NETWORKS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5a</th>
<th>Faith groups</th>
<th>Faith communities</th>
<th>Two way</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Ad hoc channels of communication for difference faiths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
- Churches Major Incident Plan covers pan-London and Borough-based Churches  
- Faiths Forum (coordinated by GLA) has links to representatives of various faiths  
- Some boroughs have links at a local level |
| 5b  | Team London database | Volunteers and registered voluntary organisations | One way | 20,000 volunteers & 5,000 community groups | Via Team London (GLA) | - In office hours only  
- Online portal links volunteers to community groups offering volunteering opportunities |
<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 5c  | Schools and other educational settings | Children and their parents, students | One way | Extensive | Via local authorities | - Local authorities may not have contact details for all schools (e.g. private schools)  
- Communicating to children may enable messages to reach potentially hard-to-reach families, such as non-native English speakers |
| 5d  | Other community networks | General public or specific audiences | One way (poss. two way in some cases) | Unknown | | - Local authority community teams may have local links with a wide range of community organisations / networks or voluntary groups  
- These channels may be key for local dissemination of messages when other channels are not available (e.g. in widespread power outage)  
- Additional tool to develop trusts from recipient |

**TOOLS TO REACH SPECIFIC GROUPS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>TOOL</th>
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<th>COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 6a  | Insight Radio | Blind or partially sighted | One way | ~17,000 blind and partially sighted, thought actual reach thought to be greater | [http://www.insightradio.co.uk/](http://www.insightradio.co.uk/)  
Tel no: 0141 357 3518 (national centre live 0700 - 1900) | - Broadcasts 24 hours a day, 7 days a week online, on Freesat channel 777 and on Sky Digital Channel 0188. |
Communicating with specific groups

3.4 Consideration should be given to communicating key messages to groups who may not access or receive communications through commonly-used channels. Use of specific channels may reach some of these individuals, or they may rely on information from community contacts or family and friends. In the latter case, this emphasises the importance of using multiple channels when communicating key messages.

3.5 Certain organisations (e.g. local authorities, health organisations, utility companies) may hold list of ‘vulnerable’ people. In the initial stages of an incident, these organisations should consider if they can assist in communicating key information to these people.

Visually impaired

3.6 Individuals who are blind or partially sighted may still be able to receive urgent messages via radio, television or face to face communication. They may also have tools (e.g. screen readers) to enable them to access information on the internet.

3.7 When developing materials in slower time (e.g. information about recovery) consideration should be given to making these accessible to individuals who are blind or partially sighted, particularly the elderly and those who may not use the internet. Note that many blind or partially sighted people would require audio or large print alternatives rather than just braille.

3.8 Local authorities may have list of visually impaired individuals who have registered their details. The RNIB also operate a helpline (0303 123 9999) which operates during office hours, and a radio station which broadcasts 24/7 online in London.

Deaf / hard of hearing

3.9 Many younger (and some older) people with hearing difficulties will access information through normal channels, particularly online or through mobile devices. Those who don’t, may be more reliant on family, friends and community contacts or networks for information.

3.10 Action Hearing Loss (formerly RNID) operate a helpline during office hours (0808 808 0123 / textphone 0808 808 9000).

Older people

3.11 Older people may be less likely to access information online or via mobile devices (although older people are the fastest-growing group on social media). They may receive information via television and radio, and be more likely to read delivered publications and leaflets. Older people may also be reliant on family, friends and community contacts and networks for information.

Non-English speakers (residents)

3.12 Those with limited or no English are likely to receive information through family, community or faith contacts and networks. In some cases, school-age children may be a source of information, or be able to access information for parents or elderly relatives. Images are also a useful method of overcoming the language barrier.

3.13 Communication with non-English speakers may require appropriate cultural accommodation or references.
Transient population (including English and non-English speaking visitors)

3.14 London is an international tourist destination, visited by many people every year for business and leisure. Foreign visitors who are caught up in an emergency may not speak English, have local support mechanisms in place or be proactively looking for information.

3.15 Through the CSSC communications tool, links to hotel and travel companies can be accessed to get specific messages out to their clients. The business sector can also contact business visitors to the capital.

3.16 The Foreign Office are responsible for liaising with embassies regarding foreign citizens who may have been killed or injured – this is done through Metropolitan Police.

The Mayor’s role as the ‘Voice of London’

3.17 The role of the Mayor is to support the operational response to an emergency in London by providing a unified statement – a “voice” for London. It will be the Mayor’s role to provide regional information and reassurance throughout the duration of the response and into the initial stages of the recovery phase – this role is complementary to, and in support of, local responders and operational spokespeople. The Mayor will collaborate closely with the Strategic Coordinating Group, and where appropriate, central government. The Mayor may also be invited to attend meetings of COBR.

3.18 Both the London Resilience Team and the Mayor’s Press Office at the GLA will update the Mayor’s Office on key issues relating to the incident. In addition, the Mayor may obtain specific advice at a senior level through the Mayor’s Advisory Group. In addition to give press briefings, the Mayor’s Twitter feed (@MayorofLondon) may be used to communicate key information and reassurance messages.
Section 4: Coordination of Communications - Pre-incident

Introduction and lead responders

4.1 Promoting public awareness and preparedness activity may help reduce the stress to individuals associated with being caught up in a major incident, and assist emergency responders by ensuring responders only have to focus on assisting the most vulnerable in an emergency. It is also important to manage the expectations of the public regarding what the response of organisations will be in an incident and where resources will be focused (e.g. on helping the most vulnerable).

4.2 Whilst generic information covering a range of risks is available on the London Prepared website (see below), organisations who have responsibilities relating to specific risks may have their own mechanisms and tools for communicating with the public. Annex A details pre-incident lead agencies for different risks covered in the London Risk Register. Where lead responder organisations provide information on specific risks, this is generally cross-referenced on the London Prepared website.

4.3 Local authorities have a duty under the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) to provide advice and assistance to business and voluntary organisations about business continuity management. The information on the London Prepared website may be of assistance to London local authorities in discharging this duty.

London Prepared website and social media

4.4 The London Prepared website is hosted by the Greater London Authority as part of the london.gov website. It can be accessed directly through www.londonprepared.gov.uk.

4.5 The content of the website is updated and maintained by the London Resilience Team on behalf of the Partnership. It contains generic and risk-specific information and preparedness advice for the general public and businesses, and can be used as an additional tool to reinforce single and multi-agency messages. The latest version of the London Risk Register is also available in a full and edited version, along with copies of those London Resilience Partnership Plans that are not protectively marked.

4.6 The London Resilience Team also manages a Twitter account (@London_Prepared) to complement the website. This is used to promote the website and work of the Partnership and support partners in their communicating with the public work.

Pre-determination of key messages

4.7 Annex B contains some nationally developed templates which could be used as the basis for public messages in the initial stages of an incident. Although uniformity and consistency of message is important, communications need to be specific to events on the day; thus these templates will need to be adapted by the appropriate lead responder before messages are issued.

4.8 In addition, some of the London Resilience Partnership plans contain key public messages relating to specific capabilities which may be used to support the incident response.
4.9 Communications team considering use of pre-determined messages should ensure they speak to other key agencies prior to use to ensure consistency and clarity of public messaging.

4.10 Further information and guidance on use of the national alert message templates is available in the supporting guidance document, available from the London Resilience Team.
Section 5: Coordination of Communications - Response

Introduction

5.1 Depending on the nature and scale of an incident, public messaging will take place at three levels; local (borough) level, regional and national. In exceptional cases, there may also be international messages (e.g. the World Health Organisation), although generally coordination with these would be dealt with at the national level.

5.2 In the majority of smaller-scale and single site incidents, messages to the public will be ‘bottom-up’, with the majority of messaging taking place at the local level, supported by regional messages (particularly where there is a wider impact on London) and national messages (if required). For incidents with a much wider impact across different parts of the country, a ‘top-down’ approach to communicating with the public may be necessary with key messages being determined nationally (to ensure consistency) to be reinforced and localised at regional and local levels. This may be the case, for example, in a pandemic influenza situation or where there is widespread disruption to fuel supply. Figure 5.1 illustrates these hierarchies of communication, along with some of the Communication Tools (as outlined in section 3) likely to be used to communicate at different levels.

Sudden impact events

5.3 With the advent of new technologies, and in particular social media, the public are now likely to receive information on a sudden impact incident at the same time, or even before, responding agencies. This makes the need to communicate a prompt, accurate, coordinated message on the nature of the incident and any public safety information more pressing; and the process for this more challenging.

5.4 Members of the public involved in the incident may also become the first ‘communicators’ of this news (via calls to family and colleagues or social media), closely followed by the news media. Responding organisations have no control over this information or misinformation; other than ensuring accurate, authoritative messages and public safety advice are issued as soon as possible to clarify the situation.

5.5 Figure 5.2 illustrates the process for ensuring coordination of communications to the public between different agencies, and between the incident response structures (i.e. the group(s) established to coordinate the multi-agency response to an incident) and communications response structures. In this type of incident, it is likely that individual agencies will put out ‘holding’ messages based on their own response before coordination and multi-agency messages can be established. Escalation of both incident and communications response structures will take place as the scale of the incident dictates.

5.6 In the event of a terrorist incident, or suspected terrorist incident, no information should be provided to the news media without authority of the Counter Terrorism Command. The relevant police force would take the lead in coordination of messaging, through the London Resilience Gold Communications Group.
Rising tide events

5.7 A rising-tide event is one in which there is some element of pre-warning; this may affect London only (e.g. flooding), or be a national, or even international situation. There is a preparatory phase prior to the start of the incident which may offer an opportunity to put incident and communications response structures in place, and communicate with the public in advance of the incident. Public awareness prior to official communications may be limited or speculative, so coordinated, consistent messages from all agencies are vital.

5.8 Figure 5.3 illustrates processes and structures which may be put in place for communicating with the public in a rising tide incident – this is indicative, as the nature of the incident and preparatory time available may influence structures put in place.
Figure 5.1: Hierarchies of Communication
Likely content and tools for public messaging

**TOP-DOWN INCIDENT** (incident affecting wider country / international community – e.g. pandemic influenza, disruption to fuel supply)

**NATIONAL**
- Public safety messages (to ensure consistency between areas)
- Central government coordination and response
- Messages to international community

**PAN-LONDON (REGIONAL)**
- Re-inforce national messages
  - ‘Londonise’ national messages (where relevant)
  - Business information and advice
  - Impact on London transport
  - Information for visitors to London
  - Service delivery for regional organisations

**LOCAL (BOROUGH LEVEL)**
- Specific advice to local organisations & vulnerable communities
- What actions people need to consider taking – now and in future (if relevant)

**BOTTOM-UP INCIDENT** (incident affects one of more specific locations – e.g. transport incident, explosion, flooding, terrorist attack(s))

**LOCAL (BOROUGH LEVEL)**
- Safety advice for affected community / immediate area
- Specific advice (if relevant) for local communities
- Impacts on local service delivery
- Business information (specific)

**PAN-LONDON (REGIONAL)**
- Pan-London information
  - Business information (generic)
  - Impacts on transport, and regional services
  - Information for visitors to London
  - General information for people affected, friends and family

**NATIONAL**
- Supporting local response
- International impacts / concerns
- Central government support

**COMMUNICATION TOOLS LIKELY TO BE USED**

**NATIONAL**
- National media (press / broadcast)
- Websites
- Social media

**PAN-LONDON (REGIONAL)**
- Mayor of London
- London-based media (press / broadcast)
- Local radio stations
- Social media
- CSSC (business communications)
- Community networks and groups (operating at a regional level)

**LOCAL (BOROUGH LEVEL)**
- Local radio stations and media
- Social media (inc. key individuals)
- Community networks and groups (operating at a local level)
- Face to face communications (staff on the ground)
- Mobile / telephone alerting systems
- Leaflets to affected area(s)
Figure 5.2: Information to the public: Sudden impact incident
Process for coordination of information to the public in a no-notice incident

- Immediate, life-saving information to public in immediate vicinity (e.g. evacuate, stay inside):
  - face to face messaging, door knocking

- Social media reports (comments, photographs, video images)

- News reports

- Emergency responders attend incident – coordination through JESCC

- 999 calls

- Information received by individual agency communication teams

- Initial holding messages relating to individual agency response and urgent public safety information:
  - social media, press release

- Coordinated single-agency messages / multi-agency briefing giving public key information and advice and directing to further information

- Ongoing, coordinated messages on incident response:
  - audience specific messages and tools (see section XX)
  - multi-agency press briefings
  - engagement with community networks
  - two-way communication via social media (and other tools)

- Longer-term messaging around Recovery:
  - specific messages to individuals affected
  - general update messages on recovery from incident
  - messaging relating to investigation / inquiry / trials

TIME FROM START OF INCIDENT (NOT LINEAR)
Figure 5.3: Information to the public: Rising-tide incident
Process for coordination of information to the public in a rising-tide incident (either London-only or national)

**Preparation**
- Horizon Scan highlights issue
- COBR meeting – national strategy and response (meetings continue throughout response)
- Tripartite discussion

**Response and Recovery**
- National, coordinated messages giving public key information and advice
- Coordinated single-agency messages / multi-agency briefing giving public key information (based on national messages if applicable)
- Information and advice to public consistent with London (and national) messages
- Ongoing coordinated single-agency messages / multi-agency messages to public through all available channels (ref section XX)
- News and social media reports
- Longer-term messaging around Recovery:
  - specific messages to individuals affected
  - general update messages on recovery from incident
  - messaging relating to investigation / inquiry / trials

**INCIDENT BEGINS (MAY BE ONGOING)**
- Meeting / teleconference to discuss communications response:
  - agree lead agency
  - share information
  - set communications strategy (based in national strategy if applicable)

**INCIDENT RESPONSE**
- Lead agency comms officer
- Brief responding staff on public messages
- Ongoing Strategic Coordinating Group meetings throughout response:
  - identify key public messages (based on national messages if applicable)

**COMMUNICATIONS RESPONSE**
- COBR meeting
- COBR Comms (coordination of national communications)
- Lead agency comms officer
- Ongoing Coordinating Group meetings throughout response:
  - identify key public messages (based in national strategy if applicable)

**COBR**
- National, coordinated messages giving public key information and advice
- Coordinated single-agency messages / multi-agency briefing giving public key information (based on national messages if applicable)
- Information and advice to public consistent with London (and national) messages
- Ongoing coordinated single-agency messages / multi-agency messages to public through all available channels (ref section XX)
- News and social media reports
- Longer-term messaging around Recovery:
  - specific messages to individuals affected
  - general update messages on recovery from incident
  - messaging relating to investigation / inquiry / trials

**INFORMATION RECEIVED BY PUBLIC**
- Handover to Recovery Coordinating Group
- Local authority comms rep
Operational level

5.9 On attending a scene, emergency services officers will give immediate, life-saving advice to the public if this is required – for example, this may be to evacuate an area, or to stay inside and shut doors and windows. Officers will inform the duty press officer for their organisation if the incident is likely to gain media attention – depending on the incident and organisation, this may be done by officers at the scene or by the control centre. Responding personnel should not speak to any media who arrive at the scene, but should refer them to the relevant organisation’s press office.

5.10 As per the LESLP manual, a Joint Emergency Services Control Centre (JESCC) is likely to be established close to the scene of a major incident to form the focus from which the major incident is managed. The JESCC consists primarily of silver level offices from the emergency services, but other agencies (e.g. local authorities, TfL) may also be included.

5.11 Press officers attending the scene of an incident should seek out their counterparts and establish regular liaison to ensure common situational awareness and coordination communications to the public.

Strategic (regional) level

5.12 If an incident is likely to have regional impacts, then structures will be put in place to coordinate the multi-agency response, as outlined in the London Resilience Partnership Strategic Coordination Protocol. This may initially be a Blue Light Gold Group (with other agencies invited as required), or a full Strategic Coordinating Group.

5.13 These groups will determine the strategic issues relevant to the incident including key information which needs to go out to the public, and/or action that needs to be taken by members of the public. It is therefore vital to ensure a strong link between the Strategic Coordinating Group and communications teams to help ensure that messages going out to the public (e.g. via staff on the ground or the media) are consistent and address the objectives of the agreed multi-agency strategy.

5.14 Whilst the media play an important role in warning and informing the public, it is important that a full range of communication channels are considered, taking into account any specific audience(s) that need to be reached.

London Resilience Gold Communications Group (LRGCG)

5.15 The London Resilience Gold Communications Group is responsible for coordinating strategic communications in London during a major incident or emergency by ensuring that mechanisms and structures are in-place to share key messages with a particular audience and the wider public.

5.16 Membership of the LRGCG consists of the director / heads of communication from Category 1 responder organisations in London, Cabinet Office and the London Resilience Team. London Councils represent London’s local authorities. Other organisations may be invited to join the group when appropriate.

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7 Currently under development – due to be approved February 2014
5.17 During an incident the Group will be chaired by the director/head of communication from the lead operational organisation or their designated deputy. Normally this will either be the lead police service, the London Fire Brigade or NHS England (London). In the event that an incident takes place that involves several different organisations, the Chair or Vice Chair of the LRGCG will be responsible for bringing the group together. The Group can be called together in person or remotely via a conference call.

5.18 The LRGCG will be represented at a Strategic Coordinating Group by a communications officer from the lead agency.

**London Communications Alert System**

5.19 The London Communications Alert System is used by the LRGCG to ensure a quick and coordinated communications response to an incident. The aim of the system is to ensure that group members are “tipped off” when an incident occurs so they can take forward the initial coordination of communications in the area for which they are responsible.

5.20 Activation of the system is based on the “fastest finger first” principle – whoever knows first tells the rest of the group directly using a group text system.

5.21 Once the group has been alerted, a conference call can, if required, be immediately convened. The initial conference call may be used to establish:
- who the lead responder(s) should be
- who if necessary should support them
- who will take forward which actions, including liaison with the Prime Minister’s office, on the resolution/mitigation and on communications issues
- when the group should meet/confERENCE call again to review progress
- what the triggers will be for increased action or a stand down.

5.22 The process for activation of the system is outlined in Annex D (Protectively marked).

**Setting a Communications Strategy**

5.23 The London Resilience Gold Communications Group (LRGCG) would take the lead in setting the overall communications strategy for the response to an incident. Depending on the nature of the incident, and how long it goes on for, this strategy may need to be revised to take into account operational priorities, and changes to key messages or audiences.

5.24 The following should be considered when setting the Communications Strategy:
- Aim and objectives of the strategy – these should link to strategy established by the Strategic Coordinating Group (if and when one is established)
- An audience-based approach – what information you need to provide to different groups, and what they need from you
- Key messages to be communicated – what actions or behaviours need to be triggered?
- Appropriate channels for communication to reach different audiences
- Which agencies will take the lead on particular messages, and how messages will be coordinated, and supported to ensure audiences receive a ‘single picture’
- How the strategy will be communicated to key stakeholders (e.g. communication teams, Gold officers, emergency planning teams)
• How and when the strategy will be reviewed.

**National level**

5.25 During an incident, the Cabinet Office will share key public messages and media lines with partners through Top Lines Briefs which are distributed to Category 1 and 2 responders. Cabinet Office comms are also represented on the London Resilience Gold Communications Group and may liaise directly with other members of the group to ensure coordination of public messages.

**Coordination of social media messaging**

5.26 Social media refers to online technologies and practices used to share opinions and information, promote discussion and build relationships. Social media is characterised by connectedness, participation, openness, conversation and community; hence it is an ideal tool through which to communicate with the public.

5.27 Many London Resilience Partnership organisations have active social media accounts which are resourced to enable a degree of two-way communication to take place on a day to day basis. Although during emergency response resources may be drawn elsewhere, there will still be an expectation from social media audiences that this conversation will continue.

5.28 Social media is a rapid-time communication channel, which does not allow for the same coordination of multi-agency messaging as, for example, press releases. However, use of social media should follow the communications strategy established by the LRGCG in an incident, and the principles outlined below.

5.29 London Resilience Partnership organisations should use the following principles as a guide when using social media in incidents:

• The lead responder principle still applies to social media messaging – organisations should only comment on the aspects of the incident they are responsible for

• To ensure the public can establish a coordinated picture of the situations, all organisations involved in the response to an emergency should endeavour to put out messages through their social media channels as soon as possible. If one or more key organisations fail to do this, this could create an information gap, which may result in misinformation being spread

• Where organisations are asked for information which falls outside their responsibilities, they should direct followers to the relevant organisation’s social media channel

• Liaison between agency press offices (or the relevant teams responsible for corporate social media channels) should take place to ensure requests for information from the public are picked up and addressed (as far as possible)

• Organisations may retweet or share messages from partners to answer specific queries from followers which relate to aspects of the response

• Where key public messages have been agreed by the SCG and/or LRGCG all organisations should seek to promote these through their social media accounts (in addition to other communication channels)
• The LRGCG should seek to ensure as soon as possible that coordinated, multi-agency messages are produced which organisations can direct social media followers to look at (e.g. a joint press release, or information on the London Prepared website).

Twitter Alerts and Verified Accounts

5.30 In November 2013, Twitter launched its emergency alert service, ‘Twitter Alerts’ to users in the UK. London Fire Brigade, London Ambulance Service, the Environment Agency, London police forces and the Mayor of London are signed up to the system which enables them to send a priority alert message to followers who have signed up to receive text messages or push notifications.

5.31 Twitter Alerts are used to share urgent information about a significant risk to life or impact on the local and wider community. Each organisation will have different criteria and critical information that would need to be issued, but this should generally be discussed at the initial London Resilience Gold Communications Group meeting before Twitter Alerts are issued.

5.32 Category 1 responders are able to get their Twitter account(s) verified via the Civil Contingencies Secretariat – this indicates to users that the account is an official channel of information.

5.33 Emergency services in London have a Twitter Alerts protocol. The aim of this protocol is to ensure a co-ordinated approach to the use of Twitter Alerts during a crisis, disaster, or major incident, or when other communication methods are not available. The protocol falls in line with the London Communications Alert Protocol and London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) guidance.
Section 6: Coordination of Communications - Recovery

Introduction

6.1 Communicating with the public during the recovery phase of an incident may often be more challenging than during the response.

6.2 The challenges of ensuring key audiences are communicated with, and coordination of a much larger number of organisations, including the voluntary and private sector necessitates a dedicated recovery communications strategy.

Recovery Communications Group

6.3 The London Recovery Management Protocol (v3.0) states that a Communications Group would be set up to support the Recovery Management Group, with the following objectives:

- Continue and expand upon the work of public consultation and media teams set-up during the response phase
- Ensure that the public and media are fully informed and consulted
- Ensure that all information is in an understandable language and format
- Oversee the communications output of all other sub-groups
- Address local, sub-national and national communication issues
- Allow communities to make informed decisions.

6.4 This role may be picked up by the London Resilience Gold Communications Group (LRGCG) or a subgroup set up under the direction of the LRGCG. The Group should be chaired by either a Local Authority PR and Communications Manager, or the London Councils Director of Communications to reflect the lead role of local authorities in recovery.

6.5 The London Recovery Management Protocol (v3.0) contains a list of issues and actions for the group to consider.

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Section 7: Working with the Media

Briefing the media

Media attendance at incident sites
7.1 Media representatives are likely to turn up at the scene(s) of a major incident – this may necessitate the designation of a media rendezvous point (RVP), where the press can base themselves to report back from the scene. The location of the media RVP will be agreed following consultation with the lead responding organisation’s communications team and the Silver (or Gold) commander, and should be close to the site of the incident, without impinging on the operational response. Consideration should be given to the equipment that media organisations may want to bring in (e.g. cherry pickers). Representatives from the London Resilience Gold Communications Group will share information and updates to ensure that information is consistent and interviews coordinated.

7.2 Where there are multiple incident scenes, media RVPs should be established close to each of the scenes, but it may also be appropriate to set up a media centre (see below) to act as a central point for press conferences and briefings. Communications officers from respective agencies will most likely be dispatched to manage media facilities and this will be agreed in discussion between the agencies.

Designated spokespersons
7.3 Organisations will designate a senior officer to act as their spokesperson as part of the coordinated communications response to an incident. This may be an individual who is not directly involved in the management of the incident, i.e. a non operational officer, if that is required and agreed.

Joint-agency press briefings
7.4 Although individual organisations may provide their own interviews with the media, it may be beneficial to hold joint-agency briefings, either at the scene or at the media centre (if one is established). This approach demonstrates that the response to the incident is a joint effort carried out in a coordinated manner between agencies.

7.5 Joint-agency press briefings are most often held between the emergency services, however depending on the nature and impacts of the incident, consideration will be given to involving representatives of other key responding agencies.

7.6 Joint-agency press briefings will be organised by the lead organisation’s communication team, the multi-agency media centre, or coordinated through the London Resilience Gold Communications Group.

7.7 A media centre may be set up where an incident is likely to attract a large amount of media interest, both nationally and internationally. It may be of particular use when there are multiple incident sites to act as a focal point for press conferences, briefings and interviews, and can act as a hub point for media with facilities to file copy and pictures.
**Timing / Activation**

7.8 It is likely that the operation of a media centre would be run as a joint operation with the Metropolitan Police Service (operationally in the lead) and the Cabinet Office’s News Co-ordination Centre (NCC). The London Communications Alert System would be integral to ensuring co-ordination across all partners.

7.9 Handling an operation of this magnitude will need a different approach to normal press operations. In most circumstances the Metropolitan Police Service’s Press Bureau together with the lead Government Department or lead organisation’s press office would take the vast majority of calls and queries resulting from an emergency with each other organisations’ Press Offices running its own operation.

**Establishment of a Media Centre**

7.10 There is a minimum in terms of facilities that the media centre will need:

- Somewhere that can be safely and realistically accessed whilst considering security and from an operational perspective
- Clear line of sight for satellite vans
- Space for accreditation facilities
- Telecoms – phone/ISDN lines & Wifi for the media
- Power - it may be that independent power will not be available as a result of the incident or simply not available at the site chosen, therefore independent generators may be required
- Staff – sufficient press officers and admin staff agreed by the LRGCG in attendance from responding organisations to run the media centre.

7.11 Ensuring that the media can get access to the areas that have been designated for them and that they can do so easily and quickly will rely to a certain extent on pre-accreditation. For coverage of a large scale major incident it is recommended that:

- The existing UK Press Card is used; some flexibility may have to be adopted for overseas media, but they should be able to provide evidence of who they work for to be allowed access.
- An operational note giving details of the expected accreditation process should be distributed widely and quickly to overseas news organisations (including directly through the internet) as soon as practicable. However, overseas media should consider as a minimum requirement that their passport and a letter from their editor will be required for the event-specific requirement.

**Other considerations**

7.12 Media representatives are likely to turn up at rest centres, hospitals where casualties may have been taken, and any mortuary facilities or assistance centres set up. Agencies involved in setting up or running these facilities should be prepared for this, and communications officers from the relevant agency deployed to help manage this if appropriate.

7.13 Visits by VIPs can lift the morale of those affected by an incident, and those involved in the response. VIP visits will be considered at the Strategic Coordinating Group meeting, but the London Resilience Gold Communications Group (LRGCG) should ensure that relevant responders’ press offices are linked in with their counterparts in the VIP’s team.
7.14 Media interest in a London incident may extend to other parts of the country, particularly where affected individuals come from outside of the capital. Coordination of media lines with authorities in areas outside of London should take place through the LRGCG.

**Monitoring media coverage**

7.15 Ongoing monitoring of news and social media during an incident can have several benefits including:

- Increasing situational awareness, for example, through eye witness accounts, photo and video footage
- Analysing the effectiveness of public messaging - the extent to which messages have been understood and intended action taken
- Identification of further public information needs, either generally or for specific target audiences, which may need to be addressed.

7.16 During incidents, responding agencies will monitor media enquiries, reporting and social media channels and respond where appropriate to reassure, clarify and offer verified updates.

7.17 Resourcing to ensure common situational awareness across the London Resilience Partnership (including social media analysis), is being considered as part of a wider piece of work directed by the London Resilience Forum.
Section 8: Roles and Responsibilities

Introduction

8.1 Table 8.1 outlines the roles and responsibilities of key groups and individuals in relation to communicating with the public before, during and after an incident. This does not cover generic roles in responding to incidents, or responsibilities in relation to specific risks or aspects of response which are covered in other plans.
Table 8.1 – Roles and Responsibilities

**LEAD RESPONDER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-incident</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Recovery (this may be a different organisation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| - Consider the need to communicate with the public regarding specific risk(s)  
- If appropriate, make information and advice relating to specific risks available to the public and engage with the public to raise awareness (e.g. through social media)  
- Inform partners of any publicly available materials, information or advice to encourage signposting and consistency of information provision | - Activate the London Communications Alert System to notify communication leads in partner agencies of the incident  
- Convene a teleconference/meeting of the LRGCG and invite any additional responding agencies who are not usually part of this group  
- Provide communications support to a Strategic Coordinating Group and ensure a link between this group and the LRGCG  
- Lead on tactical coordination of messages between press offices | - Chair the Recovery Communications Group (if one is set up)  
- Provide a link between the Recovery Communications Group and the LRGCG |

**LONDON RESILIENCE GOLD COMMUNICATIONS GROUP (LRGCC)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-incident</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Recovery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| - Have a horizon-scanning role in considering incidents or issues that may arise and any communications preparation needed (including confirmation of lead responder) | - Set the overall communications strategy, and endeavour to update this as necessary during the course of the response  
- Ensure process for coordination of key messages between relevant agencies  
- Consider the need for a media centre or other facilities to support the media response | - Set the communications strategy for the recovery (if a Recover Communications Group is not set up) |

**ORGANISATIONAL PRESS OFFICERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-incident</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Recovery</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Be familiar with the contents of the Communicating with the Public Framework, specifically around mechanisms for coordinating messages in an incident</td>
<td>- Have an awareness of the overall communications strategy for the incident and their role in contributing to it</td>
<td>- Have an awareness of the overall communications strategy for the recovery and their role in contributing to it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘GOLD’ REPRESENTATIVES OF RESPONDING AGENCIES</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-incident</strong></td>
<td><strong>Response</strong></td>
<td><strong>Recovery</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have an awareness of the need to consider communicating with the public as part of the overall strategy for responding to incidents</td>
<td>• Consider communicating with the public as a core part of the overall incident response strategy</td>
<td>• Consider communicating with the public as a core part of the overall recovery strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Feedback from Strategic Coordinating Group meetings to communication teams to ensure they are aware of actions and messages relating to communicating with the public</td>
<td>• Ensure public facing staff are aware of key public messages and how to feed information received on the incident back to inform the ongoing response</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EMERGENCY PLANNING OFFICERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-incident</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Work with communications team to make information and advice relating to specific risks available to the public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Have a horizon-scanning role and highlight any potential issues or incidents to communications team</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Annex A: Lead responders for communicating with the public

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ref ID</th>
<th>Risk sub-category</th>
<th>Risk Rating</th>
<th>Lead Responder</th>
<th>Other key agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Raising awareness</td>
<td>Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Diseases / Human Health Incidents</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H22 / H24</td>
<td>Influenza Type Disease (Epidemic) / Emerging infectious diseases</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Public Health England</td>
<td>Public Health England</td>
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<td><strong>Flooding</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>H19</td>
<td>Major coastal and tidal flooding affecting more than two UK regions</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Environment Agency</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H21</td>
<td>Severe inland flooding affecting more than 2 UK regions</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Environment Agency</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL16 / HL17 / HL19 / HL20</td>
<td>Local coastal / tidal flooding / Local fluvial flooding / Localised, extremely hazardous flash flooding</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Environment Agency</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL18</td>
<td>Local / Urban flooding fluvial or surface run-off</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Environment Agency, GLA (Drain London)</td>
<td>Police, Local Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref ID</td>
<td>Risk sub-category</td>
<td>Risk Rating</td>
<td>Lead Responder</td>
<td>Other key agencies</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>H44</td>
<td>Reservoir dam failure/collapse</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Environment Agency, Local Authorities</td>
<td>Police, Local Authorities, Reservoir owner, LFB, NHS, utility companies, transport companies</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Severe Weather</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>H17</td>
<td>Storms &amp; Gales.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Met Office</td>
<td>Met Office, Local Authorities, MPS, Local Authorities, LAS, LFB, Utility companies, Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H18</td>
<td>Low temps and heavy snow.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Met Office, Local Authorities</td>
<td>Met Office, Local Authorities, MPS, NHS, LAS, Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H50</td>
<td>Drought</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Environment Agency / Defra</td>
<td>Environment Agency / Defra, Water companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Structural Incidents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL21</td>
<td>Land movement</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>London Fire Brigade</td>
<td>London Fire Brigade, Local Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Severe wild fires</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL33</td>
<td>Forest or moorland fire</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>London Fire Brigade</td>
<td>London Fire Brigade, Local Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Animal Diseases / Animal Health Incidents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>H25</td>
<td>Non-zoonotic animal diseases</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>DEFRA</td>
<td>Local Authorities, LAS, Local Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H26</td>
<td>Zoonotic animal diseases</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>DEFRA, NHS, PHE</td>
<td>NHS, PHE, LAS, Local Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref ID</td>
<td>Risk sub-category</td>
<td>Risk Rating</td>
<td>Lead Responder</td>
<td>Other key agencies</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Major Industrial Accidents / Incidents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL 25</td>
<td>Fire or explosion at a flammable gas terminal including LPG/LNG storage sites / Industrial explosions and major fires / Fire/explosion at a fuel distribution or storage site toxic liquids in atmospheric pressure storage tanks</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Site operator (where appropriate) / London Fire Brigade</td>
<td>London Fire Brigade / Local Authorities / Site operator, Police, LAS, PHE, MPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL7 / H4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL28</td>
<td>Localised fire or explosion at a fuel distribution site or tank storage of flammable and/or toxic liquids.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Site operator (where appropriate) / Generic messaging</td>
<td>London Fire Brigade / Local Authorities / Site operator, Police, LAS, PHE, MPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H5 / H7 / HL30</td>
<td>Fire or explosion at an onshore fuel pipeline / Explosion at a high pressure natural gas pipeline / Localised explosion at a natural gas main</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>London Fire Brigade</td>
<td>London Fire Brigade / Local Authorities / Gas main / pipeline operator, Police, LAS, PHE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H9</td>
<td>Large toxic chemical release</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Site operator (where appropriate) / London Fire Brigade / Public Health England</td>
<td>Local Authorities / Site operator, Police, LAS, EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL3</td>
<td>Localised industrial accident involving small toxic release</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Site operator (where appropriate) / London Fire Brigade / Public Health England</td>
<td>Local Authorities / Site operator, Police, LAS, EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H11</td>
<td>Accidental release of radioactive material from incorrectly handled or disposed of sources</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Site operator (where appropriate) / HSE / Public Health England</td>
<td>Local Authorities / Site operator, Police, LAS, MPS, EA, MPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref ID</td>
<td>Risk sub-category</td>
<td>Risk Rating</td>
<td>Lead Responder</td>
<td>Other key agencies</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>H12 / H46</td>
<td>Biological substance release from facility where pathogens are handled deliberately or during an unrelated work activity/industrial process</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Site operator (where appropriate) / HSE</td>
<td>Site operator, LFB, Police, LAS, NHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H14</td>
<td>Major contamination incident with widespread implications for the food chain</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Food Standards Agency</td>
<td>Public Health England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H15</td>
<td>Maritime pollution</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Maritime and Coastguard Agency</td>
<td>Maritime and Coastguard Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL4</td>
<td>Pollution of controlled waters, Major pollution of inland waters</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Environment Agency</td>
<td>Environment Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL14</td>
<td>Road accident involving transport of fuel/explosives</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Highways Agency / Transport for London / London Fire Brigade</td>
<td>London Fire Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL37</td>
<td>Release of significant quantities of hazardous materials as a result of major shipping accident</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Maritime and Coastguard Agency</td>
<td>Maritime and Coastguard Agency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Major Industrial Accident / Major Structural Accident**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HL22</th>
<th>Building Collapse</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>HSE</th>
<th>LFB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HL22a / HL102</td>
<td>Large Building Collapse / Complex Built Environments</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Local Authorities</td>
<td>LFB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL23</td>
<td>Bridge Collapse.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Relevant highways authority</td>
<td>Local Authorities, Highways Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref ID</td>
<td>Risk sub-category</td>
<td>Risk Rating</td>
<td>Lead Responder</td>
<td>Other key agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Major Industrial Accidents / Technical Failures</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>H38</td>
<td>Technical failure of a critical upstream oil/gas facility, Disruption in upstream oil and gas production</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Site operator (where appropriate) /DECC</td>
<td>DECC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H40</td>
<td>No notice loss of significant telecommunications infrastructure in a localised fire, flood or gas incident</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Telecommunications / gas provider</td>
<td>Telecommunications provider, Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H41 / H45</td>
<td>Technical failure of national electricity network – Blackstart / Technical failure of electricity network due to operational error or bad weather causing damage to the system.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Network provider</td>
<td>London Fire Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H43</td>
<td>Telecommunication failure, Telecomms infrastructure - human error.</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Telecommunications provider</td>
<td>Telecommunications provider, Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H49</td>
<td>Loss of drinking water supplies due a major accident affecting infrastructure</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Water companies</td>
<td>Water companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref ID</td>
<td>Risk sub-category</td>
<td>Risk Rating</td>
<td>Lead Responder</td>
<td>Other key agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major Transport Accidents / Incidents</td>
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<tr>
<td>HL8 / HL34</td>
<td>Fire, flooding, stranding or collision involving a passenger vessel in or close to UK waters or on inland waterways</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Maritime and Coast Guard Agency</td>
<td>Port of London Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incidents leading to evacuation or partial evacuation of ship’s population</td>
<td></td>
<td>Maritime and Coast Guard Agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H16 / HL9</td>
<td>Aviation accident</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Aviation company, LFB</td>
<td>Local Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>London Fire Brigade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL10</td>
<td>Local accident on motorways and major trunk roads</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Highways Agency / Transport for London</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Highways Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL11</td>
<td>Railway Accident</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Train operators / Network Rail / Transport for London</td>
<td>Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Local Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL12</td>
<td>Local accident involving transport of hazardous chemicals</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>HSE</td>
<td>Local Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>London Fire Brigade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disruptive Industrial Action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HL42 / H30</td>
<td>Loss of cover due to industrial action by workers providing a service critical to the preservation of life / loss of emergency fire and rescue cover because of industrial action</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>The organisation affected</td>
<td>The organisation affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>The organisation affected</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Other similar organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ref ID</td>
<td>Risk sub-category</td>
<td>Risk Rating</td>
<td>Lead Responder</td>
<td>Other key agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>H31</td>
<td>Significant or perceived significant constraint on fuel supply at filling stations</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>DECC</td>
<td>MPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H35</td>
<td>Industrial action by key rail or London Underground workers</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>DfT / Transport for London / transport operator</td>
<td>TfL / transport operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Public Disorder</strong></td>
<td><strong>Influx of British Nationals not normally resident in the UK</strong></td>
<td><strong>Medium</strong></td>
<td><strong>Home Office, Local Authorities</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Annex B: National Alert Message Templates

## Template 1: Take Immediate Shelter

This template could be issued for sudden impact risks requiring immediate shelter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Immediate desired behaviour for the public in the event of risk occurring</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• For people to enter their houses (or if away from home to take shelter wherever possible).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• For them to remain sheltered and await further instruction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Acknowledgment of the alert (if sent via a format which allows receipting i.e. SMS).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Alert message content- Short version (max 140 characters)

UKAlert: An incident has occurred at XYZ. TAKE SHELTER NOW. Stay inside and tune into XYZ.0FM or visit bit.XYZ for info.

### Alert message content- Standard version (no character limit)

This is an emergency alert from XYZ.

An incident has occurred at XYZ.

The impacted area is XYZ.

You must go inside now, close all windows and doors and *(if required): switch off the air conditioning.*

Do not go outside until you are told to do so – you will put yourself in harm’s way.

Tune in to your local radio or TV station for further instructions from the authorities.

For further information visit XYZ.com or call XYZ.

*(If required): Do your neighbours need assistance? If so notify the authorities by calling XYZ.*

*(If required): Keep warm and conserve power on battery powered devices.*

Do not call 999 unless it is an emergency – you might prevent others from getting through.

### High level information to be issued within the first three hours

- Further detail about the nature of the incident and possible health implications.
- More detailed protective actions for people to take.
- Indications for how long they might be required to take shelter.
- Detail on whether it is safe for people to drink from the water supply.
Template 2: Leave the Area Immediately

This template could be issued in the event of sudden impact risks and emergencies requiring immediate movement of the population away from dangerous areas.

Immediate desired behaviour for the public in the event of risk occurring

- For people to leave the impacted area immediately
- For people to remain away from the impacted area and not return until told it is safe to do so.
- Acknowledgment of the alert (if sent via a format which allows receipting i.e. SMS).
- For people to take essential belongings with them

Alert message content- Short version (max 140 characters)

UKAlert: An incident has occurred at XYZ. LEAVE AREA NOW. Stay away and tune into XYZ.fm or visit bit. XYZ for info.

Alert message content- Standard version (no character limit)

This is an emergency alert from XYZ. An incident has occurred at XYZ. The impacted area is XYZ. You must leave this area now.

(If required) do not use XYZ route.

Take only essential belongings (medication & phone). (If required) If possible bring a small first aid kit, toiletries, spare glasses or contact lenses, mobile phone and charger, cash and credit cards.

Do not return until you are told it is safe to do so.

Await further instructions from the authorities.

For further information visit XYZ.com or call XYZ.

(If required): Assist those in need where possible.

Do not call 999 unless it is an emergency – you might prevent others from getting through.

High level information to be issued within the first three hours

- Further detail about the nature of the incident and possible health implications.
- More detailed protective actions for people to take.
- Information on rest centres or further aid should people be unable to return home.
## Template 3: Emergency Travel Advice

This template could be issued in the event of transport or travel related risks (and can be altered depending on the severity of the incident)

### Immediate desired behaviour for the public in the event of risk occurring

1. Following any incident, the public should contact their travel operator for the latest travel advice prior to commencing their journey.
2. (In the event of an incident overseas) If travelling overseas, the public should consult the latest FCO travel advice prior to commencing their journey.
3. Avoid affected areas, only make essential journeys, stagger journeys where necessary.

### Alert message content- Short version (max 140 characters)

UKAlert: An incident has occurred at **XYZ** AVOID THE AREA & check advice BEFORE you travel tune into xxx.fm or visit bit.**XYZ** for info

### Alert message content- Standard version (no character limit)

This is an emergency alert from **XYZ**.

An incident has occurred at **XYZ**.

The impacted area is **XYZ**.

(If required): Do not make any journeys unless critical, avoid the impacted area.

(If required): Prior to commencing your journey, you should contact your travel operator/FCO for advice.

Await further instructions from the authorities.

For further information visit **XYZ.com** or call **XYZ**.

Do not call 999 unless it is an emergency – you might prevent others from getting through.

### High level information to be issued within the first three hours

- The cause of disruption/ the incident.
- Steps that will be taken to rectify the incident.
- If required steps that will be taken to investigate the incident.
### Template 4: Incident Occurred – no risk to the Public

This template could be used for any incident that has occurred to which the public will be aware but which does not pose a risk or require any action.

**Immediate desired behaviour for the public in the event of incident occurring**

- Public take note of message and are informed of the incident.
- Alleviation of panic or concern.

**Alert message content- Short version (max 140 characters)**

UKAlert: An incident has occurred at XYZ impacting XYZ area. There is NO RISK TO THE PUBLIC. Visit bit.XYZ for further info.

**Alert message content- Standard Version (no character limit)**

This is an information alert from XYZ.  
An incident has occurred at XYZ.  
The impacted area is XYZ.  
There is NO RISK to public health and/or property.  
There is NO RISK to animal health.  
For further information visit XYZ.com or call XYZ.  
Do not call 999 unless it is an emergency – you might prevent others from getting through.

**High level information to be issued within the first three hours**

- Further information on what the incident is and any longer term implications.  
- Information on the impacted areas and whether these areas should be avoided.
## Template 5: All Clear

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>End of emergency message/no further risk to the public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immediate desired behaviour for the public in the event of incident occurring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• That the public take note.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• That there is alleviation of any panic or concern.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alert message content- Short version (max 140 characters)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UKAlert: The incident at XYZ has now concluded. This is an ALL CLEAR MESSAGE. Visit bit XYZ for further info.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alert message content- Standard Version (no character limit)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>This is an information alert from XYZ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This is an ALL CLEAR message.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The incident which occurred at XYZ IS NOW OVER.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is NO FURTHER RISK to public health and/or property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return to your normal activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For further information visit XYZ.com or call XYZ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not call 999 unless it is an emergency – you might prevent others from getting through.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High level information to be issued within the first three hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Information on what the incident was and whether there are any lasting side effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Information on support services.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex C: Training and Exercising

Exercising and Review

All responders should have a clear understanding of their role and responsibility throughout any incident where the procedures outlined in this document have been invoked. This should be achieved through training and exercising at all levels. Training should take place prior to exercising the plan. The experience from exercises and incidents should contribute to reviews of the document.

The London Resilience Team maintains a list of lessons identified through exercises and incidents on behalf of the wider partnership. These are identified, recorded and implemented in accordance with the partnerships lessons learned policy. The status of these lessons is reported to London Resilience Programme Board, and the London Resilience Forum.

Responsibilities for Training and Exercising

Agency specific: Agencies are responsible for ensuring that they are able to carry out the roles and duties described in this document. It is expected that this will include role specific training and an appropriate level of knowledge of multi-agency procedures.

Partnership wide: The following will support a consistent approach to multi-agency cooperation approach across the London Resilience Partnership:

- A Capability Awareness Package accompanies the document. This is prepared by the Lead Agency responsible for developing the capability. The package provides basic information about the capability for all responders.
- The LRF Training and Exercising Group will coordinate:
  - Briefing and workshops hosted by the London Resilience Team.
  - Partnership wide exercises at the sub-regional and pan-London level.

Record keeping: Agencies are to maintain records of their training programmes as evidence. The LRF will, from time to time, carry out an audit of multi-agency training across the partnership to ensure a consistent approach. The Lead Agency for each Partnership workstream is to document the development of the capability through the record of exercises, testing and activation attached to this document.
## Record of Exercises, Testing or Activations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proposed Exercise / Training</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>What will be tested/ Covered</th>
<th>Validation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>e.g. Professional Partner Training</td>
<td>Seminar</td>
<td>Roles and responsibilities; flood warning procedures</td>
<td>Evaluation sheets/ feedback from Participants.</td>
</tr>
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