

Summary of evidence considered by the Mayor's AI and Jobs Taskforce

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Introduction

The London AI and Jobs Taskforce has now fulfilled its mandate and reported back to the Mayor. In making its recommendations, it was able to draw on a wealth of evidence that ranged from innovative socio-technical research by academics at the Institute for the Future of Work (IFOW) to a wide-ranging survey of small and large employers, and from roundtable discussions with business and civic society leaders to direct engagements with Londoners.

This report brings together these workstreams and highlights the most significant findings and overarching themes that informed the Taskforce's work.

Chapter 1 provides a high-level summary of the evidence and sets out the main themes that emerged during the intensive three-month evidence-gathering period between the Taskforce's launch and the publication of its recommendations.

Chapter 2 links each main source of evidence to the Taskforce's recommendations, providing some of the key findings in each source that speak to the three decisions that it has put to the Mayor: **Act Early**, **Shape Change**, and **Create Opportunity**.

And **Chapter 3** provides longer highlights and summaries across the main research areas, and a look at some of the most influential external commentary and analysis considered by the Taskforce.

This report draws on research and analysis carried out for the Taskforce by the Institute for the Future of Work (publication forthcoming) and the GLA.

It also presents a summary of evidence collected from external organisations and individuals. As such, it is based on GLA Economics' understanding of the evidence and should not be interpreted as the views of any participant involved.

We are grateful to the employers, workers, trade unions, educators, civil-society organisations, public bodies and Londoners who gave their time and generously shared their experience and expertise. A list of the organisations and groups engaged is provided in the appendix.

Chapter 1: What themes emerged from the Taskforce evidence?

London's AI and Jobs Taskforce considered a wide range of evidence, including labour-market analysis, detailed sector research, employer and stakeholder engagement, surveys of Londoners and a deliberative workshop. Taken together, this evidence does not point to a single or inevitable outcome from AI. Instead, it suggests that work is being reshaped in gradual, uneven and sometimes difficult-to-observe ways. The effects will depend not only on what the technology can do, but on how employers adopt it, how jobs and training are redesigned, and the response and capabilities of public institutions.

AI is changing work itself before it is changing overall employment

The clearest finding across the evidence is that AI is currently affecting tasks, skills and the organisation of work more visibly than overall employment levels. GLA Economics estimates that around 46% of London's workers are in occupations where generative AI could automate a significant share of existing tasks. However, exposure is not the same as job loss. Whether technical capability translates into changes in employment depends on type of adoption, business models, regulation, organisational readiness and wider economic conditions.

The evidence gathered so far does not indicate widespread replacement of workers. Instead, it points to the substitution of particular tasks, new combinations of task and skill bundles, role changes and growing expectations that workers use AI as part of their roles. In some cases, AI may allow people to pursue more complex or higher-value work. In others, it may narrow roles, increase workloads associated with checking the quality of AI outputs or reduce opportunities to develop expertise.

This means that headline employment statistics alone are unlikely to provide an adequate account of change. A role may retain the same title while its responsibilities, skills requirements, level of autonomy or progression prospects change substantially.

The effects are likely to be highly uneven

London's economic structure – which is reliant on services and activities where highly-skilled occupations are prevalent – means that it is particularly exposed to AI-driven change. The capital has a high concentration of knowledge-intensive sectors, including finance, professional services, technology, public administration and the creative industries. Many of the language-, analysis- and information-processing tasks common in these sectors are well suited to current generative AI systems.

However, the effects vary considerably between and within sectors. In the creative industries, there are already reports of falling demand, fewer commissions and lower fees for some freelance services, including graphic design, writing, and photography, while workers whose skills complement AI may benefit. These changes can be difficult to detect in headline employment data because freelancers may experience a gradual loss of work rather than redundancy. In professional services, attention has focused on routine analytical and administrative work, on the future of junior roles and the increase in workload to verify AI outputs. In transport, significant disruption may come later and follow a different pattern. In some parts of the sector, the sharpest future risks fall on experienced workers in higher-paid safety-critical roles, rather than junior roles.

IFOW's adaptive-capacity analysis adds an important qualification to the exposure analysis. While London is highly exposed to AI, many of its workers are comparatively well placed to adapt because they have transferable skills, higher incomes, and access to a large and varied labour market. However, this resilience is unevenly shared and adaptive capacity is not guaranteed. Around 600,000 Londoners work in occupations that combine higher exposure with fewer resources or routes into other work. These workers are concentrated in lower-paid clerical and administrative roles and are disproportionately women. This indicates where workers may be less able to adapt if their work changes; it does not predict job losses. Without early action, London risks the costs of AI-driven change concentrating among the workers and places least equipped to absorb them.

The evidence also points to uneven adoption between firms. Larger and more digitally mature organisations appear to be moving faster, while many smaller businesses face constraints relating to skills, management capacity, confidence, cost, data security and governance. This raises the possibility of a two-tier economy in which the productivity benefits of AI become concentrated among a relatively small number of businesses and sectors.

Entry routes and career progression are a particular concern

Concern about entry-level work was one of the most consistent themes across the evidence. Junior roles often include research, drafting, administration and other routine tasks that both support an organisation and allow new workers to learn. If these tasks are automated, the effect may not immediately appear as redundancies. Employers may instead recruit fewer people, leave vacancies unfilled or expect applicants to arrive with more experience.

There are some early reports of this happening, although the evidence on recruitment remains mixed. IFOW's employer survey found entry-level hiring broadly stable overall and did not identify a clear association between AI adoption and the reductions in junior recruitment. This suggests that the effects may not be visible through a widespread fall in entry-level employment.

The risk is therefore not only a less visible contraction in recruitment. AI may also weaken career ladders if young workers have fewer opportunities to undertake developmental tasks, build judgement, receive supervision, develop networks and demonstrate their potential.

Londoners expressed particular concern about the implications for younger people. Survey and workshop evidence also suggested that many students and apprentices do not feel adequately prepared to use AI at work. At the same time, younger workers are likely to be among the most active users of the technology and could benefit substantially from new opportunities where appropriate training, experience and support are available.

The evidence therefore suggests that the policy question is not simply how to preserve existing entry-level jobs. It is also how to ensure that new and credible routes into work, learning and progression are created as traditional ones change.

Employer decisions will play a major role in determining outcomes

Across the evidence, AI's impact has been shown not to be predetermined. Employers make choices about which tasks to automate, whether to redesign or remove roles, whether to retrain and redeploy workers, and how productivity gains are made and distributed.

There are examples of AI increasing efficiency, supporting workers and enabling smaller, high-agency teams to produce more. There are also concerns that it could reduce worker autonomy, weaken skills, increase monitoring or concentrate gains without improving job quality. The consequences will therefore depend heavily on the quality of implementation. IFOW's analysis reinforces the importance of work design. The same technology can give workers greater autonomy, reduce repetitive activity and support learning, or it can fragment roles and remove opportunities to develop skills and expertise.

Employers and workers also highlighted practical barriers to successful adoption. These include limited management capability, uncertainty about which tools are reliable, data protection and cyber-security concerns, and a lack of established approaches to involving staff in decisions. Analysis of company reporting similarly suggests that organisational interest in AI may be developing faster than responsible governance arrangements.

These findings point towards the importance of practical collaboration with employers, workers, trade unions and education providers. They also suggest that definitions of successful adoption should consider workforce outcomes alongside technical deployment and productivity.

Skills needs are changing, but the response is not yet keeping pace

The evidence indicates growing demand for combinations of technical and human capability. As AI performs more routine information-processing tasks, employers may place greater value on judgement, communication, creativity, collaboration, adaptability, regulatory understanding and the ability to use AI critically and responsibly.

These capabilities are not new, but their relative importance compared to more technical skills may be increasing. They are also not always well recognised through existing qualifications, recruitment practices or training programmes. At present, much AI learning appears to be informal and self-directed, while workers, businesses and education providers do not share a settled view of what training is needed or how it should be delivered.

This creates both a risk and an opportunity. People who already have access to technology, professional networks and supportive employers may be well placed to benefit. Others may face new barriers if AI capability becomes an informal requirement for work without accessible routes to acquire and demonstrate it.

Productivity opportunities are real, but will not automatically be widely shared

The evidence points to real but uneven opportunities for AI to improve productivity, reduce repetitive work, support innovation and create new roles – particularly in AI implementation, assurance, governance and compliance. IFOW's employer survey reflects this mixed picture: around 40% of organisations reported increased output, a similar proportion reported no change and around one fifth reported a decline. This suggests that there is real potential but it is not yet widespread or consistent.

However, productivity gains do not automatically translate into better work or broader opportunity. Benefits may be used to improve services, strengthen businesses, raise wages, invest in skills or reduce administrative burdens. They may also result in smaller teams, higher work intensity or fewer routes into employment.

The distribution of these gains is therefore an important part of the debate. Londoners consulted by the Taskforce generally supported innovation but wanted its benefits to be accompanied by fairness, transparency, worker involvement and visible public value.

Trust, accountability and inclusion are central to successful adoption

Public concern about AI extended beyond employment numbers. Londoners and stakeholder organisations raised issues relating to bias, privacy, misinformation, data protection, worker monitoring, accountability and the loss of human judgement. These concerns were particularly important where AI is used in high-stakes settings or affects access to employment and public services.

The evidence also suggests that existing inequalities could be reinforced. Impacts may differ by age, disability, ethnicity, migration status, caring responsibilities, employment status and access to digital tools and training. Freelancers, people in insecure work and those outside established education or professional routes may be less visible in conventional data and have less influence over how technology is introduced.

This means that inclusion cannot be assessed only after policies and systems have been designed. It needs to shape how evidence is collected, how employers and workers are engaged and how new opportunities are developed.

London needs to be able to learn and respond as the evidence develops

A final theme was uncertainty. AI capabilities and adoption patterns are changing quickly, while many of the longer-term effects remain unclear. Some evidence points to early pressures on recruitment and particular forms of work, but it is often difficult to separate AI-related change from wider economic conditions. New roles and business models may also emerge in ways that cannot be predicted from current exposure measures.

This uncertainty is not in itself a case for either alarm or inaction. It strengthens the case for an adaptive response: one that draws on different forms of evidence, tests assumptions and changes course as impacts become clearer.

No single dataset provides a complete picture. The Taskforce's own work was most informative when official statistics were combined with vacancy data, employer reporting, surveys, sector research, academic analysis and the experiences of workers and Londoners.

How the Taskforce responded

These themes informed three inter-connected enduring civic capability recommendations: **Act Early, Shape Change, and Create Opportunity**.

First, the evidence on uncertainty, uneven impacts and hidden changes in recruitment and progression led the Taskforce to propose a **London AI Early Action System**. This would combine labour-market, employer and local intelligence to identify emerging risks before they become entrenched, recognise new opportunities as they develop, and support earlier, coordinated action.

Second, the importance of employer choices, work design, and organisational capability informed the proposed **London AI at Work Partnership**. Guided by intelligence from the Early Action System, this practical partnership would bring employers, workers, trade unions, educators and London government together to improve how AI is adopted, with employers investing in workforce transition alongside technology and London aligning its existing skills, business-support and convening powers behind good practice.

Third, the risks to entry routes and the growing importance of human capabilities informed proposals to **create new pathways into work and co-create London's future workforce**, including an employer-recognised **London Future Ready Guarantee**, developed with and recognised by employers. The guarantee would help young Londoners demonstrate capabilities such as judgement, communication, creativity and adaptability alongside their technical skills and qualifications, providing a clearer route into work as traditional entry-level pathways change.

Together, **these capabilities are intended to operate as a continuous cycle**: the Early Action System identifies emerging change, the AI at Work Partnership helps employers and partners respond, and new pathways into work turn that response into opportunities for Londoners. Evidence from implementation would then feed back into the Early Action System, allowing London to learn and adapt over time.

However, these recommendations do not address every issue raised in the evidence. Questions relating to employment law, regulation, welfare, taxation, cyber security and some aspects of data protection extend beyond the Taskforce's remit or London government's current powers. Nor does the evidence remove the need for further work on SMEs, digital exclusion and the distribution of AI's costs and benefits. The recommendations are therefore best understood as a set of civic capabilities: intended to help London observe change, influence how it unfolds and expand opportunity as the evidence develops.

Chapter 2: How does the evidence link to the Taskforce recommendations?

The Taskforce drew on a wealth of evidence in formulating its recommendations. That ranged from innovative technical research by academics to a wide-ranging survey of small and large employers, and from roundtable discussions with business leaders to a deliberative forum of Londoners.

To help readers navigate from evidence to action, each section below provides a precis of the source material with a short note identifying the Taskforce recommendations most directly related to the evidence.

Section 1 – London's workforce exposure to GenAI (GLAE):

The Taskforce's starting point was the GLA Economics working paper, [London's workforce exposure to generative artificial intelligence](#) (GenAI). This used task-based exposure estimates to identify which occupations in London are most likely to be affected by GenAI. Combined with near real-time job postings and business survey evidence, it helped show not only where impacts might occur, but where early signs of change are already emerging. In so doing, it provided some important guidance and justification for identifying the Taskforce's priorities.

This foundational analysis established the scale and shape of London's exposure: at least 46% of London's workers – around 2.4 million people – are in roles where GenAI could automate a significant share of tasks, well above the UK average of 38%, with over 300,000 workers in routine administrative roles facing the highest exposure and ICT, finance, professional services and public administration the most affected sectors. Crucially, it found that task change within roles, not job losses, is the main effect so far, even as reported AI adoption has nearly doubled in two years to 26–35%.

These findings – that AI changes tasks and pathways before headline employment – support the case for a London AI Early Action System (**Act Early**). The concentration of young, early-career workers in high-exposure "stepping-stone" jobs shows the importance of the new pathways into work (**Create Opportunity**).

Section 2 – Labour market overview (IFOW):

Building on the exposure analysis, the IFOW brought together evidence on workers' capacity to adapt, business adoption, work design, skills, and movement between occupations. Its central finding is that the most important changes are not yet widespread job losses, but a quieter reconfiguration of work: tasks and responsibilities are being redistributed, skills requirements are changing, and roles and career pathways are being redesigned.

The analysis finds that London is highly exposed to AI but comparatively well placed to adapt overall. However, this resilience is unevenly shared. Around 600,000 Londoners work in occupations that combine higher exposure with fewer resources or routes into other work, particularly lower-paid clerical and administrative roles. This indicates where workers may be less able to adapt to change; it does not predict that their jobs will be lost.

AI adoption is also widespread but uneven and is often running ahead of organisational readiness, workforce planning and governance. Smaller firms face particular barriers, while the effects on entry-level hiring remain mixed; the clearer risk at present is that junior roles may offer fewer opportunities to learn, build judgement and progress.

IFOW's role typology provides a practical way of tracking these less visible changes. It combines evidence on vacancy demand, pay progression, mobility and job transitions to identify gateway roles, transition roles, emerging or recombined roles and foundational roles. This helps show where opportunities are opening, where established routes into good work may be weakening and where workers may have few realistic alternatives.

These findings support the case for a **London AI Early Action System (Act Early)** that looks beyond headline employment figures and monitors changes in tasks, adaptive capacity, work design, recruitment and progression. The evidence that employer choices and organisational readiness shape outcomes also supports the **AI at Work Partnership (Shape Change)**, including its focus on responsible adoption, worker involvement and support for

SMEs. Finally, the changing content of junior work and growing demand for wider combinations of technical and human skills reinforce the case for protecting and creating new pathways into work (**Create Opportunity**).

Section 3 – Sector deep-dives (IFOW):

The Taskforce chose to examine three important parts of London's economy in greater detail: ***the creative industries; financial, professional and legal services; and transport and autonomous systems***. IFOW's dedicated sector deep dives provided further evidence of where and how changes are beginning to emerge in London's labour market.

These deep-dives drew on a wide mix of evidence, including targeted literature reviews, interviews with employers and sector experts, vacancy and freelance platform data, and employer survey findings.

Across creative industries, financial and professional services, and transport, IFOW analysis of the evidence found AI changing tasks, skills and career pathways before changing overall employment – but with sharply uneven impacts.

In the creative industries, impacts are very uneven across sub-sectors, emphasising the need to pursue a context-specific response rather than a one-size-fits-all approach. Evidence suggests that artistic and creative workers have been impacted by a decline in commissions, pay and compensation for secondary uses of original work. AI is not only complicating routes into work by younger people but also worsening the sustainability of mid-career pathways and progression. In financial, professional and legal services, the "pyramid model" puts junior roles at double risk – fewer hours and lost learning opportunities – even as AI raises productivity on some legal tasks by 50%-130%. Routine work also faces accelerated offshoring. In transport, the research found that in some sub-sectors the sharpest future risks fall on higher-paid, safety-critical roles. In others, the difficulty of automating perception and dexterity in complex environments continues to protect the human workforce.

It also found that of 8,700 company reports assessed, 17% discussed AI adoption but far fewer addressed responsible governance – adoption is running ahead of preparedness.

This evidence relates strongly to where the Taskforce recommends a London AI at Work Partnership (**Shape Change**), while the exposure of junior, freelance and training-pathway roles underpins the new pathways into work recommendations (**Create Opportunity**). The findings on oversight in high-stakes work speaks to the proposed employer commitments on responsible adoption and work redesign. The analysis also finds evidence of a broken rung at the first step of progression: in every sector examined, the routes from junior and support roles into established professional work appear to be narrowing, with the gap widest in financial and legal services. This matters because progression, not just entry, determines whether early-career work leads to good work

Section 4 – Business and stakeholder engagement roundtables (GLA):

Across 21 consultations involving 182 people from 144 organisations, the impact on entry-level roles was the most consistent concern raised. Stakeholders said that AI may absorb many of the routine and administrative tasks traditionally carried out by junior staff, while employers may increasingly expect applicants to have more experience before entering these roles. Stakeholders noted that hiring decisions are being shaped by a range of economic factors, not just AI alone. Against this backdrop, some described a "hidden labour market contraction", in which firms slow or freeze recruitment rather than make visible redundancies. This means headline labour-market data may understate changes in demand, while making it difficult to isolate the specific effect of AI. They also reported a two-tier economy, with advanced firms rapidly benefiting from material productivity gains while many SMEs lag and identified the main adoption constraint as organisational and cultural rather than technical.

The hidden-contraction finding again speaks to the case for the London AI Early Action System (**Act Early**) and the two-speed economy to the AI at Work Partnership's approach to business support and SME adoption (**Shape Change**) while the entry-level evidence relates strongly to **Create Opportunity**.

The strong cross-sector consensus on proactive, coordinated intervention underpins the framework as a whole.

Section 5 – Talk London AI in London survey:

Drawing on 1,227 survey respondents and 137 discussion participants between May and June 2026, this engagement found AI use is already widespread – 83% had used it in the past six months, 47% most days – but so is concern: 74% worry about job losses in certain industries and 74% also see AI as a risk to young Londoners' job prospects. Among students and apprentices, 40% said AI had not been covered at all in their training and 39% felt they lacked the AI skills needed for work. Meanwhile, 44% of employees said they were not consulted before workplace AI decisions, and 57% of respondents wanted the Mayor to protect Londoners against inequalities.

The concerns about young people's prospects and inequality are directly relevant to the **Create Opportunity** recommendations and the expectation that widened participation and co-creation runs through all AI at Work Partnership activity. The consultation gap helped shape the proposed employer commitment to involve staff in significant AI deployment (**Shape Change**), and the appetite for training – a third of participants wanted free AI-related provision – has a clear read across to the skills and capability recommendations.

Section 6 – London AI and Jobs Taskforce youth roundtable:

A roundtable with young Londoners aged 18–24 found AI use already woven through their work, study and daily lives, but paired with sharp awareness of the risks. Their top three concerns were the loss of early-career skill development (note-taking, writing, reading reports) as AI absorbs formative tasks; the outsourcing of critical thinking, with AI outputs going unreviewed for accuracy and tone; and AI-led recruitment on both sides – algorithmic filtering of applications met by AI-written applications with limited personal input. Participants wanted London to embrace AI while preserving human skills, calling for education reform to build AI literacy alongside the capabilities employers actually demand, and for employers to be transparent about AI in hiring. The human-centric skills they identified as essential – critical thinking and judgement, digital and AI literacy, communication and interpersonal skills, creativity and problem-solving, and adaptability – closely anticipate the capabilities the Taskforce's recommendations seek to recognise and develop.

This engagement drew out findings directly relevant for the **Create Opportunity** recommendations: the skills young Londoners identified map almost exactly onto the proposed London Future Ready Guarantee, and their perspective underpins the commitment to co-create new pathways with stakeholders including young Londoners themselves. Their concerns about AI-led recruitment also reinforce the broader case for responsible employer adoption (**Shape Change**), while the risk of eroding early-career skill formation strengthens the case for monitoring entry-level change through the London AI Early Action System (**Act Early**).

Section 7 – GLA AI and jobs Londoners engagement workshop (2CV):

This one-day deliberative workshop with 43 Londoners from diverse backgrounds identified skills, training, and AI education as the clearest priority – practical, inclusive support beginning at school age and continuing through working life. Participants strongly supported an observatory function, but only as a transparent, accessible public tool. They wanted to ensure that it captures people easily missed by traditional data: older and disabled workers, migrants, carers and the self-employed, not just graduates in large firms. They wanted stronger accountability and safeguards around AI adoption, and were clear that London should not "wait and see" but act early and visibly, lobbying national government where its own levers fall short.

These design principles are related to **Act Early**, particularly the commitment to inclusive intelligence; the accountability themes shaped employer commitments as part of the AI at Work Partnership (**Shape Change**); the skills priorities informed **Create Opportunity**; and the call for national engagement is reflected in the report's proposals on additional powers and flexibilities.

Chapter 3: Detailed summaries of contributory evidence

1) London's workforce exposure to generative artificial intelligence

GLA Economics, July 2026

The Taskforce's starting point was an analysis by GLA Economics on London's workforce exposure to generative artificial intelligence (GenAI). Using occupational exposure estimates developed by the International Labour Organization, the research examined how closely the tasks performed in different jobs align with the capabilities of GenAI.

However, exposure does not mean that jobs will necessarily disappear. It indicates where work could be affected, while the eventual impact will depend on how employers adopt the technology, how roles are redesigned and wider economic conditions.

Key findings

- **Nearly half of London's workforce is in an occupation exposed to generative AI.** Around 46% of London's workers – approximately 2.4 million people – were employed in occupations where generative AI could automate a significant share of existing tasks. Within this group, around 313,000 workers were in the highest-exposure occupations, where most tasks could potentially be performed using 2024 and 2025 generative AI capabilities.
- **Exposure is concentrated in particular occupations and industries.** Routine administrative and clerical roles face the highest levels of exposure because many of their tasks closely match current generative AI capabilities. More than 300,000 London workers were employed in this highest-exposure group.
- **Many professional occupations are also highly exposed.** This reflects the importance of language, data and analytical tasks in professional work. However, roles involving high-stakes judgement, accountability and substantial client interaction are less directly automatable. In these occupations, AI may be more likely to support and reshape work than replace it.
- **Some of London's most important industries are highly exposed.** ICT, finance, professional services and public administration have particularly high concentrations of exposed occupations. This creates opportunities to improve productivity, but also the potential for significant changes to tasks, roles and workforce structures.
- **The potential effects are unlikely to be evenly shared.** Workers with higher educational qualifications are among the most exposed because they are concentrated in knowledge-intensive occupations. Women are overrepresented in highly exposed administrative and clerical work. Many younger workers starting professional careers are also concentrated in exposed digital and knowledge-based roles.
- **Entry routes may be particularly important.** Generative AI can perform many of the routine research, drafting and administrative tasks traditionally carried out by people at the beginning of their careers. Changes to these tasks could affect not only recruitment, but also how younger workers gain experience and progress into more senior positions.
- **There are tentative early signs that demand may be weakening in some exposed occupations, but the evidence remains uncertain.** Online job postings suggest that employer demand for some administrative and professional roles may be softening. However, it remains difficult to separate the effects of AI from wider changes in London's economy and individual sectors.

The full report is available to download at: [London's workforce exposure to generative artificial intelligence | London City Hall](#)

2) Labour market overview – The new equilibrium

IFOW, July 2026

Following on from the foundational GLA Economics report (above), this analysis brings together the Institute for the Future of Work's (IFOW) research for the Taskforce on AI exposure, business adoption, work design, skills, occupational mobility and sector-level change. Drawing on a wide range of sources, it seeks to better understand how AI is already materially changing work in the capital.

IFOW's central finding is that the **new frontier of AI-driven change is largely hidden from headline employment statistics**. Rather than widespread job losses at this stage, the strongest evidence is of tasks being reallocated, roles redesigned, skills requirements changing and routes into and between occupations being reshaped.

This "quiet revolution" may be felt most sharply by workers who are highly exposed to change but have fewer resources, transferable skills or alternative opportunities. The key issue for London is therefore the **quality and direction of the transition**: whether AI expands human capability, good work and opportunity, or weakens agency and progression.

Key findings

- **London is highly exposed to AI, but exposure is not the same as vulnerability.** London has the highest average AI exposure of any UK region because of its concentration of employment in technology, finance, professional and business services, and media. However, while exposure estimates show where AI could change work, they do not tell us whether jobs will disappear or how easily workers could respond.
- **A new measure, 'adaptive capacity' can help identify where support may be most needed.** Building on international approaches, this occupation-level measure considers four metrics that may help workers manage a transition:
 - access to a financial buffer;
 - skills that can be transferred into other occupations;
 - the availability of alternative jobs in the local labour market; and
 - the age profile of the workforce.

Combined with AI exposure, it distinguishes between exposed workers with strong options and those with fewer resources or routes into other work. It is a measure of **potential vulnerability**, not a prediction of job losses.

- **London is comparatively well placed to adapt, but its resilience is unevenly shared.** Just over half of London's employment is in occupations that combine relatively high exposure with above-average adaptive capacity. Many workers in professional and knowledge-intensive roles have higher incomes, transferable skills and access to a large and varied labour market, supporting their ability to adapt to the impacts of AI.
- **London's average resilience conceals significant vulnerability.** Around 600,000 Londoners work in occupations that combine higher exposure with a lower capacity to adapt. These workers are concentrated in clerical and administrative roles, are disproportionately women and tend to be paid below the London median. This identifies where workers may have fewer options if their work changes; it is not a forecast that these jobs will be lost.
- **AI adoption is widespread, but highly uneven.** No single source provides a complete picture with employer surveys, job advertisements, company reports and worker evidence all suggesting wide differences between firms and sectors. For example, adoption is close to universal in financial, legal and professional services, but remains more experimental in much of the creative sector. Consistent with other research, adoption also rises sharply with firm size.

- **Adoption is running ahead of readiness.** Around 60% of surveyed organisations reported substantial use of employer-approved generative AI tools, while informal 'shadow AI' use was also widespread. Yet many firms lack clear strategies, policies, training, system inventories or processes for assessing risk and monitoring effects. Governance, workforce involvement and advance planning are generally developing more slowly than the technology's use.
- **SMEs face distinct pressures and barriers.** Smaller firms tend to adopt later, with fewer resources for training, governance and business redesign. They often rely on generic third-party tools and may experience AI through client demands, competitive pressure or unmanaged employee use. Some mid-sized firms risk becoming caught between legacy systems and better-resourced competitors without yet seeing clear returns from their investment.
- **The strongest early evidence is of work being reconfigured, rather than jobs disappearing.** AI is changing how tasks and responsibilities are allocated, the value placed on human expertise, and the opportunities workers have to exercise judgement and develop skills. These changes can occur within jobs, organisations and sectors without immediately appearing in headline employment data, potentially concealing significant disruption for particular workers or career routes.
- **Entry-level roles are under pressure — but the evidence is more mixed than headline data suggest.** The IFOW employer survey found entry-level hiring broadly stable overall, and AI adoption was not clearly associated with reductions in junior recruitment in London. Among firms reporting change, the creation of new entry-level roles was more common than their removal. However, the tasks through which junior workers traditionally learn, build judgement and develop expertise are being compressed or reallocated. The risk may therefore be a weakening of career pathways rather than an immediate fall in job numbers.
- **There are positive productivity signals but these remain unsettled.** Around 40% of employers reported increased output, a similar proportion reported no change, and around one fifth reported a decline. More advanced adopters were more likely to report improvements in output quality. However, the mechanisms remain unclear and productivity and other benefits cannot be assumed without new capabilities and focus on the workforce. Short-term gains could support better work and faster learning, or they could come at the expense of the developmental tasks that build future expertise.
- **How work is redesigned will determine whether AI strengthens or weakens human expertise.** Roles that are reconfigured to preserve workers' judgement, autonomy, specialist knowledge and opportunities to learn are better placed to use AI to improve work and productivity. If AI instead simplifies or fragments tasks, it may weaken skills and progression. The analysis finds that human expertise is more strongly linked to pay than AI skills alone.
- **Employers are asking for wider and more diverse combinations of skills, with human capabilities becoming increasingly important alongside technical knowledge.** London job advertisements increasingly combine digital and analytical skills with judgement, communication, leadership, creativity, collaboration, commercial awareness and regulatory understanding. As AI takes on more routine tasks, employers are placing greater value on people's ability to interpret information, make sound decisions, manage relationships and apply specialist knowledge responsibly. Many roles are therefore becoming broader and less easily described by a single occupational title.
- **Career pathways are shifting as well as roles.** Work-to-work transitions have become more frequent in London, and the network of viable moves between occupations continues to change. Demand has recently shifted towards care and other people-facing work, while some technology roles have become less prominent as destinations. The report's role typology is intended to identify gateway roles, emerging or recombined roles, transition roles and foundational roles, and to show where pathways are opening, narrowing or becoming blocked (see Box 3.1).

Overall conclusion

Overall, the report argues that London is moving towards a new balance between human expertise and AI, but that the outcome is not predetermined. The evidence supports an active approach to transition, including better labour-market intelligence, targeted support for SMEs, closer attention to work design and governance, and the protection and redesign of entry routes and career pathways.

These London-wide findings provide the framework for the sector analysis that follows, which shows how the pace, form and distribution of change differ across different parts of the economy.

Box 3.1: IFOW role typology framework

What is the role typology?

IFOW does not classify occupations by AI exposure alone. Instead, the typology combines several labour-market indicators: vacancy demand and growth, observed pay progression, cross-sector mobility, career histories and job transitions. Roles are then mapped across two main dimensions: how transferable they are across sectors, and whether they provide a route into higher-paid or more advanced work.

It identifies four main types of roles:

Role type	What it indicates	Why it matters
Gateway roles	Roles that develop transferable skills and offer a wide range of routes into other or more advanced work.	Protect and modernise important entry and progression routes, particularly for younger workers.
Transition roles	Roles in which transferable skills have been identified that could help people move into related occupations or sectors.	Support realistic moves before disruption results in unemployment, underemployment or limited progression — including pay progression.
Recombined roles	Roles in which new combinations of tasks and skills are developing, often with opportunities for progression.	Make sure hidden transitions are understood and new opportunities are accessible to a broad range of Londoners. Often indicates an area of growth.
Anchor roles	Roles that support essential economic, public-service or civic functions.	Improve job quality, resilience and opportunities for entry into work. Erosion can indicate blockage or erosion of civic capability.

Why is it useful?

The typology is useful because it **moves beyond a simple “jobs at risk” versus “jobs safe” framing**. AI can change work before it changes employment numbers: tasks can be redistributed, junior roles consolidated, skill requirements expanded, and career ladders reshaped. A role may keep the same title while becoming more demanding, less developmental or harder to progress from. The typology helps make these changes visible.

It also gives policymakers a more practical basis for action than exposure scores alone. By linking AI-related change to progression, mobility and job quality, it shows where workers may need support, not just where technology may be applicable. It helps identify roles that are opening up opportunity, roles that are becoming weaker stepping stones, and roles being reconfigured rather than clearly displaced or clearly improved. **Tracking how occupations shift between these signals over time can also provide an early warning of where demand, progression or job quality may be weakening.** This allows interventions to be better targeted: protecting entry routes, supporting transitions, improving job design, updating skills provision, strengthening worker involvement, or planning redeployment where needed.

3) Sector deep-dives

IFOW, July 2026

To understand how these London-wide patterns are playing out in practice, IFOW – under the Taskforce's direction – examined three important parts of the capital's economy: ***the creative industries; financial, professional and legal services; and transport and autonomous systems.***

These deep-dives drew on sector research, interviews with employers and experts, vacancy and freelance-platform data, and the employer survey. They show that the pace, form and distribution of AI-driven change vary considerably between sectors and between different groups of workers within them.

Key points:

- **The form and timing of change differ considerably between sectors.** Workers in the creative industries are already seeing changes in commissions and demand; financial, professional and legal services are experiencing the redesign of knowledge-based work; and the largest effects in transport may emerge over a longer period as autonomous systems develop in tandem with infrastructure and regulation, including licensing.
- **Sector averages conceal important differences within the workforce.** Risks are concentrated among freelancers and production workers in the creative industries, junior and administrative workers in professional services, and marginalised workers subject to less labour market mobility in transport.
- **Employer and institutional choices will shape the outcome.** Across the sectors, the effects of AI depend on how work is redesigned, whether workers are involved, how skills and entry routes are developed and supported, transparency of information, and whether appropriate safeguards and governance are in place.

Creative industries

AI is reshaping London's creative industries in ways that go beyond the most visible creative roles. Public debate about AI in the sector has generally focused on writers, performers and visual artists. However, this misses a wider group of workers who help creative work get made, managed and distributed, including people in technical, production, marketing, graphic design, editing, audio, and administrative roles. It also shows that AI is likely to affect creative sub-sectors in very different ways, meaning the sector should not be treated as one uniform group.

The impact is uneven, with some skills becoming more valuable while others face reduced demand. Some workers may benefit where AI complements their skills, particularly in more technical digital roles such as software, web development and digital production. Others, including workers in writing, graphic design, voice, music, photography, design support and entry-level production roles, may face reduced demand, lower fees or fewer commissions.

There is already evidence of creative tasks being substituted or repackaged through AI. Anecdotal evidence points to AI being used to replace, alter or extend creative outputs, sometimes without the affected workers clearly knowing or consenting. This makes the scale of change harder to measure because workers may not always know that a commission, task, or future opportunity has been replaced by AI.

Freelancers and early-career workers appear particularly exposed to these changes. Some freelance creative work, including graphic design, writing and photography, is declining, alongside falling incomes in particular roles. The declining commissions for creative work have significant repercussions for workers' livelihoods and ability to sustain a career in the sector, heightening the risk of the creative industries becoming even more inaccessible by underrepresented groups. For London this matters because freelance and project-based work is a major route into the sector, and early-career tasks often provide the experience, credits and networks people need to progress.

Existing work arrangements may make these risks harder to manage fairly. Many creatives already work in precarious employment because of their reliance on freelance or project-based arrangements. These structures can limit collective bargaining coverage and leave junior and freelance workers more exposed with less influence over how AI is introduced. Without these protections, AI may further exacerbate existing employment vulnerabilities for many in the sector.

Employer choices will play an important role in shaping outcomes. Some employers in the sector are actively choosing not to use AI in ways that would reduce paid creative work, even where the technology is available and capable. There are also examples of staff being redeployed rather than released after AI adoption. This suggests that the impact of AI is not inevitable but rather the decisions of employers, commissioners and public bodies will play an important role in shaping worker outcomes.

Financial, professional and legal services

London's financial, professional and legal services are highly exposed to AI, but its effects are still only taking shape. The sector contains many roles that are exposed to AI, particularly because they involve analysis, drafting, compliance, client advice, administration and other knowledge-based tasks. However, adoption does not automatically lead to productivity gains or job losses. So far, high adoption has not translated into a clear sector-wide shift in hiring, suggesting a focus on a slower redesign of roles, tasks and training pathways rather than immediate job loss across the sector.

Adaptive capacity also varies considerably within the sector. Established professionals are generally well placed to adapt to AI labour market adjustments, while administrative and back-office workers combine high exposure with fewer resources and alternative opportunities. Legal services appear resilient overall, but junior and associate roles are more vulnerable than established professional roles. There is a marked dependency on organisation size too, with larger firms showing significantly more capacity to invest, experiment, and hire a trained workforce.

Entry-level and early-career roles are particularly exposed. Many professional service firms rely on a pyramid model, where a large base of junior workers carry out research, drafting, document review, and routine administration to support senior staff, typically through billable hours. These are also among the tasks most likely to be affected by AI with the industry itself expecting to derive cost-savings in these areas. This creates a double risk for junior workers: firstly, firms may reduce their hours and their overall number, and secondly, they will lose some of the practical experience, feedback and confidence-building that help them progress.

AI may be changing how junior workers learn and receive feedback with implications for their long-term development. In addition to getting less practical experience as a result of AI integration, Junior workers in the sector may increasingly use AI tools for answers or feedback where they might previously have asked a supervisor. While this may help some workers become more independent more quickly, it could also weaken the day-to-day supervision, judgement-building and relationship-based learning that professional careers depend on. Some studies have found that AI helped junior lawyers move more quickly into editing and higher-order reasoning, but also risked under-developing core drafting skills unless training pathways were redesigned.

AI could raise productivity, but the gains are uneven. AI can reduce the time needed for some legal and finance tasks, including drafting, underwriting, fraud detection and research. On specific legal tasks, access to advanced reasoning models increased worker productivity by between 50% and 130%. However, gains vary substantially by task and by worker seniority. Quality improvements disproportionately benefited lower-performing participants, while some higher-performing participants saw reduced quality with use.

Routine professional work is being affected by both automation and offshoring. Some lower-complexity legal, accounting, and administrative tasks may be easier to automate and easier to move outside London (and the UK) as AI lowers the skill threshold for completing them. An analysis of London's online freelance labour market suggests an acceleration in offshoring of legal and accounting work, with growing concentration in South Asia. This creates a dual risk for some junior and routine roles – work may be redesigned within firms or commissioned from lower-cost providers elsewhere who can now use AI to complete the work.

Oversight and responsible use will be essential in high-stakes work. There are particular risks in legal and regulated settings where accuracy, accountability, and professional judgement are critical. AI tools need to support expertise, not replace the judgement and supervision that good professional work depends on. This means checking outputs, managing risks, keeping key decisions human-led, and supporting workers to develop the wider technical, regulatory and analytical skills needed to use AI well.


Transport and autonomous systems

AI and wider automation in transport are likely to develop in stages, rather than arriving all at once.

Current AI adoption appears broad but still relatively shallow in the sector, with major changes to hiring not yet visible. Over time, its impact is likely to develop in three stages: (Figure 3.1):

1. Firstly, autonomous systems may be introduced over work to help supervise, improve safety, and reduce downtime, while gathering data.
2. Next, autonomous systems may be deployed with workers still in place, allowing them to learn from human expertise, judgement and feedback while meeting regulatory requirements that still rely on human oversight.
3. In the final stage, the most advanced autonomous systems, including driverless vehicles, could eventually fully replace parts of the existing transport workforce, even as new adjacent roles emerge.

Figure 3.1: Proposed stages of automated transport system development (Transport work stream)



Transport's relatively low current exposure does not necessarily mean low vulnerability. Workers in the sector have lower adaptive capacity on average, including fewer transferable skills and alternative employment options. Interviewees also spoke of career ladders disappearing which have been pathways for workers marginalised within the wider economy to travel 'up the ladder' from. Transport is therefore among the most vulnerable of the sectors examined, although much of the risk is likely to emerge over a longer period as autonomous technologies develop.

Migrant, self-employed, and precarious workers may be particularly exposed. London's transport workforce includes many migrant and self-employed workers, and the sector has relatively high levels of insecure or fragmented work. Even if transport is sometimes described as less exposed to AI overall, workers affected by monitoring, algorithmic management or autonomous systems may have less bargaining power and fewer routes to shape how technology is introduced.

The sharpest risks may not always sit in entry-level roles. Unlike creative and professional services, some of the clearest future risks in transport may fall on higher-paid, higher-skill head office and or safety-critical roles. This is an important exception to the wider pattern of AI affecting junior and routine tasks first, although the impact will depend on technology readiness, regulation and deployment choices.

Autonomous transport raises live safety and accountability questions. In areas such as autonomous vessels and vehicles, there is not yet enough clarity over who is responsible if something goes wrong: the operator, the employer, the technology provider, the regulator or the system itself. Firms in the industry highlight concerns about autonomous systems using AI-generated instructions in safety-critical situations, where expert human judgement currently remains essential. For London, this points to the need for system-level oversight and governance as AI becomes more integrated into the sector.

New opportunities are possible, but they will need deliberate design. Automation could create or expand roles in remote operation, data, assurance, maintenance, cleaning, safety testing and system supervision. It could also open routes for people with transferable technical or digital skills. However, without careful design, new work could become lower quality, more fragmented or outsourced through agencies.

4) Business and stakeholder engagement roundtables

GLA, June 2026

To complement the other empirical strands of research, the AI Taskforce also convened a series of stakeholder engagements. These included meetings with representatives from frontier AI businesses leading its development, small and large firms from a variety of sectors, employer representative bodies, equalities organisations, young people, and other public sector organisations.

There were 182 people representing 144 organisations involved through 21 GLA-led consultations to better understand the impact of AI on London's labour market. These engagements took the form of roundtables, focus groups, forums, and one-on-one meetings. Below is a summary of what these stakeholders told us:

Key findings

- The impact on entry-level positions is the largest concern consistently identified across all stakeholder groups, driven by AI replacing routine and administrative tasks.
- AI is causing a “hidden labour market contraction” characterised by reduced hiring rather than visible job losses.
- There is strong evidence of a two-speed economy emerging, with advanced firms rapidly benefitting from AI while others lag behind.
- Inequality risks will be wide reaching, affecting skills, access, and outcomes, particularly for protected groups.
- AI is also disrupting London's core knowledge economy sectors (incl. finance, professional services, and tech), not just routine or low-skilled work.
- Productivity gains are already material, enabling smaller teams to deliver significantly higher output.
- The primary constraint on adoption is no longer technical, but organisational, cultural, and governance related.
- The skills system is not responding quickly enough to the pace and nature of change, particularly in relation to entry-level pathways.
- Governance capability gaps exist across the public and private sector.
- There is strong cross-sector consensus on the need for proactive, coordinated intervention, rather than reactive policy responses.

The engagements highlighted agreement on many issues, including:

- AI is already having a tangible impact on how work is organised and delivered, with changes visible across multiple sectors and functions.
- Entry-level roles are under increasing pressure. Stakeholders across business, public sector, and civil society highlight early signs of reduced hiring and changing job requirements, particularly as routine tasks are automated.
- Skills and training are critical to navigating the transition and support workers to adapt to the change. However, there was not agreement on the type and delivery of training required.
- There was agreement that policy intervention was required to manage risks, given the possibility that AI could increase existing inequalities, including the access to opportunities.

However, there were diverse views about interpretation of risks, priorities, and policy responses.

- Frontier firms prioritise growth, innovation, and global competitiveness.

- Businesses focus on implementation challenges and risk management.
- Equalities organisations emphasise inclusion and fairness.
- Public sector actors focus on governance, coordination, and delivery.
- Youth sector organisations and young people focus on how AI is changing access to opportunities

Key risks

Risks identified by stakeholders included:

- **The decline in entry-level pathways.** The risk is AI automating the routine and administrative tasks that underpin junior roles, leading to reduced hiring and increasing expectations of experience at entry level. This has implications not only for immediate employment but also for long-term career progression and social mobility.
- **Hidden labour market contraction.** Rather than large-scale dismissals, organisations are responding to AI by slowing or freezing hiring, particularly at entry level. Traditional labour market data may not be able to identify these transitions and could thus underestimate the scale of the impact.
- **Widening inequality.** AI can reinforce existing inequalities facing disadvantaged groups through unequal access to AI tools and training, difference in organisational adoption, biased datasets and differences in digital literacy and AI skills.
- **Emergence of a two-tier economy,** where some organisations are adopting AI effectively and advising rapidly, other firms, including many SMEs are lagging behind. Over the longer term this may lead to widening gaps in productivity, wages, and employment opportunities between firms and sectors.
- **Impact is more pronounced in certain sectors.** Knowledge-intensive industries such as finance, legal services, and business administration have seen large disruptions. These sectors have historically provided entry routes into employment.
- **A lack of good AI governance impacting public trust.** AI needs clear rules, strong safeguards and people with the right expertise to test and challenge it. Without this, organisations are more likely to produce poor-quality outputs or harmful errors, which can quickly undermine public trust. This risk is growing as AI develops faster than many governance systems can keep up with.
- **Growing cyber security risks.** Wider use of AI and dramatic improvements in model capability is increasing risks around cyber security, fraud, and data protection. Organisations need clear controls over what data can be used, how systems are secured, and how privacy is protected with a necessity for staff to be upskilled in these areas.
- **Job quality and workforce experience:** Emerging concerns include workers losing cognitive skills, reduced independence in performing jobs and increased monitoring of workers.
- **Poor alignment with skills system:** Skills system is reacting and not acting strategically and proactively to the rapid expansion of AI use.

Key opportunities

Stakeholders identified opportunities from AI adoption.

- **AI can potentially support large productivity gains.** AI is enabling organisations to automate routine tasks, improve efficiency, and increase output per worker.
- **Emerging evidence of a shift towards higher-value work.** By removing administrative burdens, AI enables workers to focus on activities such as problem-solving, creativity, and interpersonal engagement. In some cases,

this allows individuals to progress more quickly into higher-skilled roles, although the extent of this benefit varies across organisations.

- **The creation of new roles and functions.** These include positions related to AI implementation, governance, compliance, and oversight, requiring a combination of technical and domain-specific skills.
- **Potential for transforming skills attainment.** AI can act as a learning tool, enabling rapid access to knowledge and reducing barriers to skill development. This creates opportunities to make the skills system more flexible and responsive to labour market needs.
- **Improve accessibility and inclusion.** AI tools such as translation services and assistive technologies can support participation in the labour market and access to services for groups that have historically faced barriers.
- **Strategic opportunity for London to position itself as a global leader** in responsible AI adoption, building on its strong talent base and institutional capacity.

Strategic implications

The combined evidence suggests that the AI transition is presenting a dual challenge. First, the need to realise productivity and growth opportunities, and second, managing structural labour market risks, particularly access to work and inequality. This requires a shift from a reactive approach to a proactive and coordinated response. In particular, the stakeholder engagement highlighted that there is a need to:

- Safeguard and redesign entry-level pathways
- Ensure equitable access to skills and training
- Support adoption across all parts of the economy
- Strengthen governance, develop capability frameworks and provide regulatory clarity to support responsible adoption.
- Collect data to monitor impact, improved labour market intelligence.
- Ensure benefits are shared

Without such intervention, according to participants, there is a significant risk that AI will lead to a labour market that is more productive but also more unequal and less accessible.

5) Talk London AI in London survey

Talk London and GLA Opinion Research, June 2026

The Mayor's AI Taskforce wanted to hear from Londoners about their own experiences of using AI at work and in daily life, focusing on the opportunities and challenges that AI brings. These findings are based on engagement through Talk London, with 1,227 survey respondents and 137 discussion participants aged 16 and over between May 18 and June 21, 2026. Proportions are based on unweighted responses.

Key findings

Usage and experience of AI

- **Frequent and prevalent AI usage.** The majority of respondents have used AI (83% in the last six months), with 47% using it most days or daily. However, many are concerned about AI's potential impacts – particularly young Londoners.
- **Informal AI learning is commonplace.** Respondents mostly found self-teaching or experimenting (74%) helped them learn about AI. Educational institutions (8%) and community groups or libraries (4%) were the least common places where people learnt about AI.
- **AI is changing the way Londoners work or study** (71%), with some proven benefits including completion of some tasks (52%), while many are also finding themselves with extra work in reviewing AI outputs and its accuracy (47%). These changes were reflected in the discussion with comments around the benefits of AI in boosting productivity and efficiency, but also the need to maintain human oversight and critically review AI outputs.
- **Strong concerns expressed around AI integrity.** For younger Londoners in particular there are high levels of concern about AI integrity (85-94%), although these concerns are also widespread amongst all ages. Concerns around data privacy and ethical use were raised in the discussion with calls for regulation to ensure ethical and secure AI adoption.

A changing labour market

- **Respondents are highly concerned about AI's impact on the labour market** – with 74% concerned about 'job losses in certain industries'. It is particularly perceived as posing a **risk to young Londoners' job prospects** (74%). Responses from students and apprentices suggest that AI is not fully covered in training (40% say it hadn't been covered at all). Among this group, 39% don't feel they have the AI skills they need for work.
- **Young Londoners and workers feel unprepared for a workforce with wide AI-use.** Discussions with young Londoners and responses from students and apprentices suggest that AI is not fully covered in training (40% say it had not been covered at all). Among this group, 39% don't feel they have the AI skills they need for work.
- **Productivity and new work opportunities also recognised.** The benefits of AI were seen, by a smaller proportion, to be about more productive and less repetitive work (46%) and new job opportunities not yet in existence (41%). Discussion comments centred on how AI could support local government, improve transport and security systems and speed up medical research.


Employer behaviour

- **Business owners and self-employed groups are trialling or implementing AI** (62%), but **employees do not feel consulted** before decisions are made (44%). Employees are receiving guidance on the organisation's policy (54%), but fewer have formal training (36%).
- **Barrier to adoption:** Employers also see data security as a barrier to AI adoption (48%) but are less concerned about it than respondents overall (74%). Uncertainty around which tools are reliable (34%) and a lack of a clear business need (30%) are also highlighted.

Supporting change

- **Survey respondents want the Mayor to protect Londoners against inequalities** (57%). This is also reflected in the discussion with an emphasis on job creation and collaboration with businesses to protect staff. Some respondents place a greater emphasis on working with government to strengthen rights (e.g. 62% for students) and protecting entry-level jobs (e.g. 72% for 16-to-24-year-olds).
- **Desire for training provision** with a third of respondents showing an interest in free AI-related training (34%). The discussion comments emphasise this as well as greater support on safe AI-use, and more guidance on misinformation to use AI confidently in their day-to-day and for work-related tasks.

Figure 3.2: Key statistics from Londoners we heard from:



Base: Talk London survey respondents (1227)

Base: 16-24-year-olds (110)

Base: For Apprentices/trainees, students (full/part-time) (75)

Base: Self-employed / business owners (154)

6) London AI and Jobs Taskforce Youth Roundtable

A roundtable with young Londoners between the ages of 18-24 years highlighted the widespread use of AI across work, study and daily life, emphasizing the efficiency of benefits for educational research and job applications.

Concerns raised included the possible over-reliance on AI and the resulting reduced critical thinking, ethical issues, data privacy, and loss of entry level jobs. Most participants would like London to embrace AI while preserving human skills and support.

The top three risks young Londoners highlighted were:

1. Loss of or not developing early career skills such as note taking, writing emails, reading reports.
2. Outsourcing critical thinking e.g. not reviewing AI outputs for inaccuracy, tone and not trying to problem solve independently.
3. AI led recruitment by companies and applicants e.g. AI filtering of applications and submitting AI written applications with limited personal input.

They did see opportunities from AI adoption which could bring efficiency gains, access to knowledge and reduced time spent on administrative work and mundane tasks.

Young people suggested that building AI literacy and critical thinking skills are important. However, the education system needs to be reformed so that young people can learn to use AI effectively and build the skills are in demand from employers.

Given the concerns raised around hiring and applying for jobs, they would encourage employers to be transparent about the use of AI in hiring practices and balance this with human involvement.

Young people identified some human-centric skills which they think Londoners will need to thrive in an AI-driven future, these included:

- **Critical thinking and judgement** - to evaluate AI outputs
- **Digital and AI literacy** - knowing how and when to use tools effectively
- **Communication and interpersonal skills** – AI cannot replace human relationships at work or in personal lives
- **Creativity and problem-solving** - areas AI cannot fully replace
- **Adaptability and continuous learning** - to keep up with rapid change

Overall, the young people consulted thought that individual and London-wide success will depend on combining AI use with strong human skills rather than relying on AI alone.

7) GLA AI and jobs Londoners engagement workshop

2CV, July 2026

A deeper consultation was held to discuss how AI may affect work, hiring, skills, progression, and fairness in the capital. to reflect the broad range of views around AI. The format was a one-day workshop with 43 Londoners from diverse backgrounds taking part. It included a framing presentation, the use of themed evidence, and finally breakout groups to develop ideas for the AI and Jobs Taskforce.

The engagement highlighted the following:

- **The clearest priority was skills, training, and AI education.** Participants wanted practical support that helps people adapt as work changes, including a skills hub, AI awareness from school age, workplace and community training, and support for people whose jobs may change or disappear. These actions mattered because they felt concrete, inclusive, and directly linked to people's ability to stay in work, move into new work, and avoid being left behind.
- **Participants also strongly supported better public intelligence on how AI is changing jobs, but only if this is transparent, accessible, and inclusive.** The idea encapsulated in the AI Early Action System was well received if it was framed as a public tool that helps London spot change early, understand who is affected, and identify where intervention is needed. Participants were clear that this should not just track large employers, graduate jobs, or formal career paths. It should also capture the experiences of people who are more easily missed as concern were raised regarding the impact on younger workers, older workers, disabled people, migrants, people with caring responsibilities, self-employed workers, and those outside traditional education or employment routes.
- **Accountability was another major theme. Participants wanted stronger reporting, expert input, safeguards, and oversight around AI adoption.** They were concerned about job loss, bias, privacy, data protection, scams, worker monitoring, and employers avoiding responsibility. Some supported an independent regulatory body, but others questioned whether London alone could credibly regulate AI. This points to a broader desire for standards and accountability, rather than a settled view on the exact mechanism.
- **Participants felt that London should not act alone. Several groups wanted the GLA to lobby national government and work across public, private, UK, and international systems.** They saw AI as too large and fast-moving for a purely local response but still wanted London to use its influence to shape good adoption, protect workers, and build shared standards.
- **For the Taskforce, the strongest message was to act early and visibly.** Participants did not want a "wait and see" approach. They wanted practical skills support, public evidence, employer accountability, and inclusive design from the start. The Taskforce should lead with actions that help Londoners adapt, make the Early Action System a trusted public resource, be clear about what London can do versus what needs national action, and keep public benefit, representation, and worker protection at the centre of its preferred set of actions.

Participants also described a positive AI future in practical terms. Londoners consulted wanted AI to reduce repetitive work, improve access to training and opportunity, support better services, and make work more human, not less. The strongest themes which emerged are summarised below.

- **AI should support human work, not replace human judgement:** A good future was one where AI takes on repetitive, administrative, or mundane tasks, but people remain central to decisions, judgement, relationships, creativity, and care. As articulated by one group of participants "AI should be a decision support tool, not the decision-maker."
- **Skills, training, and AI literacy are central to a positive future:** A future where Londoners can access training, AI awareness, and ongoing support. Participants wanted this to start early, continue through working life, and reach people outside confident, office-based, or already-skilled groups.

- **Benefits need to be shared with workers and the public:** Participants wanted productivity gains from AI use to translate into better jobs, shorter or more flexible working weeks, improved services, reduced stress, and support for people whose roles change.
- **Employers need to be transparent and responsible:** Participants wanted employers to be clearer about how they use AI, include staff in decision-making, protect jobs where possible, and provide training and support. Participants wanted employers to help people adapt rather than simply adopt AI around them.
- **Fairness and inclusion are the main tests of a good AI future:** Participants repeatedly worried that AI could widen inequality, favour people who already have knowledge and confidence, exclude disabled people or people facing language barriers, and reduce opportunities for entry-level workers.
- **Participants wanted safeguards against misuse, dependency, and harm:** Common concerns included scams, misinformation, misuse, data and privacy risks, over-dependence on AI, job loss, loss of skills, environmental impacts, financial hardship, and AI mistakes affecting people's lives. A good future requires trust, standards, accountability, and human oversight.

8) Additional research

In addition to the London specific research and evidence commissioned by the Taskforce, a range of other papers, essays, and analyses were also drawn upon to inform their deliberations. A small sample of these resources are set out below as well as their headline findings.

1. **Ensuring AI is a Force for Good in London – BusinessLDN.** A BusinessLDN position paper informed by its AI Steering Committee and the London Local Skills Improvement Plan (LSIP), bringing together employer perspectives from financial services, technology, professional services, infrastructure, media and education. The paper sets out a 10-point plan for ensuring AI supports productivity, growth and workforce development across London
 - a. **High-level findings.** The paper argues that AI is already becoming a board-level workforce and organisational transformation issue rather than simply a technology issue. Employers report that the main constraints on adoption are workforce capability, skills and confidence rather than the technology itself. While impacts are currently concentrated at task level rather than job level, businesses increasingly expect AI to reshape roles, team structures and career pathways over time. BusinessLDN identifies growing concerns about weakening entry-level opportunities, the emergence of an "experience gap" for younger workers, skills systems that move too slowly to keep pace with technological change, and a lack of real-time labour market intelligence. The paper strongly supports many of the themes emerging from the Taskforce's work, including the need for better labour market intelligence, employer involvement in skills design, new pathways into work, stronger transferable skills, applied learning opportunities, and action to address risks to early-career progression. It also provides an important employer-led perspective that reinforces the argument that AI adoption should be understood as an organisational and workforce transformation challenge, not simply a technical one.
2. **AI Workforce Policy Framework – Brookings Institution.** A policy framework from the Brookings Institution setting out how governments can prepare for and respond to AI-driven labour market change. The framework focuses on workforce transitions, worker protection, skills, employer behaviour and public policy responses to technological disruption.
 - a. **High-level findings.** The framework argues that policymakers should move beyond debates about whether AI will replace jobs and instead focus on helping workers navigate transition. It emphasises that labour market outcomes are shaped by policy choices, employer decisions and workforce support systems rather than technology alone. Brookings highlights the importance of early intelligence, workforce transition support, retraining, employer accountability, career mobility and targeted interventions for workers most exposed to change. This aligns closely with the Taskforce's focus on the Early Action System, influencing employer behaviour through the London Future Ready Guarantee, and creating new pathways into work for young people and those most vulnerable to disruption. It also reinforces the report's underlying argument that governments should not simply respond to labour market impacts after the fact, but should actively shape how technological change affects workers and opportunities.
3. **UK AI Compass – Diffusion.** A large public attitudes study based on a survey of nearly 3,000 UK adults and focus groups exploring how the public views AI, who they think benefits from it, and what forms of governance and oversight they want.
 - a. **High-level findings.** The research finds that concern about AI significantly outweighs excitement, with most people believing the benefits of AI will primarily accrue to large technology companies and wealthy individuals rather than ordinary citizens. The public is not anti-AI, but wants stronger safeguards, accountability, regulation, transparency and a greater say in how AI is implemented. These findings closely align with the Taskforce's emphasis on agency, trust, accountability and public legitimacy. They also reinforce the importance of combining innovation with visible protections and public benefit if London wants widespread support for AI adoption

4. **The Messy Middle – Molly Kinder.** A labour market analysis arguing that the future of AI and work is unlikely to be either mass unemployment or business as usual. Instead, most workers will experience a prolonged period of changing tasks, changing skills requirements, redesigned jobs and shifting career pathways
 - a. **High-level findings.** The biggest impacts of AI are likely to occur within jobs rather than through the disappearance of entire occupations. Employer choices about how AI is deployed will be at least as important as the technology itself, meaning outcomes are not predetermined. The paper argues for a focus on job quality, progression, work redesign and worker agency during periods of transition, which closely aligns with the report's overall framing of moving from adaptation to agency and its emphasis on shaping labour market change rather than simply responding to it.
5. **Pro-worker AI – MIT Sloan.** A framework for deploying AI in ways that complement workers rather than replace them. It focuses on how organisations adopt AI and what "good AI adoption" looks like in practice.
 - a. **High-level findings.** The paper argues that AI adoption is fundamentally a management and organisational choice, not a technological inevitability. Organisations can use AI to augment worker capability, improve productivity and create better jobs, or they can use it to narrow roles and reduce opportunity. The strongest outcomes come when organisations redesign jobs, involve workers in implementation, invest in workforce capability and share the gains from productivity improvements. This provides one of the clearest available definitions of "good AI adoption" and directly supports the rationale for the London Future Ready Guarantee, especially given feedback asking how employer behaviour can be influenced and what participating employers would actually do differently.
6. **AI and Young Graduates: Some Worrying Patterns – Tera Allas.** An examination of emerging evidence on how AI may be affecting graduate recruitment, junior professional roles and early-career development.
 - a. **High-level findings.** The analysis suggests that graduate and entry-level roles may face disproportionate disruption because AI is increasingly capable of performing many of the routine research, drafting and information-processing tasks that have traditionally formed the foundation of early-career learning. The risk is not simply fewer jobs but weaker career ladders, fewer opportunities to build judgement and experience, and reduced access to professional progression. This directly reinforces one of the report's most distinctive arguments: that AI may affect pathways into work before it affects overall employment levels, making it particularly relevant to the focus on young people, gateway roles, new pathways into work and the Human Skills Accelerator.
7. **AI and the UK Labour Market: The Evidence So Far – Centre for British Progress.** A review of UK labour market evidence examining whether AI has yet had measurable impacts on jobs, wages and occupational change, drawing on ONS employment data, adoption data and occupation-level analysis.
 - a. **High-level findings.** The report finds little evidence that AI has replaced jobs at scale in the UK to date, despite rapid technological progress and growing adoption. Instead, AI use appears concentrated in a relatively small number of tasks and is often being used to augment rather than replace workers. At the same time, significant variation exists between occupations, with some administrative and clerical roles showing signs of decline while many highly exposed professional occupations continue to grow. This supports the Taskforce's argument that the immediate challenge is not mass unemployment but changing tasks, skills requirements and career pathways, particularly for entry-level and administrative work. It also reinforces the need for ongoing monitoring and early intervention rather than assuming either displacement or safety
8. **What the AI 'Jobpocalypse' Narrative Misses – Financial Times.** A Financial Times analysis challenging simplistic narratives that AI will immediately trigger mass unemployment and arguing that technological impacts depend on economic, organisational and social factors as much as technical capability. (Listed in the Taskforce source pack.

- a. **High-level findings.** The article argues that whether AI can perform a task is only a small part of understanding its labour market impact. Adoption, regulation, organisational redesign, consumer demand and wider economic change all influence whether jobs shrink, expand or evolve. This strongly supports the report's central premise that labour-market outcomes are not predetermined and that employer behaviour, public policy and institutional choices will shape the transition. It also provides support for the Early Action System and London Future Ready Guarantee by reinforcing the need to monitor real-world change rather than relying solely on exposure estimates
9. **Predicting AI Job Exposure - Benedict Evans.** An essay arguing that attempts to predict exactly which occupations are most exposed to AI are often misleading because jobs, industries and business models change in complex and unpredictable ways during technological transitions.
 - a. **High-level findings.** Author argues that exposure scores can only tell part of the story because technological change does not simply automate existing tasks. New technologies often reshape demand, create new forms of work, transform business models and alter occupations in ways that are difficult to predict in advance. Historical examples such as accounting, journalism and the taxi industry demonstrate that the effects of technology can be indirect and surprising. This provides a useful caution against over-interpreting AI exposure metrics and supports the report's emphasis on observing real-world labour-market signals, monitoring transitions as they emerge and remaining flexible about how policy responds to change.

Appendix

During its intensive evidence-gathering phase, the GLA and the AI and Jobs Taskforce engaged with 182 people representing 144 organisations across business, civil society, education and government. Their experience and expertise made an important contribution to the Taskforce's understanding of how AI is changing work across London. We are very grateful to everyone who gave their time and shared their insights. A list of the organisations and groups engaged is set out below.

Engagement	Organisation
London Business Forum	BusinessLDN
	London & Partners
	CBI
	LCCI
	British Beauty Council
	NWEC
	Nighttime Industries Association
	Association of Town Centre Management
	British Beer and Pub Association
	Camden Town Unlimited
	HOLBA
Business LDN AI Taskforce Steering Committee Roundtable	JLL
	NatWest
	Deloitte
	WSP
	Sky
	BusinessLDN
Barclays Roundtable	Barclays
Culture-focused Stakeholder Roundtable	Creative Rights in AI Coalition
	Creative PEC
	Equity
	UK Music
	BECTU
	DACS
	Musicians' Union
	Society of Authors
	ISM
	Association of Photographers
Creative Talent Sector Board	Framestore
	UKFT
	Mayamada
	ScreenSkills

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	Bauer Media
	Film London
	Bloomberg Associates
Mayor's Cultural Leadership Board	Erskine Analysis
	Theatre Green Book
	NHS Northeast
	English National Ballet
	SXSW London
	Google
	Historic England
	VARA Metrics
	Arts Council England
	The Creative Content Exchange
	British Fashion Council
	Outland
	Notion Capital
Transport AI Roundtable	Go Ahead
	Stagecoach
	First Bus
	Road Haulage Association
	Logistics UK
	Uber
	FreeNow
	Addison Lee
	Human Forest
	ASLEF
	GMB
	Unite
	LTDA
GLA/NLA Built Environment Stakeholders Roundtable	Ballymore
	Buro Happold
	Stace
	C40
	Landsec
	Aktins Réalis
	Zaha Hadid
	British Land
	Stantec
	Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI)
	Multiplex

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	NLA
Infrastructure M Group Interview	M Group
Youth Sector Roundtable	King's Trust
	Mayor's Fund for London
	AND Digital
	Careers & Enterprise Company
	Youth Futures Foundation
	Partnership for Young London
	National Education Union
	Central London Careers Hub
	London Youth
	London Borough of Merton
	London Active Communities
FE/HE and Training Providers Roundtable	AELP
	UCL
	AoC
	London Higher
	Newham College
	HOLEX
	Westminster Adult Education
	London City IoT
	HRUC
	New City College
	Brunel University London
	City Lit
	King's College London
	ADA College
	Capital City College
London Boroughs and SRPs Meeting	London Councils
	WLA
	SLP
	LB Barnet
	LB Lambeth
	Local London
	LB Croydon
	LB Ealing
	Central London Forward
National Government - DSIT	DSIT
ITDG Focus Group	NHS England (London)
Mayoral EDI Advisory Group Roundtable	C40 Cities
	Action on Disability

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	HEAR Network
	London Gypsies & Travellers
	Inclusion London
	Publica
	South Asian Heritage Trust
	Holocaust Memorial Day Trust
	London Age Friendly Forum
DWB and Equalities Stakeholders Roundtable	Hillingdon Autistic Care
	CAST
	Citizens Advice Haringey
	Policy in Practice
	2020 Levels
	BDA
	Ada Lovelace Institute
	Age UK
	Belina Grow
	Trust for London
	Tech for Disability
	Fawcett Society
	Disability Rights UK
	Streets of Growth
	Wise Age
Heads of London Libraries - AI Taskforce Engagement	Brent Council
	Hammersmith & Fulham Council
	Southwark Council
	Camden Council
	Newham Council
Meta	Meta
Anthropic	Anthropic
Wayve	Wayve
Youth Voice Roundtable	20 Young Londoners aged 18-24

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