

Oversight of Met police culture: Is MOPAC driving the necessary change?


Police and Crime Committee

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LONDONASSEMBLY

Police and Crime Committee



The London Assembly Police and Crime Committee examines the work of the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) and investigates issues relating to policing and crime reduction in London.

This investigation was carried out by the Police and Crime Committee in 2025-26, with Marina Ahmad AM as Chair, and the Assembly Members listed above.

Contact us

Janette Roker

Senior Policy Adviser
Janette.Roker@london.gov.uk

Anthony Smyth

External Communications Officer
Anthony.Smyth@london.gov.uk

Lauren Harvey

Principal Committee Manager
Lauren.Harvey@london.gov.uk

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Foreword



Marina Ahmad AM
Chair of the Police and Crime Committee 2025-26

The Metropolitan Police Service is one of the most scrutinised public institutions in the world. Since Baroness Casey's landmark review in 2023 exposed deep failures of culture, leadership and accountability within the Met, Londoners have rightly expected that those responsible for overseeing the Met's reform would rise to meet that challenge.

This Committee's investigation asked a straightforward question: is MOPAC doing enough to drive and scrutinise culture change in the Met? What we found was a picture of genuine progress alongside gaps that are acknowledged by MOPAC.

Since Casey, MOPAC has taken a more active role in holding the Met to account. New governance structures have been established, more data is publicly available, and there is greater transparency around how the Met is performing and how cultural reform is being monitored. The London Policing Board has brought greater public visibility to that oversight, and MOPAC has placed increased emphasis on specific areas of concern, including violence against women and girls, children's safeguarding, and the Met's delivery of its Race Action Plan.

The challenge now is to ensure these structures deliver demonstrable impact. The evidence we heard, from community monitoring groups, staff associations, and independent experts, pointed to a consistent gap between the oversight mechanisms that exist and the experience of those who encounter policing on the ground. Culture change in the Met takes time, and I recognise the scale of what is being asked of both the Met and those who oversee it.

The recommendations in this report are offered in the spirit of making oversight of the Met more visible, more connected to communities, and more effective at the pace that Londoners deserve.

This investigation took place with the knowledge that the Fairfield Review is presently underway to consider how Casey has been implemented as a whole. We hope that our information and recommendations will add value to the Review.

Executive Summary

In March 2023, Baroness Casey published her independent review into the Metropolitan Police Service's (the Met's) standards of behaviour and internal culture. Baroness Casey delivered a hard-hitting diagnosis of a police service facing deep-rooted cultural issues, a broken misconduct system, failing vetting and standards, poor accountability, and a culture of denial.¹

Baroness Casey was also clear that the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), the body that holds the Met to account on behalf of Londoners, had not been strong enough to detect or prevent the cultural problems that had taken root. She described governance and scrutiny arrangements as "relatively weak",² with the Met often keeping MOPAC at arm's length and failing to share information in a timely or transparent way.³ The Review concluded that the relationship required a reset, with a need for "more robust and strategic oversight, based on support, challenge and mutual respect for their respective roles".⁴

Three years on from Baroness Casey's assessment, and given the importance of MOPAC's role in overseeing the Met, the Committee set out to examine whether MOPAC is now providing the level of scrutiny and leadership needed to drive meaningful cultural reform within the Met.

Since the Casey Review, MOPAC has taken steps to strengthen its oversight. New governance arrangements, including the London Policing Board, have increased transparency and brought greater external expertise into the system. MOPAC has also expanded its performance frameworks and oversight activity, placing more emphasis on strategic scrutiny.

However, despite these developments, the impact of this oversight is not yet clear. The Committee consistently heard that while activity has increased, it is difficult to demonstrate how far this has led to tangible cultural change within the Met. Oversight risks becoming focused on process – meetings, data and governance structures – rather than outcomes.

More broadly, the lack of clear and agreed measures of cultural change remains a fundamental gap. Without defined indicators, it is difficult for MOPAC – or Londoners – to judge whether reform is genuinely taking hold.

The Committee heard that MOPAC's oversight is also constrained by dependence and proximity. This creates an imbalance that limits its ability to independently verify progress, identify emerging risks, or challenge institutional narratives effectively. The Committee heard

¹ Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023, p. 24

² Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023, p. 15

³ Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023, p. 16

⁴ Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023, p. 16

concerns that MOPAC and the Met can appear too closely aligned, potentially weakening the level of scrutiny required, particularly on sensitive issues such as culture, misconduct and discrimination. Effective oversight depends not only on formal powers, but on visible independence and a willingness to challenge. Where this is not evident, public confidence may be undermined.

The London Policing Board is the most visible reform to MOPAC's oversight arrangements. It was set up to increase transparency and bring discussions about policing into the public domain. However, its overall effectiveness remains uncertain. While it provides a forum for scrutiny and advice, the Committee found limited evidence of how it has directly influenced decision-making or driven change within the Met. Concerns were also raised about whether the Board delivers sufficiently robust challenge and whether its independence from the Mayor is clear. As it matures, the Board will need to demonstrate more clearly the difference it is making.

Cultural change in the Met cannot be assessed solely through engagement with its senior leaders. The Committee found that MOPAC needs to strengthen how it listens to, and acts on, the experiences of frontline police officers and staff. While engagement is taking place, it is not always clear how this insight influences oversight decisions or leads to change. Independent staff voices, particularly those raising concerns about discrimination or misconduct, are not yet embedded in a systematic or visible way.

MOPAC engages widely and gathers significant amounts of data on public confidence, but there is also limited evidence of how this insight shapes priorities or drives reform. Community groups highlighted inconsistent engagement and a lack of feedback on how MOPAC acts upon their concerns.

Overall, MOPAC's oversight of the Met is improving, but it is not yet strong enough to ensure the depth and pace of cultural change required. For oversight to be effective, it must be independent, outcome-focused and capable of driving change when progress stalls.

The next phase of MOPAC's oversight of cultural reform will require it to move beyond strengthening structures and processes, towards demonstrating impact. This means being clearer about what success looks like, more transparent about where progress is falling short, and more assertive in holding the Met to account.

Ultimately, restoring trust and confidence in policing depends not only on the Met changing, but on Londoners being able to see that change happen – and to have trust in the system that holds it to account.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1

MOPAC's work to develop clear, measurable indicators of cultural reform needs to be completed within 12 months.

MOPAC should work with the Met to develop and publish a clear framework for measuring positive culture change within the Met, including BCU-level data on misconduct, grievances, disproportionality and promotion.

Recommendation 2

MOPAC should be more robust in visibly demonstrating the consequences and the action it takes when the Met fails to meet expected standards.

Recommendation 3

The London Policing Board should publish an annual review to demonstrate to Londoners how its oversight has influenced and supported the Met's cultural reform.⁵

Recommendation 4

MOPAC should publish the London Policing Board one year review in full and set out what action will be taken as a result of the findings by the end of September 2026.

Recommendation 5

Within the next 12 months, MOPAC should establish a structured programme for engaging with staff associations, with clear and transparent processes for how insights from this engagement are reported to senior leaders in the Met.

To support this programme, MOPAC should publish an outcomes framework that clearly demonstrates how insight from officers and staff across the Met is used to inform its oversight, scrutiny, challenge and assessment of cultural change. This should include transparent "you said, we did" information showing how MOPAC has used staff feedback to challenge senior leaders in the Met.

Recommendation 6

MOPAC should clearly set out how community-led scrutiny and insight is shaping oversight of the Met's cultural reform. This should include accessible mechanisms to capture, and escalate, community feedback across London, with regular "you said, we did" updates, and a

⁵ Susan Hall AM and Emma Best AM (City Hall Conservatives) are of the view that the Mayor should go further and establish formal performance expectations for the London Policing Board, with a view to it being dissolved if these are not met. This builds on the London Assembly's November 2025 motion, which passed with ten votes to eight, calling for the London Policing Board to be disbanded outright.

requirement for the Met to respond to community-driven recommendations, explaining how they have been acted on or why they have been rejected.

Recommendation 7

In the next 12 months, MOPAC should publish a clear strategy for improving trust and confidence in policing among LGBTQ+ and disabled Londoners, setting out how community insight from these groups will inform its oversight of the Met's cultural reform.

Recommendation 8

MOPAC should strengthen the effectiveness of community-led scrutiny by expanding access to information and improving transparency. This should include enabling Community Monitoring Groups to select body-worn video samples by category, rather than relying solely on random sampling, and being provided with written explanations where concerns raised through scrutiny, including red-rated stop and search findings, are not upheld or acted upon.

Introduction

In March 2023, Baroness Casey published her independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service (the Met/MPS), setting out a stark assessment of an organisation facing deep-rooted, unhealthy and systemic-problems.⁶

Few moments have shaken the Met as profoundly as Baroness Casey's review. Her findings cut to the core of the organisation. It exposed patterns of racism, sexism, and homophobia that had taken root over decades and a tendency to downplay wrongdoing or dismiss serious issues as "banter".⁷ The review described the Met as an organisation characterised by "hubris", "defensiveness and denial", where criticism was routinely rejected, lessons were not learned, and resistance to change allowed discrimination and misconduct to persist.⁸ Baroness Casey also highlighted entrenched elitism, a disconnect between leadership and frontline officers, and a pervasive "we know best" attitude that shut out external challenge.⁹

Baroness Casey concluded that these issues amounted to institutional, systemic cultural failings that shaped "the way things are done" across the Met, undermining accountability, public trust and the principle of policing by consent.¹⁰

It was a diagnosis that demanded not just acknowledgement but transformation — an overhaul of culture, leadership and everyday practice if the Met was to regain the trust of the city it serves. The Met accepted the substance of Casey's assessment, recognising the depth of the challenge ahead. Yet Commissioner Sir Mark Rowley resisted the term "institutional".¹¹

*"The Metropolitan Police Service is pivotal to the credibility and delivery of anti-racism and culture reform across policing. Its size, national role, and symbolic importance mean that London's oversight arrangements have implications far beyond the capital."*¹²

Abimbola Johnson, Chair, Independent Scrutiny & Oversight Board

⁶ Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023

⁷ Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023, p. 14

⁸ Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023, p. 13

⁹ Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023, p. 13

¹⁰ Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023, p. 13

¹¹ The Guardian, [Louise Casey accuses Met police chief of 'hollow' reasoning on failings](#), 22 March 2023

¹² Abimbola Johnson – written evidence, p.5

The Casey Review was explicit that MOPAC had not been able to provide the level of strategic oversight the Met required.¹³ Governance and scrutiny arrangements were described as “relatively weak”,¹⁴ with the Met often keeping MOPAC at arm’s length and failing to share information in a timely or transparent way.¹⁵ As a result, MOPAC’s scrutiny and governance tended to be less strategic and more tactical.¹⁶ The Review concluded that the Commissioner should “draw a line under past dysfunction in the relationship between the Met and MOPAC, taking the opportunity to reset and better integrate”.¹⁷

MOPAC’s oversight role – the background

The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 established a national model of democratic oversight for policing in England and Wales, requiring each police force area to have a directly elected individual responsible for setting policing priorities and holding the police service to account.¹⁸ In most areas, this role is fulfilled by a Police and Crime Commissioner, while in combined authority areas it is undertaken by a directly elected mayor. Police and Crime Commissioners provide political leadership and strategic direction for policing, while operational decisions remain the responsibility of chief constables.¹⁹

In London, these responsibilities sit with the Mayor. The Mayor sets the strategic priorities for policing and community safety in London, agrees the policing budget and holds the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to account for delivering an effective and professional service. The Mayor discharges these functions through MOPAC, supported by the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime.²⁰ However, the Mayor remains the legal occupant of the Police and Crime Commissioner role and is ultimately accountable for the exercise of all Police and Crime Commissioner functions in the capital.

Progress made since the Casey Review

Since the publication of the Casey Review, MOPAC has adopted a more proactive approach to holding the Met to account, placing greater emphasis on transparency and structured oversight. New governance arrangements have been introduced, most notably the London Policing

¹³ Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023, p. 16

¹⁴ Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023, p. 15

¹⁵ Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023, p. 16

¹⁶ Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023, p. 16

¹⁷ Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023, p. 233

¹⁸ [Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011](#)

¹⁹ House of Commons Library, [Police and crime commissioners](#), December 2025

²⁰ MOPAC, [About the Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime \(MOPAC\)](#)

Board,²¹ alongside an expanded performance framework intended to provide clearer data and more accessible public reporting.²² MOPAC has also increased its focus on areas of persistent concern within the Met, including violence against women and girls, children’s safeguarding, public protection and delivery of the Met’s race action plan.

In response to the seriousness of Baroness Casey’s findings, the Met committed to a programme of reform under A New Met for London, setting out plans to refresh and embed new organisational values, address cultural challenges, and establish a clearer vision for the standards and behaviours expected across the service.²³

Baroness Casey recommended that the Met and the Mayor commission independent reviews of the Met’s progress after two years, and again after five years, to provide Londoners with assurance that meaningful cultural reform is being delivered.²⁴ In December 2025, the Met and the Mayor announced the appointment of Dr Gillian Fairfield to undertake the first of these independent assessments.²⁵ ²⁶ In February, MOPAC told us that the Fairfield Review would also examine MOPAC’s oversight of the Met and the nature of their relationship.²⁷ The Committee welcomes this commitment and looks forward to the Review’s findings.

The Fairfield Independent Review will form a key test of whether the Met has begun to address the cultural and organisational failings identified by Baroness Casey, and whether MOPAC’s current oversight arrangements are capable of driving sustained and measurable change. The Committee expects MOPAC and the Met to publish the Review’s findings in a timely manner, given the importance of transparency and the central role this work will play in strengthening oversight and accountability.

Given the importance of MOPAC’s role in overseeing delivery against the Met’s commitments to reform, in this investigation we set out to examine both how MOPAC’s oversight arrangements are operating in practice, and the extent to which they are strengthening strategic scrutiny and supporting the cultural and organisational reform the Met requires. The Committee trusts that the findings from this investigation will provide a valuable contribution to the Fairfield Independent Review. By examining MOPAC’s oversight of cultural change in detail, the Committee hopes that this report will support the Fairfield team in building a comprehensive picture of what is working, where challenges remain, and how oversight and accountability can be strengthened.

Throughout this investigation we have heard that despite developments, the demonstrable impact of MOPAC’s oversight on the Met’s cultural reform remains difficult to see ([chapter 2](#)).

²¹ Mayor of London, [London Policing Board](#), [accessed April 2026]

²² MOPAC, [Evidence & Insight](#), [accessed April 2026]

²³ MPS, [A New Met for London](#), [accessed April 2026]

²⁴ Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023, p. 24

²⁵ Mayor of London, [Mayor of London and Metropolitan Police Commissioner announce details of follow-up progress review following Baroness Casey Report](#), 17 December 2025

²⁶ [Fairfield Independent Review](#), [accessed April 2026]

²⁷ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p. 2

Evidence to the Committee showed that the London Policing Board, the most visible change to MOPAC's oversight structures, could do more to demonstrate the impact it is having ([chapter 3](#)). The Committee also heard that there is scope for MOPAC to strengthen its oversight through better engagement with officers and staff across the Met ([chapter 4](#)) and be clearer in how London's communities help shape decisions and contribute to MOPAC's oversight of the Met's cultural change ([chapter 5](#)).

"MOPAC and the London Policing Board do not exist solely to interrogate the Metropolitan Police on systemic racism, nor should they. However, when assessing whether oversight is effective the most reliable indicator of institutional health is the gap between what an organisation says it stands for and what people actually experience on the ground."²⁸

Dr Shereen Daniels, Managing Director, HR rewired

²⁸ Dr Shereen Daniels – written evidence, p.12

MOPAC's oversight

MOPAC's oversight role

MOPAC oversees the Met through a wide range of statutory and discretionary mechanisms designed to provide strategic direction, monitor performance and ensure public accountability. Its core responsibilities include setting out the strategic priorities for policing in the Mayor's Police and Crime Plan²⁹ and assessing the Met's progress against these priorities. MOPAC also has the power to commission inspections by His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) where concerns arise, and it facilitates a number of external scrutiny arrangements,³⁰ including independent panels and the London Policing Board (see [chapter 3](#)),³¹ established following the Casey Review.

*"There is no shortage of oversight mechanisms in London [...] London's current oversight arrangements demonstrate commitment, structure and intent. However, cultural transformation requires more than oversight activity; it requires enforceable accountability, demonstrable independence and outcome-focused scrutiny."*³²

Andy George, President, National Black Police Association

Alongside these formal structures, MOPAC publishes performance data and dashboards to ensure transparency,³³ undertakes regular public attitude surveys³⁴ to gauge Londoners' confidence in the Met, and maintains routine engagement with the Commissioner and senior leadership through scheduled oversight meetings.³⁵ Its internal audit functions provide an additional layer of assurance on governance, risk, and control within the Met. Together, these mechanisms form the framework through which MOPAC seeks to hold the Met to account and monitor progress on cultural and organisational reform.

MOPAC's oversight in practice

MOPAC's oversight mechanisms provide a broad framework for scrutiny, with several elements representing clear strengths. The Mayor's Police and Crime Plan,³⁶ and associated performance

²⁹ Mayor of London, [The Mayor's Police and Crime Plan 2025-29](#), March 2025

³⁰ MOPAC, [MOPAC governance and decision making](#), [accessed April 2026]

³¹ Mayor of London, [London Policing Board](#), [accessed April 2026]

³² Andy George – written evidence, p.6 and p.10

³³ MOPAC, [Evidence & Insight](#), [accessed April 2026]

³⁴ MOPAC, [Taking part in MOPAC's surveys](#), [accessed April 2026]

³⁵ MOPAC, [Mayor-Commissioner meeting](#), [accessed April 2026]

³⁶ Mayor of London, [The Mayor's Police and Crime Plan 2025-29](#), March 2025

framework, give MOPAC a statutory basis for setting expectations and monitoring delivery, while the publication of dashboards³⁷ and survey data have improved transparency for Londoners. MOPAC's ability to commission HMICFRS inspections offers an important route for independent challenge, and the establishment of the London Policing Board (LPB) and external scrutiny panels have expanded opportunities for expert and community input.

The Committee heard that, through MOPAC and other mechanisms, the Met is "probably one of the most scrutinised organisations in the world" and there is no "lack of scrutiny and oversight".³⁸ When asked about what has been the most impactful change MOPAC has made to the way it oversees cultural reform in the Met since the Casey Review, the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime (DMPC) told the Committee that it is now "less tactical and more strategic" and has "moved from having fewer tactical one-to-one meetings with Assistant Commissioners (ACs) to deeper dives in thematic areas".³⁹

Panellists suggested that MOPAC's oversight also has limitations. In written evidence provided to the Committee Abimbola Johnson, Independent Scrutiny & Oversight Board (ISOB), told the Committee that MOPAC's oversight is "not yet strong enough" to drive or guarantee the depth and pace of cultural change required within the Met.⁴⁰ Andy George, National Black Police Association (NBPA), told the Committee that the persistent challenges that continue to surface, including ongoing issues around misconduct disproportionality, inspection findings and low workforce confidence, indicate that the current approach is not strong enough to drive change or deliver the necessary shift.⁴¹

*"Oversight is not attendance at meetings, receipt of updates, or the existence of a board. Effective oversight is structured, independent, outcome-driven, and willing to escalate when progress stalls."*⁴²

Abimbola Johnson, Chair, Independent Scrutiny & Oversight Board

Despite the volume of information MOPAC now publishes, concerns remain about whether the data meaningfully reflects cultural change within the Met. David Spencer, Policy Exchange, noted that while data is plentiful, it is far less clear how easily it can be navigated or how effectively it is being synthesised and interpreted to assess whether cultural reform is genuinely taking hold.⁴³ Much of the performance data published by MOPAC remains high-level and does not always capture the cultural indicators highlighted by Baroness Casey. David Spencer added:

³⁷ MOPAC, [Police and Crime Plan Dashboard](#), [accessed April 2026]

³⁸ Chief Constable Gavin Stephens, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.7

³⁹ DMPC, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.2

⁴⁰ Abimbola Johnson – written evidence, p.2

⁴¹ Andy George – written evidence, p.6

⁴² Abimbola Johnson – written evidence, p.2

⁴³ David Spencer, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.16

“It is not about the collection, it is about knowing what is there and the assessment and analysis of it”.⁴⁴

The transparency and robustness of oversight are further constrained by a significant asymmetry of information between the Met and MOPAC.⁴⁵ Because MOPAC is largely dependent on data and narratives provided – and framed – by the Met itself, its ability to offer genuinely independent scrutiny is limited. Andy George, NBPA, told the Committee:

“MOPAC is largely reliant on information generated and framed by the MPS. This dependency can constrain the depth of challenge and make it more difficult to identify emerging cultural risks before they become systemic issues. Where scrutiny relies heavily on internal reporting, oversight can drift towards assurance rather than independent verification.”⁴⁶

This imbalance risks turning oversight into a process of reassurance rather than rigorous verification.

“The MPS would not be alone in being a public body trying to put forward a positive view – some might say spin – on the work it has done.”⁴⁷

David Spencer, Head of Crime and Justice, Policy Exchange

Moreover, MOPAC’s reliance on the Met for information limits its ability to test the accuracy and completeness of the data it receives. For example, Abimbola Johnson, IOSB, highlighted concerns about the transparency of the Met’s stop and search pilot launched in June 2023. She said that the pilot was presented to the community with “clear commitments to interim analysis, community sharing and publication on completion”.⁴⁸ She added:

“These commitments were not met. Data was not shared until well after the pilot concluded, and meaningful engagement did not follow. MOPAC staff also appeared to lack access to more detailed information. The full evaluation was only published in October 2025.”⁴⁹

This makes it difficult to assess whether the deeper behavioural and cultural shifts required within the Met are actually taking place, and limits MOPAC’s ability to track progress in a meaningful or measurable way.

⁴⁴ David Spencer, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.16

⁴⁵ Andy George – written evidence, p.7

⁴⁶ Andy George – written evidence, p.7

⁴⁷ David Spencer, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.21

⁴⁸ Abimbola Johnson – written evidence, p.4

⁴⁹ Abimbola Johnson – written evidence, p.4

It was suggested to the Committee that the Met's current approach to cultural reform lacks the transparency and independent scrutiny needed to demonstrate real progress. Abimbola Johnson, IOSB, told the Committee that "accountability loops often remain open or controlled by the Met, making outcomes difficult to track".⁵⁰ Andy George, NBPA, added that the Met's:

*"cultural reform continues to rely heavily on self-reporting, internal assurance processes and compliance based performance metrics. While strategies, action plans and training programmes are necessary components of reform, they do not in themselves evidence meaningful cultural change."*⁵¹

While MOPAC has attempted to provide test and challenge, Diane Vincent, Metropolitan Black Police Association (MetBPA), told the Committee that cultural reform is not being tracked through a clear or transparent process, nor is it supported by a consistent set of performance indicators.⁵² Similarly, Kenny Bowie, MOPAC, added that the Met "does not currently have the metrics which we, the LPB and the MPS itself wants to develop in that space".⁵³

Measuring culture is inherently more complex than assessing crime outcomes or operational performance, as cultural change is less tangible and spans multiple dimensions of organisational behaviour. Without defined measures, it is difficult to assess progress or hold the Met to account for delivering the transformation it has committed to. The Committee was told that the Met does not yet have the cultural metrics that both MOPAC and the LPB consider necessary for effective oversight.⁵⁴ MOPAC explained that developing these measures is now a priority for the Met's Culture, Diversity and Inclusion Directorate.⁵⁵

More broadly, it was suggested that accountability for the Met's performance remains weak. The Committee was told that there are no meaningful consequences for failure, and this lack of enforceable accountability undermines both the credibility of oversight and the likelihood of sustained cultural change. David Spencer, Policy Exchange, suggested that there has been insufficient consequence for failures relating to resourcing, human resources or vetting – he added that, "given what we have seen over the last ten years in those areas, it should be inconceivable that the senior leaders who are responsible for those areas are still in post".⁵⁶ Abimbola Johnson, IOSB, reported that "Forces can disengage from reform with limited repercussions. Without consequences, oversight becomes advisory rather than authoritative in London, this risks reform fatigue."⁵⁷

⁵⁰ Abimbola Johnson – written evidence, p.4

⁵¹ Andy George – written evidence, p.6

⁵² Diane Vincent, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.1

⁵³ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.30

⁵⁴ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.30

⁵⁵ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.30

⁵⁶ David Spencer, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.3

⁵⁷ Abimbola Johnson – written evidence, p.3

“Culture change in policing fails not due to a lack of meetings, but due to insufficient clarity, consequence, and coordination. London has an opportunity to model what effective oversight can be. This requires moving from observation to integration, and from integration to demonstrable influence. Without this, reform risks remaining fragmented and performative rather than genuinely transformative.”⁵⁸

Abimbola Johnson, Chair, Independent Scrutiny & Oversight Board

Kenny Bowie acknowledged that MOPAC had not previously created dedicated structures for focused discussion on positive culture.⁵⁹ To address this, MOPAC now holds a monthly oversight analysis meeting where data and insights from across crime, finance and culture are brought together and reviewed. The findings are then escalated to a senior oversight coordination meeting which considers how this analysis should inform MOPAC’s next steps and drive its oversight work forward.⁶⁰

The Committee believes this introduces a more structured and systematic approach to discussing culture within MOPAC’s oversight work, and welcomes this development. These new arrangements provide a clearer framework for identifying trends, comparing progress over time, and deciding how to act on emerging issues, and will strengthen MOPAC’s ability to understand cultural dynamics within the Met and to translate that understanding into targeted oversight activity.

Oversight of misconduct

MOPAC told the Committee that its oversight of culture, particularly in how the Met’s Professional Standards Directorate deals with conduct and misconduct, is “very strong”.⁶¹ Kenny Bowie explained that MOPAC has a complaints review team that is able to identify thematic issues and feed them back to the Met. This has led to a number of policy changes in the Met, and has resulted in some “very serious allegations of criminality, where investigations had been closed or had not been being pursued, reopened”.⁶² Kenny added that MOPAC has also been collaborating with the Met to examine disproportionality in misconduct, holding weekly meetings to review high-profile individual cases, identify recurring themes, and ensure those insights are fed back into recruitment learning.⁶³

However, the Committee heard that Met-wide averages “mask disparities”.⁶⁴ Diane Vincent, MetBPA, said that robust Basic Command Unit (BCU) level data is needed and essential to

⁵⁸ Abimbola Johnson – written evidence, p.5

⁵⁹ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.27

⁶⁰ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.27

⁶¹ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.5

⁶² Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.5

⁶³ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.5

⁶⁴ Diane Vincent, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.1

“identify hot spots of harm and track progress over time”.⁶⁵ She added that the Met “routinely applies sophisticated victim-offender location analysis to external policing. The same approach should be applied internally when it comes to misconduct, disproportionality, promotion, and vetting”.⁶⁶

In January 2026, the LPB looked at how the Met is intensifying its work on culture change. The Met reported that it has “undertaken this work at pace” and that it still needs to “further articulate success measures” for some of its cultural change work.⁶⁷ The Met explained that part of this work is the creation of the “innovative” Culture, Standards and Integrity Ecosystem (CSIE).⁶⁸ It added that the CSIE is “accelerating” its aim to embed a public health approach to preventing complaints, corruption and misconduct, and will create a “data observatory” to “put data into local leaders’ hands that can be used to analyse culture and standards trends, cases and thematic areas locally within Operational Command Units (OCUs)”.⁶⁹

The Committee welcomes the Met’s commitment to strengthening local-level data, particularly through the development of the CSIE and the planned data observatory. These steps have the potential to provide the transparency and insight needed to support meaningful cultural change. The Committee encourages MOPAC to work closely with the Met to prioritise this work and ensure that BCU-level data on misconduct, grievances, disproportionality and progression is developed, published and used consistently across the organisation.

The Met and MOPAC’s relationship

The Committee heard a range of perspectives on how MOPAC’s oversight of the Met could be strengthened. David Spencer, Policy Exchange told the Committee “that there are questions to be asked over whether MOPAC and the Mayor of London have discharged their duties sufficiently to hold the MPS to account when it comes to crime performance”⁷⁰ – and the same question could be asked in relation to culture change. David Spencer said: “I am unsure whether it is the system that is at fault or whether it is those who are operating it at the moment, based on some of the crime types that are heading in the right direction.”⁷¹

Baroness Casey characterised the relationship between the Met and MOPAC as strained, inconsistent and at times dysfunctional.⁷² Her Review highlighted that staff from both organisations reported frustrations that reflected gaps in trust and collaboration. The Met was

⁶⁵ Diane Vincent, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.1

⁶⁶ Diane Vincent, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, pp.1-2

⁶⁷ MPS, [05b - MPS Building a Positive Workforce Culture Paper Final.pdf](#), 27 January 2026, p.1

⁶⁸ The Met’s states that “The CSIE programme consists of the creation of a data observatory, which will deliver an intelligence tool that brings key MPS systems such as, Connect – crime and intelligence system, Centurion – discipline system, PSOP – HR system and CARM – roster and duties system into one space.” MPS, [05b - MPS Building a Positive Workforce Culture Paper Final.pdf](#), 27 January 2026

⁶⁹ MPS, [05b - MPS Building a Positive Workforce Culture Paper Final.pdf](#), 27 January 2026, p.2

⁷⁰ David Spencer, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.4

⁷¹ David Spencer, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.4

⁷² Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023, p. 220

frequently described as defensive or evasive, often invoking “operational independence” to shut down scrutiny.⁷³ At the Committee’s meeting in January 2026, the DMPC agreed and said: “There is a tendency for the MPS to be, at points, defensive.”⁷⁴ She added that this is improving through the work that MOPAC has been doing in its oversight role and that the “LPB has led to greater openness to some of the challenges [MOPAC] puts to it, especially around areas that the LPB brings expertise on, in terms of transformation and finance, and that has been taken on board and led to improvement.”⁷⁵

“Governance arrangements are opaque. Clear roles should be more important than more meetings.”⁷⁶

Abimbola Johnson, Chair, Independent Scrutiny & Oversight Board

While the Deputy Mayor acknowledged that the shift away from a defensive culture is beginning to show results, she acknowledged that continued effort is needed to embed this approach across the Met.⁷⁷ She described this progress as like “turning an oil tanker”, a slow process, but one that is heading in the right direction.⁷⁸

“We have always been open and honest about the fact that the culture of the MPS is literally like turning an oil tanker, and that is work that is slow but is progressing.”⁷⁹

Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime

Evidence presented to the Committee also suggested that the relationship between the Met and MOPAC may be improving. David Spencer, Policy Exchange, noted that the current Commissioner, his leadership team and MOPAC have moved the relationship into a “more productive state of affairs” than in previous years.⁸⁰

However, the Committee also heard concerns about the closeness of that relationship. Diane Vincent, MetBPA, argued that the “proximity of the MPS and MOPAC is too close for comfort” and “too institutionally and personally close or aligned”.⁸¹ She warned that blurred

⁷³ Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023, p. 220

⁷⁴ DMPC, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.15

⁷⁵ DMPC, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.15

⁷⁶ Abimbola Johnson – written evidence, p.3

⁷⁷ DMPC, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.6

⁷⁸ DMPC, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.7

⁷⁹ DMPC, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.7

⁸⁰ David Spencer, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.7

⁸¹ Diane Vincent, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.5

accountability and personal alignment risk softening the challenge required for effective oversight, particularly on issues of culture, discrimination and misconduct.⁸²

“There are times when MOPAC representatives, when they refer to the MPS when they are talking, say “we” and “us”, signalling that there is an alignment, they are close together, rather than any differences for scrutiny. Personal relationships would risk softening the challenge, particularly when it comes to culture, discrimination, and misconduct-related issues.”⁸³

Diane Vincent, Chair, Metropolitan Black Police Association

Andy George, NBPA, also highlighted an issue of “institutional de-confliction”. He told the Committee:

“The co-location of some MOPAC staff within Metropolitan Police premises, alongside frequent informal contact between MOPAC officials and senior MPS leadership, can inadvertently blur the distinction between oversight body and operational service. In some instances, this has manifested in language that frames the Met in terms of “we” and “us”, rather than maintaining a clear separation between those responsible for delivery and those responsible for scrutiny.

Effective oversight depends not only on formal independence but on visible cultural separation. Where the boundary between scrutiniser and scrutinised appears porous, public confidence in the robustness of challenge can be weakened.”⁸⁴

“There should always be a healthy tension between an oversight and an overseen body, should there not? If the overseen body thinks that everything is absolutely fine, it probably means you are not doing your job as an oversight body in terms of holding them [to account]. It is just how you keep that tension healthy.”⁸⁵

Kenny Bowie, Director of Strategy and MPS Oversight, MOPAC

Andy George, NBPA, added that improving transparency, robustness and institutional independence between MOPAC and the Met will require strengthening the structures that separate oversight from operational policing.⁸⁶ He suggested several ways this could be achieved, including creating clearer structural and physical separation of oversight functions, establishing more formalised channels of engagement to reduce reliance on informal influence,

⁸² Diane Vincent, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.5

⁸³ Diane Vincent, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.5

⁸⁴ Andy George – written evidence, p.7

⁸⁵ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.30

⁸⁶ Andy George – written evidence, p.7

explicitly reinforcing MOPAC's constitutional role as an accountability body, and introducing independent data validation and external auditing of the Met's reform claims.⁸⁷ Andy George also concluded that "Where oversight is visibly robust, reform accelerates. Where it is perceived as aligned too closely with delivery, confidence diminishes."⁸⁸

Scrutiny and accountability – 30 Patterns of Harm report

In November 2025, the Met published an independent report by Dr Shereen Daniels into racism in the organisation: [30 Patterns of Harm – A Structural Review of Systemic Racism within the London Metropolitan Police Service](#). The final report, dated July 2025, was commissioned by the Met to "assess the effectiveness and impact of the 'London Race Action Plan', the Met's strategic framework for becoming an anti-racist organisation" and to examine how the Met has "responded to long-standing evidence of racism and discrimination".⁸⁹ In the report, Dr Daniels stated:

"This review was commissioned by the Met. It marked a rare institutional admission: that its aspiration to become an anti-racist organisation was not matched by a clear understanding of the structural nature of the problem it was trying to solve. Despite a flurry of activity – evolved 'race' action plans, revised statements, clearer language, the set up of a dedicated internal team – there was little confidence that these efforts were hitting the mark. The institution was busy, but not grounded and external pressure was demanding more. It required the Met to reinterrogate the very assumptions shaping its view of the problem and I was hired to help them do that."⁹⁰

The Met welcomed the report in full. It said that "it recognises the scale of the challenges it sets out" and that "Tackling racism and discrimination remains a key priority in the New Met for London Plan. Sustainable change means addressing deep-rooted problems, not offering surface-level fixes."⁹¹

The Committee explored concerns raised by Dr Shereen Daniels about the Met Commissioner's ownership of the issues identified in her 30 Patterns of Harm report. In written evidence to the Committee, she described how her evidence rests on three core points. First, even after the Met received a clear diagnosis in July 2025 of how its own behaviours created and sustained racial harm, she told the Committee that it continued to act in ways that reproduced the very harm it claimed to be addressing.⁹² Second, when this occurred, she highlighted that in her experience the oversight and scrutiny mechanisms did not intervene to test, challenge or disrupt those behaviours.⁹³ Instead, she said, they largely accepted the Met's assurances that it was

⁸⁷ Andy George – written evidence, p.7

⁸⁸ Andy George – written evidence, p.11

⁸⁹ MPS, [Metropolitan Police publishes Dr Shereen Daniels' independently commissioned report into racism in the Met](#), 7 November 2025

⁹⁰ Dr Shereen Daniels, [30 Patterns of Harm: A Structural Review of Systemic Racism in the London Metropolitan Police Service](#), 18 July 2025 [published 7 November 2025], p. 10

⁹¹ MPS, [Metropolitan Police publishes Dr Shereen Daniels' independently commissioned report into racism in the Met](#), 7 November 2025

⁹² Dr Shereen Daniels – written evidence, p.13

⁹³ Dr Shereen Daniels – written evidence, p.14

“reflecting” and “working out what this means”, without consistently pressing the essential follow-up question: what has that reflection actually produced.⁹⁴ In addition, she raised concerns about the institutional signal sent by the fact that the Met Commissioner did not meet with her at any point between July 2025 and January 2026, noting what this absence of engagement implied at an organisational level.⁹⁵ She added that the Met has repeatedly described the report as “powerful” and as prompting deep reflection; yet in a command and control organisation, direct engagement from the Commissioner is one of the clearest indicators of organisational priority, permission and seriousness.⁹⁶ She said:

“Where a report is described publicly as significant, but the Commissioner does not engage directly with its author over an extended period of time, it raises a legitimate question about how the findings are being taken up in practice, how they are being interpreted internally, and how much weight they are being given at the most senior level and whether, ultimately, what is said publicly aligns with what is happening behind closed doors.

For oversight bodies, this should have been a point of scrutiny in itself. Not “why has the meeting not happened?”, but what does the absence of that engagement suggest about leadership, sponsorship, ownership, and the likelihood that the report’s findings would translate into changes in leadership behaviour rather than being absorbed as an “oh that’s interesting” moment and carrying on regardless.”⁹⁷

When we raised these points with the DMPC, she acknowledged that while Dr Daniels had been embedded within the Met’s Culture, Diversity and Inclusion unit, there should have been greater opportunities for her to engage directly with senior leaders and teams across the organisation.⁹⁸ The DMPC noted that she and the Deputy Commissioner had since met with Dr Daniels, and that the LPB had recently considered how the work is being taken forward and what leadership responsibilities are required to embed it.⁹⁹ She described the limited engagement as a missed opportunity, but expressed hope that the ongoing work will now be understood as integral to the positive cultural change the Met’s leadership is seeking to deliver.¹⁰⁰ The Committee believes that stronger senior-level ownership will be essential if the findings of the report are to drive meaningful reform.

Recommendation 1

MOPAC’s work to develop clear, measurable indicators of cultural reform needs to be completed within 12 months.

MOPAC should work with the Met to develop and publish a clear framework for measuring

⁹⁴ Dr Shereen Daniels – written evidence, p.14

⁹⁵ Dr Shereen Daniels – written evidence, p.14

⁹⁶ Dr Shereen Daniels – written evidence, p.14

⁹⁷ Dr Shereen Daniels – written evidence, p.14

⁹⁸ DMPC, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.15

⁹⁹ DMPC, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.15

¹⁰⁰ DMPC, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.15

positive culture change within the Met, including BCU-level data on misconduct, grievances, disproportionality, and promotion.

Recommendation 2

MOPAC should be more robust in visibly demonstrating the consequences and the action it takes when the Met fails to meet expected standards.

London Policing Board

Baroness Casey concluded that a new governance structure for the Met was needed – one capable of overseeing and scrutinising the reforms required, ensuring full transparency and accountability to the public, while preserving the Commissioner’s operational independence. She recommended the creation of a new, quarterly Policing Board for London – chaired by the Mayor and modelled on Transport for London – to drive forward the changes called for in her review.¹⁰¹

In response, the Mayor announced the London Policing Board (LPB) in May 2023.¹⁰² The LPB meets in public, and is webcast, four times a year. It is chaired by the Mayor and currently has 15 members that “bring a wide variety of skills, insights and experiences to support the Mayor in providing strong oversight of the Metropolitan Police”.¹⁰³ It is supported by two committees: the Performance and Finance Delivery Committee; and the People and Culture Committee.¹⁰⁴

What impact has the LPB had?

At the Committee’s meeting on 11 February 2026, Kenny Bowie, MOPAC described the LPB as the “most impactful and the most visible change” MOPAC has made since the Baroness Casey Review.¹⁰⁵ He added that it has brought in external expertise, and moved MOPAC’s oversight of the Met into the open.¹⁰⁶

“When you look at the level of external expertise which is brought on board by the [London Policing Board], which is expertise, which, at the price we pay we would not be able to access from MOPAC.”¹⁰⁷

Kenny Bowie, Director of Strategy and Oversight, MOPAC

Increasing public transparency and adding value

The LPB has increased public transparency around how MOPAC oversees the Met, offering Londoners a clearer view of the oversight taking place. Caroline Tredwell, MOPAC, highlighted that there is now “a lot more paperwork, information in the public domain around what the MPS has done on things like stop and search, things like the LRAP [London Race Action Plan],

¹⁰¹ Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [An independent review into the standards of behaviour and internal culture of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), March 2023, p. 24

¹⁰² Mayor of London, [Mayor to establish London Policing Board to oversee and scrutinise reform of the Metropolitan Police Service](#), 23 May 2023

¹⁰³ MOPAC, [The London Policing Board](#), [accessed April 2026]

¹⁰⁴ MOPAC, [The London Policing Board](#), [accessed April 2026]

¹⁰⁵ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.2

¹⁰⁶ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.2

¹⁰⁷ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.19

things that matter to Londoners”.¹⁰⁸ However, she also added that, as part of this, the LPB inevitably creates additional work for the Met, including the preparation of papers and attendance at meetings, though this responsibility is shared across different parts of the organisation rather than falling on the same individuals each time.¹⁰⁹

Despite these improvements in the volume of transparency, the Committee heard concerns about the Board’s overall value. Although the Board has positioned itself as an advisory and oversight body for the Mayor, David Spencer, told the committee that he believes there is still little visible evidence of its credibility or influence:

“One of the questions I would ask is whether the introduction of the LPB in particular has been a successful move or not. Now, the LPB is relatively early in its gestation, it has not been going for that long in reality, and it may be too early to judge. However, the reality is that senior officers need to have sufficient time to prepare for scrutiny, and given we would expect that London’s elected representatives, i.e. all of you, that they would have to appear here, and the fact that they then also have to go to the LPB and have private conversations with MOPAC, the Deputy Mayor [for Policing and Crime], and the Mayor, I wonder whether the addition of the LPB has added anything positive or whether it is just additional complexity that is taking away from senior officers being able to undertake their role effectively.”¹¹⁰

In response to this, Kenny Bowie, MOPAC, said that his view is that the LPB exists to support the Mayor in discharging his statutory duty to hold the Met to account.¹¹¹ He said that the role of the LPB is to provide both challenge and support, acting as a voice for Londoners. In this sense, he added, that the Board should be understood as helping senior Met officers to carry out their responsibilities more effectively – whether through constructive scrutiny or through informed support.¹¹²

Caroline Tredwell, MOPAC, also noted that senior Met leaders have told her they find the process valuable.¹¹³ Those working on areas such as finance and transformation reported that the challenge and advice provided through the LPB had been helpful to their work. She said the Met’s Deputy Commissioner found the Board’s scrutiny of the cultural intensification programme constructive and that it had prompted useful reflection within the Met.¹¹⁴ Caroline also emphasised that the relationship between the Met and the LPB has at times been marked by frustration, with the Board pressing for greater transparency, requesting that information be made public, and pushing the Met to move further and faster on reform.¹¹⁵

¹⁰⁸ Caroline Tredwell, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.22

¹⁰⁹ Caroline Tredwell, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.26

¹¹⁰ David Spencer, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.6

¹¹¹ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.26

¹¹² Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.26

¹¹³ Caroline Tredwell, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.26

¹¹⁴ Caroline Tredwell, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.26

¹¹⁵ Caroline Tredwell, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.22

Impact and effectiveness

The Committee was told that across the Met, MOPAC and the LPB, culture change is often discussed in broad, reassuring terms, with frequent references to values, commitment, learning and progress. In written evidence to the Committee, Abimbola Johnson, IOSB, suggested that while there are examples of robust questioning at LPB meetings from members, the Met, including the Commissioner, can defer or decline to answer without consequence, limiting the effectiveness of this challenge.¹¹⁶ Similarly, Diane Vincent, MetBPA, also raised concerns that the Board meetings themselves tend to be dominated by the Met and by Met-led presentations, with comparatively less challenge from members.¹¹⁷

Panellists raised questions as to whether the LPB is delivering the level of scrutiny and challenge it was created to provide, and about the extent to which it has driven meaningful change or has sufficiently addressed the ongoing concern heard by the Committee that MOPAC's oversight function is too closely aligned with the Met itself.

The LPB's independence

Questions also persist about how representative the LPB is and its independence from the Mayor and MOPAC. David Spencer, Policy Exchange, said that "Maybe that was never the intention of it, and it is just an extension of the Mayor and the Mayor's views, and if that is the case, that may well be what it is doing."¹¹⁸ Nathalie Stewart, pan-London Community Monitoring Network, raised particular concerns in relation to its governance and proximity to the Mayor's Office.¹¹⁹ She told the Committee that the annual allowance of approximately £15,000 received by board members for their participation, has led to a perception amongst some stakeholders that the Board is not sufficiently independent from the Mayor.¹²⁰ She added that while the Board routinely questions the Commissioner, its position within the Mayor's governance structure has led some to argue that it cannot operate with full independence, which has created ongoing uncertainty about the extent to which the Board is able to provide robust and impartial oversight.¹²¹ Although Baroness Casey recommended that the Mayor should chair the Board, Nathalie suggested that the Board should be chaired by an independent figure rather than the Mayor.¹²²

London Policing Board – one year review

An independent one-year-on review of the LPB was completed in May 2025, at a cost of nearly £30,000.¹²³ It was commissioned to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the LPB's performance, effectiveness and alignment with its strategic objectives in its first year of operation. MOPAC told the Committee:

¹¹⁶ Abimbola Johnson – written evidence, p.4

¹¹⁷ Diane Vincent, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.13

¹¹⁸ David Spencer, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.14

¹¹⁹ Nathalie Stewart – written evidence, p.38

¹²⁰ Nathalie Stewart – written evidence, p.38

¹²¹ Nathalie Stewart – written evidence, p.38

¹²² Nathalie Stewart – written evidence, p.38

¹²³ BidStats, [MOPAC London Policing Board One Year Review 2024 \(1083\) – A Contract Award Notice by THE MAYOR'S OFFICE FOR POLICING AND CRIME](#), May 2025

“The findings have been shared obviously with us, with MOPAC, with the Mayor, with LPB members and discussed with them. It has been shared with the MPS and there has been a series of work after receiving the report, firstly to consider it, socialise it, think about the implications of that. Then, secondly, to move into a working mode and work up what next, what do the next steps look like. That work is currently with the Mayor for review, and then we will be implementing those next steps.”¹²⁴

When asked if the review could be shared more widely, the Committee was informed that MOPAC is “going to publish a summary of the key themes, key recommendations from that report, and then what the next steps are on the back of that, and that will be published”.¹²⁵

The Committee understands that the independent review of the LPB was intended to provide a clear assessment of its first year. Nearly a year after its completion, the findings remain unpublished and still under consideration by the Mayor. Although the review has been circulated privately among key stakeholders, the Committee notes that wider publication would support transparency and public confidence in the Board.

Recommendation 3

The London Policing Board should publish an annual review to demonstrate to Londoners how its oversight has influenced and supported the Met’s cultural reform.¹²⁶

Recommendation 4

MOPAC should publish the London Policing Board one year review in full and set out what action will be taken as a result of the findings by the end of September 2026.

¹²⁴ Caroline Tredwell, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.27

¹²⁵ Caroline Tredwell, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.27

¹²⁶ Susan Hall AM and Emma Best AM (City Hall Conservatives) are of the view that the Mayor should go further and establish formal performance expectations for the London Policing Board, with a view to it being dissolved if these are not met. This builds on the London Assembly’s November 2025 motion, which passed with ten votes to eight, calling for the London Policing Board to be disbanded outright.

Involving Met staff and officers in MOPAC's oversight

During our investigation, the Committee heard about MOPAC's work with the Met's senior leadership on cultural change. This is important in maintaining the Met's openness to oversight and in driving reform. However, we also heard that MOPAC must do more to strengthen the independent staff voice from within the Met, including a stronger role for staff associations in the oversight process.

'Blurred lines': MOPAC and the Met's senior leadership

MOPAC's ability to influence Met staff and frontline officers depends to some degree on the level of receptiveness within the Met's senior leadership. It reported that this has improved significantly over the past two to three years, with senior leaders now more open to MOPAC's challenge and insight – an important shift given the command-and-control structure through which expectations filter down to street-level officers.¹²⁷

MOPAC highlighted to the Committee its recent presentations to the Met's Strategic Performance Group on trust, confidence and victims' experiences as evidence of this growing influence.¹²⁸ It explained that this has translated into joint work with the Met in several boroughs, focusing on local trust and confidence and supporting officers and teams to develop an internal culture that reflects the positive external behaviours expected by the public.¹²⁹

This shift in senior-level receptiveness is a positive step, but MOPAC's oversight must extend beyond engagement at the top. Throughout our investigation, the Committee heard how relying too heavily on senior-level engagement can create significant gaps in effective oversight. This was summed-up by evidence from Nathalie Stewart, chair of the pan-London Community Monitoring Network, who told us:

*"Whilst the Met itself, via the Commissioner, and the new Deputy Commissioner are trying to ensure that major changes within the force are implemented, this has not taken off in the way they had wished, with many officers still feeling that "lip service" and bureaucracy is playing out, rather than effective changes taking place. MOPAC's failure to assist the Met in a better, effective way, to affect and implement cultural changes, plays a major part in inhibiting the Met to deliver on cultural changes."*¹³⁰

The Committee acknowledges this is a difficult balancing act for MOPAC, which has key working relationships with the Met's senior leadership. However, strengthening independent staff and officer voice in its oversight process does not need to come at the expense of trusted

¹²⁷ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.6

¹²⁸ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.6

¹²⁹ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.6

¹³⁰ Nathalie Stewart – written evidence, p.37

relationships with senior leaders. Instead, MOPAC can strengthen both sides, and help it to shed light on cultural issues that may otherwise have been hidden from senior leaders in the Met.

The importance of independent staff voice

The vile and unacceptable behaviours at Charing Cross police station¹³¹ were exposed by an undercover BBC journalist. The behaviour exposed by Panorama at Charing Cross was not an isolated incident but reflected wider cultural problems across the Met. Independent reviews, including the Casey Review and HMICFRS inspections, have found similar patterns of misogyny, racism, bullying and inappropriate behaviour in the Met, alongside a misconduct system that has failed to identify repeat offenders. Misconduct cases involving discrimination and abuse have been recorded across several BCUs, demonstrating that the issues highlighted at Charing Cross were symptomatic of broader, systemic failings within the organisation and reflective of wider trends.

The Committee heard from Diane Vincent, MetBPA, that the findings of this BBC documentary were not a surprise to many of the members of the MetBPA and the NBPA:

“A lot of our members from the Met BPA, the National Black Police Association (NBPA), and serving officers were not surprised because this is something they have experienced at some point in their career: comments being made or behaviours and attitudes not being challenged, people being concerned about challenging attitudes, whistleblowers, and things like that. As such, this has gone on unchecked and people feel emboldened and empowered to use that language and behaviour even where there is CCTV [...]

Some of these behaviours that should have gone to misconduct, people have been let off with a slap on the wrist. They have not been dealt with or used as an example for others to see that the MPS is tackling bad behaviour within its ranks.”¹³²

This suggests a gap in MOPAC’s oversight at the grassroots level and highlights the need for a stronger role and clearer feedback routes for independent staff voices. David Spencer, Policy Exchange, highlighted to us how this was linked to an overreliance from MOPAC on reassurance from the Met’s senior leadership:

“The reality is that this is not the first time this Committee or the public of London or more broadly have seen the problems at Charing Cross [...]

[MOPAC] must have been reassured that Charing Cross had been resolved. Therefore, how was that reassurance provided? Particularly, it would appear that it was unable to or failed to reach sufficiently into the organisation to understand whether the issues at Charing Cross had been resolved, which they clearly had not been.”¹³³

¹³¹ In October 2025, secret filming by BBC Panorama revealed evidence of racism, misogyny and officers using force at Charing Cross Police Station ([BBC One - Panorama, Undercover in the Police](#)), [accessed April 2026]

¹³² Diane Vincent, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p. 10

¹³³ David Spencer, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p. 11

A stronger presence of independent staff and officer voice in oversight processes might have alerted MOPAC to cultural issues that were hidden from the Met's senior leadership. In her written evidence to the Committee, Dr Shereen Daniels noted that oversight can be constrained by "the existence of things considered off-limits".¹³⁴ She highlighted the risk this creates: "When those dynamics remain off-limits, oversight can never fully act on behalf of the public. Not because people do not care, but because there are boundaries around what feels permissible to challenge."¹³⁵

These challenges reflect wider concerns about how effectively the voices of officers and staff are incorporated into MOPAC's oversight. Written evidence from Andy George, NBPA, highlighted that while MOPAC "engages constructively with a range of stakeholders", this engagement "does not always translate into co-production or demonstrable influence over reform priorities".¹³⁶ He noted that those raising systemic concerns – including staff associations, whistleblowers and individuals with lived experience of discrimination – do not consistently see clear feedback loops showing how their contributions have shaped oversight decisions.¹³⁷ Andy emphasised that stronger engagement would require more systematic incorporation of workforce confidence indicators into oversight reporting, greater transparency in how stakeholder input informs policy direction, and reinforced protections for those who challenge institutional narratives.¹³⁸

During this investigation, we asked the DMPC about the role of staff associations and unions in MOPAC's oversight. The DMPC told the Committee that MOPAC has been meeting regularly with staff associations and unions to hear the concerns of their members and ensure these are fed back to the Met.¹³⁹ She added that MOPAC has also brokered joint meetings to encourage a culture in which staff associations and unions are recognised within the Met as part of the solution to difficult or challenging issues.¹⁴⁰ The Deputy Mayor also told us that she regularly visits police stations and ward teams, which includes "helpful suggestions about things that are not changing" and that these are "reflected back in our conversations" with the Met's senior leadership.¹⁴¹

"It is also important that you recognise that we regularly – I myself regularly – visit police stations, ward teams, and talk to officers all the time."¹⁴²

Kaya Comer-Schwartz, Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime

¹³⁴ Dr Shereen Daniels – written evidence, p.34

¹³⁵ Dr Shereen Daniels – written evidence, p.34

¹³⁶ Andy George – written evidence, p.8

¹³⁷ Andy George – written evidence, p.8

¹³⁸ Andy George – written evidence, p.8

¹³⁹ DMPC, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.6

¹⁴⁰ DMPC, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.6

¹⁴¹ DMPC, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.7

¹⁴² DMPC, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p. 7

The Committee welcomes the Deputy Mayor's engagement with staff associations and unions, as well as the regular conversations with Met officers and ward teams. However, the outcomes of these meetings are not evident, and it is not clear how feedback is passed to the Met's senior leaders or subsequently acted upon.

We also heard that MOPAC's engagement with some staff associations had actually decreased. Diane Vincent, MetBPA, told us:

"I will say from experience that our engagement with the Deputy Mayor has been slightly reduced from an Association point of view, from the NBPA and Met BPA point of view, and some of the youth forums have been significantly reduced compared to previous years. We used to have regular meetings and messaging then. Now it is very difficult to distinguish between some of the consultation and the co-production and the communication that we have with the office [...] consultation events often structured around predetermined messaging with limited scope for challenge or influence."¹⁴³

From the evidence we have heard, it is clear that MOPAC needs to go further in embedding independent staff voices within its oversight structures. Staff associations should have a formal place within MOPAC's processes, with protected reporting lines and safeguards that sit outside the usual channels of engagement with the Met's senior leadership.

Andy George, NBPA, told us that MOPAC should consider embedding a small number of recognised, non-statutory staff associations within its structures, supported by protected reporting lines and safeguards against retaliation.¹⁴⁴ He suggested this could include representation from the MetBPA, the Women's Association, the LGBTQ+ Association, the Jewish Police Association and the Disability Network.¹⁴⁵ He added: "Providing these associations with a formalised, protected interface with MOPAC would help ensure that lived workforce experience informs oversight directly and without filtration through operational hierarchy."¹⁴⁶

Embedding staff associations more formally in MOPAC's oversight processes, rather than relying on informal interactions and feedback, would help identify and surface strategic cultural issues, drive cultural change and provide a stronger feedback mechanism for senior leadership within both MOPAC and the Met. It will be important, however, that any enhanced role is designed proportionately, so that associations are able to contribute meaningfully without being over-burdened or diverted from their core representative functions.

Effective oversight of culture change in the Met cannot solely sit at senior level if it is to be effective. Officers and staff across the organisation must understand the direction of travel and feel able to contribute to it. While cultural change in any organisation may start at the top down, it is essential that all staff and officers are engaged. There must be safe routes for Met

¹⁴³ Diane Vincent, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p. 15

¹⁴⁴ Andy George – written evidence, p.7

¹⁴⁵ Andy George – written evidence, p.7

¹⁴⁶ Andy George – written evidence, p.7

employees to raise concerns, including through staff associations and whistleblowing procedures. MOPAC has a role to play in ensuring these are protected so that patterns of strategic cultural issues are identified, and acted upon early. MOPAC must also make clear how information provided by Met officers and staff informs the oversight work MOPAC undertakes.

Recommendation 5

Within the next 12 months, MOPAC should establish a structured programme for engaging with staff associations, with clear and transparent processes for how insights from this engagement are reported to senior leaders in the Met.

To support this programme, MOPAC should publish an outcomes framework that clearly demonstrates how insight from officers and staff across the Met is used to inform its oversight, scrutiny, challenge and assessment of cultural change. This should include transparent “you said, we did” information showing how MOPAC has used staff feedback to challenge senior leaders in the Met

Community voice in MOPAC's oversight

In 2023, Baroness Casey found that, despite the existence of community engagement structures supported by MOPAC, “there isn’t a clear way for local authorities and their residents to hold the Met to account for how they police and tackle crime on a Borough basis”.¹⁴⁷ In this investigation, we revisited the role community insight is playing in the oversight of the Met’s cultural reform.

We heard about how MOPAC engages with a wide range of stakeholders, including community groups and representative associations. Part of what MOPAC described as a broader “ecology of oversight”, including community scrutiny panels and engagement with partners.¹⁴⁸

We also heard about how MOPAC draws on large-scale data sources to inform its oversight. Kenny Bowie, MOPAC, highlighted that MOPAC regularly carries out its Public Attitude Survey, User Satisfaction Survey and Online Victim Survey to bring Londoners’ insight into its oversight of the Met’s cultural reform.¹⁴⁹ He explained to the Committee that its Public Attitude Survey, which gathers views from 19,200 Londoners each year, is considered by MOPAC a “gold standard” measure of public confidence – offering richer insight than the Crime Survey of England and Wales.¹⁵⁰ MOPAC noted that internal culture often mirrors external perceptions, and that identifying areas where public trust and confidence are low can highlight where cultural reform within the Met is not progressing as expected.¹⁵¹ These insights allow MOPAC to pinpoint specific issues and challenge the Met where improvements are needed.

Despite this rich data, the Committee heard that MOPAC’s engagement with Londoners is not yet consistently targeted towards those groups with the lowest levels of trust and confidence in policing. Kenny Bowie, MOPAC, told the Committee that rebuilding trust should focus on “where there is the biggest disparity”, identifying LGBTQ+ and disabled Londoners as groups where confidence in the Met is currently lowest.¹⁵² While MOPAC highlighted ongoing engagement with these communities, including meetings with representative organisations, it acknowledged that this work is still developing. Kenny noted that engagement with LGBTQ+ Londoners is “probably not been something we have historically focused” on and that MOPAC needs to “look at how we do better” in this area.¹⁵³

We also heard a recurring concern about MOPAC’s inconsistent engagement with community groups. Stakeholders described this to the Committee as one of their most significant frustrations, noting that opportunities for dialogue were irregular and that MOPAC often failed

¹⁴⁷ Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB, [Baroness Casey Review](#), p.345

¹⁴⁸ DMPC Kaya Comer-Schwartz, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.12

¹⁴⁹ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.3

¹⁵⁰ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.32

¹⁵¹ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.32

¹⁵² Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.35

¹⁵³ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.35

to maintain strong, sustained relationships with those representing London's diverse communities.

MOPAC was also criticised for weaknesses in its communication with key community groups, including Safer Neighbourhood Boards (SNBs) and Community Monitoring Groups (CMGs). Guests described engagement as inconsistent, with limited advance communication on decisions affecting their work. For example, SNB representatives told the Committee that changes to funding arrangements were communicated without prior consultation. Collet Hunter, Lewisham SNB, stated "we just got a letter sent".¹⁵⁴

Translating engagement into influence

Further, while MOPAC engages widely, the Committee found little evidence of how or if this engagement has a demonstrable influence on the Met's cultural reform priorities. In evidence to the Committee, Abimbola Johnson, ISOB, said:

*"Engagement is essential. But engagement is not consultation and consultation is not influence. In previous reports, we raised concerns that engagement activity can be presented positively even where stakeholders feel unheard. Effective engagement requires clear evidence of how community feedback shapes decision; inclusion of critical voices, not just established partners and transparency where recommendations are rejected."*¹⁵⁵

This concern was echoed by community representatives, who highlighted the absence of clear feedback loops demonstrating how their input is used. Ian Weatherley, Havering CMG, told the Committee: "I have not seen any feedback of, 'OK, you said you have raised this issue. This is what we are going to do' [...] There is a lack of communication saying, 'Thank you for raising that point, and because of that we have done this'."¹⁵⁶ He added that without this, there is a risk of disengagement, noting that community members may feel "there is no point in me saying it because you do not do anything about it".¹⁵⁷

The Committee also heard that community scrutiny has been limited by the ability of both MOPAC and local groups to secure meaningful responses from the Met. Mirren Gidda, Tower Hamlets CMG, noted that MOPAC itself faces challenges in "getting the MPS to listen to what it has to say", particularly in relation to accessing data and information.¹⁵⁸ While MOPAC was described as supportive in some cases, guests emphasised that it appears to lack authority to ensure that concerns raised by community groups lead to action. As Mirren explained, "MOPAC is good, it is supportive, but it does not really have much power, and does not help us get much further."¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁴ Collet Hunter, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.18

¹⁵⁵ Abimbola Johnson – written evidence, p.4

¹⁵⁶ Ian Weatherley, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.5

¹⁵⁷ Ian Weatherley, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.5

¹⁵⁸ Mirren Gidda, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.3

¹⁵⁹ Mirren Gidda, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.4

Evidence from MOPAC also pointed to wider structural weaknesses in how community insight is translated into policing practice. Kenny Bowie, MOPAC, acknowledged the need for a more coherent and joined-up approach between MOPAC and the Met. He emphasised that “what we want here is for the MPS to be engaging with the communities, not for us to be going out and doing things in two separate ways”.¹⁶⁰

Strengthening the community voice in oversight

For community insight to meaningfully shape MOPAC’s oversight of cultural reform, there must be a clear and effective system through which Londoners can hold the Met to account. The Committee found that the current landscape does not consistently achieve this. Multiple bodies – including Community Monitoring Groups, Safer Neighbourhood Boards and Independent Advisory Groups – operate with differing roles and remits, and evidence from guests indicated that coordination between them is limited. Mirren Gidda, Tower Hamlets CMG, described the overall landscape as “very fragmented” and highlighted a lack of interaction between local scrutiny structures.¹⁶¹ This fragmented landscape weakens the ability of community voices to influence oversight and limits the effectiveness of MOPAC’s oversight of the Met.

Community scrutiny groups face limitations in their ability to escalate concerns and secure accountability. Evidence from guests highlighted that there are no clear or consistent mechanisms through which serious issues identified through community groups can be formally progressed. Mirren Gidda, Tower Hamlets CMG, told the Committee that when the CMG identified serious concerns through its highest “red” ratings, there was no clear route to escalate these cases within the Met or to external oversight bodies. She noted that CMGs are not recognised as formal complainants, limiting their ability to trigger formal review processes.¹⁶²

Guests also highlighted limitations in the current approach to reviewing body-worn video footage. Collet Hunter, Lewisham SNB, explained that current scrutiny relies on randomly selected footage, with groups reviewing individual encounters and recording their assessment of officer conduct against set criteria.¹⁶³ While this provides a structured approach to assessing individual cases, it limits the ability of scrutiny groups to focus on higher-risk incidents or identify patterns in the use of police powers.

Similarly, Ian Weatherley, Havering CMG, told the Committee that this approach often results in scrutiny groups reviewing repeated types of encounters, particularly drug searches, which limits their ability to assess the effectiveness of policing activity across different types of incidents.¹⁶⁴ He suggested that scrutiny would be more effective if groups were able to select footage by

¹⁶⁰ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.34

¹⁶¹ Mirren Gidda, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.6

¹⁶² Mirren Gidda, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, pp.10-11

¹⁶³ Collet Hunter, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.11

¹⁶⁴ Ian Weatherley, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.15

category, such as Taser deployment or incidents involving weapons, enabling a more rounded understanding of police activity.¹⁶⁵

MOPAC told the Committee that it is seeking to address many of the challenges in community-led scrutiny through its Community Scrutiny Transformation Programme. MOPAC reported that this programme will enable it to bring together issues raised by community groups, identify common themes and learning, and present these more effectively to the Met.¹⁶⁶ In a report to the LPB, MOPAC stated that it is working jointly with the Met and communities to “co-design and build a new model for police scrutiny, with the aim of making it easier and simpler for Londoners to scrutinise the work of the police, including the use of police powers such as stop and search and Taser, and to influence change in their local area.”¹⁶⁷

The DMPC has also written to the Committee to provide an update on MOPAC’s Community Scrutiny Transformation Programme.¹⁶⁸ She highlighted that the programme responds to Londoners’ calls for an overhaul of scrutiny arrangements and aims to strengthen and expand community oversight of the Met.¹⁶⁹ The Committee was informed that the “new model aims to make community scrutiny groups more representative, transparent, and provide them with greater support, so that feedback from communities is better able to drive change in policing”.¹⁷⁰ The DMPC also noted that the programme will prompt reflection on the respective roles of MOPAC and the Met in community engagement.¹⁷¹

The Committee welcomes this work and MOPAC should make full use of this opportunity to ensure that the voice of London’s communities is fully embedded in the challenge it provides to the Met. As we heard from Chief Constable Gavin Stephens, Chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council, “if communities are involved in identifying the issues that matter most [...] that leads to confidence. It is direct scrutiny because they can see straightaway whether it is having an effect or not”.¹⁷² This requires moving beyond engagement as a process, towards a model in which community insight directly informs oversight priorities, scrutiny activity and reform outcomes, helping to build a clearer sense of shared contract between community groups, the Met and MOPAC.

Stronger, more structured community engagement would enable MOPAC to bring forward insights that could positively influence the Met’s cultural reform, ensuring that community perspectives are not only heard but actively shape the improvements being sought. We trust MOPAC’s Community Scrutiny Transformation Programme indicates a shift towards a more coherent and community-centred model of community scrutiny, and that these developments reflect a growing recognition of the need for more accessible, transparent and community-

¹⁶⁵ Ian Weatherley, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.15

¹⁶⁶ Kenny Bowie, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 11 February 2026, p.36

¹⁶⁷ London Policing Board, [Stop and Search Charter: a year after launch, impact and ongoing community engagement](#), 10 March 2026, p.4

¹⁶⁸ DMPC Kaya Comer-Schwartz, Police and Crime Committee, [Letter](#), 11 March 2026

¹⁶⁹ DMPC Kaya Comer-Schwartz, Police and Crime Committee, [Letter](#), 11 March 2026

¹⁷⁰ DMPC Kaya Comer-Schwartz, Police and Crime Committee, [Letter](#), 11 March 2026

¹⁷¹ DMPC Kaya Comer-Schwartz, Police and Crime Committee, [Letter](#), 11 March 2026

¹⁷² Chief Constable Gavin Stephens QPM, Police and Crime Committee, [Transcript](#), 14 January 2026, p.19

driven oversight across London. The Committee urges MOPAC to complete this transformation at pace.

Recommendation 6

MOPAC should clearly set out how community-led scrutiny and insight is shaping oversight of the Met's cultural reform. This should include accessible mechanisms to capture, and escalate, community feedback across London, with regular "you said, we did" updates, and a requirement for the Met to respond to community-driven recommendations, explaining how they have been acted on or why they have been rejected.

Recommendation 7

In the next 12 months, MOPAC should publish a clear strategy for improving trust and confidence in policing among LGBTQ+ and disabled Londoners, setting out how community insight from these groups will inform its oversight of the Met's cultural reform.

Recommendation 8

MOPAC should strengthen the effectiveness of community-led scrutiny by expanding access to information and improving transparency. This should include enabling Community Monitoring Groups to select body-worn video samples by category, rather than relying solely on random sampling, and being provided with written explanations where concerns raised through scrutiny, including red-rated stop and search findings, are not upheld or acted upon.

Committee Activity

The Committee held its first meeting on how MOPAC oversees culture change within the Metropolitan Police on Wednesday 14 January 2026. The following guests attended this session:

Panel 1:

- **David Spencer**, Head of Crime and Justice, Policy Exchange
- **Chief Constable Gavin Stephens QPM**, Chair, National Police Chiefs' Council
- **Diane Vincent**, Chair, Metropolitan Black Police Association

Panel 2:

- **Mirren Gidda**, Chair, Tower Hamlets Community Monitoring Group
- **Collet Hunter**, Vice-Chair, Lewisham Safer Neighbourhood Board
- **Ian Weatherley**, Chair, Havering Community Monitoring Group

The Committee held its second meeting at City Hall on 11 February 2026. The following guests attended this session:

- **Kaya Comer-Schwartz**, Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime
- **Kenny Bowie**, Director of Strategy and MPS Oversight, MOPAC
- **Caroline Tredwell**, Head of Oversight Governance, MOPAC

Written evidence was also received from:

- **Dr Shereen Daniels**, Managing Director, HR rewired
- **Nathalie Stewart**, Chair, Pan-London Community Monitoring Network
- **Andy George**, President, National Black Police Association
- **Abimbola Johnson**, Chair, Independent Scrutiny & Oversight Board (ISOB)
- **Baroness Casey of Blackstock DBE CB**

Other formats and languages

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Vietnamese

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Hindi

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