LONDONASSEMBLY Budget and Performance Committee

Policing in London
A London Assembly report into the future shape of the Metropolitan Police Service

June 2011

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Budget and Performance Committee Members

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Role of the Budget and Performance Committee

The Budget and Performance Committee scrutinises the Mayor's annual budget proposals and holds the Mayor and his staff to account for financial decisions and performance at the GLA. The Committee also looks at spending and performance across the GLA group, undertaking investigations into issues such as the cost of policing, spending on the Olympics and public transport fares.

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Chairman's foreword

The London Assembly will be assuming a greater responsibility for the oversight of the work of London's Police, and the Mayor's guidance of it, if, as expected, the Metropolitan Police Authority is abolished, probably later this year. But we have always had a strategic interest in the Met, and its budgets and performance, as it constitutes one of the arms of the GLA group, and is accounted for by the Mayor and considered by us in the annual budget process and through monitoring during the year.

London's policing will always be a politically important part of the Mayor's work and its performance, and responsiveness, is inevitably always in the public eye. During roughly the first decade of the GLA we saw annual increases in funding for policing, which allowed challenges to be met substantially through growth. A combination of the current Mayor's budget strategy and Government spending cuts means that those days are now at an end. Londoners will expect their Mayor to 'sweat the assets' and achieve the same, or better, with real terms funding cuts. This requires hard choices and creates an even stronger imperative than previously to secure efficiencies and look 'under the bonnet' of the Met.

The headline debate at City Hall and in the London media has tended to be dominated by the threat to or maintenance of police numbers, as an ill-defined but politically simple measure of 'Front-Line Policing'. The number of police officers remains an important indicator of strength and capacity but it is clearly the case that policing is not just about the number of uniforms but also about the way in which they are deployed and the support they receive. The policing of London requires a range of skills working together, and to focus on just one of these does not create an informed picture – what about officers who are stuck behind desks, or about forensic staff who are vital to detection but are not uniformed officers? These are just two examples of the flaw in a reliance on officer numbers.

The report has two sets of recommendations. First, we are attempting to move the debate on police numbers on to more sophisticated ground. The Metropolitan Police already have a more sophisticated 'Operational Policing Measure' of capacity and strength and we are recommending that this is developed and used as a better indicator than 'crude' officer numbers.

Second, our examination suggests that there are already a range of important questions about whether the balance of staff and skills is right:

- We think, and we know that the Met agrees with us, that 'back office' staffing costs could be reduced. For every pound saved in support areas, a saving is not required in the 'front line'.

- We challenge the growth of specialist units within the Met, often with their own support staff. There needs to be a more rigorous process of challenge, both of the need for ever-increasing specialism, and of the support these functions require.

- Progress can be made with the use of technology, such as the use of PDAs, to improve productivity.

- While there may be good reasons for deploying officers in this manner, the use of police officers in support roles needs to be challenged and justified.

- We are requesting further detail on the resilience requirements of the Met and of the continuing plans the service has for 'civilianisation' as a better use of, and maximisation of, resources.

This has been a detailed and interesting study. At its heart are questions about value for money, about transparency and about the ways in which Londoners wishes and needs are best interpreted by our politicians and our public servants in the police service. It will hopefully provide a useful foundation for future scrutiny by the Assembly of both the police service and the priorities the Mayor sets for London's policing.

I would like to thank all of our witnesses, and my colleagues on the Committee, and our staff for each of their thoughtful and helpful contributions to this work.

John Biggs AM
Chairman of the Budget and Performance Committee

Executive Summary

The Mayor and the Government have made it clear that their intention is to prioritise front-line policing. What is less clear is what is meant by the 'front line'; how its prioritisation fits with Londoners' desire to see more police on the streets; and whether the policing capacity required to keep London safe and the public's confidence in policing high can be maintained given the resource reductions faced.

This report is intended to inform the debate about how London's police budget and resources should be prioritised and where workforce efficiencies may be found. More specifically, the Committee has sought to define more accurately the terms of the debate; develop a better understanding of the MPS workforce and how its roles contribute to Londoners' safety; and identify potential workforce efficiencies, particularly around the use of civilian staff.

Defining the terms of the debate

Front-line policing

The public would benefit from having a more clearly defined set of terms to describe policing activities. Assertions by Government and the Mayor that the front line is being maintained or increased have little meaning without a clear understanding of what constitutes the 'front line'. The public will only feel reassured that policing levels can be maintained with fewer resources if the Mayor and MPS make it clear exactly which policing activities they are prioritising and use well-defined terms to explain any commitments on future policing levels.

Measuring policing performance and capacity

The Committee considers that police officer numbers is an overly simplistic measure of policing capacity. We propose instead the use of the MPS's Operational Policing Measure (OPM) – a tool for categorising the MPS workforce based on the roles officers and staff perform - as a framework for considering policing capacity. Its use would need the support of the MPA and an associated commitment to make appropriate data available.

The widespread use and publication of OPM data by the MPS and the MPA would increase transparency and help explain how the MPS uses its workforce resources. It would not provide a comprehensive measure of policing capacity, but categorising the workforce into the three categories - operational, operational support and organisational support - would demonstrate how the MPS workforce is deployed to different areas of policing and how this changes over time. We

recommend that the MPA should integrate OPM analysis into its budget-setting and performance monitoring processes; and the Mayor and the MPS should use it as a tool to try to raise the profile of policing roles that are not regularly seen by the public.

Additionally, OPM analysis could be used to add some clarity to the Mayor's commitment on front-line policing. This would give the public a clearer idea of the policing roles the Mayor is prioritising and better enable them to hold him to account. The Committee therefore recommends that the Mayor should present his commitments with reference to the numbers working in operational, operational support and organisational support roles.

A single model for analysing the police workforce should be agreed upon and adopted by all forces across England and Wales. This would allow for comparison between forces and the sharing of good practice. We have requested that Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabularly (HMIC) comment on whether OPM analysis could be adopted as a standard way of analysing the use of workforce resources across all forces in England and Wales.

The desire for more visible policing

More information should be made available to the public to explain the breadth of activities the police carry out and how the less visible policing roles contribute to a force's effectiveness. Other forces have developed initiatives to try to increase public awareness of the breadth and importance of all their policing activities. While some of these initiatives may not be appropriate for London, it is incumbent on the MPA and MPS to develop ways of increasing public awareness in this area and raise the profile of the less visible aspects of policing. The MPA's aim to increase the proportion of officers on operational duty is commendable, but we must be cautious and ensure that it is not done at the cost of valuable operational support functions and the force's overall capability.

The balance between operational and support roles

Back office efficiencies

The back-office function of the force - organisational support functions - should always be run with the minimum number of staff required to provide effective support. We welcome the staffing reductions found in organisational support since 2003 and urge the

MPS to take an ambitious approach to finding further efficiencies in this area.

The growth of operational support

Operational support roles – those that do not deliver operational duties but directly support colleagues in operational roles – have grown from representing less than a fifth of the workforce in 2003 to almost a third by 2010. This growth can largely be attributed to an increased use of specialist units and staff, and additional risk management requirements adding to the force's administrative workload.

Increased specialism

The MPS should reassess the balance of resources between specialist units and regular policing. While there is often good reason for setting up specialist units, we heard that these units had not grown in an entirely efficient manner. We recommend that the MPS should reassess the importance of each specialist unit and the level of resources it is given and look to find further efficiencies by bringing together and sharing some of the common functions of specialist units.

Risk management and increases in administrative work

Efficiencies should also be available by taking a more proportionate approach to risk management. We heard how the MPS had over-invested in some areas of policing in an attempt to remove all risk. Despite this being the view of several reports on policing, little progress has been made in addressing it. We hope that the current financial situation may provide the impetus needed for all parties to take responsibility and address this growing area of inefficiency.

The use of technology

The Committee welcomes the use of technology to improve the MPS's effectiveness and efficiency. Given the success of handheld computers in the Chicago Police Force, the use of PDAs by the MPS has the potential to provide workforce efficiencies and service improvements. We urge the MPS to drive its PDA programme forward so that its benefits can be realised as soon as possible. We will monitor the progress of the programme through the Budget Monitoring Sub-Committee.

Civilianisation

The civilianisation of support functions is desirable because officers are generally more expensive to employ than non-warranted staff. Equally, for specialist support roles it is often more useful to employ civilians with specific professional skills than officers with general skills. Comparison with other forces suggests that there should be opportunities for the MPS to find efficiencies in support functions through further civilianisation. The MPS should seek to increase the proportion of support roles filled by civilian staff.

Recognising that there are currently limitations on opportunities for civilianisation, the MPS should aim to only fill operational support roles with police officers if:

- their ability, when called upon, to carry out operational duties makes them an essential part of the force's resilience capacity; or

- they are unable to carry out operational duties and giving them support roles is more cost effective than employing a civilian.

To indicate the potential for further civilianisation, a proper assessment is required of the total number of officers required as resilience capacity for extraordinary circumstances.

An opportunity for reform

The need to find new levels of savings in the MPS should be viewed as much as being an opportunity as a hindrance. Small scale, year-on-year efficiencies, will no longer be sufficient given the scale of budget reductions the police face. Big ideas are needed and the current financial situation must be used to kick-start an informed debate about how policing should be reformed. The debate will need to be based on a good understanding by all parties, including the public, of where policing is now and what needs to happen to make it more effective and efficient. This report is our contribution to this process.

1 Introduction

Aim of the report

1.1 Londoners want to know what they are getting from their contribution towards the cost of policing. In times of growth, people are interested in what extra policing they will get for their money, and in times of reduced funding, they are interested in how decisions are being made about where to find savings and the effects on the service they receive.

1.2 This report is intended to inform the debate about how effectively and efficiently the MPS uses its resources to provide policing in London. More specifically, it aims to develop a better understanding of the MPS's workforce and how resources should be allocated to maintain or increase policing capability.

Workforce capacity

1.3 The number and cost of police officers and staff are important elements of the debate about police effectiveness and efficiency. From a financial perspective, workforce costs account for almost 80 per cent of London's policing budget. Equally, from the public's point of view, the perception of the MPS's capability is largely informed by the size of its workforce as increases and reductions in officer numbers are well publicised in the press and by politicians.

1.4 Although debate about workforce capacity therefore tends to focus on police officer numbers, it is a blunt measure. It takes no account of the contribution civilian staff make to policing or how effectively police officers are using their time. As the Policing Minister told the Committee:

> *There needs to be a better debate about what officers are doing and I welcome the fact that this Committee is looking at that, rather than simply a debate about overall numbers.*[1]

Context

1.5 One of the Budget and Performance Committee's roles is to assess and scrutinise how efficiently and effectively the MPS makes use of its resources. In order to provide effective scrutiny of policing in London, the Committee needs access to

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[1] Rt Hon Nick Herbert MP, Minister of State for Policing and Criminal Justice, Budget and Performance Committee meeting, 7 Dec 2010

information and the MPS and MPA need to be transparent. For several years we have sought more information on how the service's capacity has changed as a result of additional funding. More specifically, following discussions with the MPA in 2008, the Committee recommended that the MPA should put a measure in place to ensure that the capacity of the police service could be more easily understood. Since then, the MPA and MPS have been developing ways of monitoring the use of workforce resources more effectively.

1.6   The context of the debate over policing has changed over the past year. Following more than a decade of growth, we are now entering a time where police resources are reducing. Government funding for policing is set to reduce by 20 per cent in real terms over the next four years. These reductions and the challenge of policing the upcoming Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012 provide a new imperative to modernise the service and make it more efficient and effective. A former MPS Assistant Commissioner explained to the Committee:

> *This financial challenge is the burning platform that we just did not have before.*[2]

1.7   Developments at a national level are also likely to affect the way the MPS can reform itself. The Government is currently reviewing the remuneration and conditions of service of police officers and staff in England and Wales. Part one of the Winsor Review (published in March 2011) focused on short-term measures to help the police manage its reducing budgets over the next two years. Part two is due in June 2011 and will cover longer-term issues, including a new career model for officers and police staff.

1.8   The complexity of policing the country's capital adds to the challenge of trying to understand how the MPS makes use of its resources. London has a population of over 7.6 million and attracts over 27 million overnight visitors each year.[3] With more than 240 languages spoken and over 50 diverse communities it is the most ethnically and culturally diverse city in the UK. The

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[2] Bob Quick, former Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations at the MPS, Budget and Performance Committee meeting, 14 Oct 2010
[3] Figures taken from the *Police Authority Inspection repo*rt, March 2010, Audit Commission

city hosts Parliament and the Monarchy and contains some of the most affluent and deprived neighbourhoods in the country. It carries the greatest threat from terrorism of any city in England and Wales. While it is useful to compare the MPS to other forces to understand where efficiencies may be found, comparisons must always be done with an element of caution and take into account London's unique circumstances.

Report structure

1.9 In this report we seek to shed light on how changes to the MPS workforce affect its capacity. We begin in chapter two by looking at the language used in discussion about police workforce changes and their effects on service levels. We examine the current terminology used and the issues caused by the ambiguity of the term 'front-line policing'. We then explore the potential option of using an MPS system that clearly defines and categorises police staff, based on the activities they carry out. We ask whether this would add transparency to the debate over the use of workforce resources and more specifically, bring clarity to the Mayor's commitments on policing.

1.10 Chapter three looks at how the MPS deploys its staff between operational and support roles. It looks at how the number of staff allocated to different areas of policing has changed since 2003 (the first year from which broadly comparable data is available), and how the balance could be changed to make the service more effective and efficient.

1.11 In chapter four we look at civilianisation – finding savings by reducing the number of police officers in roles that do not require their warrant powers or specialist training. We examine how the mix of officers and civilian staff has changed since 2003; how the MPS workforce mix compares to other forces in England and Wales; and whether efficiencies could be found through further civilianisation.

Committee role and background

1.12 The Assembly has a responsibility to hold the Mayor to account and to investigate issues that are important to Londoners. It is responsible for investigating the activities and decisions of the GLA functional bodies, including the MPA – the body

responsible for maintaining an effective and efficient police service in London.

1.13 The structures for overseeing the MPS and holding it to account are currently being reformed. Parliament is currently considering The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill. Under the provision of the Bill, the MPA would be abolished and replaced by a Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPC) and a London Assembly Police and Crime Panel (PCP). The MOPC would assume the MPA's responsibility for maintaining an effective and efficient police service in London. The PCP would have responsibility for scrutinising the MOPC. The earliest possible commencement date for the new arrangements is October 2011. This report makes recommendations to the MPA. If the MPA is replaced by a MOPC later in the year, the Committee expects the MOPC to address the recommendations and findings of this report.

Evidence base

1.14 In conducting this investigation, the Committee has held public meetings with representatives of the Government, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, the MPA, the MPS and policing experts.[4] It has also received written submissions from: the Audit Commission; the Value for Money Unit, Home Office; the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts Innovation Unit; and Professor FitzGerald, Visiting Professor of Criminology at the University of Kent. We are grateful to all those who provided evidence for this investigation.

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[4] Appendix 3 has a full list of guests at Committee meetings and written submissions received.

2 Defining the terms of the debate

Key points

- The term 'front-line policing' is ambiguous and therefore has little meaning when used to describe how police resources should be prioritised.

- In the absence of a definition, the Mayor's assertion that front-line policing is increasing cannot currently be fully tested. The public would benefit from the Mayor explaining his policing commitments using measurable, well-defined terms.

- The MPS's Operational Policing Measure could provide a powerful tool and help the MPS demonstrate to the public the implications of workforce changes on policing capacity.

- The Operational Policing Measure also provides a useful tool to help the Mayor and the MPS demonstrate the breadth of activities the police carry out and the important contribution that non-visible policing makes to the safety of Londoners.

Front-line policing

2.1 The term 'front-line policing' is used on a daily basis in the press and by politicians. The Policing Minister has made it clear that the Government's priority, whatever budget reductions are made, is to protect front-line policing.[5] Similarly, the Mayor told the Assembly when presenting his draft 2011/12 Budget:

> *We have just had [considerable success] in protecting the Metropolitan Police Service from front-line cuts, and indeed been able, in very difficult times, to increase front-line policing.*[6]

2.2 The reality is that front-line policing is an ambiguous term. As the Minister for Policing explained to the Committee:

> *There is no fixed definition. Inevitably, as politicians, we all find ourselves talking about the front line, so I should start with a caveat which is that there is no formal definition.*[7]

2.3 The difference in what people understand by the term 'front-line policing' is huge. It ranges from referring purely to the visible policing service carried out by officers on the streets, to

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[5] Rt Hon Nick Herbert, Police review, 23 July 2010
[6] The Mayor speaking at London Assembly Plenary meeting, 10 Feb 2011
[7] Rt Hon Nick Herbert, Budget and Performance Committee meeting, 7 Dec 2010

including all policing activities carried out by police officers and non-warranted police staff, visible or not, that contribute to the force's crime-fighting ability.

2.4 The term is useful at a conceptual level, but is of no use at a practical level. What is common to all definitions of front-line policing is that they encapsulate the part of policing that people consider as being important. This gives them value at a conceptual level. However, as it is not well defined, it cannot be used to explain the implications of workforce changes and nor can we test the Mayor's assertion that front-line policing is increasing.

2.5 **The public would benefit from having a more clearly defined set of terms to describe policing activities. Assertions by Government and the Mayor that the front line is being maintained or increased have little meaning without a clear understanding of what constitutes the 'front line'. The public will only feel reassured that policing levels can be maintained with fewer resources if the Mayor and MPS make it clear exactly which policing activities they are prioritising and use well-defined terms to explain any commitments on future policing levels.**

Measuring policing performance and capacity

2.6 The MPS has gone through an unprecedented period of investment and growth over the last ten years. Recorded crime is down and the public's confidence in policing has risen. What is less clear is the correlation between crime and confidence, and policing activity. More specifically, it is not clear how effectively the MPS has used the additional funding it has been given and how this has contributed to the increase in confidence and fall in crime levels.

2.7 Studies have found that increasing funding for police does not necessarily lead to reductions in crime levels. The Home Affairs Select Committee looked at the relationship between reductions in crime levels and increased investment in policing in England and Wales between 1997 and 2007. It noted that the most significant reductions in crime levels came in the early part of the decade, but that the bulk of additional police funding came in the second half of the decade. The Committee concluded

that "the reduction in overall crime levels does not seem to have been directly related to additional resources".[8]

2.8 A measure of policing capacity is a useful tool to help bridge the gap between measuring funding levels and measuring crime and confidence levels. As a measure of available resource it cannot be used to measure performance, but it can be used to help understand how effectively and efficiently the MPS is turning its funding into the policing resource that the public values.

2.9 The traditional measure of policing capacity – officer numbers – has become less meaningful as policing has got more complex and forces have employed more non-warranted staff. The Chair of the MPA told us in 2008 that the argument about police officer numbers was "stale".[9] He explained that, rather than the overall number of police officers, he was interested in officer time spent on front-line activities.

2.10 If police officer strength is not an appropriate measure of policing capacity, then the MPA should provide us with an alternative. While police officer numbers will always be an important part of the debate, we agree there should be better ways of measuring policing capacity than solely officer strength. If the MPA considers the time spent by police staff on front-line activities to be the most appropriate way to assess the efficiency and capacity of the force then it should provide us with the analysis that demonstrates how this is changing over time.

2.11 Experts told the Committee that it is unrealistic to expect to be able to come up with a single measure that could comprehensively account for policing capacity, but a combination of output and outcome measures might go some way to demonstrating policing capacity. The police would first have to track the number of units and staff carrying out the various policing activities and then how effectively these units were operating.

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[8] Home Affairs fourth report, House of Commons Select Committee of Home Affairs, Jul 2007
[9] Budget and Performance Committee meeting, 22 July 2008

2.12 **Analysis of recorded crime rates and/or confidence in policing is important, but it does not help us to understand how efficiently the police are using their resources. The Committee agrees that police officer numbers is an overly simplistic measure of policing capacity. No alternative though has been provided. The remainder of this report proposes an alternative framework for considering police capacity. It relies on the support of the MPA and an associated commitment to make appropriate data available.**

The desire for more visible policing

2.13 The public and political imperative is to maintain or increase visible policing. In 2010, despite London having more officers, Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), and special constables than ever before, a record 66 per cent of people said that the number one thing that would make them feel safer would be having more police around on foot.[10] Professor of Criminology Marian FitzGerald summed it up at our meeting, saying the public demand for more police on the streets was "perennial and potentially insatiable".[11]

2.14 There is a risk that public opinion may lead to visible street policing being prioritised at the cost of less visible, but potentially more important, aspects of policing. As Professor FitzGerald went on to say, public opinion in this area "takes no account of the essential, serious but less visible police functions".

2.15 Some other forces have attempted to inform the public of the importance of the less visible elements of policing. To highlight the range of its activities, Greater Manchester Police Authority recently put a 'budget simulator' on its website allowing people to decide how they would allocate the force's budget and gain an understanding of the tough decisions the Authority faces.[12] It also used Twitter to show every incident it dealt with over a 24-hour period.[13] The experiment demonstrated to 40,000

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[10] Annual London Survey, 2010
[11] *Notes for a GLA inquiry into front line policing in London*, Prof M. FitzGerald, Sept 2010
[12] Greater Manchester Police Budget Simulator, www.budgetsimulator.com/GMPA
[13] 24 hour tweet experiment, Oct 2010, www.gmp.police.uk/mainsite/24hourtweets.htm

observers that the majority of callouts were related to problems such as missing children and domestic abuse, rather than community safety.[14]

2.16 The MPA and the MPS made it clear that they have no plans to emulate Manchester's innovations. The MPA pointed to crime mapping and information about officer numbers as examples of information it has recently made available to help the public understand its activities.[15] While this additional information is to be welcomed, it does not help to demonstrate the breadth of policing activities and will not relieve public pressure for ever greater levels of visible policing.

2.17 **More information should be made available to the public to explain the breadth of activities the police carry out and how these activities contribute to the police's effectiveness. We recognise that initiatives used by other forces to increase public awareness around policing activities may not be the most appropriate methods for London. However, if the MPA and MPS are reluctant to adopt similar initiatives, then it is incumbent on them to develop alternative ways of increasing public awareness and transparency.**

Operational Policing Measure analysis

2.18 The Operational Police Measure (OPM) is potentially a practical tool for understanding the implications of workforce changes and how effectively the MPS is using its resources. Introduced in 2002 by the MPS, and used internally since, OPM analysis is only now beginning to be made public. We can use OPM data to examine the roles the force carries out and how it deploys its staff between them.

2.19 OPM analysis works by assigning all members of the MPS workforce to one of 132 clearly defined roles, based on their core activities. The definitions are detailed enough to distinguish between different staff in the same department. For

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[14] Greater Manchester Police continues to use social media to engage and exchange views with the public and the number of regular observers following its activities has gone up from 3,000 to over 14,000.
[15] Chair of the MPA, Budget and Performance Committee, 7 Dec 2010 and the MPS Commissioner, Assembly Plenary meeting, 10 Nov 2010

example, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) is split between two roles: those staff who investigate crime and interact with the public and those who provide direct support to these staff.

2.20 Each role is then assigned to one of four broader categories:

- **Uniformed operational** – police officers and staff who work in uniform and whose primary role is the direct delivery of the overarching aims of the MPS
- **Non-uniformed operational** – police officers and staff who primarily wear plain clothes and who work either in direct contact with the public or in covert operations to deliver the overarching aims of the MPS
- **Operational support** – uniformed and non-uniformed police officers and staff who provide direct support to colleagues engaged in operational roles in contact with the public and in covert roles
- **Organisational support** – police officers and staff that support the internal needs of the organisation, maintaining the force's structures, setting policy and managing the MPS

2.21 The table below provides some examples of how roles have been classified between OPM categories. For each OPM category, we have selected two examples to demonstrate the breadth of roles included within that category. A full breakdown of all roles and how they are categorised can be found in Appendices 2 and 3.

	OPM Category	Role	Summary of role definitions
Operational	Uniformed operational	Foot/Car/Beat patrol	The overt presence of a locally accountable uniformed police constable who provides public reassurance and ensures an appropriate response to the needs and demands of the general public
		Schools Officers	Individuals who are predominantly employed to work in schools or liaise with schools
	Non-uniformed operational	Child/Sex/Domestic	Individuals who predominantly investigate and resolve cases of domestic violence involving any member of the family
		Control room (Dispatching)	Control Room Operatives in either service or borough control rooms dispatching calls
Operational support	Operational support	Custody	Gaolers, i.e. Individuals who are predominantly employed in looking after prisoners in police custody
		Technical Support Units	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the provision, maintenance and installation of technical support equipment
Organisational support	Organisational support	ACPO & Directors	Police officers of ACPO ranks and police staff at equivalent levels, e.g. Finance Director
		Architect / Surveyor	Individuals who are predominantly employed as architects or surveyors

2.22 On the whole, the MPS's categorisation appears logical and in line with expectations, but there will always be some debate as to how to categorise some roles. For example, whether someone working on a telephone in the control room is operational or operational support. Given that they interact directly with the public, it would seem reasonable that the MPS has classified them as operational staff.[16] What is more important is that the categorisation is consistent over time and staffing levels can be compared from year to year.

Using OPM analysis

2.23 OPM analysis should provide a valuable tool to help define the terms of the debate about how to allocate the MPS's limited resources. More specifically, it could be used to do the following:

- help demonstrate the implications of workforce changes on the force's operational capacity;

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[16] A recent report by the HMIC - *Demanding Times*, March 2011- carried out a public survey and found that the majority of the public felt that call handlers should be considered as being on the front line.

- help increase public awareness of the breadth of activities the MPS carries out and how they contribute to the force's overall effectiveness; and

- add clarity to what the Mayor's commitments on front-line policing mean in terms of the MPS's workforce capacity.

2.24 OPM analysis alone cannot provide a complete understanding of the force's operational capacity as it does not measure the amount of time officers and staff spend on operational duty. A member of staff's core activity may contribute to the force's operational capacity, but without knowing how much time they spend on this activity and how much time on other (potentially non-operational) activities, the force's operational capacity cannot be measured.

2.25 Currently there is no easy or cost effective way of collecting data that would allow analysis of how much time staff spend on particular activities. As technologies improve (for example, increasing the use of Global Positioning Systems to understand where officers are at all times of their shifts) more comprehensive ways of measuring operational capacity should become available. Better information should lead to better measures, but a balance will always need to be found between the cost of collecting additional information and the value it adds.

2.26 Until then, OPM analysis can provide a cheap, well-defined basis for understanding the implications of workforce changes. Its use would allow the MPS to demonstrate that it is prioritising staff reductions in organisational support and, where possible, show that it is maintaining or increasing the number of police staff carrying out operational duties.

2.27 **The widespread use and publication of OPM data by the MPS and MPA would increase transparency and help explain how the MPS uses its workforce resources. Although it would not facilitate a comprehensive measure of policing capacity, it would be a step change and demonstrate how MPS officers and civilian staff are deployed to different areas of policing and how this changes over time.**

2.28 **The Committee therefore concludes that OPM analysis should be made publicly available and integrated into the budget-setting and performance monitoring processes of the MPA and, in the future, the MOPC. The Mayor and the MPS should also use it as a tool to increase public awareness of the breadth of roles within the force and as a basis to demonstrate how the less visible policing roles contribute to the force's effectiveness.**

2.29 **Additionally, OPM analysis could be used to add some clarity to the Mayor's commitment on front-line policing. If the Mayor explained his commitments with regard to workforce numbers using the categories of operational, operational support and organisational support, the public would have a clearer idea of the policing roles he is prioritising and would be better able to hold him to account.**

Recommendation 1

From May 2011, the MPA/MOPC's budgets and quarterly performance monitoring reports should provide a breakdown of how its officers, special constables, PCSOs and other non-warranted staff are deployed between the roles defined under OPM analysis.

In considering the implementation of this recommendation, we recognise the MPA/MPS will need to balance the level of reporting and the resource required to provide it. We would therefore welcome a meeting with representatives of the MPA/MPS to discuss how OPM data can be used in the way we propose.

Recommendation 2

In response to this report and by the end of September 2011, the Mayor should present his commitment to increase front-line policing in 2011/12 in terms of the changes in the number of officers, special constables, PCSOs and other non-warranted staff carrying out operational, operational support and organisational support roles.

Recommendation 3

In response to this report and by the end of September 2011, the MPA should comment on whether a more comprehensive tool that takes account of the time police staff spend on operational activities could be developed to explain how the MPS makes use of its workforce resources. In particular, the response should include details of any plans the MPS has to develop a tool using Global Positioning Systems data or other technology to show the amount of time police staff spend on operational duty.

Using OPM analysis nationally

2.30 It is not only Londoners that want a better understanding of how effectively the police use their workforce resources. Various attempts have been made over the years by government agencies, policing experts and forces to develop a system to analyse how effectively the police use their workforce resources. Most recently, and in response to a request from the Home Office to facilitate agreement on a definition for the 'front line', HMIC produced a report that suggested a system for evaluating the percentage of staff who could be classified as carrying out front-line policing duties.[17]

2.31 Despite the collective need for a better system to analyse the police's workforce, work on the subject appears to have been carried out in silos. The model developed by the HMIC categorises staff based on their core activities, and it is very similar to the MPS's OPM system. It is therefore surprising that the HMIC report makes no reference to the work already carried out by the MPS and that the technical group who developed the HMIC model did not include any representatives from the MPS.

2.32 **A single model for analysing the police workforce should be agreed upon and adopted by all forces across England and Wales. This would allow comparisons between forces, the sharing of good practice and for a better understanding of where workforce efficiencies may be achievable in the MPS.**

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[17] *Demanding Times*, HMIC, March 2011

Recommendation 4

In response to this report, and by the end of September 2011, we request that HMIC comment on whether OPM analysis could be adopted as a standard way of analysing the use of workforce resources across all forces in England and Wales. The response could usefully include an assessment of the suitability of the system as a tool for comparison between forces and an explanation of the processes that would need to be completed for OPM analysis or a similar system to become the standard model used by all forces in England and Wales.

The risk of undervaluing operational support

2.33 OPM analysis should provide a useful tool but caution should be applied to its use. In distinguishing between operational and operational support, there is a danger that operational support roles are undervalued and seen as something the force could do without.

2.34 The former Chief Constable of Gloucestershire Police explained that essential policing tasks may look like overheads when carried out by support staff instead of being part of an officer's regular duties:

> *to relieve the administrative work on operational officers and you have these support units [...] The idea being that you can get the officer back on the streets and get them out there. The problem is, of course, this looks like an overhead.*[18]

2.35 In 2010, the MPA set a target of increasing the proportion of officers on operational duty by two per cent each year.[19] This is a commendable aim if it is achieved by reducing the number of officers in organisational support functions. However, if it comes about through the reduction of staff in operational support functions, it must be through finding efficiencies and should not reduce the quality of operational support. Resources

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[18] Timothy Brain, Budget and Performance Committee meeting, 16 Sept 2010
[19] The target was included in the 2010-13 *Policing London Business Plan as KPI 8.* This KPI is not included in the 2011-14 *Policing London Business Plan,* but MPA Board papers continue to note the MPA's aim to reduce the number of officers in operational and organisational support roles and release more officers for operational duties.

should only be moved from operational support to operational duty if doing so adds to the force's overall operational capability. All workforce changes that involve increasing or decreasing the number of officers and non-warranted staff in operational and operational support functions should be assessed in terms of how they affect the force's overall effectiveness.

2.36 **It is a commendable aim to increase the proportion of officers on operational duty. However, we must be cautious and ensure that the proportion of officers on operational duty is not increased at the cost of valuable operational support functions and the force's overall capability. OPM analysis should not be used as a blunt tool for setting targets, but instead as a starting point from which to build an understanding of how the MPS workforce is being used.**

# 3 The balance between operational and support roles

Key points

- Back office roles have decreased at the MPS since 2003, but comparisons with other forces suggest further workforce efficiencies should be achievable.

- Operational support functions have grown from 17 per cent of the workforce in 2003 to 29 per cent in 2010, largely because of the increased specialisation within the force.

- Efficiencies in operational support functions should be possible, but this will require:
    - the balance of resources between specialist and regular policing to be reassessed;
    - a more proportionate approach to risk reduction being adopted by the police; and
    - taking advantage of the opportunities offered by new technology.

3.1 In this chapter we look at the balance of MPS staff between different policing roles. Using OPM analysis, as described in the previous chapter, we examine how the workforce strength of operational, operational support and organisational support has changed since 2003, when OPM analysis was first used. By understanding how and why the workforce balance between these categories has changed we can begin to assess what the appropriate balance between these activities may be and where the MPS should be able to find the greatest workforce efficiencies. Ideally, information would be available to compare the MPS workforce to other forces in the country. However, as explained in the previous chapter, a standard model for workforce analysis does not exist and OPM analysis is only used by the MPS.

Changes at the MPS since 2003

3.2 The balance between the different types of policing roles at the MPS has changed in recent years. Between 2003 and 2010, the percentage of the workforce in operational roles reduced from 68 to 61 per cent; operational support roles increased from 17 to 29 per cent; and organisational support roles reduced from

15 per cent to 10 per cent.[20] The graph below shows how the balance has changed.

MPS workforce deployment

Back office efficiencies

3.3 Organisational support functions are being carried out with fewer staff now than they were in 2003. This supports the MPA's claim that significant efficiencies have already been found in back office functions such as human resources, finance and property services.[21]

3.4 Organisational support roles have reduced by 8 per cent but further staffing efficiencies should be available. Based on data published by the Audit Commission in July 2010, the MPS had a relatively smaller number of staff in Human Resources, Information and Communication Technology, and other admin/clerical functions than its most similar forces.[22] However, taking its relative size into account, it had more staff in Corporate Development and Finance than at its most similar

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[20] 2010 figures as at 31 Aug and sourced from Operational Policing Measures, MPA Strategic Operational Policing Committee paper, 9 Dec 2010. The 2003 figures are sourced from the Policing and Performance Plan 2002/03.

[21] Kit Malthouse, Budget and Performance Committee, 5 Jan 2011

[22] *Sustaining Value for Money in the police service,* Audit Commission, July 2010 – The MPS had 2.6 staff per 100 total staff in Corporate Development compared to an average across its most similar forces of 1.2 in 2008/09. The MPS had 1.7 staff per 100 total staff in Finance compared to an average across its most similar forces of 0.9 in 2008/09.

forces. This suggests that workforce efficiencies should be possible in these areas. The Audit Commission noted that:

> *Forces needed to save more in the back-office. A lack of ambition for back-office savings is a barrier to achieving better value for money.*

3.5 **As the back-office function of the force, organisational support should always be run with the minimum number of staff required to provide support efficiently and effectively. We welcome the staffing reductions the MPS has found in organisational support since 2003 and urge it to take an ambitious approach to finding further efficiencies.**

The growth of operational support

3.6 Operational support is the area of policing that has seen the biggest growth. Since 2003, for every new operational role, roughly two new roles have been created in operational support. As a result, operational support has grown from less than a fifth of the workforce in 2003 to almost a third by 2010.

3.7 During our investigation we heard that the growth of operational support can be attributed to the following key factors, which are explained in more detail in this chapter:

- an increased use of specialist units and staff, with a tendency towards piecemeal growth; and

- additional risk management requirements adding to the force's administrative workload.

3.8 We heard ways in which the growth of operational support could be addressed, including:

- sharing support services and assessing the resources allocated to some existing specialist units;

- reducing administrative tasks through a new approach to risk management; and

- making use of new technology.

Increased specialism

3.9 The biggest reason for the growth of operational support is the expansion of specialism within the force. The Committee heard

how specialist units and specialist staffing roles within the MPS have increased since 2003. Specialist units rely heavily on intelligence gathering, data analysis and other functions that are carried out by operational support staff. Equally, the majority of new specialist staff, outside of specialist units, carry out roles that are classified as being in operational support.

3.10 Two examples of specialist areas that have grown since 2003 are the Counter Terrorism Command and the Specialist Crime Directorate. The resources allocated to counter-terrorism have grown in response to the rise in terrorist activity over the past ten years. The Specialist Crime Directorate, established in 2002, has grown as the force has chosen to target specific areas of serious crime (eg rape and serious sexual offences) in response to changes in crime patterns and public priorities.

3.11 The Committee also heard how this change to a more specialised workforce has not come about entirely efficiently. Professor FitzGerald suggested that:

> *It is fair to assume that what currently exists has developed piecemeal, with its many disparate elements growing like Topsy during the recent boom years, but at different rates and with insufficient reference to each other.[23]*

3.12 This view was supported by Her Majesty's Inspector who told the Committee how intelligence functions had grown with the formation of each new specialist unit:

> *Every time somebody forms a unit they often want their own intelligence. So I think it is a constant battle to keep these things under control.[24]*

Sharing support services and assessing existing specialist units

3.13 Her Majesty's Inspector explained how the MPS had recently found some savings by grouping together intelligence and

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[23] *Notes for GLA inquiry into front-line policing in London*, Professor FitzGerald, Sept 2010
[24] HMIC for the MPS, Budget and Performance Committee meeting, 16 Sept 2010

surveillance functions from different specialist units. He suggested that further such efficiencies should be achievable.[25]

3.14 Some further efficiencies should come through the MPS's Service Improvement Plan. The plan was set up in 2008/09 and focuses on finding efficiencies in support functions and reducing overheads. In 2010/11, it managed to reduce the number of staff in operational and organisational support by over 500 through efficiencies. It is forecasting a further reduction of 1,500 in 2011/12 and is developing plans for further support staff efficiencies from 2012/13.[26] We will monitor the success of the MPS's Service Improvement Plan and its ability to find efficiencies in operational support roles by reducing duplication.

3.15 More broadly, we heard that the resources allocated to existing specialist units should be kept under assessment. As crime patterns and priorities change, bringing about increases in areas such as Counter Terrorism and Specialist Crime, demand in other areas might decline. For example, homicide rates are over 25 per cent lower than they were in 2003.[27] This may be due to the increased resources that homicide command has been given in recent years, but it may also suggest that these resources could be used better elsewhere. As Her Majesty's Inspector put it, each specialist unit usually has a "well articulated argument for why it needs more resources [but] you have to keep asking these questions because otherwise the resources remain where they have been traditionally".[28]

3.16 **The need for specialist units should not be assumed. The MPS should regularly review the balance of resources between specialist units and regular policing and be prepared to reduce the size of specialist units where officers and staff could be used more effectively elsewhere. Equally, some further workforce efficiencies should be achievable in specialist units by bringing together and sharing some of their common functions,**

[25] HMIC for the MPS, Budget and Performance Committee meeting, 16 Sept 2010
[26] MPA submission to investigation
[27] MPS Crime Statistics show 140 homicides in 12 months to Feb 2011 and 189 in 12 months to March 2003
[28] HMIC for the MPS speaking at the Budget and Performance Committee meeting, 16 Sept 2010

as the MPS has already done with some units' intelligence and surveillance functions.

> **Recommendation 5**
> **In response to this report, and by the end of September 2011, the MPA should explain its approach to ensuring the balance between specialist units and regular policing is the most appropriate. The response should include details of how the need for specialist units is evaluated; how often the resources allocated to each specialist unit are reviewed; and the potential for further savings to be found through sharing common functions across specialist units.**

Risk management and increases in administrative work

3.17 Risk management requirements have led to an increase in operational support staff. The Committee heard how guidance, reporting requirements and standard operating procedures have all grown to help manage risk, increasing the force's administrative workload and need for support staff. An example is the effect of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) on daily management meetings. Reports suggest that the guidance given in the NIM has led supervisors to spend on average two hours of their shift preparing for daily management meetings as well as needing several analysts to carry out their background research.[29]

3.18 Her Majesty's Inspector told us that the MPS had over-invested in some areas of policing in an attempt to remove all risk. He explained that removing all risk was not an efficient use of resources and savings could be found if a small amount of risk was deemed acceptable:

> *If we do this in this way we will remove it [risk], if we did it with 50 per cent of the best resources it might happen two per cent of the time.*

3.19 The view that a change in the police's approach to dealing with risk would result in significant efficiencies is not new. As early as 1998, and prior to the growth of support functions identified in this report, Sir Ronnie Flanagan's review of policing recommended that, "the government should examine the role

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[29] Reducing Bureaucracy in Policing, Final Report, Jan Berry, Oct 2010

of risk within the police service and begin a national debate on risk aversion and culture change at a central government level." His views have been restated in several academic papers including Jan Berry's report, *Reducing Bureaucracy in Policing*.[30]

3.20 Progress has been slow in putting the recommendations of these reports into action, but budget reductions should provide a new incentive. While budgets were growing, efficiency programmes tended to focus on finding incremental annual cost reductions instead of pursing transformational reform. With a clear mandate to drive forward major reform and a heightened focus on value for money, the current financial situation provides an opportunity to put these recommendations into action and bring about a change in the approach the police take to dealing with risk.

3.21 **Led from the centre by Government, all parties involved – police forces, Authorities/Police and Crime Panels, regulators and the Home Office – should work together to develop a more proportionate approach to risk reduction. The balance between risk reduction and the effective use of resources will need to be reassessed with the aim of bringing about transformational change.**

The use of technology

3.22 Evidence from other police forces suggests that the use of new technologies reduces the need for operational support roles. For example, the Chicago Police Department estimates that, by introducing handheld computer devices, officers were able to spend 20 per cent more time on the street and administrative support staff numbers were reduced by 17 per cent within the first two years of their use.[31]

3.23 The MPS has begun to use similar handheld devices to speed up administrative processes. The MPA agreed a contract to develop and produce Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) in 2008. By early 2010, it had tested them in three boroughs and two

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[30] Reducing Bureaucracy in Policing, Final Report, Jan Berry, Oct 2010

[31] *Chicago's Citizen Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting CLEAR* , NESTA Innovation unit submission to Investigation, Sept 2010

central units, and had plans to roll out a further 4,000 devices.[32] The rollout has since been delayed due to "technical testing issues" and it is not clear when the full efficiency benefits of this new technology will be realised.[33]

3.24 **There are opportunities for the MPS to find workforce efficiencies and improve service levels through the increased use of technology. One example that the Committee has heard about is through the use of hand held computer devices. Given the success of these devices in the Chicago Police Force, the Committee urges the MPS to drive its PDA programme forward so that the benefits it should provide can be realised as soon as possible.**

Recommendation 6
The MPA/MOPC should report back to the Budget Monitoring Sub-Committee, through the quarterly monitoring reports, on the progress of its PDA programme and on any savings and efficiencies it achieves.

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[32] Commissioner Report to the MPA, 25 Feb 2010
[33] *Capital and Budget Monitoring 2010/11, period 8,* MPA Finance and Resources Committee paper, 20 Jan 2011

4 Civilianisation

Key points

- Between 2003 and 2010 police officer strength at the MPS grew by over 4,000 despite it falling slightly across the rest of forces in England and Wales.

- The proportion of operational support roles filled by police officers at the MPS increased between 2003 and 2010.

- There should be opportunities for further civilianisation at the MPS to increase efficiency.

- The MPS should aim to only use police officers in operational support roles where:

    - Their ability to carry out operational duties makes them an essential part of the force's resilience capacity; or
    - It is more cost effective than employing civilian staff to carry out the same roles.

- If further civilianisation is to bring efficiencies, several constraints will need to be overcome or minimised, including: resilience capacity requirements and workforce flexibility; police officer terms and conditions; and public perceptions.

4.1 Civilianisation – using non-warranted civilian staff to carry out some of the roles currently carried out by police officers[34] – should provide the MPS with the opportunity to find savings. As support roles generally do not require warrant powers or police officer training, it is generally cheaper and more efficient to fill them with civilian staff than police officers. This chapter looks at how operational support functions are staffed at the MPS, how and why this has changed over time and what this tells us about the scope for the MPS to use civilianisation to find workforce efficiencies.

Workforce growth since 2003

4.2 The MPS workforce has grown more than other forces since 2003. Across England and Wales, workforce numbers grew by 16 per cent between 2003 and 2010. This compares to 26 per cent at the MPS.[35]

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[34] Technically a police officer is a civilian, but for the purposes of this report, a civilian is used to mean a non-warranted member of staff i.e. not a police officer
[35] Figures taken from *the Police Service Strength England and Wales,* Home Office Statistical Bulletins at 31 March 2003 and 30 Sept 2010

4.3   During this time the MPS's growth has been more focussed on increasing officers and less on civilian staff than the rest of England and Wales. Between 2003 and 2010, the number of warranted officers at the MPS increased by 4,451 (16 per cent), while it fell by 253 (0.2 per cent) across other forces.[36] Non-warranted staff numbers did increase in London, largely due to the increased use of PCSOs, but continued to represent a smaller portion of the force than elsewhere.[37]

Officers in operational support roles

4.4   The MPS is using more officers in operational support roles now than it did in 2003. Between 2003 and 2010, the number of operational support roles more than doubled and over half of these new roles were filled with officers. Officers now fill 45 per cent of operational support roles compared to 38 per cent in 2003.

4.5   Evidence suggests that other forces have a smaller proportion of officers working in operational support than the MPS. As OPM analysis is unique to the MPS, it is not possible to use it to compare to other forces. However, a national study by the Audit Commission identified that the MPS had a relatively small proportion of non-warranted staff in the following areas (based on 2008/09 figures)[38]:

- **The Criminal Investigation Department (CID)** – The MPS had the third lowest proportion of non-warranted staff in England and Wales at 1.3 per cent. The highest proportion was Surrey Police at 37 per cent.

- **Training** – The MPS has one of the lowest percentages of non-warranted staff at 29.2 per cent. This is similar to West Midlands (28.8 per cent) but lower than Greater Manchester (39.4 per cent). In some forces, such as Warwickshire, the figure is as high as 79 per cent.

- **Criminal Justice and Custody** – While the number of non-warranted staff was relatively high at 41.1 per cent,

[36] Figures taken from *the Police Service Strength England and Wales,* Home Office Statistical Bulletins at 31 March 2003 and 30 Sept 2010
[37] In 2003, non-warranted staff (including PCSOs) made up 30 per cent of the workforce at the MPS and 32 per cent across all forces in England and Wales. By 2010, non-warranted staff made up 36 per cent of the workforce at the MPS and 40 per cent across England and Wales.
[38] Audit Commission submission to Investigation, 10 Sept 2010

this was lower than Greater Manchester where the figure was 57.3 per cent.

Civilianisation in operational support

4.6   Following several trials, the MPS rolled out a civilianisation programme – Project Herald – in 2008/09 to modernise custody operations and reduce the number of officers working in custody suites. This programme replaced 300 officers with 502 non-warranted staff by the end of 2010/11. A further 250 officers are expected to be released from custody roles by March 2012.[39] The programme is expected to deliver annual savings of almost £5.5 million from 2012/13 as well as improve custody operations.

4.7   The higher number of officers in some support functions at the MPS suggests that there should be opportunities for further civilianisation programmes. However, there are several constraints, particularly in the current financial climate. The following constraints are discussed in more detail below: resilience capacity requirements and workforce flexibility; police officer terms and conditions; and public perceptions.

Resilience capacity requirements

4.8   Officers in support roles provide a valuable reserve capacity that non-warranted staff cannot provide. They can be deployed to operational duties if additional capacity – 'resilience capacity' – is needed to deal with extraordinary circumstances.

4.9   The MPS maintains that London needs to have a larger resilience capacity than other forces due to the city's size and international status. As the country's capital city, the risks and threats it faces and the number and scale of public events that need policing are far greater than elsewhere. Moreover, policing the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012 is going to put new levels of pressure on the MPS workforce, both in terms of regular policing capacity and resilience capacity requirements.

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[39] MPA response to the Committee's request for information, 14 Jan 2011

4.10　At present it is argued that the number of officers in operational support can only be reduced if the force's resilience capacity is maintained. The Chair of the MPA told the Committee that the MPA believed that police officer numbers were "about right at the moment" and the additional resilience capacity provided by officers in operational support duties was needed.[40]

4.11　We have not seen a formal evaluation of resilience capacity requirements or the level of additional officer capacity that is currently available to the MPS. The additional capacity will be dependent on how many officers there are in support roles, but equally on how ready they are to carry out operational duties if called upon to do so. Many officers in support roles are unlikely to have carried out operational duties for a number of years and therefore an assessment of how effectively they could work on the front line if required to do so is also needed. We call at the end of this chapter for a proper assessment of the total number of officers required for exceptional circumstances and an evaluation of how many of the officers in support roles would be fit and ready to carry out operational duties at short notice if required to do so.

Workforce flexibility

4.12　There is a danger that civilianisation could reduce the flexibility of the workforce. Unlike officers, non-warranted staff are employed to carry out a specific task and cannot easily be redeployed to other areas of policing if needs change. Furthermore, their conditions of employment usually mean that overtime cannot be used to manage fluctuations in workloads in the same way that it is with officers.

4.13　Police officers are able to carry out many different roles within the police and this gives forces a flexibility that other organisations do not have. We heard how this has led to the MPS being slower than some other organisations to develop sophisticated resource and task management tools.[41] The former Chief Constable of Surrey police explained the situation:

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[40] Kit Malthouse, Budget and Performance Committee meeting, 7 Dec 2010
[41] Bob Quick, Budget and Performance Committee meeting, 14 Oct 2010

One of the symptoms of having a workforce that is very flexible and can turn its hand to almost any task is that the service has not had the same pressures to develop very sophisticated demand forecasting and management systems, workforce planning tools and management information systems.[42]

He believed that improved workforce management systems may offer a way to maintain workforce flexibility while reducing the number of officers in support roles.

Officer terms and conditions

4.14 Large-scale civilianisation is only currently possible by growing the force. Police officers cannot be made redundant; they are independent office holders. Consequently, civilians can only be employed by the MPS if they replace officers leaving through natural wastage, or by growing overall numbers.

4.15 Moreover, if redundancies are required as budgets are reduced, it is likely to be civilians who are the first to go. Recent news reports have suggested that for some forces, constraints of reducing officer numbers have forced them to find savings by reducing the number of civilian staff in support roles. Police officers have had to be taken off front-line policing activities to cover the work previously carried out by these civilian staff.[43]

4.16 A Government review of police pay and conditions may lead to greater flexibility to reduce officer numbers. Part 1 of the Winsor review, published in March 2011, noted that, "there is no inconsistency between the office of constable and a police force having the right to require a police officer to leave because the workforce has to be reduced".[44] It does, however, suggest that a compulsory redundancy scheme is not necessary in the short-term and that forces should devise and use voluntary exit schemes to help manage the situation.

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[42] Bob Quick, Budget and Performance Committee meeting, 14 Oct 2010
[43] *Government reductions in policing,* Hansard, Commons debate, 4 Apr 2011, column 854-855
[44] *Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions*, Part 1, Mar 2011, T.Winsor

4.17 A further constraint related to terms and conditions is the number of officers retained by the force who are unable to undertake operational activities. At 31 December 2010, 2,886 officers (9 per cent) at the MPS were on recuperative or restricted duties.[45] This is roughly in line with reports that approximately one in ten officers in England and Wales is on restrictive duty or sick leave and shows the situation is not unique to the MPS.[46] Under current conditions and regulations, forces have limited flexibility around how they manage officers on restricted duty. For example, for officers unable to carry out operational duties for medical reasons, often the only (or cheapest) option is for them to be given a job in a support role performing the same role as non-warranted staff but with officer pay and conditions.[47]

4.18 The MPA is hoping that the Winsor review will help it to manage officers on restricted and recuperative duty more flexibly. This issue will be looked at in the second part of the review, due to be published later in 2011.[48]

Findings on civilianisation

4.19 **The civilianisation of support functions is desirable because officers are generally more expensive to employ than non-warranted staff. Equally, for specialist support roles it is often more useful to employ civilians with specific professional skills than officers with general skills. Comparison with other forces suggests that there should be opportunities for the MPS to find efficiencies in support functions through further civilianisation. The MPS should seek to increase the proportion of support roles filled by civilian staff.**

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[45] 980 on recuperative duty and 1,906 were on restricted duty, MPA response to the Committee's request for information, 14 Jan 2011

[46] Results of freedom of information request from The Times newspaper, 4 Dec 2010

[47] There are limits on how many officers can be given early retirement for medical reasons and/or because a medical pension may be more expensive than the extra cost of having such officers work in support roles instead of non-warranted staff.

[48] Part 2 of the review will consider: whether there are other ways in which police officers who are unable to perform a role requiring the office of constable could be treated, other than ill-health retirement, including transfer to police staff terms and conditions; and whether length of service should be the sole focus of medical retirement under the Police Pension Scheme 1987 or whether other factors such as the severity of an officer's disability should be considered.

4.20 **Recognising that there are currently limitations on opportunities for civilianisation, the MPS should aim to only fill operational support roles with police officers if:**

- **their ability, when called upon, to carry out operational duties makes them an essential part of the force's resilience capacity; or**

- **they are unable to carry out operational duties and giving them support roles is more cost effective than employing a civilian.**

4.21 **To indicate the potential for further civilianisation, a proper assessment is required of the total number of officers required as resilience capacity for extraordinary circumstances.**

Recommendation 7
In response to this report and by the end of September 2011, the MPA should comment on our conclusions:

- **The MPS should aim to only fill operational support roles with police officers if:**

    - **their ability, when called upon, to carry out operational duties makes them an essential part of the force's resilience capacity; or**

    - **they are unable to carry out operational duties and giving them support roles is more cost effective than employing civilian staff.**

- **Opportunities for further civilianisation are limited by resilience capacity requirements and officers who are unable to carry out operational duties being retained by the force.**

The response should also provide:

- **An assessment of the number of officers required under resilience capacity requirements and an evaluation of how many of the officers in support functions would be available for operational duty at short notice if required; and**

- **An update on the MPA's plans for further civilianisation over the remainder of the comprehensive spending review period.**

5 Conclusion

5.1   The need for workforce efficiencies and the value of the Mayor and the MPS being able to demonstrate to the public the implications of workforce changes are not new. What is new is the scale of the efficiencies required and therefore the importance of the Mayor and the MPS demonstrating to the public the implications of the changes.

5.2   Evidence gathered for this investigation would suggest that there are opportunities for the MPS to find workforce efficiencies that can make a sizable contribution to savings requirements. Year-on-year incremental savings should continue to be available from making back-office functions more efficient, but more fundamental reform will also be needed. Our assessment of how the workforce has grown since 2003 and where resources have been focussed suggests there are opportunities to find efficiencies by: reviewing the size and resources given to specialist units; removing duplication, improving workforce management tools and making better use of technology; increasing the use of civilian staff in support roles; and more fundamentally, rethinking the police's approach to risk and the use of resources to minimise it.

5.3   There are several constraints that will limit the MPS's ability to find these efficiencies and it is important that all parties involved take responsibility for minimising and where possible removing these constraints. Some of these limitations are unique to the MPS and exist as a result of policing the country's capital, but other limitations affect all forces in the UK. It would therefore be beneficial to policing across the country if Government, regulators and Police Authorities/police and crime panels were to take an active role in trying to reduce these constraints. We will therefore be seeking comment on the issues we have identified from the Policing Minister.

5.4   One of the biggest constraints to finding efficiencies will be public opinion and concerns that the MPS will not be able to maintain effective policing with a smaller budget. The Mayor and the MPS should demonstrate to the public that, where possible, the changes they are making to the force are efficiencies and not service reductions.

5.5   The MPS's OPM analysis provides a useful tool to show the public the breadth of activities it carries out and the implications of workforce changes. The work by the MPS over the last twelve months to refine OPM analysis has been valuable. As the report shows, while OPM analysis cannot provide a comprehensive measure of policing capacity, it does provide a well defined set of terms and a system to help understand how the MPS workforce is deployed between policing roles. It is therefore a powerful tool and one that should be used by the Mayor, the MPA/MOPC and the MPS to communicate the workforce implications of their management decisions.

5.6   OPM analysis could provide an even more powerful tool if it was adopted and used by all forces in England and Wales. Our analysis of where the MPS could find workforce efficiencies would have benefited from being able to compare the MPS with other forces. Equally, a single system for analysis across all forces would make it easier for forces to benchmark themselves against each other. This would allow them to identify where other forces have identified more efficient ways of managing their workforces and learn from them. As the need for a better understanding of how effectively the police use their resources is not limited to London, we call on the HMIC to adopt OPM analysis or agree on a single, similar model that can be used to compare how all forces in England and Wales use their workforce resources.

5.7   The need to find new levels of savings in the MPS should be viewed as being as much an opportunity as a hindrance. A consistent message we received while carrying out this investigation is that we must take advantage of the new opportunity provided by the need for large-scale savings. The current financial situation must be used to kick-start an informed debate over how policing should be reformed. The debate will need to be based on a good understanding, by all parties, including the public, of where policing is now and what needs to happen to make it more effective and efficient.

Appendix 1 Recommendations

Recommendation 1

From May 2011, the MPA/MOPC's budgets and quarterly performance monitoring reports should provide a breakdown of how its officers, special constables, PCSOs and other non-warranted staff are deployed between the roles defined under OPM analysis.

In considering the implementation of this recommendation, we recognise the MPA/MPS will need to balance the level of reporting and the resource required to provide it. We would therefore welcome a meeting with representatives of the MPA/MPS to discuss how OPM data can be used in the way we propose.

Recommendation 2

In response to this report and by the end of September 2011, the Mayor should present his commitment to increase front-line policing in 2011/12 in terms of the changes in the number of officers, special constables, PCSOs and other non-warranted staff carrying out operational, operational support and organisational support roles.

Recommendation 3

In response to this report and by the end of September 2011, the MPA should comment on whether a more comprehensive tool that takes account of the time police staff spend on operational activities could be developed to explain how the MPS makes use of its workforce resources. In particular, the response should include details of any plans the MPS has to develop a tool using Global Positioning Systems data or other technology to show the amount of time police staff spend on operational duty.

Recommendation 4

In response to this report, and by the end of September 2011, we request that HMIC comment on whether OPM analysis could be adopted as a standard way of analysing the use of workforce resources across all forces in England and Wales. The response could usefully include an assessment of the suitability of the system as a tool for comparison between forces and an explanation of the processes that would need to be completed for OPM analysis or a similar system to become the standard model used by all forces in England and Wales.

Recommendation 5

In response to this report, and by the end of September 2011, the MPA should explain its approach to ensuring the balance between specialist units and regular policing is the most appropriate. The

response should include details of how the need for specialist units is evaluated; how often the resources allocated to each specialist unit are reviewed; and the potential for further savings to be found through sharing common functions across specialist units.

Recommendation 6

The MPA/MOPC should report back to the Budget Monitoring Sub-Committee, through the quarterly monitoring reports, on the progress of its PDA programme and on any savings and efficiencies it achieves.

Recommendation 7

In response to this report and by the end of September 2011, the MPA should comment on our conclusions:

- The MPS should aim to only fill operational support roles with police officers if:
  - their ability, when called upon, to carry out operational duties makes them an essential part of the force's resilience capacity; or
  - they are unable to carry out operational duties and giving them support roles is more cost effective than employing civilian staff.

- Opportunities for further civilianisation are limited by resilience capacity requirements and officers who are unable to carry out operational duties being retained by the force.

The response should also provide:

- An assessment of the number of officers required under resilience capacity requirements and an evaluation of how many of the officers in support functions would be available for operational duty at short notice if required; and

- An update on the MPA's plans for further civilianisation over the remainder of the comprehensive spending review period.

Appendix 2 Policing roles categorised using OPM analysis

Below is a table showing how the MPS has categorised its workforce into 132 roles and then assigned then to one of four categories: Uniformed operational, Non-unformed operational, Operational support and Organisational support.[49]

Uniform operational

Territorial Police
- Enquiry/Station
- Foot/Car/Beat Patrol
- Local Long-term Operations
- Schools Officers
- Youth Offenders Team (YACs)
- Special Constables

Control Room - Officers
- Control Room (Call Handling)
- Control Room (Used Exclusively For IBOs)

Community
- Community Beat Officers
- Ward-Based Reassurance Officers
- Public Transport Reassurance Officers

Proactive Squads
- Disorder Unit (Problem Solving)
- Proactive (Crime Squad)
- Proactive Community Team
- Retail Crime Unit (Shoplifters)
- Robbery

Street Duties
- Training Instructors
- Street Duties Probationers

Security
- Court Security
- Building Security
- Security Patrols

Pan London
- Air
- Dogs
- Marine
- Underwater
- Mounted

Specialist Roles
- Firearms - Tactical
- Ports
- Special Escort Group
- Static Protection

Traffic
- Traffic
- Traffic wardens

Transport
- Vehicle Removal Officers
- Transport Route Team
- Transport Task Team

Other
- POLSA
- Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR)

Non-uniform operational

CID
- CID
- CID Aides/Trainee Investigator

Control Room - Staff
- Control Room (Call Handling)
- Control Room (Used Exclusively For IBOs)

Proactive Squads
- Burglary
- Hate Crime
- Child/Sex/Domestic
- Vice
- Proactive (Crime Squad)

Territorial Policing
- Asset Confiscation
- MISPER Unit
- Youth Offenders Team (YACs)
- CBRN - TSG Only

Protection
- Jury Protection
- Personal Protection Officer

Identification
- Coroner's Officer
- Fingerprints/Photographic
- Scenes of Crime

Specialist Roles
- Special Branch
- Surveillance Units
- Shooting Investigation Team
- Murder Review Team
- Paedophile Squad
- Computer Crime
- Flying Squad
- Money Laundering Team
- Kidnap & Special Investigation Unit
- Anti Terrorist Officer
- Major Investigation Team

Port & Extradition
- Extradition Unit
- Port Control Officer

Other
- Complaints and Discipline
- Drugs
- Fraud
- Intelligence (Dedicated Source/Handling Unit)
- Vehicle Crime
- Robbery
- Sex Offenders (Inc. Sapphire & Jigsaw)
- Cab Enforcement Team

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[49] *Operational Policing Measure*, Appendix 1, MPA Strategic and Operational Policing Committee paper, 9 December 2010

Operational support

Community
- Community Safety/Relations
- Child/Sex/Domestic
- Crime Prevention

Criminal Justice
- Criminal Justice Units
- Firearms/Explosives
- Licensing

Custody
- Custody Sergeant
- Custody Support (Inc. Gaolers & DDOs)
- Case Progression Unit

Identification
- Fingerprints/Photographic
- Scenes of Crime
- Suspect Identification

Management
- Departmental Heads
- Local Commanders

Data Systems
- Holmes Unit
- Bomb Data Centre Officer

Traffic
- Traffic – Collision Investigation Unit
- Traffic
- Traffic Wardens

Other
- CID
- Communications
- Complaints and Discipline
- Crime and Incident Management
- Dogs
- Drivers
- Intelligence (Inc. Crime Analysts & Researchers)
- Mounted
- Operational Planning
- Property
- Special Branch
- Surveillance Units
- Technical Support Units
- Training
- Vehicle Workshops/Fleet
- Anti-Social behaviour unit
- Force Armourer

Organisational support
- ACPO & Directors
- Buildings
- Catering
- Corporate Development
- Criminal Records Offices
- Departmental Heads
- Finance
- IT/Communications/Audio
- Operational Planning
- Other Admin/Clerical
- Personnel/Human Resources
- Press and Public Relations
- Staff Associations
- Staff Officers (Inc. Personal Assistants)
- Stores/Supplies
- Welfare/Occupational Health
- Management Support Unit (MSU)
- Projects
- Architect/Surveyor
- Legal Staff

Non Category
- Recruits Modules 1-7
- Career Break
- Seconded
- Suspended

Appendix 3 Definition of policing roles used in OPM analysis

Below is a table of all OPM roles and their definitions[50]

Uniformed Operational	
Role Name	**Definition**
Air - Operational	Individuals who are predominantly employed as pilots, ground crew or air observers
Court Security	Individuals who are predominantly assigned to security duties at Magistrates' and Crown Courts.
Dogs	Dog handlers including those employed for general policing, drugs and explosive detection duties
Enquiry/Station	Individuals who are predominantly employed in dealing with front office enquiries from members of the public at any Police station.
Firearms - Tactical	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the use of firearms either as tactical advisors, trainers or in the provision of firearms support to operational incidents. Officers employed in Armed Response Vehicles should only be included if they are mainly employed within the Force Firearms Unit. Officers employed in Armed Response Vehicles but not employed within the Force Firearms Unit should be shown within their regular deployment category.
Foot/Car/Beat Patrol	The ACPO Working Group on Patrol settled on the definition: "The overt presence, whether on foot or mobile, of a locally accountable uniformed police constable who provides public reassurance and who is approachable and available to ensure an appropriate response from all the resources of the police service, to the needs and demands of the general public".
Marine	Individuals who predominantly conduct marine or boat patrol including supervisors. Members of Underwater Search Units should be shown at 169.
Mounted	Individuals who predominantly conduct mounted patrol duties, including supervisors.
Ports	Individuals who are predominantly employed at sea or airports on general policing and security duties, excluding protection duties
Traffic	Individuals who are predominantly employed on motor-cycles or in patrol vehicles for the policing of traffic and motorway related duties. This does not include officers employed in accident investigation, vehicle examination and radar duties.
Traffic Wardens	Traffic Wardens engaged in patrol and other duties
Training	Individuals who are predominately employed in the training of Street Duty Probationers.
Underwater	Individuals who are predominantly employed in an Underwater Search Unit.
Community Beat Officers	Individuals who are predominantly employed as community beat officers (home beat) and their line managers. Includes sector based sergeants and inspectors, and PCSOs where applicable.
Ward-Based Reassurance Officers	Individuals who are employed in "ring-fenced" posts as dedicated ward-based officers under the National Reassurance Policing Project (Operation Opal). Includes Sergeants, PCs and PCSOs.
Public Transport Reassurance Officers	Individuals who are employed in "ring-fenced" posts as dedicated public transport based officers under the National Reassurance Policing Project (Operation Opal). Include Sergeantsts, PCs and PCSOs.
Disorder Unit (Problem Solving)	Individuals who are predominantly employed as a borough disorder team or problem solving team in uniform. Does not include proactive uniform non specific crime squad (219).
Proactive (Crime Squad)	Individuals who are predominantly employed as a proactive non specific crime squad in uniform.
Proactive (Community Team)	Individuals who are predominantly employed as a proactive community team in uniform.
Retail Crime Unit (Shoplifters)	Individuals who predominantly investigate offences of shoplifting in uniform.
Robbery	Individuals who predominantly investigate offences of robbery in uniform.
Security Patrols	Individuals, including PCSOs, predominantly engaged in Security Patrols
Building Security	Individuals who are predominantly employed to provide security for buildings.
POLSA	Individuals who are predominantly employed as a part of a POLSA search team.
Street Duties Probationers	Individuals who are predominantly employed as a Street Duties Probationer.
Local Long-term Operations	Individuals who are predominantly employed on local long term operations in uniform.

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[50] *Operational Policing Measure*, Appendix 2, MPA Strategic and Operational Policing Committee paper, 9 December 2010

Schools Officers	Individuals who are predominantly employed to work in schools or liaise with schools.
Youth Offenders Team	Individuals who are predominantly employed in youth offenders team in uniform. (YACs)
Special Constables	Special Constables engaged in patrol and other duties.
Vehicle Officers Removal	Individuals who are predominantly employed in removal of vehicles.
Special Escort Group	Individuals who are predominantly tasked with assisting with the safe movement of Royalty, Diplomats or Members of Parliament.
Static Protection	Individuals who are predominantly employed as static protection officers stationed outside buildings containing Royalty, Diplomats or Members of Parliament.
Transport Route Team	Individuals who predominantly patrol key bus routes.
Transport Task Team	Individuals who predominantly work on a transport task team patrolling a transport "crime corridor"
Automatic Number Plate Recognition	Individuals who are predominantly employed operationally in uniform to detect offences using ANPR equipment. (ANPR)

Non-uniformed Operational	
Role Name	**Definition**
Asset Confiscation	Individuals who predominantly identify and seize assets from the proceeds of crime under the Drugs Trafficking Offences Act 1986, the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984
Burglary	Individuals who predominantly investigate offences of burglary in plain clothes. Includes "Operation Bumblebee". Do not include analysts (104) or administrative assistants (104).
Child/Sex/ Domestic	Individuals who predominantly investigate and resolve cases of domestic violence involving any member of the family
CID	Individuals mainly employed in plain clothes for the investigation of crime and who are not part of a specialist unit. Individuals who predominantly investigate crime (not including the National Crime Squad) and who are not shown under other specific squad headings.
CID Aides/Trainee Investigator	Uniform officers temporarily seconded to CID.
Complaints and Discipline	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the investigation and administration of complaints and discipline matters.
Control Room (Receiving)	Individuals who are predominantly employed as Control Room Operatives in either service or borough control rooms receiving calls.
Control Room (Dispatching)	Individuals who are predominantly employed as Control Room Operatives in either service or borough control rooms dispatching calls.
Coroner's Officer	Individuals who are predominantly assigned to duties in connection with sudden deaths and inquests.
Drugs	Individuals who predominantly investigate drug offences in plain clothes, including Individuals who are predominantly assigned to the inspection of chemists' registers in connection with dangerous drugs.
Fingerprints/ Photographic	Individuals who are predominantly employed as Fingerprint Officers and Individuals who are predominantly employed as Photographers. Do not include Scenes of Crime Officers (139) or Individuals employed in a Fingerprint Bureau or Photographic Laboratory (80)
Fraud	Individuals who predominantly investigates fraud cases such as Cheque / Credit Card fraud and Serious Fraud Investigation. Includes Fraud Squad officers. Do not include individuals who are predominantly employed in asset confiscation duties (7).
Hate Crime	Individuals mainly employed in the investigation of hate crime in plain clothes, including race and homophobic incidents.
Intelligence (Dedicated Source/Handling Unit)	Individuals who are predominantly employed in criminal intelligence units including Field Intelligence Officers and Local Intelligence Officers and Individuals who are predominantly employed in the co-ordination of the policing of football matches and collating associated intelligence.

Scenes of Crime	Individuals who are predominantly employed in providing scientific support including Scenes of Crime Officers and their supervisors. Include Assistant Forensic Practitioners, Scene Examiners and Scientific Support Officers who attend Scenes of Crime but do not include staff who are predominantly employed in connection with Fingerprints and Photographs (79).
Special Branch/Protection / Immigration/ Nationality	Individuals who are predominantly employed on Special Branch duties including officers posted to Units situated at ports. Do not confuse with Ports Control Officers who are specifically posted on a long-term basis to ports (368).
Surveillance Units	Individuals who are predominantly employed on surveillance duties.
Vehicle Crime	Individuals who are predominately assigned to the investigation of theft of or from motor vehicles.
Vice	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the investigation of offences relating to obscene publications and prostitution. Also include individuals who predominantly investigate offences relating to obscene publications on the internet.
Proactive (Crime Squad)	Individuals who are predominantly employed as a proactive non specific crime squad in plain clothes.
Robbery	Individuals who predominantly investigate offences of robbery in plain clothes.
Sex Offenders	Individuals who predominantly investigate sexual offences or sex offenders. Include Public Protection Units, Sex Offenders Registration Officers & SOIT/Sapphire Officers
Jury Protection	Individuals who are predominantly employed on Jury Protection.
MISPER Unit	Individuals who predominantly investigate Missing Persons.
Youth Offenders Team	Individuals who are predominantly employed in youth offenders team in plain clothes. (YACs)
Shooting Investigation Team	Individuals who predominantly deal with the reactive and proactive investigation of non fatal and non Trident shootings
Murder Review Team	Individuals who are predominantly employed in reviewing murder investigations.
Paedophile Squad	Individuals who predominantly investigate the production and distribution of child pornography and the associated criminal activities of child sex offenders.
Computer Crime	Individuals who predominantly investigate crimes committed against computer systems including hacking, viruses and counterfeit software. Do not include Individuals who predominantly investigate crime where a computer has been used to aid the crime such as fraud (91).
Flying Squad	Individuals who predominantly investigate robbery from cash transit companies, building societies, betting shops, post offices, jewellers, casinos, banks and robberies against all other commercial premises where a firearm is produced or intimated.
Money Team Laundering	Individuals who predominantly investigate money laundering.
Kidnap & Special Investigation Unit	Individuals who predominantly provide response to life threatening crimes in action such as kidnap for ransom, extortion and blackmail.
CBRN - TSG Only	Individuals predominantly employed to deal with Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear incidents (TSG only)
Anti Terrorist Officer	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the investigation of terrorist activity.
Extradition Unit	Individuals who predominantly seek out and arrest fugitives wanted for crimes committed in other countries. Include individuals who deal specifically with international 'Letters of Request'.
Major Investigation Team	Individuals who predominantly investigate murder, manslaughter, infanticide, attempted murder and missing persons or abductions where there is substantial evidence to suspect life has been taken or is under threat.
Personal Protection Officers	Individuals who are predominantly employed as Close or Personal Protection Officers providing close quarter protection for Royalty, Diplomats or Members of Parliament.
Port Control Officer	Special Branch Officers specifically posted to ports.
Cab Enforcement Team	Individuals who predominantly enforce laws relating to licensed and unlicensed taxis and mini cabs.

Operational Support	
Role Name	**Definition**
Child/Sex/Domestic	Individuals who predominantly support the investigation and resolution of cases of domestic violence
CID	Police Staff mainly employed in supporting those employed in plain clothes for the investigation of crime.
Communications	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the provision, maintenance, research, development and administration of radio, telephone and communications networks.
Community Safety/Relations	Individuals who predominately undertake community safety work including community relations.
Complaints and Discipline	Individuals who predominantly support those employed in the investigation and administration of complaints and discipline matters.
Crime and Incident Management	Individuals who are predominantly employed on administrative, clerical or other support duties on behalf of general CID, burglary, drugs, fraud, stolen vehicles, vice or other permanent CID squads including Crime Desks, Crime management / Support units or units involved in crime clear ups Includes Post sentence visits units and cold case reviews.
Criminal Justice Units	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the administration, checking and processing of prosecution files including liaison with the Crown Prosecution Service and Individuals who are predominantly employed in the making of additional enquiries required to supplement the quality of files. Individuals who are predominantly employed in the processing and administration of applications in connection with licensed premises, registered clubs and matters concerning betting, gaming and lotteries. Individuals who are predominantly employed in the execution of warrants, service of summonses etc. Do not include officers who specifically deal with Gaming and Licensing as part of SO (420), or Case Progression Units (430).
Custody	Individuals who are predominantly employed as custody officers performing duties in accordance with PACE.
Custody	Gaolers, i.e. Individuals who are predominantly employed in looking after prisoners in police custody.
Department Heads	Individuals designated Heads of more than one operational unit or department e.g. Superintendent – Operations.
Dogs	Individuals who are predominantly employed within Dogs Sections other than Dog Handlers.
Drivers	Individuals who are predominantly employed on driving duties relating to the transportation of personnel and/or property but not including officers shown at 88 or 160.
Fingerprints/Photographic	Individuals who predominantly support Fingerprint Officers or Photographers. Including Fingerprint Bureau and Photographic Laboratory staff. Do not include Scenes of Crime Officers. (139)
Firearms/Explosives	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the processing of applications and in making enquiries for firearm and shotgun certificates, renewals, rejections, appeals and firearms surrendered to Police custody, or in connection with the licensing and security of explosives and explosives stores.
Holmes Unit	Individuals who are predominantly employed in duties connected with the operational use of HOLMES. Individuals employed as full time HOLMES Training Instructors should not be included in this section. (167)
Intelligence	Individuals who are predominantly employed in criminal intelligence units including Field Intelligence Officers and Local Intelligence Officers. Other Individuals who maintain indices and records for criminal intelligence purposes should also be included.
Local Commanders	Operational local commanders and their deputies (Basic Commanders or equivalent).
Mounted	Individuals in support roles within mounted units including those individuals who are Stable Hands, Lead Hands, Farriers or Drivers within Mounted Branch.
Operational Planning	Individuals who are predominantly employed in planning operational events include those planning special events and contingency planning. Includes football liaison.
Property	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the administration, retention and disposal of property coming into police possession.
Scenes of Crime	Individuals who are predominantly employed in providing operational support to Scenes of Crime Officers and their supervisors. Includes Computer Forensic Examiners, Exhibits Officer, Forensic Support, Identification Officer and Video Forensic Examiners. Do not include individuals who are predominantly employed in connection with Fingerprints and Photographs (79).
Special Branch/Protection/ Immigration/ Nationality	Administration staff who are predominantly employed in Special Branch units including port units Individuals permanently employed in the registration of foreign nationals and the conduct of naturalisation enquiries other than Ports Officers (127).

Surveillance Units	Individuals who are predominantly employed in supporting surveillance duties.
Technical Support Units	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the provision, maintenance and installation of technical support equipment.
Traffic	Individuals who are predominantly employed to support the traffic function of the force including radar, accident investigation, vehicle examination and traffic administration. Include officers working with hazardous chemicals. Do not include individuals from Collision Investigation Unit (485)
Traffic Wardens	Individuals (including Senior Traffic Wardens) who are predominantly employed in the supervision of Traffic Wardens, otherwise than on patrol.
Training	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the training or management of training. Do not include individuals employed in Firearms Training (see 82).
Vehicle Workshops/Fleet	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the administration and maintenance of the vehicle fleet.
Licensing	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the processing and administration of applications in connection with licensed premises, registered clubs and matters concerning betting, gaming and lotteries.
Case Progression Unit	Individuals who are predominantly employed to provide arrest support to uniform officers and improve case file quality.
Anti-Social behaviour unit	Individuals who are predominantly employed to deal with anti social behaviour.
Crime Prevention	Individuals who are predominantly employed as Crime Prevention, Crime Reduction or Architectural Liaison Officers.
Suspect Identification	Individuals who predominantly work within an identification suite or who help identify suspects by creating an e-fit or typelikeness or by using the Witness Albums Display System.
Bomb Data Centre Officer	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the collation, entry and retrieval of bomb data.
Force Armourer	Individuals who predominantly plan, carry out and record the maintenance and repair of all weapons and ancillaries contained within the MPS Firearm Inventory.
Traffic - Collision Investigation Unit	Individuals who are predominantly employed to investigate serious and fatal road collisions, including accident investigation and vehicle examination in this respect.

Organisational support	
Role Name	**Definition**
ACPO & Directors	Police officers of ACPO ranks and police staff at equivalent levels, e.g. Finance Director.
Buildings	Individuals who are predominantly employed on duties relating to the cleaning, maintenance and administration of Police buildings, but not including Individuals employed as part of a contract. Include handymen, grounds maintenance and cleaners.
Catering	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the provision of catering facilities but not including catering. Individuals employed as part of a contract.
Corporate development	Individuals who are predominantly employed within service or inspection units, including quality assurance and similar functions. Individuals who are predominantly employed in the collation of statistics within the service. Individuals who are predominantly employed in research and development, operational and strategic planning and information and policy analysis units. This section does not include officers employed on research and development in connection with computers and communications.
Criminal Records Officer	Staff who are predominately employed in maintaining the force Criminal Records Office including officers working in PNC units.
Department Heads	Officers with supervisory responsibility for more than one support department or unit
Finance	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the administration of finance.
IT/Communications / Audio	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the provision, maintenance, research, development and administration of computer or telecommunications systems-include maintenance of CRIS terminals, IT systems, graphics & web pages or IT projects etc
Operational Planning	Individuals who are predominantly employed to support those in planning operational events, including those planning special events and contingency planning. This does not include corporate projects creating policy or an advanced organisational system.
Other Admin/Clerical	Individuals who are predominantly employed in admin or clerical support, archives staff or typists.

Personnel/Human Resources	Individuals who are predominantly employed in personnel/career development and management, equal opportunities and diversity, including associated administrative support.
Press and Public Relations	Individuals who are predominantly employed in media relations and publicity about the service. Include press officers.
Staff Associations	Individuals who are predominantly employed in Staff Association work. Include Federation.
Staff Officers	Individuals who are predominantly employed as Staff Officers or Personal Assistants to senior officers
Stores/Supplies	Individuals who are predominantly employed in the administration and handling of stores/supplies.
Welfare/Occupational Health	Individuals who are predominately employed as welfare officers, occupational health officers, nurses and force medical officers.
Management Support Unit (MSU)	Individuals who are predominantly employed to provide support to the senior management team.
Projects	Individuals who are predominantly employed on corporate projects. They are not operational or for intelligence purposes
Architect / Surveyor	Individuals who are predominantly employed as architects or surveyors.
Legal Staff	Individuals who are predominantly employed in legal work including Accident Claims Officer.

Not categorised	
Role Name	**Definition**
Recruits Modules 1-7	Officers being trained under Modules 1 -7 (Recruit Training in Metropolitan Police).
Career Break	Individuals who are on career break
Seconded	Individuals who are seconded to another OCU or Force.
Suspended	Individuals who are suspended either on or off pay.

Appendix 4 Views and information

The Committee held three public meetings as part of this investigation.

On 16 September 2010 we met:
- Mr Bernard Hogan-Howe, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary
- Professor Betsy Stanko, MPS
- Dr Timothy Brain, Cardiff University
- Professor Marian FitzGerald, University of Kent

On 14 October 2010 we met:
- Mr Robert Quick, former Assistant Commissioner at the MPS

On 7 December 2010 we met:
- Rt Hon Nick Herbert MP, Minster of State for Policing and Criminal Justice, Home Office
- Kit Malthouse AM, MPA
- Catherine Crawford, MPA
- Anne McMeel, MPS
- Ian McPherson, MPS

Minutes and transcripts of these meetings are available on request and can also be found on the London Assembly website via:
http://www.london.gov.uk/who-runs-london/the-london-assembly/committees/budget-performance

The Committee received written submissions from the following individuals and organisations:
- The Audit Commission
- The Value for Money Unit, Home Office
- The National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts Innovation Unit
- Professor FitzGerald, Visiting Professor of Criminology at the University of Kent
- The Metropolitan Police Authority

Copies of written submissions are available on request and can also be found on the London Assembly website via:
http://www.london.gov.uk/who-runs-london/the-london-assembly/investigations/front-line-policing

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Chinese

如您需要这份文件的简介的翻译本，
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Vietnamese

Nếu ông (bà) muốn nội dung văn bản này được dịch sang tiếng Việt, xin vui lòng liên hệ với chúng tôi bằng điện thoại, thư hoặc thư điện tử theo địa chỉ ở trên.

Greek

Εάν επιθυμείτε περίληψη αυτού του κειμένου στην γλώσσα σας, παρακαλώ καλέστε τον αριθμό ή επικοινωνήστε μαζί μας στην ανωτέρω ταχυδρομική ή την ηλεκτρονική διεύθυνση.

Turkish

Bu belgenin kendi dilinize çevrilmiş bir özetini okumak isterseniz, lütfen yukarıdaki telefon numarasını arayın, veya posta ya da e-posta adresi aracılığıyla bizimle temasa geçin.

Punjabi

ਜੇ ਤੁਸੀਂ ਇਸ ਦਸਤਾਵੇਜ਼ ਦਾ ਸੰਖੇਪ ਆਪਣੀ ਭਾਸ਼ਾ ਵਿਚ ਲੈਣਾ ਚਾਹੋ, ਤਾਂ ਕਿਰਪਾ ਕਰਕੇ ਇਸ ਨੰਬਰ 'ਤੇ ਫ਼ੋਨ ਕਰੋ ਜਾਂ ਉਪਰ ਦਿੱਤੇ ਡਾਕ ਜਾਂ ਈਮੇਲ ਪਤੇ 'ਤੇ ਸਾਨੂੰ ਸੰਪਰਕ ਕਰੋ।

Hindi

यदि आपको इस दस्तावेज का सारांश अपनी भाषा में चाहिए तो उपर दिये हुए नंबर पर फोन करें या उपर दिये गये डाक पते या ई मेल पते पर हम से संपर्क करें।

Bengali

আপনি যদি এই দলিলের একটা সারাংশ নিজের ভাষায় পেতে চান, তাহলে দয়া করে ফো করবেন অথবা উল্লেখিত ডাক ঠিকানায় বা ই-মেইল ঠিকানায় আমাদের সাথে যোগাযোগ করবেন।

Urdu

اگر آپ کو اس دستاویز کا خلاصہ اپنی زبان میں
درکار ہو تو، براہ کرم نمبر پر فون کریں
یا مذکورہ بالا ڈاک کے پتے یا ای میل
پتے پر ہم سے رابطہ کریں۔

Arabic

للحصول على ملخص لهذا المستند بلغتك،
فـرجاء الاتصال برقم الهاتف أو الاتصال على
العنوان البريدي العادي أو عنوان البريد
الالكتروني أعلاه.

Gujarati

જો તમારે આ દસ્તાવેજનો સાર તમારી ભાષામાં જોઈતો હોય તો ઉપર આપેલ નંબર પર ફોન કરો અથવા ઉપર આપેલ ટપાલ અથવા ઇ-મેઈલ સરનામા પર અમારો સંપર્ક કરો.

Principles of scrutiny

An aim for action

An Assembly scrutiny is not an end in itself. It aims for action to achieve improvement.

Independence

An Assembly scrutiny is conducted with objectivity; nothing should be done that could impair the independence of the process.

Holding the Mayor to account

The Assembly rigorously examines all aspects of the Mayor's strategies.

Inclusiveness

An Assembly scrutiny consults widely, having regard to issues of timeliness and cost.

Constructiveness

The Assembly conducts its scrutinies and investigations in a positive manner, recognising the need to work with stakeholders and the Mayor to achieve improvement.

Value for money

When conducting a scrutiny the Assembly is conscious of the need to spend public money effectively.