

London Fire Commissioner

STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE 2017/18

Introduction

1. The Fire and Rescue National Framework for England sets out a requirement for fire and rescue authorities to provide an annual Statement of Assurance, providing assurance to communities and government on financial, governance and operational matters. In addition, the framework says that authorities should say how they have had due regard to the:
 - expectations set out in their Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP). For the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority, as was, and the London Fire Commissioner, as is now, this is the London Safety Plan; and
 - requirements included in the Framework.
2. The purpose of this statement is to satisfy the requirement to produce an annual statement under the National Framework. The statement also provides assurance against the Framework, and to the community of London and government, with respect to the areas highlighted above for the 2017/18 year (1 April 2017 to 31 March 2018). The National Framework in place for the period covered by this statement is the version issued by the government in July 2012.
3. The preparation of this Statement of Assurance follows guidance provided by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG). This guidance can be found [here](#).
4. The focus of this Statement is the year 1 April 2017 to 31 March 2018. It should be noted that for this financial year the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (the Authority) was the body responsible for ensuring that Brigade business was conducted in accordance with the law and appropriate standards. The London Fire Commissioner (LFC) is the successor fire and rescue authority to the previous governance body (the Authority), and is presenting this statement on behalf of Authority to demonstrate the financial, governance and operational arrangements that were in place for 2017/18, and to satisfy the requirement for a statement of assurance.

Assurance on Finance

5. All local authority accounts are required to adopt 'proper accounting practice' based on either statutory requirements or the Code of Practice on Local Authority Accounting in the UK (the Code) as published by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA). These specify the principles and practices of accounting required to prepare a Statement of Accounts that 'present a true and fair view'.
6. For the financial year, 2017/18, the Director of Corporate Services has provided an annual statement summarising and supporting the annual accounts. This summary and a copy of the accounts was approved and signed off by the London Fire Commissioner in July and are publicly available.
7. An independent audit of the accounts is undertaken by an external audit provider. For the year 2017/18, this work was undertaken by Ernst and Young LLP.

8. The external audit provider undertakes a review of the accounts and forms an overall opinion which is published by 31 July each year. This follows the statutory deadline for producing the accounts having been brought forward for the financial year 2017/18.
9. A copy of the statement of accounts report for 2017/18, along with the external auditor's opinion can be found [here](#).

Efficiency Plan

10. In March 2016 the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government invited local authorities to publish locally owned and locally driven four year efficiency plans. An Efficiency Plan for LFEPA was subsequently agreed by London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority on 29 September 2016, which then also went on to form part of a GLA wide Efficiency Plan. The planning assumptions included in that plan have been kept under review and progress against meeting the forecast budget gap was reported in the March 2018 Budget Update report (FEP2825).

Assurance on Governance

11. During 2017/18, the Authority's governance framework comprised the systems and processes, and culture and values, by which the Authority directed and controlled and the activities through which it accounted to, engaged with and led the community. It enabled the Authority to monitor the achievement of its strategic objectives and to consider whether those objectives led to the delivery of appropriate, cost-effective services.
12. The governance framework was underpinned by a Corporate Code of Governance which set out how the Authority discharged its governance responsibilities based on the six core principles defined in the CIPFA/SOLACE *Delivering Good Governance in Local Government* guidance. This includes defining scrutiny arrangements; maintaining effective policies and procedures on whistleblowing and complaint handling (on the London Fire website); and engaging with all sections of the local community through community safety strategies and partnerships to ensure accountability. The Corporate Code of Governance was last approved by the Authority on 27 September 2012.¹
13. The London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA) held the London Fire Brigade (LFB) to account and was assisted by four committees. Decision making arrangements were confirmed for 2017/18 following reconstitution of the Authority at the meeting in April 2017 (FEP2730). The reconstitution confirmed the roles and duties of the following Committees:
 - Resources Committee – had responsibilities for budgets, staffing and assets, and performance related to those responsibilities;
 - Strategy Committee – had responsibilities for policy and strategy for the service delivery functions of emergency response, prevention and protection, including responsibility for community engagement;
 - Governance, Performance and Audit Committee – had responsibilities for service delivery performance (excluding performance related specifically to the functions of the Resources Committee) and for all audit and governance matters, including the Annual Governance Statement; and
 - Appointments and Urgency Committee - met on an ad hoc basis as and when urgent matters or appointments dictated.

¹ The LFC approved a new Corporate Code of Governance on 1 April 2018.

14. In accordance with the Localism Act 2011, arrangements had to be put in place for the appointment by the Authority of at least one Independent Person. The Independent Person(s) views needed to be sought and taken into account by the Authority before it made any decision on a formal complaint against an elected Member that it has decided to investigate. The Independent Person's views would also be sought by a Member of the Authority if that person's behaviour was the subject of an allegation, and would also be sought by the Authority in relation to an allegation it had not yet decided to investigate. The Authority extended its appointment of two Independent Persons on 22 June 2017 (FEP2736) until 31 March 2018 (to coincide with the abolition of the Authority).
15. The Authority also established a Local Pensions Board (set up in 2015/16) for the firefighter pension schemes to support it on scheme governance and administration in its role as a Scheme Manager.
16. The terms of reference and delegated powers for these committees can be found [here](#).
17. The Mayor of London had powers to direct the Authority to take (or not to take) action. No new directions were received pertaining to the Authority during 2017/18².
18. The system of internal control was also a significant part of the Authority's governance framework and was designed to manage risk to a reasonable level. It could not eliminate all risk of failure to achieve policies, aims and objectives; it could therefore only provide reasonable and not absolute assurance of effectiveness.
19. The system of internal control was based on an ongoing process designed to identify and prioritise the risks to the achievement of the Authority's policies, aims and objectives, to evaluate the likelihood of those risks being realised and the impact should they be realised, and to manage them efficiently, effectively and economically.
20. The preparation of an Annual Governance Statement to support the Annual Statement of Accounts is a statutory requirement for local authorities. Its purpose is to demonstrate and evidence that there is a continuous review of the effectiveness of the Authority's internal control, performance and risk management systems. The Annual Governance Statement is signed by the LFC. The latest statement for 2017/18 includes one action to improve governance and focusses on the successful transition to the new governance arrangements.
21. The governance framework has been in place at the Authority for the year ended 31 March 2018 and supports the annual budget report and statement of accounts.
22. The system of internal control comprised a network of policies, procedures, systems, reports, processes and meetings. These arrangements were in place to verify the Authority's objectives, risk management arrangements, performance management processes and financial controls. These controls were in place to:

² One new Mayoral direction was received during 2017/18 (on 21 March 2018) which directed that the London Fire Commissioner Governance Direction be received and adopted on 1 April 2018. The Direction prepares for the governance changes as per the Policing and Crime Act 2017 and sets out those matters requiring the Mayor's approval, those matters requiring the Deputy Mayor for Fire and Resilience's approval, and those matters on which the Deputy Mayor for Fire and Resilience needs to be consulted. It also requires the Commissioner to follow the GLA Group Corporate Governance Framework Agreement and to follow GLA practice on staff political restrictions, based on those in the Local Government and Housing Act 1989.

- establish and monitor the achievement of the Authority's objectives through quarterly monitoring reports to members;
- facilitate policy and decision making via , for example Standing Orders, and the service planning process;
- ensure compliance with established policies, procedures, processes, laws and regulations, as underpinned by regular reviews carried out by internal and external auditors;
- establish and monitor the achievement of the Authority's objectives through regular monitoring reports to members;
- facilitate policy and decision making via , for example Standing Orders, and the service planning process;
- ensure compliance with established policies, procedures, processes, laws and regulations, as underpinned by regular reviews carried out by internal and external auditors;
- ensure the delivery of high quality services in an efficient and effective manner through established policies and procedures and the monitoring of performance through Directorate Management Boards, the Commissioner's Corporate Management Board, the Corporate Management Team, the Top Management Group performance meetings, the Governance, Performance and Audit Committee, the Resources Committee and the Strategy Committee;
- identify, assess and manage the risks to the Authority's objectives including risk management;
- ensure the economical, effective and efficient use of resources, and for securing continuous improvement in the way in which the Authority's functions are exercised, through the Authority's medium term financial forecasting and budget processes, strategic and annual internal audit plans, and the budget review process;
- provide appropriate financial management of the Authority and the reporting of financial management to the Resources Committee;
- provide adherence to the Authority's values and ethical standards through the application of the leadership model and equality framework; and
- ensure proper performance management of the Authority and the reporting of performance management through the Governance, Performance and Audit Committee, the Resources Committee and the Strategy Committee.

23. The Authority had a statutory duty, each financial year, to "*conduct a review of the effectiveness of the system of internal control*" to meet the statutory requirement set out in Regulation 6(1) of the Accounts and Audit Regulations 2015. Internal audit provides independent assurance on risk management internal controls and governance arrangements within the Authority. The internal audit function was conducted by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) for the Authority via a shared service agreement. MOPAC completed its audit plan for 2017/18 which consisted of 17 risk and assurance reviews, one management letter, 4 advisory reviews and 10 follow up reviews. From the work undertaken during the year, internal audit has concluded that the internal control framework was adequate, with controls to mitigate key risks, generally operating effectively.

24. The Authority met the mandatory data publication as set out in the DCLG Transparency Code (February 2015). There is a dedicated transparency page on the London Fire Brigade website [here](#) as well as a number of data sets on the [London Data Store](#), including data for all incidents attended and resources mobilised to those incidents since January 2009 (updated monthly). The web mapping tool ([here](#)) allows users to see the numbers of different types of incidents as well as attendance times for first and second fire engines down to ward level, and is updated monthly.

25. During 2017/18, the Head of Legal and Democratic Services was the Authority's Monitoring Officer and the duties of this role were discharged in line with the Monitoring Officer Protocol agreed by the Authority on 26 March 2009 (FEP1339).

Governance changes pertaining to LFEPA

26. The Policing and Crime Act received Royal Assent on 31 January 2017. The Act changed the governance arrangements for fire and rescue services in London by abolishing the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA) and creating the London Fire Commissioner (LFC) as a corporation sole having the functions of the fire and rescue authority for Greater London under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. A new London Fire Commissioner (LFC) has been appointed by the Mayor of London and under the arrangements, the Mayor has the power to give directions and guidance to the London Fire Commissioner relating to the exercise of their functions. The London Fire Commissioner's appointed statutory deputy is the Deputy Commissioner and Director of Operations. The Mayor has also appointed a Deputy Mayor for Fire and Resilience to exercise any function of the Mayor relating to fire and rescue. The Act also places a duty on police, fire and rescue and ambulance services to collaborate, and enables Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) outside London to take on responsibility for fire and rescue services in England and Wales. The governance changes arising from the Act came into effect on 1 April 2018.

Assurance on Operations

27. The National Framework outlines the requirements for fire and rescue authorities to provide assurance on operational matters.
28. Fire and rescue authorities function within a clearly defined statutory and policy framework. The key documents defining operational responsibilities for LFEPA were:
- The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004
 - The Civil Contingencies Act 2004
 - The Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005
 - The Fire and Rescue Services (Emergencies) (England) Order 2007
 - The Localism Act 2011
 - The Fire and Rescue National Framework for England 2012.
 - Policing and Crime Act 2017 (see above)
29. The purpose of this section is to provide assurance that the service was delivered in line with the Brigade's statutory responsibilities and in consideration of Integrated Risk Management Plans and local strategies, including cross-border, multi-agency and national arrangements.

Integrated Risk Management Plan (London Safety Plan)

30. The Fire and Rescue National Framework sets out the requirement that each fire and rescue authority must produce an Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP) that identifies and assesses all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community, including those of a cross-border, multi-authority and/or national nature. The plan must have regard to the Community Risk Registers produced by Local Resilience Forums and any other local risk analyses as appropriate.
31. The Authority's London Safety Plan ([here](#)) – which was the Authority's corporate plan and its Integrated Risk Management Plan as required by the government's fire and rescue service national framework - set out the Authority's plans for improvement in services to address the risks facing Londoners, together with the management arrangements required to implement them. The Plan in place for the period covered by this statement was approved by the Authority on 30

March 2017 (FEP2723) and was developed to cover the period from 2017 to 2021. An inclusive approach was taken to the development of the Plan incorporating the ideas, views and contributions from as many people as possible. Details of the public consultation undertaken can be found in the covering report to the Plan (FEP2723). Key performance indicators and targets are included in the London Safety Plan and the relevant committees have reviewed indicators and targets on an annual basis. The London Safety Plan is the extant corporate plan and Integrated Risk Management Plan for the London Fire Commissioner.

Our risk based approach

32. Each London Safety Plan is supported by a risk based approach in order to plan emergency cover. The approach taken for the current Plan (i.e. the Plan in place for the period covered by this statement) was incorporated into the London Safety Plan under the 'Risk in London' section.
33. A number of considerations make up the Brigade's approach when deciding how to provide its service. This includes:-
 - the principle of equal entitlement - in the event of a serious incident, each person should be entitled to expect a broadly similar response in terms of the resources deployed and the time taken to arrive;
 - an understanding of risk in London based on the likelihood of an incident occurring and its consequences; distinguishing between likelihood and consequence, because, in general terms, different activities are carried out for each;
 - the full range of incident types that the Brigade attends;
 - incident trends - there is a strong, long-term, trend in nearly all types of incidents that demand a response from London Fire Brigade. There is a very strong relationship between where the Brigade has attended incidents in the recent past and where it attends incidents now;
 - assessment of local risk – a risk tool that shows Londoners what the Brigade knows about their local area;
 - targeting people at risk - using many information data gathering and analysis tools to identify and target those most at risk from fire; and
 - London's demography – understanding the relationship between the number of people and buildings in London and the number of emergency incidents.

Safety outcomes in 2017/18

34. Key performance indicators and targets are agreed as part of the London Safety Plan and are reviewed on an annual basis. All key LSP targets and commitments, as well as key projects, were subject to scrutiny and monitoring by the Resources, Strategy, and Governance, Performance and Audit Committees.
35. The Authority refreshed its targets for 2017/18 as part of the new London Safety Plan. Overall, the Authority had performed well against the majority of its targets for 2017/18. This information is available online in the annual end of year performance report on the London Fire website under 'Information we publish' (via the following link <https://www.london-fire.gov.uk/about-us/transparency/information-we-publish/>). Commentaries against performance can also be found in the performance reports to the Governance, Performance and Audit Committee and the Resources Committee.
36. Overall, performance, and safety outcomes for Londoners, for 2017/18 reveals that the majority of indicators set as part of the London Safety Plan are on target. The key headlines are:

- Total incidents attended by the London Fire Brigade in 2017/18 (104,694) decreased slightly compared to the previous year (104,721),
- The number of primary fires attended in 2017/18 (10,615) was almost the same as the previous year (10,618)
- The number of dwelling fires (5,641) increased by 2.5 per cent compared to the previous year (2016/17) but the long term trend was down by 6 per cent compared to five years earlier (2013/14).
- Over 83,336 home fire safety visits (HFSV) have been conducted and is well in excess of the target of 73,000 for 2017/18.
- The number of arson incidents (i.e. all fires of deliberate motive) (3,763) saw a large reduction of 10 per cent compared to the previous year (2016/17), reversing the trend which had seen arson incidents increase over the previous two years
- The total number of fire fatalities for 2017/18 based on the 10 year rolling average was 51. There were 110 fire deaths in 2017/18 which is higher than the 44 fire deaths in 2016/17. This includes the fire fatalities which occurred at the tragic Grenfell Tower fire on 14 June 2017. More on this incident is provided later in the statement.
- The number of serious fire injuries (686) for 2017/18 increased over the previous year (542) and reflects the challenging year which the Brigade has faced. This number also includes injuries as a result of the Grenfell Tower fire. Performance in this area is now worse than it was five years ago (647 in 2013/14). However, the overall number of total injuries from fire continues to fall to 966 for 2017/18 which represents a 17 per cent improvement over the position five years ago (1,164 in 2013/14).
- Our headline indicator for primary fires in non-domestic properties (H3) focusses on those property types covered by the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 (RRO). There were 1,986 fires in these types of building in 2017/18, and this is a 2 per cent increase over the end of year position for 2016/17 (1,952). However performance remains within target.
- The speed of attendance to incidents by both first and second fire pumping appliances continues to remain well within the performance targets (6 minutes and 8 minutes, on average, respectively). On average, a first appliance arrived at an incident in 5 minutes 14 seconds and a second appliance in 6 minutes 35 seconds. The first appliance arrived within 10 minutes on over 96 per cent of occasions.
- The number of unwanted calls (false alarms) caused by automatic fire alarms (AFAs) in non-domestic buildings (22,017) increased by 0.5 per cent compared to the previous year (21,929 - 2016/17). This means the indicator is off target although it should be noted that the target was revised to 20,000 for 2017/18. Compared to the year end position five years ago however, this still represents a reduction of 5 per cent (23,235 – 2013/14).

Grenfell Tower fire

37. On 14 June 2017, the Brigade received the first of multiple calls to a fire at Grenfell Tower in North Kensington. The fire affected all floors of the 24 storey building and was declared a major incident by the Brigade. The fire was the biggest incident and loss of life the Brigade has seen since the Second World War.
38. Following the fire, the Brigade initiated an investigation to establish and understand the facts of the fire and the LFB response in order to fulfil its statutory duty to review its response and identify operational learning. This work is also key in preparing the organisation to support the Public Inquiry, Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) investigation and any subsequent Inquest proceedings. The investigation and associated activities are headed at a strategic level by a Deputy Assistant Commissioner who has determined key work streams and seconded Brigade

staff into established posts to form a core team to support these functions. This team is known as the Grenfell Tower Investigation and Review team (GTIRT).

39. GTIRT is a stand-alone investigative group that will provide updates to the organisation, operating outside the established Brigade organisational structures but within the parameters of a Terms of Reference agreed by the London Fire Commissioner. However, so as not to risk compromising any criminal proceedings and given that the MPS has primacy for managing the investigation, it has been agreed that the LFB will keep the MPS Senior Investigation Officer (SIO) apprised of all aspects of its own review work.
40. Her Majesty's Government, under the Inquiries Act 2005, opened a Public Inquiry into the Grenfell Tower fire in September 2017, and appointed the retired Court of Appeal Court Judge Sir Martin Moore-Bick as the Chairman. The Authority applied to the inquiry to be a core participant, to allow the Authority to take a full part in the proceedings.
41. The police investigation and public inquiry into the fire, potential future inquests into the deaths of those who sadly lost their lives and the review into the Brigade's own operational response means its impact will continue to be felt for a long time.

Operational competence

42. The Authority had a statutory duty to ensure that all operational staff were trained to undertake their role effectively and safely. Training requirements for operational staff include a number of generic core risk critical skills that all staff must develop and maintain. These core skills are set out in a formal Brigade policy - "The development and maintenance of operational professionalism" (DaMOP).
43. Training within the London Fire Brigade (LFB) is divided into two main areas:
 - *Acquisition of skills training* – The initial learning phase. The Authority's external training provider is responsible for acquisition of skills training. This includes the training of newly appointed firefighters as well as the development of new skills for more experienced staff undertaking new or modified roles.
 - *Maintenance of skills training* - Once the initial acquisition of skills training has taken place, it will be necessary for staff to practise their skills, knowledge and understanding, in conjunction with, and in addition to, their existing skills, knowledge and understanding. This 'practice' is what is referred to as maintenance of skills training.
44. The Brigade's dynamic and intelligent operational training (DIOT) process has been in place for a number of years to support the maintenance of operational competence. The DIOT process identifies and responds to risk critical issues that have the potential to effect operational performance (and staff). The process monitors operational and training performance, identifying developmental trends and provides mechanisms, including the implementation of training interventions to support operational staff.
45. At the heart of the process is effective information gathering which allows crews, monitoring officers and specialist officers, to record and identify developmental trends arising from incidents and training events. Information is recorded that describes individual and team performance and captures the issues related to training, equipment and procedures. The Operational Professionalism Board, chaired by the Deputy Commissioner, Safety and Assurance receives regular reports summarising the information gathered, and makes decisions about changes to and new training interventions, as well as communication/awareness via the Operational News internal publication.

46. The DIOT process is linked to DaMOP which sets out what is required to enable staff at stations to maintain their professionalism by continually developing their skills, knowledge and understanding. The DIOT process is closely aligned to the requirements of "HSG 65 - Successful Health and Safety Management" produced by the Health and Safety Executive.
47. During 2018/19, a review of DaMOP will take place, and will aim to deliver a new framework and internal assurance process that integrates local and centralised training (where appropriate) in order to ensure that the organisation and individuals in operational, Control and specialist roles are able to demonstrate maintenance of their professional competence. Improving our systems, will be a key part of this project.
48. The Brigade is a learning organisation and continually strives to maintain and improve operational competence, and the DaMOP process is a central strand to this. The Brigade is also mindful of recommendations that may arise through formal inquiries and inquests. The past 18 months have been challenging for the Brigade in terms of the types of incidents it has faced, and this includes the Grenfell Tower fire and the Westminster and London Bridge terrorist attacks. As an active participant in the Grenfell Tower fire Public Inquiry, the Westminster Inquest, and the London Bridge Inquest, the Brigade will carefully review the outcomes and recommendations arising from each.
49. Matters of operational competence were reported regularly to the Resources Committee through standard performance reports. This included trend reporting on health and safety events (RIDDORs), and training performance. An annual health and safety report was also provided to the Committee in July providing a full overview of performance against key health and safety indicators. This included preventative initiatives and interventions, premises audits, occupational health, workforce liaison, and compliance and liaison with the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).
50. The number of **Safety events reported under RIDDOR** first dipped below 100 events two years ago (in 2015/16). These events are those more serious events required to be reported to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases, and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR) 2013. The figure for 2017/18 of 82 RIDDOR reportable injuries is an increase over the record low figure reported for 2016/17 (73) but it is a significant improvement over the high point of the last five years (133 in 2014/15). Additionally, as part of the development of the London Safety Plan (2017), officers have introduced new targets/ context measures to specifically monitor key safety areas. This includes injuries on the incident ground and injuries to members public through road traffic collisions with brigade vehicles.
51. Officers are also able to confirm that the Brigade does not have many serious injuries (i.e. we have very few 'specified' injuries under RIDDOR) and the incidents continue to mainly relate to slips, trips and falls and the moving and handling of operational equipment (as in previous years). The improvement reflects work by officers to improve health and safety awareness, including a premises slips and trips risk assessment programme to proactively identify and record slips and trips risks on Brigade premises.

Mutual aid agreements

52. Fire and rescue authorities must make provision to respond to incidents such as fires, road traffic collisions and emergencies within their area, and in other areas in line with mutual aid agreements. We refer to these arrangements as 'cross border' and resources that may be requested to deploy cross-border are mobilised under mutual aid arrangements provided for under sections 13 and 16 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (FRSA).

53. The Brigade holds mutual agreements with all its surrounding fire and rescue authority areas. Incidents where there could be resources from two or more fire and rescue services are a relatively common occurrence between the Brigade and the six surrounding fire authorities namely – Hertfordshire, Essex, Kent, Surrey, Royal Berkshire, and Buckinghamshire. Brigade resources may also be mobilised cross border to 'standby' at neighbouring FRS stations. Deployments for 2017/18 show that the Brigade mobilised to 465 cross border incidents. This is a decrease from 2016/17 (549). Similarly, the number of incidents (836) attended by neighbouring authorities for incidents in London is also a decrease over 2016/17 (863).
54. Charging neighbouring fire and rescue authorities for the use of Brigade resources under section 13/16 of the FRSA was introduced in April 2014. This has been reciprocated by most neighbouring fire and rescue authorities who are now also charging the Brigade for the use of their resources.

National resilience

55. For the purposes of this document, national resilience is defined as the capacity and capability of fire and rescue authorities to work together and with other Category 1 and 2 responders to deliver a sustained, effective response to major incidents, emergencies and disruptive challenges, such as (but not limited to) those identified in the [National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies](#).
56. It refers to risks that need to be planned for on a strategic, national basis because their impacts and consequences would be of such scale and/or complexity that local resources would be insufficient, even when taking into account mutual aid arrangements, pooling and reconfiguration of resources and collective action.
57. The National Framework makes clear there is a need to plan for, and occasionally respond, to incidents of such scale and/or complexity. Thus, the Government retains strategic responsibility for national resilience, though, of course, it is heavily reliant upon local fire and rescue authorities in support of this. And so, the National Framework sets out the requirement of Fire and Rescue Authorities to work collectively but also with the Fire and Rescue Strategic Resilience Board to provide assurance to government that:
- Risks are assessed, plans are in place and any gaps between existing capability and that needed to ensure national resilience are identified;
 - Existing specialist national resilience capabilities are fit-for-purpose and resilient; and
 - Any new capabilities that fire and rescue authorities are commissioned to deliver by Government are procured, maintained and managed in the most cost-effective manner that delivers value for money whilst ensuring capabilities are fit-for-purpose and resilient.
58. The National Resilience Programme is one part of the Department for Communities and Local Government's contribution to the Government's Civil Contingencies Capabilities Programme. The strategic aim is to continue to enhance preparedness and resilience of the fire and rescue services in England and Wales by maintaining and improving the capability of the National Assets. The programme consists of a number of distinct capabilities. These are:
- Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive CBRN(E);
 - Urban Search and Rescue (USAR);
 - Water and High Volume Pumping (HVP); and
 - Command and Control.
59. Twenty per cent of the National Resilience assets are located within the Brigade area reflecting the importance of the capital city to national resilience in providing these capabilities to both the London region and the rest of the country. The Brigade hosted the co-ordination of these national

assets at the London Operations Centre (LOC) up to 31 March 2017. The function has since moved to the National Resilience Assurance Team in Merseyside.

60. The Brigade has a full USAR capability, as part of the resilience programme, for providing fire and rescue services with a national capability to respond and effectively manage large-scale structural collapses and heavy transportation type incidents. This national capability is designed to augment existing local and specialised planning arrangements within Brigades or regions. As part of this national capability, the LFB provides USAR trained personnel to respond to incidents outside of the Brigade area.
61. Assessment and assurance regarding the Brigade's USAR capability is exercised through the National Resilience Assurance Team (NRAT). The assurance process has been developed as a long term procedure to ensure that the fire and rescue services which have received National Resilience assets, achieve and maintain an efficient, robust and effective operational capability to respond to national and major emergencies. In previous years, this has centred on thematic reviews, including multi-capability and the dedicated use of equipment and vehicles. The assessment process has now changed to a three year rolling programme. At a high level, the process works as follows:
- Year 1 – Self-assessment
 - Year 2 – Coordinated exercise with direct observation by NRAT
 - Year 3 – National or regional exercise
62. The Brigade has recently completed year three of the programme. The NRAT assessor programme focusses on areas such as USAR worksite management and coordination, planning, logistics, operations, worksite safety and structural monitoring and intra/inter-operability. During 2017/18, two exercises were carried out, 'Black Kite' in June 2017 and 'Dark Fell' in March 2018. The general observations from the exercises concluded that the *"professionalism and enthusiasm demonstrated by the USAR teams during both exercises was in the main exemplary throughout. The partnership working demonstrated during both exercises underpinned the value that the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) principles provide with effective collaborative principles being repeatedly demonstrated. Feedback from a wide range of participating organisations was very favorable towards the USAR teams."*
63. Brigade staff also lead the fire and rescue service nationally in terms of the sector's role in the government CONTEST strategy. This involves working collaboratively with colleagues from the other blue light agencies as well as government departments to develop multi-agency operational capabilities for responding to a wide range of terrorist related threats. London has successfully introduced the concept of inter-agency liaison officers (ILOs) to UK fire and rescue services and the National ILO coordinator is a London officer. The Londoner Fire Commissioner is the National Fire Chief Council's Fire and Rescue Service Strategic Counter-Terrorism lead.

Business Continuity

64. There are a number of identified infrastructure and workforce related risks that are relevant to the Brigade. These can largely be divided into two categories: those risks that have the potential to place high levels of demand on the operational service (major incidents and emergencies) and those risks that have the potential to disrupt the service (business disruptions).
65. The Brigade has established business continuity arrangements in place. Since 2005 there has been a formal business continuity programme which has led to the successful identification of the activities that are critical to the organisation, enabled the exploration of the dependencies that exist between them and has assisted in the development and review of business continuity plans.

66. It is important that continuity arrangements are tested to assess their adequacy and to incorporate lessons learnt from testing to further improve plans. A number of other larger scale exercise arrangements and real life events have also taken place since the last statement to the Authority. These are detailed below.

Exercise Ancient Mariner

67. On the 26 April 2017, the Brigade's business continuity coordinators ran an exercise specifically designed to test the Commissioner's Group as part of the Strategic Response Arrangements (SRA). The exercise was designed to simulate the effects of a contamination and subsequent disruption to the water supply in a heavily populated area of London.
68. The scenario focused on an interruption of the water supply to areas of Southwark and Lambeth, which included the Brigade's HQ and several fire stations, as well as hospitals, tower blocks and major transport hubs. The exercise tested the ability of the Commissioner's Group to strategically manage an evolving situation, including maintaining staff health and safety whilst ensuring operational cover, redirecting resources appropriately, developing an effective communication strategy (internal and external) and preparing for evacuation of HQ and a controlled fall back to the LOC (Merton) and other designated Brigade premises.

Business disruptions

69. 2017/18 has seen a unprecedented number and variety of potential business disruptions that have or had the potential to impact on the Brigade's provision of service and business continuity arrangements. Below is a list of the major incident that required an enhanced response and resulted in the Brigade standing up elements of its business continuity arrangements.

Cyber attack – 12 May 2017

70. On Friday 12 May 2017, a worldwide cyber-attack took place, which within 24 hours was reported to have infected more than 230,000 computers in over 150 countries. Most notably in the UK, the National Health Service was impacted by the ransomware.
71. Brigade ICT systems were not impacted and once ICT were made aware of the attack, a series of measures were initiated to ensure that the risks to brigade systems were as low as possible. Whilst a significant number of systems already had the necessary security patches applied, additional work was undertaken to bring remaining systems up to date. This included bringing forward planned security related work that had been scheduled to take place out of hours.

Manchester Arena bombing - 22 May 2017

72. A shrapnel-laden homemade bomb was detonated outside Manchester Arena following a concert, the explosion killed 23 people and injured more than 250. Due to the following investigation carried out by Greater Manchester Police, the UK's terror threat level was raised to "Critical", its highest possible level. As a result, the Brigade increased its protective security arrangements within all its premises, and elements of the SRA were moved to alert before the threat level was reduced back down to "Severe" the following day.

London Bridge attack - 3 June 2017

73. A van occupied by three assailants struck a number of pedestrians on London Bridge before crashing into a bollard. The three assailants then exited the vehicle and proceeded to stab members of the public in the surrounding area and within local establishments, resulting in eight fatalities and 48 injuries.
74. The emergency services response to the incident took less than 8 minutes, with the MPS, LAS and LFB standing up their respective Strategic Response Arrangements. In accordance with the

SRA policy, the Brigade stood-up the Brigade Coordination Centre (BCC) and Commissioner's Group (CG), enabling the Brigade to effectively assist partner agencies with the multi-agency response required.

Parsons Green attack - 15 September 2017

75. An attempted terror attack targeting the underground network took place at Parson Green Station during the morning rush hour on 15 September. An improvised explosive device was activated on a tube carriage, but failed to detonate properly. However, thirty people were injured as a result of flash burns from the detonator.
76. Shortly after the event the UK Terror threat level was raised to 'Critical' , the Brigade activated the SRA arrangements and the BCC/CG were both stood up until the threat level was downgraded back to 'Severe' on the 17 September 2017.

Contingency arrangements

77. In addition to the business continuity requirements of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, fire and rescue authorities also have a statutory duty under Section 7 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 to "secure the provision of the personnel, services and equipment necessary to efficiently meet all normal requirements". To meet the requirements of this duty, there are contingency arrangements (emergency fire crew capability (EFCC)) to deploy emergency fire crews and fire appliances capable of delivering services within a defined concept of operations. These arrangements have not needed to be used during 2017/18.

Assurance Declaration

78. This statement functions as the Authority's Statement of Assurance under the Fire and Rescue Service National Framework. Officers are satisfied that the Authority's system of internal control fulfils the requirements of the National Framework., and that the Authority's financial and governance and operational assurance arrangements are adequate and operating effectively.

Dany Cotton QFSM

London Fire Commissioner

Date: November 2018

Annex to the Statement of Assurance – Key evidence of compliance with the National Framework (2012)

	Requirement	Compliance Evidenced by:-Source Documents/Processes
Section 1: Safer Communities		
Identify and assess	Each fire and rescue authority must produce an integrated risk management plan that identifies and assesses all foreseeable fire and rescue related risks that could affect its community, including those of a cross-border, multi-authority and/or national nature. The plan must have regard to the Community Risk Registers produced by Local Resilience Forums and any other local risk analyses as appropriate.	London Safety Plan incorporating sections on: - Risk in London - Helping to make London safe - Responding in an emergency - Responding effectively (working with neighbouring brigades) Assessment of local risk
Prevent and protect	- Fire and rescue authorities must work with communities to identify and protect them from risk and to prevent incidents from occurring. - Each fire and rescue authority integrated risk management plan must: - o demonstrate how prevention, protection and response activities will best be used to mitigate the impact of risk on communities, through authorities working either individually or collectively, in a cost effective way; and - o set out its management strategy and risk based programme for enforcing the provisions of the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in accordance with the principles of better regulation set out in the Statutory Code of Compliance for Regulators, and the Enforcement Concordat.	LSP Commitments: LSP1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12 Home Fire Safety Full Guide (on website) Essential reading for businesses and organisations (on website) London Safety Plan - Section on Helping to make London safe, incorporating an integrated community safety programme, working smarter with people and businesses, wellbeing in the community, strategic partnerships to reduce risk, community safety investment fund. London Safety Plan - Section on Helping to make London safe, incorporating enforcing fire safety laws, understanding our approach, protecting heritage buildings in London, understanding complex buildings, high rise.
Respond	Fire and rescue authorities must make provision to respond to incidents such as fires, road traffic accidents and emergencies within their area and in other areas in line with their mutual aid agreements, and reflect this in their integrated risk management plans.	London Safety Plan - Responding in an emergency Section 13/16 agreements

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	Requirement	Compliance Evidenced by:-Source Documents/Processes
	Fire and rescue authorities must have effective business continuity arrangements in place in accordance with their duties under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and to meet the full range of service delivery risks.	Strategic Response Arrangements Corporate Business Continuity Policy Capitalguard London Local Authority Coordination Centre London Local Resilience Forum
	Fire and rescue authorities must collaborate with other fire and rescue authorities to deliver intra-operability.	Cross Border agreements (section 13/16 agreements) National resilience assets National operational guidance programme
	Fire and rescue authorities must collaborate with other fire and rescue authorities, other emergency services, wider Category 1 and 2 responders and Local Resilience Forums to ensure interoperability.	London Local Resilience Forum National Inter-agency liaison officer – LFB officer Inter-agency liaison offers (ILOs)
Resilience	Fire and rescue authorities need to have the necessary capability in place to manage the majority of risks that may face their areas, either individually or collectively through collaborative arrangements with other fire and rescue authorities and responders.	London Risk Register London Local Resilience Forum and partnership arrangements National resilience assets Cross Border agreements (section 13/16 agreements)
	Fire and rescue authorities must engage with the Fire and Rescue Strategic Resilience Board in order to support discussions and decision making in relation to national resilience.	Commissioner - member of FRSRB and National Resilience Lead for CBRN(E)
	Fire and rescue authorities' risk assessments must include an analysis of any gaps between their existing capability and that needed to ensure national resilience (as defined above).	LSP commitment: LSP15 Operational Resilience Department Special Operations Group Assessment by NRAT
	As part of their analysis, fire and rescue authorities must highlight to the Department, or the Fire and Rescue Strategic Resilience Board, any capability gaps that they believe cannot be met even when taking into account mutual aid arrangements, pooling and reconfiguration of resources and collective action.	LFB lead in CONTEST strategy
Capability building	Fire and rescue authorities must work collectively, through the Fire and Rescue Strategic Resilience Board, to agree with the Department whether and/or how to address any capability gaps identified through the gap analysis.	Commissioner – member of FRSRB

	Requirement	Compliance Evidenced by:-Source Documents/Processes
Working in partnership	In order to meet the requirements of this Framework, fire and rescue authorities must work in partnership with their communities and a wide range of partners locally and nationally.	Borough Commander - community lead Crime and disorder partnerships Youth work Adult safeguarding Primary Authority Partnerships
Communities planning their FRS	- Each fire and rescue authority integrated risk management plan must: - be easily accessible and publicly available; - reflect effective consultation throughout its development and at all review stages with the community, its workforce and representative bodies, and partners; and - cover at least a three year time span and be reviewed and revised as often as it is necessary to ensure that fire and rescue authorities are able to deliver the requirements set out in this Framework; and reflect up to date risk.	London Fire website, hardcopies on request Consultation process (LSP covering report – FEP 2723) LSP - 4 year plan with review - Annual assessment of risk
Section 2: Accountable to Communities		
Transparent scrutiny arrangements	The fire and rescue authority must hold their Chief Fire Officer/Chief Executive to account for the delivery of the fire and rescue service.	Authority meetings Delegated authority arrangements Committee constitution/Terms of reference
	Fire and rescue authorities must have arrangements in place to ensure that their decisions are open to scrutiny.	Committee/Authority papers on London Fire Public attendance at meetings Trade unions consultation
Transparent data	Fire and rescue authorities must make their communities aware of how they can access data and information on their performance.	Data and transparency arrangements - London Fire London Datastore
Section 3: Assurance		
Assurance	Fire and rescue authorities must provide assurance on financial, governance and operational matters and show how they have had due regard to the expectations set out in their integrated risk management plan and the requirements included in this Framework. To provide assurance, fire and rescue authorities must publish an annual Statement of Assurance.	Annual Governance Statement Statement of Assurance

	Requirement	Compliance Evidenced by:-Source Documents/Processes
National resilience assurance	- In addition to the assurance arrangements detailed above, fire and rescue authorities must work collectively, and with the Fire and Rescue Strategic Resilience Board, to provide assurance to Government, that: - risks are assessed, plans are in place and any gaps between existing capability and that needed to ensure national resilience are identified; - existing specialist national resilience capabilities are fit-for-purpose and resilient; and - any new capabilities that fire and rescue authorities are commissioned to deliver by Government are procured, maintained and managed in the most cost-effective manner that delivers value for money whilst ensuring capabilities are fit-for-purpose and resilient.	Commissioner – member of FRSRB LFB lead in CONTEST strategy National Resilience Assurance Team National resilience assets Exercise programmes – USAR, Unified Response Lambeth Blue Light Demonstration Day
Section 4: Context, Timescale, Scope		
Legislation	Section 21 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 provides the statutory basis for the Framework and requires fire and rescue authorities to have regard to the Framework in carrying out their functions.	London Safety Plan Annual Governance Statement Statement of Assurance
Support and intervention	The expectation of the Government is that fire and rescue authorities, and their political and professional leadership, have proactive processes in place that provide support and lead improvement. In this context, improvement is delivered through peer led responses and effective partnership working.	London Blue Light Collaboration Programme National Operational Guidance JESIP Know the Plan Primary Authority Partnerships



Statement of Assurance 2017/18

Performance data for five years to 2017/18

November 2018

The London Fire Commissioner is the fire and rescue authority for London and is head of the London Fire Brigade.

About this publication

Publication date: 1 November 2018

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This document, and the accompanying tables, are available to download from the London Datastore at <https://data.london.gov.uk/publisher/lfb>

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The London Fire Commissioner and the London Fire Brigade

The London Fire Commissioner (LFC) is the fire and rescue authority for London and is head of the London Fire Brigade.

For more information about LFC and the work of the London Fire Brigade visit www.london-fire.gov.uk.

Other LFB Data publications

The London Fire Brigade Fire Facts publications are:

- Fires incident response times, 2017 – [here](#)
- Fires in Greater London, 2017 – [here](#)
- Fatal fires in Greater London, 2017 – [here](#)
- Finance and performance reporting 2017/18 – [here](#)

Other data available

The LFB publishes a range of data on the London Datastore. Much of these data are updated on a monthly basis. Go to the LFB page on the datastore to see what is available – <https://data.london.gov.uk/publisher/lfb>

Version history

This version (v1.1) published on 16 January 2019 with a minor correction on page 12.

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Introduction

This document sets out key performance information for five years to 2017/18 to support the Statement of Assurance (SoA) for 2017/18.

During the five year period covered by this document, changes were made to the number of fire stations and fire engines as part of the implementation of the Fifth London Safety Plan¹ (LSP5). The LSP5 closed 10 fire stations in London and removed 14 pumping appliances and was implemented in January 2014. In addition to the LSP5 changes, 13 further fire engines were permanently removed from stations in June 2016; these fire engines had been temporarily removed from stations in August 2013 to provide a contingency resource – the Emergency Fire Crew Capability (EFCC) – in the event of strike action.

Fifth London Safety Plan (LSP5)

The Fifth London Safety Plan (LSP5) was approved by the former London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA) on 12 September 2013, following a Mayoral Direction. Changes to fire stations and fire engines set out in the LSP5 were implemented on 9 January 2014 as follows:

- The closure of 10 fire stations.
- The number of fire engines (pumping appliances) reduced by 14 (net).
- Five appliances were redeployed to different stations.
- The number of fire rescue units (specialist rescue vehicles) reduced from 16 to 14.
- The minimum crewing levels on fire rescue units reduced from five firefighters to four.

Other changes at stations were introduced (before 9 January 2014) including:

- Alternate crewing introduced on the scientific support units at Poplar and Hammersmith.

- Alternate crewing introduced on the two remaining incident response units at Wimbledon and Plaistow
- On-demand mobilising for hose-laying and bulk foam units at the incident support centres.

Impacts on performance in the period since LSP5 to 2017/18

Performance in 2017/18 is impacted by a range of changes alongside those in LSP5 which includes the temporary removal of EFCC appliances and station/appliances temporary changes as a result of the PFI station rebuilding programme. In considering some of the numbers in this document it is important to recognise the changes to fire stations and fire engines across the five performance years (April to March), as follows:

- **in 2013/14** – the performance year with 27 EFCC appliances temporarily removed (from August 2013), LSP5 changes implemented (from January 2014) and stations/appliances changes arising from the property PFI project (from various dates).
- **in 2014/15** – the performance year with LSP5 changes fully implemented, but still with 13 EFCC appliances removed and station changes arising from the station PFI project.
- **in 2015/16** – the performance year with LSP5 changes fully implemented, 13 EFCC appliances temporarily removed from stations, and temporary station closures arising from the PFI station rebuilding programme. In November 2015, a new mobilising system was live, which introduced (a) mobilising to individual addresses (rather to a street); and (b) geographic mobilising which used a fire engine location to determine which was closest to be mobilised to an incident.
- **in 2016/17** – the performance with LSP5 changes fully implemented, 13 EFCC appliances temporarily removed from stations from April 2016 and permanently removed from June 2016, and

¹ The London Safety Plan is the LFC's Integrated Risk Management Plan.

there were a few temporary station closures arising from the PFI station rebuilding programme in April, May and June 2016.

- **in 2017/18** – the SoA year. There were no changes to fire stations or fire appliances this year.

Performance reporting


The data in this document is not focussed on performance against indicators/targets, but provides a trend analysis for the various data sets present.

The former LFEPA Governance, Performance and Audit Committee (GPAC) in November 2017 received a six monthly performance report which detailed performance against indicators (including much of the data in this report), with commentary. The last report considered by LFEPA was for the period to end September 2017 (FEP2801). That report is available [here](#).


The end of year position for 2017/18 was published by the London Fire Commissioner and is available on the Brigade's web site and on the London Datastore [here](#). The data published in this document for 2017/18 is consistent with the end of year report.

Emergency calls received and incidents attended

- The numbers of emergency (999) calls received and the incidents attended over the five years to 2017/18 are set out in the chart below.
- Data for incidents attended is available in annex 1C (borough) and 2B (ward). Emergency call data is not available at ward or borough level as the location of a caller is not captured.
- London-wide, the number of **incidents attended** by the Brigade in 2017/18 was similar to 2016/17 and only slightly above the number in 2013/14. The number of **emergency calls received** was slightly lower in 2017/18, and two per cent lower than five years ago.




- The total number of **fires** attended fell slightly in 2017/18 and was below 20,000 for only the second time ever (previously in 2014/15) and is the lowest annual number of fires on record. **Special services** showed a slight fall in 2017/18 and this is due to fewer attendance at medical incidents because the co-responding trial with the London Ambulance Service had come to an end in September 2017. **False alarms** were up in 2017/18 compared to the year earlier and at the highest level of the five years shown.



Attendance times

First, second and third pumping appliances

- The London-wide attendance time performance² for first, second and third pumping appliances (fire engines) is summarised in the chart below. London-wide and borough attendance times for five years are set out in annex 1A (borough) and Annex 2A (ward). The Brigade aims to meet its attendance standard at borough level, but does not undertake to meet its attendance standards at any smaller geography (e.g. at ward level).




- Average speed of arrival for a **first appliance** at an incident in 2017/18, at 5m:13s, is some five seconds faster than in 2013/14 (the year before the LSP5 changes were fully implemented). In 2017/18, only Hillingdon borough fell outside the six minutes average target for first appliance (at 6m:13s). The temporary closure of some fire stations for rebuilding between 2014/15 and 2015/16 resulted in slower first and second appliance times in those years.
- London-wide, **second appliance** average response time to incidents in 2017/18, at 6m:34s, was five seconds faster than in 2013/14 (the year before the LSP5 changes were fully implemented). In 2017/18, only Hillingdon borough was just outside the second appliance average attendance target of eight minutes at 8m:01s. The changes in LSP5 and the removal of EFCC appliances would have impacted more on second appliance performance given the overall removal of 17 second fire engines (compared to 10 first fire engines).
- London-wide, the average **third appliance** response time, at 7m:46s, in 2017/18 was 24 seconds faster than in 2016/17, and the faster time out of the five years shown. There is no target for third appliance speed of arrival, but performance is well within the benchmark average of 10 minutes used during LSP5 consultation. No borough in 2017/18 fell outside this benchmark.

² See the 'Notes on data,' on page 19.


- In considering attendance time performance, it should be noted that 58 per cent of all incidents were attended by only one appliance; 33 per cent of incidents received two appliances, with just 10 per cent receiving three or more appliances. The data underpinning third appliance attendance time performance is, therefore, more limited than that for the first appliance.

Pumps attending incidents in the five years to 2017/18



Overall pumping appliance 'incident' response time and crew turn-out time


- The overall **incident response time**, at 6m:54s, was 14 seconds faster in 2017/18 than the year before (2016/17), and the best time of the five years shown. The London-wide performance is shown in the chart below. As the incident response time covers call handling, the equivalent performance target (for a first appliance) would be an average 7m40s (1:40 call handling plus 6 minute attendance). Only Enfield and Hillingdon boroughs had an incident response time outside this notional target. Details of the overall **incident response time** between answering the 999 call answer and arrival of the first pumping appliance at incident scene are published for in annexes 1A (borough) and 2A (ward).
- Crew turn-out** performance, at 1m:16s, is the fastest of the five years shown in the chart below. Apart from in 2015/16, when turn-out times were impacted by temporary deployment of crews to other stations whilst station rebuilding work was underway, there has been a slowly improving crew turn-out performance over the five years to 2017/18. It would not be expected that crew turnout performance would be impacted by the changes to stations and pumping appliances implemented in LSP5 or the removal of EFCC appliances. The crew turn-out time is part of the first, second and third appliance response times (which are measured from the time of mobilisation to arrival at the incident address). Data on pumping appliance crew turnout performance is available by borough in annex 1A; as this data is for station watch performance, it is not available at ward level.



Note: crew turnout time not to same scale.


Special appliances

- Data for special appliance average response times – for fire rescue units (FRUs) and aerial appliances – is shown in the chart below for five years up to 2017/18. Data for borough and ward performance is shown in annex 1B and annex 2A respectively.
- London-wide, average **aerial appliance** response times were 08m:35s in 2017/18. This is slightly slower (two seconds) than in 2016/17 (8m:33s). There are no attendance standard for aerial appliances. There were no changes made to the number or deployment of aerial appliances in LSP5 or over the five years for which data is displayed. Performance is relatively consistent over the five years.
- London-wide, average **fire rescue unit** response times were 11m:19s in 2017/18, and this is slightly faster than each of the three earlier years from 2014/15 to 2016/17. There is no attendance standard for fire rescue units. In LSP5, FRUs were removed from Hornchurch in Havering, and Millwall in Tower Hamlets, which would account for the change in performance between 2013/14 and other years including 2017/18 (+23 seconds).



Ward pumping appliance attendance times

- Ward data for first and second pumping appliance attendance times is in annex 2A. The Brigade does not undertake to meet its attendance standard at ward level.
- 75 per cent of wards in 2017/18 had a **first appliance** within the average six minute target (it was 71 per cent in the previous year, 2016/17). Comparing performance in 2017/18 with the year when LSP5 changes and EFCC removals were implemented; i.e. 2013/14, there were 56 fewer wards outside target in the most recent year. The greater number of wards outside target in 2014/15 and 2015/16 reflects the temporary closure of some stations for rebuilding.



- Of the 155 wards outside the first appliance average six minute target in 2017/18, 79 wards were within 30 seconds of the target with 76 wards more than 30 seconds outside the target. The chart below shows wards outside the target within four time bands to show how far they were away from the target, together with the cumulative number of wards at each time band.



- Performance for **second appliance** comparing 2017/18 against 2013/14 shows fewer wards outside the target in the most recent year, than in any other year. So, 86 per cent of wards were within the average eight minute second appliance target (82 per cent in the year before). The greater number of wards outside target in 2014/15 and 2015/16 reflects the temporary closure of some stations for rebuilding.




- Of the 93 wards outside the second appliance average eight minute target in 2017/18, 43 wards were within 30 seconds of the target, and 50 wards more than 30 seconds outside the target. The chart below shows wards outside the target within four time bands, to show how far they were away from the target, together with the cumulative number of wards at each time band.




Fire casualties (fatal and non-fatal)

- Data about fire casualties is available in annexes 1D (borough) and 2B (ward) respectively. The number of fire deaths at borough and ward level is generally very small, so there are always limitations on the statistical conclusions that can reliably be drawn from these data.
- The chart below shows the numbers of fire casualties (fatal and non-fatal) for the five year period up to 2017/18. There was an upturn in all casualties in 2017/18 as a result of the Grenfell Tower fire. The 10 year average for all fire deaths is also impacted by the number of fatalities from Grenfell Tower, as were serious fire injuries.




- There are different **types of fire death**. Some are result of deliberate acts (which will include deliberate fire-setting (arson), suicide, or homicide), and some are accidental. Of the accidental fire deaths, the cause of the fire can be the result of faulty equipment or supply, or have a human cause (e.g. careless disposal of a cigarette, clothing too close to a heat source). The 74 fire deaths in 2017/18 due to fires of "faulty appliance/supply" cause include the deaths at the Grenfell Tower fire. Fire deaths due to "human element" were lower in 2017/18 compared to the other years shown.



Note: "Accidental: other" includes fires (and deaths) where the cause was not known or is still under investigation.
The bar showing the 74 deaths in 2017/18 due to "Accidental: faulty appliance/supply" has been truncated.

- One factor that is key to whether a person is injured or dies in a fire, is the **delay in discovering the fire and calling the fire brigade**. The chart below shows the estimated delay between ignition of the fire and calling the brigade, based on the work of crews and fire investigators. In 2017/18 and the four further years displayed in the chart, over 80 per cent of cases there was a delay of five minutes or more in calling the Brigade (data is not available for 20 per cent of fatalities).


Estimated delay between fire ignition and call to the Brigade for fire fatalities in London



Note: Typically, across the five years displayed, this data is not available for about 20 per cent of fire deaths.


Fires

- Borough and ward data for all fires, primary (more serious) fires, accidental dwellings fires, and fires in care homes/sheltered housing, are in annexes 1C and 2B respectively.
- London-wide, the number of **primary fires** and **accidental dwelling fires** continued to fall in 2017/18 and that pattern is maintained across the period covering the implementation of LSP5 in January 2014 and removal of EFCC appliances. The number of **secondary fires** fluctuates as open land and grass fires in summer months are a significant proportion of these fires and are higher in years which have more warmer/drier summer periods (like 2015/16).




- The total numbers of **primary (more serious) fires** include incidents of different types; some will require no firefighting whilst others will require the attendance of a large number of fire engines. In 2017/18, 50 per cent of primary fires either required no firefighting (20 per cent) or 'small means', e.g. stamping out, bucket of water (30 per cent). Only seven per cent of fires significant or larger fires.

Firefighting action at primary fires, 2017/18



- Data for all **deliberate fires** (i.e. potential 'arson') and for **fires in care homes/sheltered housing** is set out in the chart below. In the period since LSP5 was implemented, arson incidents have remained relatively flat and are lower than five years ago in 2017/18. In LSP5, the Brigade was concerned by the number of older people who are harmed or killed by fire in places where they should be safe, and we introduced a new headline target focusing on reducing the fires in care homes and sheltered housing; over the life of LSP5, the numbers of these fires in these places has largely reduced.




Note: Arson and fires in care homes not to same scale.

Fire safety


Regulatory fire safety

- Data on **all fire safety inspections/audits**, those in **premises not previously visited** and for **inspection/audits to high-risk premises** and this data is provided at borough level only (annex 1E). London-wide data for the past five years, including 2017/18, is set out in the chart below.
- There is no direct relationship between the stations and pumping appliance reductions in LSP5 and the volume of regulatory fire safety work undertaken, as this is currently carried out by specialist non-station based staff.
- The numbers of **fire safety audits/inspections**, including **audits in buildings not previously visited**, has fluctuated over the last few years with a fall in 2017/18 because of the impact of the rollout of the new 'mobile working device' for inspecting officers and the issues arising following the Grenfell Tower fire after June 2017.



Community safety

- Data for the proportion of **time spent on community safety by station based staff** is published at borough level only in annex 1E. The London-wide data for the last five years is in the chart below. The indicator is expressed as a proportion of available time on the day shift by the crews of pumping appliances. Borough data has been provided, as requested, but it should be noted that this is a measure of the proportion of time spent on community safety, so a smaller amount of time by a reduced number of crews arising from LSP5 changes might not show a reduction.
- Data for the numbers of **home fire safety visits** (HFSVs) carried out (mainly by station staff) and time spent on community safety activity by fire station staff is available by borough in annex 1E. Data for time spent is the percentage of time for the stations located in the LFB management borough³ (i.e. Surbiton station is counted as part of the Kingston borough total). The London-wide data for the last five years is in the chart below.
- In 2013/14, the Brigade carried out 83,947 **home fire safety visits** and in the last performance year (2017/18) nearly 83,341 visits were undertaken. Despite the reduction in the number of crew as a result of the LSP5 closure of fire stations, and removal of appliances, the volume of home fire safety visits has been largely maintained with levels in 2017/18 equivalent to 2013/14, largely before LSP5 changes happened.
- The proportion of **time spent on community safety** activities (including home fire safety visits) by fire station staff has been maintained over the five year period shown below, and the proportion of time in 2017/18 is at its high level for the period (equal to 2014/15).



Notes: HFSVs and 'station time' not to same scale.
Performance for station time on community safety based on the method of calculation of time used in 2017/18.

³ In previous similar reports, 'time spent' by Lambeth fire station was counted as part of the Westminster borough (which was previously the LFB management borough). Lambeth station data is now counted as part of Lambeth borough including for earlier years.

Comparison with performance of in London compared to all English fire and rescue services

This review of statistics for the year 2017/18 (or ending March 2018) for fire and rescue services (FRSs) in England was produced by the Home Office⁴. The results for England (with London added using Brigade statistics in italics) show:

- FRSs attended 564,827 incidents in 2017/18. This was a one per cent increase compared with the previous year (560,453) but a 29 per cent decrease compared with ten years ago (791,746 in 2007/08). The total number of incidents was on a downward trend for around a decade, though they have increased in recent years mainly driven by increases in non-fire incidents attended. However, the small increase this year was mainly driven by an increase in fires attended.
 - *LFB attended 104,689 incidents in 2017/18. This was less than half a percent lower than the previous year (104,721) but a 28 per cent decrease compared with ten years ago (144,822 in 2007/08); this is a reduction consistent with the national downward trend. In line with the national trend, the total number of incidents in London was on a downward trend for around a decade (until 2014/15), though the number has increased in recent years mainly driven by increases in non-fire incidents attended.*
- FRSs attended 167,150 fires in 2017/18. This was a three per cent increase compared with the previous year (161,997) but a 43 per cent decrease compared with ten years ago (293,920 in 2007/08). The increase in fires is driven by an increase in secondary fires with primary fires showing a small decrease.
 - *LFB attended 19,525 fires in 2017/18. This was four per cent lower compared with the previous year (20,259) but a 41 per cent decrease compared with ten years ago (32,892 in 2007/08); this is a reduction consistent with the national downward trend. The overall reduction in fires in London in 2017/18 was driven by lower numbers of secondary fires, with primary fires increasing slightly.*
- FRSs attended 225,625 fire false alarms in 2017/18. This was a one per cent increase compared with the previous year (223,896) but a 32 per cent decrease compared with ten years ago (331,478 in 2007/08).
 - *LFB attended 52,301 fire false alarms in 2017/18. This was a two per cent increase compared with the previous year (51,266) but a 27 per cent decrease compared with ten years ago (71,310 in 2007/08).*
- FRSs attended 172,052 non-fire [special service] incidents in 2017/18. This was a one per cent decrease compared with the previous year (174,560). For around a decade, there had been a general decline in the number of non-fire incidents. However, recent years have shown large increases, largely due to a rise in medical incidents attended. The recent decrease in non-fire incidents is mainly due to a decline in emergency medical responding linked to many of the trials stopping in September 2017.
 - *LFB attended 32,861 non-fire (special service) incidents in 2017/18. This was a two per cent decrease compared with the previous year (33,206). For around a decade, there had been a general decline in the number of non-fire incidents. However, recent years have shown increases in London, largely due to a pilot to co-respond with the London Ambulance Service (LAS) to certain medical incidents. The recent decrease in non-fire incidents in London reflects the national decline in emergency medical responding linked to trial stopping in London in September 2017.*
- Of all incidents attended by FRSs in 2017/18, fires accounted for 30 per cent and non fire incidents 30 per cent. The remaining 40 per cent were fire false alarms, which continued to be the largest incident type. In 2007/08

⁴ Fire and rescue incident statistics: England, year ending March 2018, Statistical Bulletin 16/18, 9 August 2018 ([Home Office](#))

these percentages were 37 per cent (fires attended), 21 per cent (non-fire incidents) and 42 per cent (fire false alarms).

- *Of all incidents attended by LFB in 2017/18, fires accounted for 19 per cent and non fire incidents 31 per cent. The remaining 50 per cent were fire false alarms, which continued to be the largest incident type. These proportions for fire and non-fire incidents in London, particularly for fires, are significantly different for the position for England as a whole. In 2007/08, in London these percentages were 23 per cent (fires attended), 28 per cent (non-fire incidents) and 49 per cent (fire false alarms). The higher proportion of false alarms in London is likely to be attributable to greater proportion of commercial buildings in the capital and the false alarms due to automatic fire alarms (AFAs).*
- The number of fire-related fatalities had been on a general downward trend since comparable figures first became available in 1981/82, when there were 755 fire-related fatalities, though the numbers have fluctuated due to the relatively small numbers involved. In 2017/18, however, there were 334 fire-related fatalities (including 71 from the Grenfell Tower fire) compared with 263 in the previous year (an increase of 27 per cent).
 - *The number of fire-related fatalities had been on a general downward trend since comparable figures first became available in 1981/82, when there were over 180 fire-related fatalities in London, though the numbers have fluctuated due to the relatively small numbers involved. In 2017/18, however, there were 109 fire-related fatalities (including those from the Grenfell Tower fire) compared with 44 in the previous year (an increase of 148 per cent).*
- There were 3,306 non-fatal fire casualties requiring hospital treatment⁵ in 2017/18 (including 77 from the Grenfell Tower fire). This was a six per cent increase compared with the previous year (3,128) but a 13 per cent decrease compared with five years ago (3,811 in 2012/13).
 - *There were 686 non-fatal fire casualties in London requiring hospital treatment in 2017/18 (including injuries from the Grenfell Tower fire). This was a 27 per cent increase compared with the previous year (542) but an 11 per cent decrease compared with five years ago (775 in 2012/13).*

⁵ Casualty figures include casualties whether the injury was caused by the fire or not. Fatalities are only included if they are fire related.

Notes on data

Corrections

This document includes some minor corrections to some data for years earlier than 2017/18 and published to support earlier versions of the Statement of Assurance. These are minor corrections and do not materially impact on any conclusions to be drawn from the data.

Attendance time calculation

Fire engine response times

The way in which fire engine response times are calculated is described in the document **Fire Facts - Incident Response Times 2017** available on the LFB web site. In line with LSP2017, the calculation has been varied to provide greater accuracy in terms of performance. The method of calculation as described previously is set out below.

Attendance times for fire engines are measured from (a) the time an appliance is mobilised to (b) the time the appliance arrives at the incident scene. No special appliances (e.g. aerial appliances, fire rescue units) currently have published attendance times. The standard applies London-wide to any type of emergency incident.

The following criteria are used to calculate published attendance time performance:

- Arrival times for all pumping appliances regardless of location of the appliance at time of mobilisation and will include appliances from other station grounds.
- First appliance and second appliance is determined by the order of arrival at the incident, i.e. the first appliance will be the first to arrive not necessarily the first to be mobilised.
- Mobilisations included in the calculation are for:
 - Incidents in London only.
 - London pumping appliances only; pumping appliances from neighbouring brigades that attend in London are not included.

- Appliances on any mobilised attendance, including running calls, incident upgrades, additional mobilisations.
- Mobilisations where a time value is present in the data; sometimes 'time arrived' is missing due to a failure (human or technical) to record the time.
- Mobilisations are excluded where:
 - The incident is a 'shut in lift' release not attended as an emergency (i.e. not on 'blue light').
 - The calculated attendance time is greater than 20 minutes (because this generally reflects a failure (human or technical) to record a time of arrival in a timely manner.
 - The mobilisation is to a batch mobilised flooding call.
 - The mobilisation was a relief appliance for an appliance mobilised as part of the initial or upgraded attendance.
 - The attending crew has added a delay code for: 'arrival time incorrect', 'did not arrive', 'returned by stop', or attendance at 'non-emergency road speed'.

Special appliance response times

The performance calculation for special appliance response times follows the same methodology as that for fire engine response times (as set out above), except that instead of excluding times greater than 20 minutes, the exclusion is set at 40 minutes given the expected longer arrival times for special appliances.

Second and third appliance average attendance performance

Data for average **third appliance response times** is provided by ward (in annex 2A). There is no target attendance time for third appliance. In this ward data there are some cases where the third appliance response is shown with a faster time than the second appliance response. This is a function of maths. Take an example of six incidents in one ward. For each incident, the times are consistent with first faster than second and second faster than third. But when they are averaged, you get a third appliance average response time faster than second appliance, as follows:

	First	Second	Third
Incident 1	05:02	07:54	
Incident 2	06:32	07:21	
Incident 3	04:45	06:23	07:04
Incident 4	05:22		
Incident 5	03:13	06:48	06:57
Incident 6	05:37	10:02	
Average	05:05	07:41	07:00

Methodological difficulties working at ward level

Ward level data is provided at the request of former LFEPA Members to assist with an assessment of the impact of the changes to fire stations and pumping appliances arising from the LSP5 (and after). As outlined in earlier documents, during LSP5 consultation and in the Statement of Assurance 2013/14 onwards, some caution is needed in interpreting ward level data.

To summarise:

- **high level of variability in ward demand and ward response performance year-on-year.**
In 2017/18, over a quarter of wards (28 per cent) had fewer than two incidents a week (175 wards). Also, as outlined earlier, in 2017/18, more than half of all incidents are attended by only one appliance. The small number of incidents receiving more than one appliance means that ward response times, particularly where a second or third appliance are mobilised, are subject to

considerable variability year-on-year. Some of the data shown for an individual ward will reflect what happened on a single occasion. In other wards it will reflect the average of what happened across a range up to 100 incidents.

- **changes to wards in three boroughs:**
Wards in three boroughs changed in 2014 impacting on 60 wards in Hackney, Kensington and Chelsea and Tower Hamlets. Data for this report is consistently on the basis of the wards in 2014 even for periods before the change. This makes direct comparison with ward data published during LSP5 consultation impossible. Changes to wards in 2018 (in Bexley, Croydon, Southwark, Redbridge) are not yet recognised in Brigade data.
- **temporary changes due to station rebuild programmes:**
A number of boroughs and many wards in 2014/15 and 2015/16 were directly impacted by temporary station closures and the temporary removal or displacement of pumping appliances due to a PFI station rebuilding programme. Those wards where stations were closed for all or part of the year, will have had a temporary impact on ward attendance times. For example, during 2015/16, six stations were closed at various points during the year⁶.

⁶ Dagenham, Dockhead, Leytonstone, Plaistow, Purley, and Shadwell.

Annex 1 | Borough data

Annex 1A – First, second and third pumping appliances attendance times

Annex 1B – Special appliance (aerial and fire rescue unit) attendance times

Annex 1C – Emergency calls, incidents attended, fires, primary fires, arson (all deliberate fires), accidental dwelling fires, fires in care homes and sheltered housing

Annex 1D – Fire casualties (deaths and serious fire injuries).

Annex 1E – Fire safety – regulatory fire safety audits/inspections in premises not previously visited and in high risk premises, station time on community safety and home fire safety visits.

Annex 1B | Special appliance (aerial and fire rescue unit) attendance times – borough data

	Fire rescue unit					Aerial appliance				
Borough	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
Barking and Dagenham	10:28	11:52	12:12	11:07	12:19	10:14	10:48	21:40	11:55	09:50
Barnet	14:29	16:50	17:24	17:29	14:32	18:04	12:50	18:18	16:30	16:45
Bexley	09:24	09:07	09:16	11:09	08:56		28:01	16:11		20:02
Brent	10:06	09:49	10:30	10:17	10:21	08:22	08:18	10:50	10:49	08:49
Bromley	14:18	14:51	15:12	14:22	14:22	11:21	13:58	14:03	14:16	12:12
Camden	08:45	09:15	09:52	09:43	09:33	08:02	07:32	07:38	07:44	07:26
City of London	09:18	09:23	11:13	10:52	09:31	09:49	09:44	09:53	09:57	09:52
Croydon	09:17	08:53	09:20	08:12	08:44	14:16	15:49	16:20	16:26	15:32
Ealing	11:53	10:59	12:57	12:33	12:33	13:16	13:28	13:03	13:22	13:13
Enfield	10:20	12:05	11:25	09:28	10:41	13:07	09:47	12:23	09:25	11:56
Greenwich	11:21	11:28	12:41	11:48	11:53	11:55	11:11	13:32	13:41	11:01
Hackney	10:57	10:08	09:53	10:31	09:28	11:37	11:50	12:47	12:41	11:09
Hammersmith and Fulham	11:32	11:38	12:12	11:40	12:28	10:48	12:47	11:01	10:54	10:00
Haringey	11:46	13:43	12:41	11:27	10:55	06:58	07:20	06:29	09:38	08:16
Harrow	12:23	14:09	13:31	13:29	12:46	12:37	11:31	08:55	11:22	12:14
Havering	11:03	18:10	17:56	17:38	17:43	09:36	07:38	07:53	08:08	09:50
Hillingdon	16:37	16:09	16:55	16:24	16:35	09:35	08:36	10:32	09:56	08:30
Hounslow	09:13	10:04	11:01	10:44	10:10	14:03	20:48	20:17	18:49	16:32
Islington	10:06	07:14	09:39	07:06	08:16	10:54	10:52	11:02	09:46	09:23
Kensington and Chelsea	10:06	10:37	09:13	08:05	08:45	09:28	09:58	09:35	09:32	09:02
Kingston upon Thames	13:46	14:29	14:05	13:18	14:49	13:20	13:18	18:11	14:12	14:00
Lambeth	11:41	10:22	11:08	11:11	11:43	07:44	07:45	07:57	07:25	07:22
Lewisham	08:25	09:01	08:40	10:24	10:30	07:11	07:07	06:48	06:53	06:39
Merton	08:57	08:06	08:04	09:25	11:25	05:34	05:34	05:41	04:57	06:08
Newham	09:42	09:23	10:29	10:17	10:33		19:08	22:23	18:16	17:47
Redbridge	12:45	12:29	13:17	13:06	12:28	13:09	12:32	11:54	13:02	13:22
Richmond upon Thames	15:04	12:10	14:13	13:02	14:10	21:10	17:47	27:28	14:32	16:05
Southwark	11:31	13:05	12:41	13:52	12:24	07:47	07:51	07:32	07:32	06:52
Sutton	11:21	10:50	10:54	11:39	11:54	13:31	12:13	13:35	13:22	11:54
Tower Hamlets	08:26	09:47	10:14	11:09	09:08	11:54	10:43	13:38	12:17	12:37
Waltham Forest	11:42	13:30	14:21	13:07	12:43	15:01	14:49	08:55	08:07	13:19
Wandsworth	08:41	11:10	10:06	09:39	09:43	08:45	08:11	08:47	08:40	08:20
Westminster	09:02	08:52	09:25	08:44	08:57	06:32	06:50	06:41	06:43	06:21
	10:55	11:27	11:42	11:24	11:19	08:28	08:25	08:38	08:33	08:35
Note: Calculation follows the counting rules as agreed and revised in light of LSP 2017-2021 with a cut-off of 40 minutes						Note: Calculation follows the counting rules as agreed and revised in light of LSP 2017-2021 with a cut-off of 40 minutes				

Annex 1D | Fire casualties (deaths and serious fire injuries) – borough data

	Fire deaths (all)					Deaths in accidental fires in the home					Serious fire injuries				
	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
Borough															
Barking and Dagenham	1	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	3	0	19	18	9	25	14
Barnet	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	17	16	14	19	40
Bexley	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	7	5	13	21	9
Brent	2	0	3	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	28	35	27	25	37
Bromley	0	1	2	2	1	0	1	1	2	1	10	17	16	10	10
Camden	2	0	1	3	2	2	0	0	3	1	38	18	11	12	9
City of London	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	1	1
Croydon	1	3	2	1	0	0	3	2	1	0	43	33	35	25	25
Ealing	0	4	2	3	1	0	3	1	2	1	36	24	23	33	21
Enfield	3	1	0	1	3	2	1	0	1	2	21	29	23	23	21
Greenwich	3	1	2	3	0	3	1	1	2	0	32	13	21	16	13
Hackney	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	18	13	18	16	22
Hammersmith and Fulham	2	0	2	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	15	9	7	16	35
Haringey	1	1	1	3	3	1	1	0	2	2	28	34	22	11	20
Harrow	0	2	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	6	6	9	13	10
Havering	1	0	1	3	1	0	0	1	3	1	13	15	17	10	17
Hillingdon	4	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	2	15	21	27	16	23
Hounslow	3	3	1	1	0	3	2	1	1	0	21	18	15	11	19
Islington	1	0	2	1	1	1	0	2	1	1	9	12	10	23	23
Kensington and Chelsea	0	0	2	0	73	0	0	1	0	73	10	8	28	17	97
Kingston upon Thames	0	2	0	1	3	0	1	0	1	2	6	6	10	5	7
Lambeth	0	0	2	3	2	0	0	2	3	2	45	21	23	20	15
Lewisham	1	4	2	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	19	25	27	20	28
Merton	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	10	7	19	10	11
Newham	3	2	2	2	0	2	2	0	2	0	33	16	21	15	38
Redbridge	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	13	24	12	22	5
Richmond upon Thames	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	3	7	9	4	7
Southwark	2	1	1	3	0	1	0	1	2	0	26	40	20	23	20
Sutton	2	0	1	1	2	2	0	1	1	1	14	10	8	10	20
Tower Hamlets	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	25	11	21	12	18
Waltham Forest	2	2	1	1	2	1	2	0	1	2	19	14	10	18	10
Wandsworth	2	1	1	3	2	2	0	0	2	2	29	30	31	24	20
Westminster	1	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	1	1	19	35	13	16	21
	43	30	36	44	109	30	23	21	39	100	647	593	570	542	686
	Note: All deaths at fires where the cause was the fire or smoke.					Note: All deaths at an accidental fire in the home (dwelling) where the cause was the fire or smoke.					Note: Serious injuries at fires that required medical attention at hospital (either slight or serious, but excluding precautionary checks and first aid at scene).				

Annex 1E | Fire safety – regulatory and community fire safety – borough data

	All fire safety audits and inspections					Fire safety audits/inspections in buildings not previously visited					Fire safety audits/inspections in high risk buildings					Home fire safety visits carried out by LFB staff					Station time on community safety (proportion of available time - per cent)					
	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	
Borough																										
Barking and Dagenham	352	317	307	251	203	128	101	62	48	16	169	161	180	122	88	1987	2410	2535	2363	2406	11.6	14.0	16.2	11.6	11.0	
Barnet	297	265	403	294	249	56	97	118	100	24	185	166	298	201	159	2685	2490	2667	2776	2918	14.0	13.9	14.5	13.7	14.4	
Bexley	236	135	177	145	116	47	32	38	20	3	127	56	126	71	54	2567	2596	2499	1930	1928	11.8	11.1	11.9	12.2	12.9	
Brent	567	308	552	418	380	168	102	189	106	61	288	130	336	237	198	2179	2090	1989	1923	1792	9.6	10.4	11.9	10.2	10.5	
Bromley	418	238	236	432	223	190	58	64	124	10	203	120	160	317	140	2574	3167	3027	3042	3126	14.2	11.6	14.1	14.1	14.5	
Camden	1000	528	1179	934	688	307	113	332	298	23	372	233	437	425	297	3916	5072	5338	5357	4185	9.7	11.5	11.8	11.0	10.7	
City of London	494	394	570	452	436	105	45	65	46	42	26	37	24	25	40	390	722	422	612	573	9.2	10.8	10.8	11.9	11.2	
Croydon	716	529	652	479	370	176	194	235	73	18	473	285	484	322	232	4612	4748	4111	3941	4162	10.2	10.1	12.0	12.4	12.7	
Ealing	584	366	606	434	301	189	87	114	62	15	260	174	331	260	140	3305	3012	3121	2934	3253	12.8	13.2	13.7	12.8	12.4	
Enfield	376	294	373	313	243	98	99	83	98	23	226	155	260	225	157	2599	2147	1953	2227	2592	10.5	9.4	10.0	10.1	10.6	
Greenwich	324	231	187	199	236	114	84	53	34	33	179	97	102	126	136	3980	3816	3808	3918	4074	11.9	11.2	12.9	13.7	13.7	
Hackney	688	563	720	566	787	219	236	125	132	46	293	221	415	216	452	3589	3289	3266	2950	3142	12.3	13.0	13.5	12.4	12.8	
Hammersmith and Fulham	315	169	298	395	224	76	14	56	46	10	175	98	176	270	128	1374	1606	1944	1859	1789	11.2	11.7	12.0	13.7	12.6	
Haringey	298	266	274	282	190	50	68	58	99	12	169	151	177	165	77	2997	3516	3234	3464	2567	12.8	11.5	11.2	11.3	10.7	
Harrow	337	123	251	266	120	92	40	45	32	0	183	68	168	102	56	1149	1449	1265	1363	1485	15.2	15.6	14.1	14.6	15.0	
Havering	486	376	455	375	255	164	118	79	69	27	208	150	224	186	113	2455	2615	2683	2453	2616	12.8	12.9	12.9	15.1	15.7	
Hillingdon	396	190	286	314	194	84	45	54	55	4	154	79	173	125	75	2531	1862	2002	2226	2224	12.3	11.9	13.8	13.9	12.9	
Hounslow	261	199	274	331	185	55	51	69	83	4	103	97	164	146	103	2261	2165	2013	2138	2473	10.1	10.0	10.8	10.6	11.4	
Islington	456	348	424	514	612	148	143	68	58	38	235	109	157	217	244	1992	2060	2289	1729	1405	14.6	13.7	14.3	12.9	12.1	
Kensington and Chelsea	411	228	452	494	310	76	32	59	44	12	235	106	268	290	195	2835	2751	2575	2283	2364	11.1	10.8	11.8	11.4	12.0	
Kingston upon Thames	348	184	219	185	140	108	38	28	28	5	155	59	117	127	58	1916	1597	1771	1929	2137	15.2	14.6	14.3	14.6	14.8	
Lambeth	505	362	499	465	397	158	115	105	86	42	233	158	281	277	203	3504	6169	6830	6663	4914	11.1	13.3	13.7	14.6	14.0	
Lewisham	263	193	233	273	218	59	11	55	49	15	157	128	174	178	153	2513	2874	2682	3435	2767	9.8	10.1	11.1	10.6	12.0	
Merton	333	177	224	100	140	115	68	53	14	6	170	71	139	51	50	1223	1249	1076	1061	1269	13.1	12.3	12.6	10.8	11.3	
Newham	565	672	800	699	524	229	233	193	166	21	212	256	219	203	230	3089	2826	2660	2221	2121	12.8	13.3	13.0	10.7	11.3	
Redbridge	430	420	510	508	284	128	146	78	74	30	237	181	266	254	113	2156	2221	2112	2533	2456	14.8	13.5	14.4	14.3	14.2	
Richmond upon Thames	349	177	243	139	156	112	39	29	18	9	178	74	161	90	63	1044	1163	1162	1229	1467	15.3	15.1	14.3	13.8	13.3	
Southwark	489	299	344	387	278	109	63	65	55	25	350	182	212	245	170	2440	2671	3260	3294	2927	10.9	11.4	12.3	11.4	12.4	
Sutton	397	220	329	246	161	117	83	94	61	5	265	148	271	176	111	1625	1818	1665	1448	1655	13.0	12.3	13.8	12.9	13.6	
Tower Hamlets	1027	926	1264	1364	1250	163	149	261	388	124	456	421	689	448	704	4054	3368	3455	3344	3137	10.0	11.4	11.9	12.7	13.2	
Waltham Forest	382	392	545	611	407	161	130	153	187	31	182	125	191	193	164	3842	3168	2843	2710	3271	14.7	14.6	14.1	14.6	15.6	
Wandsworth	362	244	420	359	350	108	85	151	74	53	174	142	260	245	198	2607	2392	2505	2108	2242	11.3	10.2	10.6	12.2	12.3	
Westminster	2194	1550	1963	1423	1012	529	337	354	212	73	985	714	790	581	476	1957	1890	1846	1435	1904	6.8	7.1	7.6	7.8	8.2	
	16656	11883	16269	14647	11639	4638	3256	3585	3039	860	8017	5352	8430	7116	5777	83947	86989	86608	84898	83341	11.8	11.9	12.6	12.4	12.6	
Note: Numbers may vary from those previously reported due to data being refreshed retrospectively.						Note: Figures may vary from those previously reported due to data being refreshed retrospectively.						Note: Numbers may vary from those previously reported due to data being refreshed retrospectively.					Note: These are home fire safety visits carried out by fire station crews, light duty staffs and CS practitioners. The numbers exclude any visits carried out by partners.					Note: The percentage of time is for the LFB management borough (i.e. Surbiton in Kingston). Lambeth station has been to returned to Lambeth borough retrospectively.				

Annex 2 | Ward data

Annex 2A – Appliance attendance times: first, second and third pumping appliances, aerial appliances, fire rescue units.

Annex 2B – Incidents, fires, dwelling fires, fires in care homes and sheltered housing, fire deaths and serious fire injuries.

Annex 2A | Pumping and special appliance attendance times - ward data

Borough	Ward	First appliance					Second appliance					Third appliance					Fire rescue unit					Aerial appliance					Overall incident response time (call answer to arrival of first appliance)				
		2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18
Westminster	Harrow Road	04:40	05:00	04:52	04:42	04:36	05:09	05:26	05:06	05:20	05:06	07:52	06:48	05:52	07:17	05:53	05:02	10:19	09:10	00:03	04:13	06:34	07:32	05:05	04:21	04:44	06:19	06:33	06:26	06:14	06:02
Westminster	Hyde Park	04:58	04:51	05:05	05:20	04:51	05:46	05:51	05:50	05:54	05:37	08:41	08:44	08:12	08:22	07:58	05:30	08:07	10:03	11:14	06:05	07:45	05:35	06:02	06:53	05:10	06:28	07:16	06:58	06:56	06:30
Westminster	Knightsbridge and Belgravia	05:21	05:51	05:56	05:45	05:31	06:46	07:15	07:08	07:00	06:58	09:31	08:07	10:10	08:24	08:02	11:30	08:44	08:35	10:16	08:23	08:25	08:02	08:28	07:53	08:28	07:08	07:31	07:27	07:18	07:06
Westminster	Lancaster Gate	05:19	05:07	05:09	05:03	04:47	06:05	06:09	05:50	05:45	05:19	07:22	07:28	07:28	06:55	06:44	07:57	08:37	04:59	06:25	15:48	04:56	05:31	06:11	04:40	05:19	07:09	06:57	08:34	06:52	06:23
Westminster	Little Venice	04:26	04:24	04:22	04:29	04:17	05:32	05:34	04:58	05:16	05:04	08:16	07:45	08:46	07:57	08:25	09:34	07:21	08:45	08:23	08:42	05:42	05:41	05:03	06:07	04:19	06:15	06:04	06:04	06:53	05:58
Westminster	Maida Vale	05:17	05:15	05:23	05:10	04:48	06:10	05:29	06:10	05:44	05:23	07:09	06:18	06:22	07:04	06:46	05:02	05:59	05:43	04:10	04:20	05:16	06:20	07:00	06:48	05:42	06:56	07:22	07:07	06:45	06:03
Westminster	Marylebone High Street	06:04	06:15	06:36	06:11	06:02	07:22	07:24	07:28	07:23	06:59	07:01	08:04	10:39	08:12	07:53	05:48	06:55	10:36	05:47	09:02	07:44	07:42	07:29	07:32	07:59	07:36	07:49	08:15	07:49	07:31
Westminster	Queen's Park	05:13	05:05	04:59	05:02	05:10	06:17	05:37	05:44	05:56	05:50	07:42	06:55	06:19	09:32	06:02	11:27	10:01	06:51	11:12	11:30	04:56	06:24	09:16	06:49	09:12	06:59	06:51	06:42	06:49	06:42
Westminster	Regent's Park	04:47	05:00	05:03	04:50	04:49	05:12	05:24	05:25	05:14	05:25	06:52	08:06	07:28	07:36	06:42	08:36	08:48	06:49	09:37	06:31	04:35	05:28	04:55	05:53	04:49	06:23	06:53	06:41	06:23	06:15
Westminster	St. James's	04:29	04:45	04:57	04:52	04:47	05:50	05:21	05:52	05:54	05:48	07:34	07:23	08:05	08:15	07:23	11:15	09:48	12:08	11:07	11:28	06:38	06:21	05:43	06:11	05:44	06:07	06:25	07:13	06:58	06:32
Westminster	Tachbrook	04:25	04:34	05:07	04:50	04:48	05:38	05:28	05:27	05:33	05:53	05:14	08:30	07:22	07:42	07:23	10:03	09:48	05:34	08:54	09:14	08:23	09:04	09:27	08:18	08:29	06:22	06:28	06:45	07:15	06:20
Westminster	Vincent Square	03:32	04:35	05:01	04:42	04:36	05:09	05:33	05:55	05:40	05:25	07:13	07:22	07:18	07:27	06:48	14:42	07:23	10:08	11:16	09:34	08:02	08:14	07:21	08:17	07:48	05:15	06:15	08:41	06:18	06:06
Westminster	Warwick	04:32	05:46	05:42	05:34	05:19	05:55	05:53	06:25	06:18	05:53	06:34	07:13	07:09	06:58	06:35	10:07	06:32	05:57	05:36	09:43	08:28	08:42	09:30	09:54	08:14	06:10	07:40	07:23	07:11	06:56
Westminster	West End	05:29	05:40	05:43	05:45	05:30	07:00	06:27	06:39	06:52	06:25	08:15	08:48	08:52	09:36	08:13	07:10	12:59	09:35	07:58	07:48	05:57	06:37	06:17	06:45	06:48	07:03	07:14	07:47	07:28	07:06
Westminster	Westbourne	04:30	04:38	04:32	04:34	04:31	05:36	05:06	05:08	05:28	04:59	06:07	06:30	06:50	06:58	06:35	09:33	11:45	14:06	04:47	07:31	05:05	08:37	05:58	06:36	05:35	06:18	06:29	06:15	06:17	06:15
		05:18	05:27	05:32	05:22	05:13	06:39	06:48	06:51	06:44	06:34	08:03	08:26	08:20	08:10	07:46	10:55	11:27	11:42	11:24	11:19	08:28	08:25	08:38	08:33	08:35	07:02	07:12	07:28	07:08	06:54

Note: Calculation follows the counting rules as agreed and revised in light of LSP 2017-2021

Note: Calculation follows the counting rules as agreed and revised in light of LSP 2017-2021

Note: Calculation follows the counting rules as agreed and revised in light of LSP 2017-2021

Note: Calculation follows the counting rules as agreed and revised in light of LSP 2017-2021 with a cut-off of 40 minutes

Note: Calculation follows the counting rules as agreed and revised in light of LSP 2017-2021 with a cut-off of 40 minutes

Note: Calculation follows the counting rules as agreed and revised in light of LSP 2017-2021. This measure is from the time the call is answered in Control to arrival of the first appliance; see section 6 of Fire Facts document.

Annex 2B | Incidents, fires and fire casualties - ward data

Borough	Ward	Incidents					Primary fires					Arson					Dwelling fires (Accidental)					Fires in care homes and sheltered housing					Fire deaths					Fire serious injuries					
		2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	
Wandsworth	Tooting	303	286	215	266	275	32	25	28	22	22	3	4	6	1	1	12	13	15	7	10	1	2	1	1		2					1		2		3	
Wandsworth	Wandsworth Common	115	96	139	121	151	35	33	58	42	60	18	22	48	30	47	8	4	5	7	7	3		2		1						8	2	6	1	2	
Wandsworth	West Hill	119	97	139	137	133	10	18	14	15	16	2	2	6	3	6	6	14	8	12	9			1				1				1	1	1	1		
Wandsworth	West Putney	118	119	99	130	94	11	14	11	9	15	3	2	3	3	5	7	12	10	6	10			1								1		3			
Westminster	Abbey Road	168	148	143	148	158	10	19	7	11	10	1	3	3	2	-	7	7	5	8	5				1	1											
Westminster	Bayswater	151	152	150	182	186	13	16	14	13	14	-	-	1	1	1	4	12	12	6	12		2	1								1	3		3	2	
Westminster	Bryanston and Dorset Square	264	276	324	289	309	27	20	22	20	24	1	2	2	-	1	11	9	8	9	13			1								1	1		1		
Westminster	Church Street	247	253	270	313	334	34	29	16	20	22	4	2	5	8	10	21	21	6	12	16	3	4			2				1		1	4				
Westminster	Churchill	163	176	182	183	179	14	12	17	10	12	1	-	-	3	-	12	10	11	7	5	1	2	2									2				
Westminster	Harrow Road	153	170	187	179	196	15	11	14	11	13	1	-	2	2	1	11	7	9	5	11	2	2		1	3							1		1		
Westminster	Hyde Park	265	277	236	272	271	37	18	29	19	21	-	1	1	1	3	13	11	17	8	7			1									6		1		
Westminster	Knightsbridge and Belgravia	298	316	346	330	350	14	14	15	14	12	1	2	-	-	-	9	5	9	6	9												1	3			
Westminster	Lancaster Gate	257	227	255	233	290	16	23	19	20	17	1	2	-	-	2	8	11	12	16	7									1		1	3		2		
Westminster	Little Venice	144	122	124	142	156	16	6	11	10	10	1	-	1	2	2	13	2	7	9	7	1	1			1							1		1		
Westminster	Maida Vale	117	99	107	120	117	14	7	3	16	10	3	-	-	4	-	9	5	3	9	6	1												1	2		
Westminster	Marylebone High Street	606	605	587	648	686	26	27	29	22	35	-	2	1	2	2	5	9	11	7	5												1	2		1	
Westminster	Queen's Park	132	145	115	145	140	12	12	18	18	19	-	3	5	5	6	11	10	13	10	15				3								2	2	2	1	
Westminster	Regent's Park	342	350	330	295	271	22	23	14	15	16	2	-	-	-	1	11	14	11	6	9	3	5	2	2	3									6		
Westminster	St. James's	1,373	1,379	1,390	1,522	1,631	65	87	68	76	71	5	5	4	5	8	12	9	15	11	12	1	1	2				1				4	6	2	3	1	
Westminster	Tachbrook	189	185	156	224	150	13	19	6	10	9	3	6	-	1	1	10	13	5	4	7	1											2				
Westminster	Vincent Square	257	230	198	249	217	20	17	13	13	17	2	3	-	2	1	12	10	6	7	8		2	1								1	3	1			
Westminster	Warwick	336	278	255	303	295	22	17	18	12	10	1	4	-	1	-	13	10	12	5	4	1	1	1	1								1	1			
Westminster	West End	1,749	1,596	1,794	1,866	2,030	89	89	83	88	94	4	7	5	4	2	10	11	11	16	14			1									1		1	6	
Westminster	Westbourne	195	211	243	235	273	18	23	21	13	16	1	6	2	1	4	17	14	15	9	9	2	1		1		1						3	5		2	
Totals		102124	95220	99535	1E+05	1E+05	11005	10816	10635	10622	10629	4237	4094	4135	4194	3760	5550	5564	5301	5102	5227	548	525	424	322	365	44	43	30	36	44	775	647	593	570	542	
Note: All incidents attended in London.							Note: All primary fires in London (including late calls). Primary fires include all fires in buildings, vehicles and outdoor structures or any fire involving casualties, rescues, or fires attended by five or more appliances.					Note: All fires (primary, secondary, chimney and late call) where the motive is recorded by attending crew as 'deliberate'.					Note: A primary fire in a dwelling (including late call). A dwelling is a flat, maisonette or house/bugalow. Dwellings do not include non-self contained sheltered housing, or care/residential homes, hostels, etc.					Note: Data includes care and residential homes, and sheltered housing (both self-contained and non self-contained),					Note: All deaths at fires where the cause was the fire or smoke.					Note: Serious injuries at fires that required medical attention at hospital (either slight or serious, but excluding precautionary checks and first aid at scene).					