

AUDIT PANEL

Friday, 31 March 2017

Health and Safety Performance Paper

Report by: The Director of People and Change

1. Report Summary

Health and Safety (H&S) Assurance Monitoring and Reporting Schedule (Para 3.1 -3.2)

- 1.1 A summary of the current assurance monitoring and reporting arrangements for H&S are included to inform the Audit Panel considerations for future reporting schedule to Panel.

Injuries Reported on MetAIR (Para 3.2- 3.8)

- 1.2 A review of injuries reported on MetAIR between January 2015 and December 2016 saw an increase in a number of the injury categories. Of note are the increases relating to assaults and handling injuries; this increase is attributed to Operation Hampshire.

Assurance Updates (Para 3.9 - 3.19)

- 1.3 Health and safety assurance including the quarterly H&S deep dive by Management Board, MPS H&S Board management of corporate H&S risks, Property Service audits and status of the ongoing assurance process is addressed.

Notifications and Liaison with External Enforcing Agencies (Para 3.20 - 3.22)

- 1.4 Health and Safety Executive (HSE) liaison/enforcement authority and investigation activity includes an update on Operation Fischer (death of a male member of the public in August 2010 at an NHS facility following contact with the police), and Safety and Health Risk Management Team (SHRMT) investigations against the HSE investigation criteria.

General Updates (Para 3.23 - 3.28)

- 1.5 A general update of H&S activity including support to relevant Gold Groups, update on new H&S IT system and safety maturity process.

2. Recommendations

- 2.1 In accordance with the Corporate Health and Safety Policy, the Audit Panel is asked to note the contents of this report.
- 2.2 The Audit Panel may wish to consider the reporting frequency of H&S to this forum.

3. Supporting Information

CURRENT H&S ASSURANCE MONITORING AND REPORTING SCHEDULE

- 3.1 MPS H&S is the subject of the following higher level assurance monitoring and reporting schedule:
 - The MPS H&S Board meets quarterly and monitors safety risk and performance under the Director of People and Change. This Board includes chief officers from the operational business areas;
 - A quarterly H&S performance paper is the subject of a deep dive review at Management Board;
 - Each operational Command Unit (OCU), department and business group provide annual H&S assurance to the Commissioner. This assurance reflects compliance with the corporate safety governance arrangements and is the subject of verification by the SHRMT;
 - All HSE reportable incidents are subject to investigation by the SHRMT;
 - The SHRMT audit thematic issues and matters of safety concern; these are reported to the relevant operational board and MPS H&S Board;
 - MPS H&S governance arrangements are the subject of a systems/process audit every 2-3 years by the Directorate of Audit, Risk and Assurance (DARA);
 - MPS H&S leadership, performance and governance arrangements are the subject of an external independent H&S audit every 3-5 years. As part of the overall audit assessment, the 2015 external independent H&S audit concluded that:
 - *Significant improvements in health and safety management have been made since the previous audit in 2009. Most notable improvements are positive step changes in relation to: the MPS health and safety maturity, top down leadership of safety, the governance structure and risk identification and management;*
 - *MPS has a comprehensive health and safety management system that meets most of the requirements of an effective safety management system as identified in HSG65.*
 - Annual H&S assurance is given by the Commissioner to the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime.

- 3.2 The new Audit Panel may wish to reconsider the current quarterly reporting frequency of H&S to this forum.

INJURY ANALYSIS

- 3.3 As part of the quarterly H&S Performance Update paper to MPS Management Board, SHRMT undertake a review of the MPS Accident Reporting System (MetAIR) injury data against injury categories. A comparison of injuries reported on MetAIR between January and December 2015, and between January and December 2016 indicates that the:
- Total accident injury rate increased by 20.1%;
 - Reportable (major and lost time) injury rate decreased by 20.9%;
 - Injuries to police officers following assault rate increased by 46.7%;
 - Injuries to Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) following assault rate increased by 89.0%;
 - Injuries to Dedicated Detention Officers (DDOs) following assault rate increased by 36.0%;
 - Slip, trip and fall injury rate decreased by 7.3%;
 - Moving vehicle injury rate decreased by 7.9%;
 - Handling related injury rate increased by 31.3%;
 - Property related injury rate increased by 3.0%.
- 3.4 In addition to the quarterly review of injury data referred to in paragraph 3.3 (above), the following actions to monitor all injury categories remains ongoing by SHRMT:
- All accidents including major injuries are formally reviewed weekly and where appropriate selected for SHRMT investigation;
 - All major injury and lost time reports are quality assured and assessed by an SHRMT advisor;
 - The SHRMT work closely with Business Groups, OCUs, specific specialist departments (such as Met Training, Met Detention, etc), as well as the staff associations, to determine whether there are any specific causational factors, or emerging trends (i.e. specific to geographical area, gender, activity, etc).
- 3.5 The increase in injury following assault reporting was expected given the high profile work to develop the principles of Operation Hampshire and its subsequent launch on 05 May 2016 (improved reporting and management of assaults to MPS officers and staff). An analysis of the MetAIR data for comparative periods between April 2016-December 2016 and April 2015 – December 2015 indicates:
- Reportable injuries decreased during in 2016 by 33%;
 - Minor injuries increased in 2016 by 50%.
- 3.6 Therefore it is not unreasonable to assume that the increase of minor as opposed to reportable injuries since the launch of Operation Hampshire

reflects the drive to ensure all injuries following assault are recorded on MetAIR.

- 3.7 The SHRMT are working with SC&O 22 Officer Safety Training (OST) unit regarding handling technique issues whilst deployed operationally and during active training. The increases in this injury category also relates to Operation Hampshire; 80% of injuries occur on operational duties primarily when dealing with arrest and restraint, patrol duties etc.
- 3.8 The OST Unit:
 - Reminded staff of the hazards and techniques for handling non-compliant members of the public during arrest and restraint during the OST in October 2016 – March 2017 ;
 - Are refreshing operational handling techniques in the forthcoming phase of OST commencing April 2017.

ASSURANCE UPDATES

Management Board Review

- 3.9 The quarterly health and safety update report was the subject of a thematic 'deep dive' review by Management Board on 21 March 2017. This report included:
 - Review of unintentional police weapon discharges;
 - SHRMT police weapon investigations;
 - Management of non-police firearms;
 - Injury analysis;
 - Near miss analysis;
 - Airwave near miss analysis;
 - Custody successful interventions;
 - HSE investigations;
 - SHRMT injury investigations;
 - MPS H&S Board and risk register update;
 - MPS H&S assurance;
 - Property and fire safety assurance.

MPS Health and Safety Board

- 3.10 The last MPS Health and Safety Board was held on 23 February 2017. Key agenda items tabled at the Board included:
 - Review of out of Committee papers:
 - Core H&S Training Schedule;
 - OH Overseas pre- and post-deployment arrangements.
 - Review of Business Group operational safety risk;
 - Review of new emerging risks:
 - Management of Construction and Design for Digital Policing works;
 - Management of vehicle seizure;
 - Management of Airwave on the new Basic Command Units.

- Review of the MPS H&S Board risk register including the following live risks:
 - Risk 1 - Unintentional discharges of firearms;
 - Risk 2 - Non police firearms;
 - Risk 3 - Water intervention;
 - Risk 12b - Safe storage of explosives;
 - Risk 16 - Firearms asset tracking;
 - Risk 17 - Compliance with the Working Time Regulations (WTR);
 - Risk 19b - Management of corporate issues associated with a case of mesothelioma - a form of lung cancer associated with the inhalation of asbestos fibres;
 - Risk 21 - Failure to maintain and improve safety maturity during service change;
 - Risk 25 - Ineffective digital policing processes to manage H&S IT system implementation requirements;
 - Risk 27 – Ineffective H&S governance of contractors.
 - Working Time Management;
 - Firearm and Explosive Sub Group Report;
 - Review of short message formats for high risk incidents
 - Review the draft Management Board H&S Performance Paper;
 - Update on assurance process for 2015/16 and revised corporate oversight for 2016/17 assurance process;
 - Health and Safety Board Objectives.
- 3.11 The current H&S risk status is shown on the MPS H&S Board Risk Heat Map at Appendix 1.
- 3.12 The Strategic Manager SHRMT is reviewing the MPS H&S Board Terms of Reference. This review will involve the inclusion of Health and Wellbeing as part of this Board.
- Firearm and Explosive Sub-Group**
- 3.13 The Firearm and Explosive Sub Group, chaired by Commander Armed Policing, now operates as the repository of all firearm and explosive safety related issues on behalf of the MPS H&S Board. This sub-group includes all the key players across the MPS that manage firearms (including non-police firearms) and explosives, and provides a quarterly update to the MPS H&S Board. Key issues addressed at the last sub-group included unintentional discharges, management of explosives, firearm asset tracking, police use of firearms standard operating procedures (SOP) and armoury audits;
- Property Services Statutory Compliance Audits of MPS Buildings**
- 3.14 The Property Services Compliance Team has developed an audit process to enable the confirmation of property safety, fire and public health statutory compliance within each of the MOPAC/MPS buildings on a regular basis.

- 3.15 The number of audits completed for the last three months are listed below in table one:

Table 1: Number of Property Safety Audits Completed in period

Audit	Number of audits undertaken			
	Oct 16	Nov 16	Dec 16	Total
Fire	15	9	3	27
Asbestos	26	37	2	65
Public Health	2	0	2	4
Health and Safety	11	16	25	52

MPS Letters of H&S Assurance

- 3.16 The H&S assurance process for FY16/17 has been distributed this month via the MPS H&S Board.
- 3.17 This forthcoming assurance process recognises that the submission of the Commissioner's letter to MOPAC for FY 2015/16 was considerably delayed. As a result, the MPS Health and Safety Board will re-introduce more central oversight to prevent recurrence. Mitigation in the forthcoming FY will include:
- Revised assurance process with enhanced monitoring by the SHRMT;
 - Inclusion of additional reporting controls via the MPS Health and Safety Board;
 - Additional corporate tracking of local Operational Command Units/Departments and Business Groups shortfalls/action plans.
- 3.18 The assurance process timelines are as follows:
- **14 April 2017:** OCUs, Heads of Departments (HoDs) and MetHQ Directorate provide assurance;
 - **April/May 2017** - the SHRMT (Safety Advisors) will verify the draft letters of assurance. SHRMT Safety Advisors will report their findings, to the appropriate Senior Safety Advisors by 19 May 2017;
 - **May/June 2017** - The Senior Safety Advisors will review the submissions, and report their findings to the Deputy Commissioner and relevant ACs by 23 June 2017;
 - **14 July 2016** - the Deputy Commissioner and relevant ACs will submit their signed letters of assurance to the Strategic Manager Safety and Health Risk Management (SHRM) for inclusion in the assurance file to the Commissioner;
 - **August 2016** - The Commissioner will issue a letter of assurance to the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime;
 - **September 2016** - The Strategic Manager, SHRM will report to the MOPAC Audit Panel.
- 3.19 The Commissioner gave MPS H&S assurance to the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime for FY15/16 on 14 February 2017.

NOTIFICATIONS AND LIAISON WITH EXTERNAL ENFORCING AGENCIES (HSE AND LONDON FIRE BRIGADE)

Ongoing HSE Activity.

3.20 The following incidents remain ongoing:

- **Operation Fischer**
 - The MOPAC Audit Panel have been previously advised that the HSE are following appropriate investigative lines of inquiry in relation to events leading to the death of a male member of the public on 31 August 2010, at an NHS facility following contact with the police. The MPS await formal release of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) report and are engaged with the Coroner, partner agencies and National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) regarding further investigative requirements. These have been captured on the relevant Corporate Risk & Organisational Learning and Health & Safety Board Risk Registers;
 - The Coroner's inquest commenced on 06 February 2017.
- A member of the MPS made a direct complaint to the HSE regarding safety standards in a property store. This was investigated and a formal report supplied to the HSE;
- A member of the MPS made a complaint to the HSE regarding safety concerns during Counter Terrorism Specialist Firearms Officer training. This has been investigated by the Specialist Firearms Command (SC&O19) and a formal report has been release to the HSE.

SHRMT Accident Investigation

3.21 SHRMT currently investigates all accidents that fall within the HSE investigation criteria.

3.22 The following investigations have been commissioned by the SHRMT against the HSE criteria between October and December 2016:

- In November 2016, a Surveillance Officer was assigned on foot, and holding a fixed position. Whilst waiting for the Subject to emerge, this Officer was approached from behind by 4 youths. One youth pulled out a large knife and attacked the officer and the officer was stabbed in the lower abdomen. The SHRMT H&S investigation is complete and Surveillance Command have accepted all recommendations;
- Member of the public had fingers amputated by closing door in Custody Suite. This is subject to an IPCC investigation and SHRMT organisational learning review. This remains on-going;
- Major injury to officer who fell from scaffolding dealing with mental health incident. Full investigation remains on going by SHRMT with the OCU;

- Four Greenwich police officers injured during an arrest. One officer was assaulted and lost consciousness. The incident remains under investigation by SHRMT and the OCU.

GENERAL UPDATES

3.23 Gold Group Support

➤ Operation Flagstad

- In 2014 an MPS officer was diagnosed with mesothelioma (mesothelioma is a form of lung cancer associated with inhalation of asbestos fibres). This serving officer has since died from this condition. This is subject to oversight by an Gold Group and the subject of investigation in conjunction with the SHRMT;
- A self-notification survey of potential exposure of MPS officers was launched in 2015 including the provision of an advice line for support. The self notification survey has been completed by approximately 5000 ex MPS transferred/retired officers and serving MPS officers;
- SHRMT collated information about third party training sites alongside information about individuals' work activities. This information has been used to determine the scale of the issue in relation to asbestos exposure within the MPS. Summary conclusions provided to the Gold Commander in a separate report are as follows:
 - That there was a very small risk of being exposed to harmful levels of asbestos materials whilst training at third party sites during the period 1980 to 2007;
 - That during the period 1980 to 2007 the MPS may not have always undertaken suitable and sufficient risk profiling at third party sites to identify potential health risks such as asbestos;
 - That since 2007 a process for risk profiling at third party sites was in place within SC&O19;
 - As a result of this incident a new enhanced documented process for undertaking risk profiling has been developed and implemented into the firearms third party venue selection process, and that this new process involves both the MPS and third party site owners/management companies;
 - That there is currently no evidence to suggest any clusters of asbestos related health issues in Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs) who undertook training at third party sites;
 - There is no conclusive evidence linking the incident of mesothelioma with working at any of the high risk sites;
 - The only medically confirmed case of mesothelioma remains that of the SC&O19 Specialist Firearms Officer (SFO) diagnosed in 2014;
 - Although the MPS received three letters where exposure to asbestos fibres could be linked to working at the sites where there was an increased risk, there were no other medically

confirmed cases of mesothelioma notified to the MPS as part of the Operation Flagstad investigation.

- The last Gold Group was held on the 18 January 2017. A final report has been produced which will be published on the Operation Flagstad internet site. This report has been submitted for peer review prior to publication.

Working Time Management.

- 3.24 A paper to the MPS H&S Board provided an update on Working Time Regulation (WTR) compliance and aligned mitigation relating to developing safe working hours. In summary, WTR data (non-compliance - officers working over 48hrs averaged over the 17 week Reference Period) for January 2017 is as follows:
- SO have decreased from 42 in December to 27 in January;
 - TP have decreased from 56 in December to 47 in January;
 - SC&O have decreased from 83 December to 76 in January.

New H&S Software

- 3.25 The current MPS accident and near miss functionality is built into the MPS ORACLE Human Resources (HR) system. This HR ORACLE system is being replaced by a new HR Police Standard Operating Platform (PSOP) under an outsourced service provider. PSOP does not provide a safety related functionality, therefore this element has been separately outsourced. Warwick International Computer Systems (WICS) was awarded a contract in November 2016 and will provide a cloud-based H&S software system.
- 3.26 The new software platform will be delivered in a number of phases between May and October 2016. Phase 1 will deliver accident/non-accident injuries, near misses and dangerous occurrences and Ill health records. Phase 1, carries significant HSE enforcement risk should the MPS not have an appropriate reporting and recording capability. It is planned for phase 1 to “go live” in the first week of May 2017.


Safety Maturity

- 3.27 The SHRMT are leading the development of a health and safety maturity strategy which will ultimately provide more proactive and effective safety control throughout the MPS, with improved delivery/efficiency. Delivery of this safety maturity project, supported by a new H&S software tool will develop and reinforce positive safety behaviours. An enhanced positive safety culture will actively influence human behaviours at work and ultimately reduce the number of accidents and the incidence of ill health. This bespoke MPS maturity model was developed by the SHRMT in consultation with the External Independent H&S Auditor.
- 3.28 The outline planned maturity project delivery is as follows:
- April 2017 – publish the maturity matrix;

- 2017/18 - OCUs, Departments, MethHQ Directorates will be mentored by SHRMT safety advisors against the maturity model; focused at consolidating level 3 compliance culture maturity with reducing reliance on SHRMT (OCUs, Departments and MethHQ Directorates to become self-sustaining at level 3). This work will inform OCUs, Departments, MethHQ Directorate targets for maturity objectives for FY 2018/19;
 - March 2018/21 - OCUs, Departments, MethHQ Directorates and business areas will report on perceived baseline safety maturity as part of the assurance process which will be validated in FY 2018/19 by audit;
 - The matrix is to be amended before release to include a Health and Wellbeing thematic.
- 4. Equality and Diversity Impact**
The report is an information report and there are no immediate implications on equality and diversity. Equality and diversity impacts will be assessed on individual incidents.
- 5. Financial Implications**
At this stage it is not known whether there will be any financial implications associated with Operation Fischer.
- 6. Legal Implications**
This report is an information report, and there are no direct legal issues that arise. Legal advice on individual incidents will be obtained as appropriate and necessary from DLS.
- 7. Risk Implications**
- 7.1 At the time of reporting there are no immediate significant health and safety implications arising from this update report.
- 7.2 The content of this paper will support the MPS strategic position on health & safety.
- 8. Contact Details**
Nick Kettle and Mike Chinchin, SHRMT;
Peter Barrett, Property Services.
- 9. Appendices and Background Papers**
Appendix 1: MPS H&S Board Risk Register Heat Map

MPS Health and Safety Board February 2017 – Risk Heat Map

Ref	Risk Trend	Risk Description	Risk Lead
1a	↔	Unintentional discharge of lethal police weapons categorised at level 1.	Commander Armed Policing
1b	↔	Unintentional discharge of lethal police weapons categorised at levels 2, 3, and 4.	Commander Armed Policing
2	↓	Unsafe handling of non-police firearms.	Commander Armed Policing
3a	↔	Inappropriate response to water related incidents. Spontaneous attendance at a scene - Flowing water (River) - Vehicle patrol.	Commander Armed Policing
3b	↔	Inappropriate response to water related incidents. CCC directed attendance at a scene - Still water - Vehicle based.	Commander Armed Policing
3c	↔	Inappropriate response to water related incidents. Spontaneous attendance at a scene - Flowing water (River) - Non-vehicle patrol.	Commander Armed Policing
3d	↔	Inappropriate response to water related incidents. CCC directed attendance at a scene - Still water - Non-vehicle based.	Commander Armed Policing
16	↔	Lack of Firearms Asset Tracking	Commander Armed Policing
17 a/b	↔	Failure to effectively manage compliance with the Working Time Regulations (WTR) and manage excessive working hours.	Director of People and Change, and all business COGs.
19b	↔	Asbestos related illness	Commander Armed Policing
21	↔	Failure to maintain and improve safety maturity during service change	Director of People and Change, and all business COGs.
25	↔	Ineffective Digital Policing Processes to manage H&S IT implementation requirements	Director of People and Change
27	↔	Ineffective H&S governance of contractors	Director of Contract Management



Likelihood

Risk Trend key - Improved (↓), Worsened (↑) or is Unchanged (↔)

New Emerging Risks Under Evaluation

Management of Construction and Design for Digital Policing works;

Management of vehicle seizure;

Management of Airwave on the new Basic Command Units

Risk Report

Risk Ref	Risk Description	Comment	Risk Appetite
1a	Unintentional discharge of lethal police weapons categorised at level 1.	The status of the breech flags trial was reviewed at the Firearm & Explosive sub Gp. The breech flags are initially being rolled out at MPSTC for further pilot testing by course intakes. A design challenge with the Glock breech flag is currently under review with options to address concerns.	
1b	Unintentional discharge of lethal police weapons categorised at levels 2, 3, and 4.		
2	Unsafe handling of non-police firearms.	Significant improvements have been seen with weapon and ammunition record keeping/auditing within the TP, LDSS property stores and within the CDSS final storage and disposal site. Despite this it is accepted that further improvements are ongoing at a number of sites. A revised NPF SoP was issued in November 2016 which streamlines the management of these weapons from receipt to disposal. In addition, an SoP for the management of these weapons in the forensic environment has been drafted and will be issued imminently.	
3a	Inappropriate response to water related incidents. Spontaneous attendance at a scene - Flowing water (River) - Vehicle patrol.	All controls have been implemented. SHRMT have engaged an external auditor from the Royal Life Saving Society (RLSS) to review the MPS strategy, training and tactics before recommending this risk is controlled. The audit is complete and the MPS await the report. The report has been delayed and is expected by the end of March 2017.	
3b	Inappropriate response to water related incidents. CCC directed attendance at a scene - Still water - Vehicle based.		
3c	Inappropriate response to water related incidents. Spontaneous attendance at a scene - Flowing water (River) - Non-vehicle patrol.		
3d	Inappropriate response to water related incidents. CCC directed attendance at a scene - Still water - Non-vehicle based.		

Risk Report

Risk Ref	Risk Description	Comment	Risk Appetite
16	Lack of Firearms Asset Tracking	Commander Armed Policing is reviewing the status of the asset tracking register and whether this remains within the firearms uplift programme or under Business as Usual (BAU) at SC&O19.	
17a	Failure to comply with the Working Time Regulations (WTR)	WTR data (non compliance - officers working over 48hrs averaged over the 17 week Reference Period) for September is as follows: SO have decreased from 42 in December to 27 in January; TP have decreased from 56 in December to 47 in January; SC&O have decreased from 83 December to 76 in January. Overall non-compliance with this criteria continues to improve.	
17b	Officers and staff working excessive hours	Nine officers worked over 72hrs per week averaged over the 17 week reference period; all these officers were from RASP. This is a significant improvement on the position in 2016. Work remains ongoing to review working hours aligned to fatigue measurement and assessment.	
19b	Asbestos related illness	The MPS has formed a Gold Group under Commander Firearms. The data from the survey has been analysed. Summary conclusions are as follows: That there was a very small risk of being exposed to harmful levels of asbestos materials whilst training at third party sites during the period 1980 to 2007; That during the period 1980 to 2007 the MPS may not have always undertaken suitable and sufficient risk profiling at third party sites to identify potential health risks such as asbestos; That since 2007 a process for risk profiling at third party sites was in place within SCO19; As a result of this incident a new enhanced documented process for undertaking risk profiling has been developed and implemented into the firearms third party venue selection process, and that this new process involves both the MPS and third party site owners/management companies; That there is currently no evidence to suggest any clusters of asbestos related health issues in AFOs who undertook training at third party sites; There is no conclusive evidence linking the incident of Mesothelioma with working at any of the high risk sites; The only medically confirmed case of Mesothelioma remains that of the SCO19 Specialist Firearms Officer (SFO) diagnosed in 2014; Although the MPS received three letters where exposure to asbestos fibres could be linked to working at the sites where there was an increased risk, there were no other medically confirmed cases of Mesothelioma notified to the MPS as part of the Operation Flagstad investigation. The last Gold Group was held on the 18 January 2017. A final report has been produced which will be published on the Operation Flagstad internet site. This report has been submitted for peer review prior to publication.	

Risk Report

Risk Ref	Risk Description	Comment	Risk Appetite
21	Failure to maintain and improve safety maturity during service change	<p>This risk is now mainly focused on the delivery of the safety maturity project and required safety cultural development. The outline planned maturity project delivery is as follows:</p> <p>April 2017 – publish the maturity matrix across MPS;</p> <p>2017/18 - OCUs, Departments, MetHQ Directorates will be mentored by SHRMT safety advisors against the maturity model; focused at consolidating level 3 maturity with reducing reliance on SHRMT (OCUs, Departments and MetHQ Directorates to become self-sustaining at level 3). This work will inform OCUs, Departments, MetHQ Directorate targets for maturity objectives for FY 2018/19;</p> <p>March 2018/21 - OCUs, Departments, MetHQ Directorates and business areas will report on perceived baseline safety maturity as part of the assurance process which will be validated in FY 2018/19 by audit.</p> <p>The safety maturity matrix is to be amended before release to include a Health and Wellbeing thematic.</p>	
25	Ineffective Digital Policing Processes to manage H&S IT implementation requirements	<p>The MPS has faced a number of critical challenges on delivering their project plan milestones. Work remains ongoing to mitigate to ensure the project remains on target.</p> <p>The supplier Warwick International Computer systems (WICS) remained on target to deliver their project milestones within the project plan for a "go live" of May 2017.</p>	
27	Ineffective H&S governance of contractors	<p>Commercial Services' Procurement Instructions are being drafted, which will include how members of the department should incorporate health and safety requirements into their tenders. SHRMT have been given access to the 1049 mailbox, to give early sight of new procurement requests coming into the Department. The Contract Management Report will also be shared on a monthly basis to allow any high-risk contracts to be identified</p> <p>Commercial Services are working with the SHRMT to ensure that the MPS standard templates are fit for purpose. Those tenders where health and safety is identified as a key risk area will have tailored input from the SHRMT.</p>	292