MOPAC MAYOR OF LONDON OFFICE FOR POLICING AND CRIME

REQUEST FOR DMPC DECISION – PCD 245

Title: Treasury Management 2016-17 Outturn Report

Executive Summary:

DMPC is asked to note the performance of the Treasury Management function in 2016-17. In 2016-17 investment income was £1.8m at an average rate of return of 0.53%, 0.26% above the benchmark. Debt interest expenditure was below budget at £6.8m. Total external borrowing reduced from £176m to £159.5m by 31 March 2017. The weighted average borrowing rate of all long term loans (weighted by size of loan and the rate of interest paid) at 31 March 2017 was 4.14%. All investment and borrowing activity during 2016-17 was undertaken within the guidelines and objectives set out in the relevant policy and investment and borrowing strategies, except for a breach in relation to counterparty concentration limits for Lloyds Bank at the start of the year and previously reported.

Recommendation:

The DMPC is asked to note the 2016/17 treasury management outturn results.

Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime

I confirm I have considered whether or not I have any personal or prejudicial interest in this matter and take the proposed decision in compliance with the Code of Conduct. Any such interests are recorded below.

The above request has my approval.

Signature

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Date

1/8/17

PART I - NON-CONFIDENTIAL FACTS AND ADVICE TO THE DMPC

Decision required – supporting report

1. Introduction and background

- 1.1. The CIPFA TM Code recommends that organisations be updated on treasury management activities regularly (at least a Strategy, Mid-year and Annual performance reports). This report therefore meets these requirements with regard to an annual report, and ensures MOPAC is implementing best practice in accordance with the TM Code.
- 1.2. The day to day management of the treasury management function is delivered by the GLA Group Treasury team under a shared service arrangement with the GLA. GLA Group Treasury also manages the Group Investment Strategy (GIS), of which the MOPAC Chief Finance Officer is a syndicate director. By being part of the GIS MOPAC's cash balances are pooled with other funds which allows greater investment options, improves diversification, liquidity and returns.
- 1.3. The annual report at Appendix 1 has been prepared by GLA Group Treasury, and provides details of performance against the TMSS 2016/17, approved by MOPAC on 17 March 2016 (DMPCD 2016 47), and as amended by DMPCD 2016 58. The report provides a review of investment performance for 2016/17, and reviews specific Treasury Management prudential indicators defined by the Code and approved by the MOPAC in the TMSS.

2. Issues for consideration

Investment

2.1. The average return on investment was 0.53%. This compares favourably with the London Interbank BID (LIBID) 3 month rate benchmark of 0.27%. This resulted in income of £1.8m.

Debt Management

- 2.2. As planned no new borrowing took place in 2016/17, and as scheduled, borrowing reduced by \pounds 16.4m from \pounds 175.9m at the start of the year to \pounds 159.5m at 31 March 2017.
- 2.3. The cost of borrowing was £6.8m. The weighted average cost of borrowing of all long term loans as at 31 March 2017 was 4.14% (3.98% as at 31 March 2016).

Compliance

- 2.4. All treasury activities met the Treasury indicators set in the TMSS, and borrowing was within the borrowing limits set by the Mayor for MOPAC. MOPAC CFO confirms that, based on reporting and assurances from the GLA shared service function, throughout the period all treasury activities have been conducted within the parameters of the TMSS 2016/17, alongside best practice suggested by the CIPFA TM Code and Central Government, except in respect of the period 1 April 2016 to 12 April 2016.
- 2.5. As previously reported the GIS counterparty concentration limits for Lloyds Bank were exceeded over the period 1 April 2016 to 12 April 2016. No losses arose from this breach of the TMSS. Details of the sums involved, reasons for the breach and amendments to the 2016/17 TMSS were previously reported in DMPCD 2016 58.

Prudential Indicators

2.6. Appendix 1 includes the maturity profile for the borrowing portfolio, and performance against the Prudential Indicators set as part of the 2016-17 TM Strategy. All indicators were met.

3. Financial Comments

3.1. The cost of borrowing and the minimum revenue provision for 2016/17 were £6.8m and £23.3m respectively and within the 2016/17 budget. Interest received in 2016/17 was £1.8m and above the budget.

4. Legal Comments

- 4.1. Under Section 1 of the Local Government Act 2003, MOPAC as local authority defined under s23 of that Act, may borrow money for any purpose relevant to its functions under any enactment, or for the purpose of the prudent management of its financial affairs.
- 4.2. The Mayor is required under s3 of the Local Government Act 2003 to determine how much money the GLA and each functional body (which includes MOPAC) can afford to borrow. In complying with this duty, Regulation 2 of the Local Authorities (Capital Finance and Accounting)(England) Regulations 2003 requires the Mayor to have regard to the Prudential Code for Capital Finance in Local Authorities when determining how much MOPAC can afford.
- 4.3. MOPAC's scheme of delegation provides that the Chief Finance Officer, as the s127 officer, is responsible for the proper administration of the MOPAC's financial affairs.

5. Equality Comments

5.1. There are no equality or diversity implications arising from this report.

6. Background/supporting papers

Appendix 1

Public access to information

Information in this form (Part 1) is subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and will be made available on the MOPAC website following approval.

If immediate publication risks compromising the implementation of the decision it can be deferred until a specific date. Deferral periods should be kept to the shortest length strictly necessary.

Part 1 Deferral:

Is the publication of Part 1 of this approval to be deferred? NO

If yes, for what reason: Until what date:

Part 2 Confidentiality: Only the facts or advice considered as likely to be exempt from disclosure under the FOIA should be in the separate Part 2 form, together with the legal rationale for non-publication.

Is there a Part 2 form - NO

	Tick to confirm statement (✓)
Head of Unit: The Chief Finance Officer has reviewed the request and is satisfied it is correct and consistent with the MOPAC's plans and priorities.	1
Legal Advice: Legal advice is not required.	1
Financial Advice: The Strategic Finance and Resource Management Team has been consulted on this proposal.	*
Equalities Advice: Equality and diversity issues are covered in the body of the report.	4

OFFICER APPROVAL

Chief Executive Officer

I have been consulted about the proposal and confirm that financial, legal and equalities advice has been taken into account in the preparation of this report. I am satisfied that this is an appropriate request to be submitted to the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime.

R. Lawrence Signature

Date 26/7/17

GREATER LONDON AUTHORITY GROUP TREASURY

Treasury Management Outturn for 2016-17 - MOPAC

Executive Summary:

This report is submitted in accordance with a requirement under the Treasury Management in the Public Services Code of Practice (The Code), issued by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA), which requires the submission of an outturn report on the activities of the Authority's treasury management operation.

Treasury activity has seen the Authority's investments outperform its investment benchmark by 0.26% during 2016-17. Total invested balances have increased from £29.78m at the 31 March 2016 to £287.59m at 31 March 2017.

The Authority's outstanding borrowing has reduced from £175.92m at the 31 March 2016 to £159.46m at 31 March 2017.

All 2016/17 Treasury activity has been within the boundaries and levels set by the Authority in its Treasury Management Strategy Statement on 17 March 2016, DMPCD 201 47, except during the period 01 April 2016 to 12 April 2016. For this period the GIS counterparty concentration limits for Lloyds Bank were exceeded. No losses arose from this exception of the TMSS. This exception was fully reported in the 2015/16 Treasury Outturn Report, DMPC Decision 58, dated 3 October 2016.

Recommendation:

That the following is noted:

 The 2016/17 Treasury outturn results against the 2016/17 Treasury Management Strategy Statement, as approved on the 17 March 2016, DMPCD 2016 47.

Introduction/Background

- 1 This report provides details of all investment and borrowing activities for the period from 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2017 and highlights relevant issues currently under consideration by officers. It provides a comparison of the closing investment and debt positions as at 31 March 2017 with the opening position as at 1 April 2016.
- 2 Under the treasury management shared service arrangement with the GLA, GLA treasury officers carry out the Authority's day to day treasury management function, managing the Authority's investments and borrowing activities. Authority officers provide the GLA with details of the Authority's daily cash flow requirements and monies are only transferred between the Authorities as and when required to match Authority need. This way, surplus funds over and above daily need are continuously held with the Group Investment Syndicate (GIS), the GLA managed vehicle used by the Authority to maximise liquidity and investment return.

Compliance with the 2016/17 Treasury Management Strategy Statement

- 3 The GLA's Chief Investment Officer confirms that, throughout the period, all treasury activities have been conducted within the parameters of the 2016/17 Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS), alongside best practice suggested by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) and Central Government, except in respect of the period 1 April 2016 to 12 April 2016.
- 4 For the period 28 March 2016 to 12 April 2016, the GIS counterparty concentration limits for Lloyds Bank were exceeded. No losses arose from this exception of the TMSS.
- 5 This exception was fully reported in the 2015/16 Treasury Outturn Report, DMPC Decision 58, dated 3 October 2016.
- 6 Following consideration of the exception, key strategy improvements were implemented within a revised GIS Investment Strategy as set out at paragraphs 10 to 12.

The Economic Background

- 7 The two major landmark events that had a significant influence on financial markets in the 2016-17 financial year were the UK EU referendum on 23 June and the election of President Trump in the USA on 9 November. The first event had an immediate impact in terms of market expectations of when the first increase in Bank Rate would happen, pushing it back from quarter 3 2018 to quarter 4 2019. At its 4 August meeting, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) cut Bank Rate from 0.5% to 0.25% and the Bank of England's Inflation Report produced forecasts warning of a major shock to economic activity in the UK, which would cause economic growth to fall almost to zero in the second half of 2016. The MPC also warned that it would be considering cutting Bank Rate again towards the end of 2016 in order to support growth. In addition, it restarted quantitative easing with purchases of £60bn of gilts and £10bn of corporate bonds, and also introduced the Term Funding Scheme whereby potentially £100bn of cheap financing was made available to banks.
- 8 In the second half of 2016, the UK economy confounded the Bank's pessimistic forecasts of August. After a disappointing quarter 1 of only +0.2% GDP growth, the three subsequent quarters of 2016 came in at +0.6%, +0.5% and +0.7% to produce an annual growth for 2016 overall, compared to 2015, of no less than 1.8%, which was very nearly the fastest rate of growth of any of the G7 countries. Needless to say, this meant that the

MPC did not cut Bank Rate again after August but, since then, inflation has risen rapidly due to the effects of the sharp devaluation of sterling after the referendum.

9 After the EU referendum, Bank Rate was cut from 0.5% to 0.25% on 4 August and remained at that level for the rest of the year. Market expectations as to the timing of the start of monetary tightening started the year at quarter 3 2018, but then moved back to around the end of 2019 in early August before finishing the year back at quarter 3 2018. Deposit rates continued into the start of 2016/17 at previous depressed levels but then fell during the first two quarters and fell even further after the 4 August MPC meeting resulted in a large tranche of cheap financing being made available to the banking sector by the Bank of England. Rates made a weak recovery towards the end of 2016 but then fell to fresh lows in March 2017.

2016/17 GIS Investment Strategy

- 10 The TMSS sets out an Annual Investment Strategy; however, in line with best practice set out by DCLG and CIPFA, the TMSS is a 'living document' subject to continual review and revision.
- 11 The GIS Investment Strategy adopted in the original TMSS for 2016/17 was subject to revision during the year in order to improve fitness for purpose under challenging market condition, such as those witnessed following the EU referendum. The revised GIS strategy was implemented on 3 October 2016.

12 The key improvements that were encompassed are summarised below:

- Reporting ambiguities relating to breaches are eliminated and the levels of discretion for both breach resolution, suspension of counterparties and use of Credit Default Swap ("CDS") data are now set out clearly.
- Provisions relating to the duties and discretions of external managers are made clear.
- The risk appetite implied by the previous strategy is stated explicitly.
- Practical arrangements for the exercise of the Chief Investment Officer's discretions are set out explicitly along with the arrangements for exercise of discretion in that officer's absence.

Current Treasury Management Position

13 The table below shows the current Treasury management position.

Current Treasury Position	Actual a March		Actual a March	and a second and a s	
	£m	Rate %	£m	Rate %	
External Borrowing					
Long Term Borrowing: PWLB	175.92	3.98	159.46	4.14	
Long Term Borrowing: Market Loans	0		0		
Total External Borrowing (A)	175.92	3.98	159.46	4.14	
Other Long Term Liabilities			-	_	
PFI Liability	82.25		77.95		
Finance Lease liability	5.53		5.36		
Total Other Long Term Liabilities(B)	87.78		83.31		
Total Gross Debt (A+B)	263.7		242.77		
Capital Financing Requirement	647.93		611.93		
Less Other Long Term Liabilities	87.78		83.31		
Underlying Capital Borrowing Requirement (C)	560.15		528.62		
Under/(Over) Borrowing (C-A)	384.23		369.16		
Investments (D)	29.78	0.63	287.59	0.49	
Total Net Borrowing (A-D)	146.14		-128.13		

14 A further analysis of borrowing and investments is covered in the following two sections.

Borrowing Outturn

- 15 The Authority is permitted to borrow in order to fund spending for its Capital Programme. The amount of new borrowing needed each year is determined by new capital schemes approved and included in the Capital Programme.
- 16 During 2016/17, Private Financing Initiative (PFI) liabilities were reduced by £4.64m from £86.89 as at the 31 March 2016 to £82.25m as at the 31 March 2017. Finance lease liabilities were also reduced from £5.68m as at the 31 March 2016 to £5.53m as at the 31 March 2017.
- 17 No new external loan borrowing was taken out during 2016/17. Instead £14.46m of external loan borrowing was repaid, reducing the total borrowing to £159.46m.
- 18 When market conditions are favourable long term loans can be restructured to:
 - generate cash savings
 - reduce the average interest rate
 - to enhance the balance of the portfolio by amending the maturity profile and/or the level of volatility. (Volatility is determined by the fixed/variable interest rate mix.)

- 19 No rescheduling was done during the year as the average 1% differential between PWLB new borrowing rates and premature repayment rates made rescheduling unviable.
- 20 The graph below compares the maximum the Authority could borrow in 2016-17 with the 'Capital Investment to be financed by borrowing' at 31 March 2017 and the actual position of how this is being financed at 31 March 2017. The final column shows the split between short (internal and external borrowing with duration of less than one year) and long term borrowing.



- 21 The graph shows that the Authority's current capital investment that is being funded via external borrowing, as at the 31 March 2017, is £159.46m, which is £341.62m below the Authorised Borrowing Limit set for the Authority at the start of the year.
- 22 In addition, the graph shows how the Authority is currently funding its borrowing requirement. As at 31 March 2017, the Authority was using £369.16m of internal borrowing to finance capital investment. Internal borrowing is the use of the Authority's surplus cash to finance the borrowing liability instead of borrowing externally.

Investment Governance

23 The Authority's short term cash balances are invested through the GLA Group Investment Syndicate (GIS). Current GIS participants are the Greater London Authority (GLA), the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA), the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC), the London Pensions Fund Authority (LPFA), and the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), with the respective Chief Financial Officers of each GIS participant jointly controlling the GIS.

- 24 Pooling resources allows the Group Treasury team to make larger individual transactions and exploit the greater stability of pooled cash flows to obtain better returns. A risk sharing agreement ensures risk and reward relating to each instrument within the jointly controlled portfolio are shared in direct proportion to each participant's investment.
- 25 Investments are made in line with a common GIS Investment Strategy, which includes a requirement to maintain a weighted average maturity (WAM), which does not exceed 91 days, and for each participant to specify a portion of their investment to remain immediately accessible.
- 26 Additionally, the Authority may invest sums independently of the GIS, for instance if the Authority identifies balances which are available for longer term investment. Such investments must remain within the parameters of the GIS Investment Strategy, except that there shall be no requirement to maintain a weighted average maturity which does not exceed three months. However, each participant can place a limit on the duration of these longer term investments. For 2016/17, the Authority opted not to enter into any investments longer than 364 days in its own name, wishing to limit counterparty risk and liquidity risk.
- 27 At no time does the GIS Investment Strategy conflict with the Authority's TMSS.
- 28 The Authority's TMSS adheres to the CIPFA Prudential Code investment principle of placing security above liquidity and investment yield and then placing liquidity above investment yield. As such, the Authority maintains a low risk appetite consistent with good stewardship of public funds.

Investment Outturn

29 The application of resources (capital receipts, reserves etc.) to either finance capital expenditure or other budget decision to support the revenue budget will have an ongoing impact on investments unless resources are supplemented each year from new sources (asset sales etc.). Detailed below are year-end investment balances.

	Actual as at the 31 March 2016 £m	TMSS Forecast to March 2017 £m	Actual as at the 31 March 2017 £m	2016-17 Variance between Forecast and Year End Actual £m
Fund balances/reserves	297.92	108.40	240.24	131.84
Provisions	62.83	229.50	57.48	-172.02
Other/Capital Reserve	4.50	272.52	349.78	77.26
Total Core Funds	365.25	610.42	647.50	37.08
Working Capital Surplus	48.75	-109.95	9.25	119.20
Under/(over) borrowing	384.22	155.13	369.16	214.03
Investments	29.78	345.35	287.59	-57.76

Core Funds and Expected Investment Balances

- 30 Investment balances as at 31 March 2017 were £287.59m, this being an increase of £257.81m over year-end balances as at 31 March 2016. The increase in investment balances is a result of significant capital receipt during the year.
- 31 The Authority has outperformed its investment benchmark by 0.26% during 2016/17. It achieved a cumulative weighted average yield of 0.53% on daily balances against a cumulative weighted average 3 month LIBID of 0.27%. Throughout the period, the Authority maintained its liquidity target of a weighted average maturity (WAM) of not more than 3 months.
- 32 Investment performance therefore reflects the success of the decision to place investments in-house through the GLA GIS.
- 33 Methods used by the Group Treasury team during the year to manage performance have included:
 - Using the strength of the GIS's £2.2bn investment balances to obtain higher than average rates without increasing risk
 - Creating a well-diversified portfolio by country, by counterparty and by credit rating.
 - Seeking to invest in higher yielding longer dated instruments, while keeping the WAM within the 16/17 GIS Investment Strategy requirement that the WAM should not exceed 91 Days.
 - Monitoring market activity and proactively seizing investment opportunities
- 34 The following graph shows the outperformance described above, alongside investment balances during period. Fluctuations in balances reflect changes in cash flow needs over the year. The significant cash increases in July and October represent the annual pension top-up grant and the capital receipt from New Scotland Yard respectively.



35 In addition, that the investment portfolio is well diversified is demonstrated in the piechart below



Treasury Management Budget

Treasury Management Budget	Actual as at the 31st March 2016	TMMS Forecast to March 2017	Actual as at the 31st March 2017	2016-17 Variance between Forecast and Year End Actual
	£m	£m	£m	£m
Interest payable (excl. PFI & Finance Lease interest)	7.22	6.84	6.84	0
Interest Receivable	-1.89	-0.80	-1.76	-0.96
Minimum Revenue Provision	28.47	24.2	23.33	-0.87
Total	33.80	30.24	28.41	-1.83

36 The small decrease in interest payable between years reflects the repayment of PWLB loans. Interest receivable held up well in a low interest rate environment, largely due to high investment balances throughout the year.

CIPFA Prudential Code Indicators and Treasury Management Limits

Background

- 37 The Prudential Code has been developed by CIPFA. The Code has a central role in capital finance decisions, including borrowing for capital investment. Its key objectives are to provide a framework for local authority capital finance that will ensure for individual local authorities that capital expenditure plans are affordable; all external borrowing and other long-term liabilities are within prudent and sustainable levels and that treasury management decisions are taken in accordance with good professional practice.
- 38 The Prudential Code also has the objective of being consistent with and supporting local strategic planning, local asset management planning and proper option appraisal.
- 39 Any such framework for the internal control and self-management of capital finance must therefore deal with all three of the following elements:
 - a. Capital expenditure plans
 - b. External debt
 - c. Treasury Management
- 40 To ensure compliance with the Code in relation to the above elements, the Authority is required to set and monitor a number of Prudential Indicators. The setting of these Prudential Indicators is a circular rather than a linear process. For example, the level of external debt will follow on from the Authority's capital plans, revenue forecast and treasury management strategy. However, if initial estimates would result in outcomes that would not be affordable or prudent, then plans for capital and/or revenue are reconsidered.
- 41 These Prudential Indicators are set out below and reviewed by officers for compliance.

Capital Expenditure

- 42 Capital expenditure results from the approved capital spending plan and proposed borrowing limits. It is the key driver of Treasury Management activity.
- 43 All capital expenditure is stated, not just that covered by borrowing.

Capital Expenditure

	Actual 2015/16	TMSS Forecast to 31st March 2017	Actual 2016/17	2016-17 Variance between Forecast and Actual
	£m	£m	£m	£m
Total Capital Expenditure	237.59	264.9	177.05	-87.85

44 The capital expenditure for 2016/17, at £177.05m, was £87.85m less than that expected at the start of the year.

Capital Financing Requirement

- 45 The capital financing requirement is an indicator of the underlying need to borrow for capital purposes. It is the total historical outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resource.
- 46 Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for, will increase the CFR.
- 47 The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual charge which broadly reduces the borrowing in line with each assets life.
- 48 The CFR includes any other long term liabilities (e.g. PFI schemes, finance leases). Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the Authority's borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility and so the Authority is not required to separately borrow for these schemes.
- 49 This borrowing is not associated with particular items or types of capital expenditure.

Capital Financing Requirement (CFR)

	Actual 2015/16	TMSS Forecast to 31st March 2017	Actual 2016/17	2016-17 Variance between Forecast and Actual
	£m	£m	£m	£m
Total CFR	647.93	614.51	611.93	-2.58

50 The capital financing requirement is in line with expectations.

External Debt Prudential Indicators

Authorised Limit for External Debt

- 51 The authorised limit is the expected maximum borrowing needed with some headroom for unexpected developments such as unusual cash movements
- 52 For the purposes of the Prudential Code borrowing is distinguished from other long term liabilities.
- 53 The authorised limit is the statutory limit that is determined, by the Mayor in consultation with the Assembly, under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. It is intended to be an absolute ceiling which cannot be exceeded, except as provided under section 5 of the Local Government Act 2003, where payments expected but not yet received can temporarily result in the limit being exceeded, provided the original setting of the limit had not taken into account any delay in receipt of the payment.

Authorised Limit for External Debt	2016-17 Authorised Limit £m	Actual External Debt as at 31 March 2017 £m	Headroom £m
Borrowing	501.08	159.46	341.62
Other long term liabilities	83.31	83.31	0
Total	584.39	156.03	428.36

54 Actual external debt is not directly comparable to the authorised limit, since the actual external debt reflects the position at one point in time, whereas the authorised limit is set as a ceiling for the whole year. Notwithstanding this, there is substantial borrowing headroom.

Operational Boundary for External Debt

- 55 The operational boundary is based on the same estimates as the authorised limit. However, it reflects an estimate of the most likely prudent but not worst case scenario. It equates to the maximum level of external debt under the capital spending plans approved by the Mayor and excludes the headroom included within the authorised limit.
- 56 The operational boundary is set as a warning signal that external debt has reached a level nearing the authorised limit and must be monitored carefully. It is probably not significant if the operational boundary is breached temporarily on occasions due to variations in cash flow. However, a sustained or regular trend above the operational boundary would be significant, requiring further investigation and action as appropriate.

Authorised Limit for Operational Boundary	2016-17 Operational Boundary	Actual External Debt as at 31 March 2017	Headroom
	£m	£m	£m
Borrowing	376.08	159.46	216.62
Other long term liabilities	83.31	83.31	0
Total	459.39	156.03	303.36

57 Actual external debt is not directly comparable to the operational boundary, since the actual external debt reflects the position at one point in time, whereas the operational boundary is set as a ceiling for the whole year. Notwithstanding this, there is substantial borrowing headroom.

Gross Debt and the Capital Financing Requirement

- 58 In order to ensure that borrowing levels are prudent over the medium term and only for a capital purpose, the Council should ensure that its gross external borrowing does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the capital financing requirement in the preceding year (2015/16) plus the estimates of any additional capital financing requirement for the current (2016/17) and next two financial years. This essentially means that the Council is not borrowing to support revenue expenditure. This indicator allowed the Council some flexibility to borrow in advance of its immediate capital needs. The table below highlights the Council's gross borrowing position against the CFR.
- 59 For the purposes of the Prudential Code, gross debt refers to the sum of borrowing and other long term liabilities.

Actual External Debt as at 31 March 2017 £m	Preceding Year CFR £m	2016-17 Actual Additional CFR £m	2017-18 Estimated Additional CFR £m	2018-19 Estimated Additional CFR £m	Total CFR over 4 years £m	Amount Gross Debt < Total CFR over 4 years £m
242.77	647.93	0.00	0.00	68.86	716.79	474.02

Gross Debt and the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR)

60 Gross debt, as at 31 March 2017, is £474.02m less than the estimated total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for the current and next two financial years. This indicates that the Authority's current financial strategy is prudent and sustainable, in that borrowing is only used to fund capital expenditure in the medium term.

Affordability Prudential Indicators

Ratio of Financing Costs to Net Revenue Stream

- 61 This indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital (borrowing and other long term obligation costs net of investment income) against the net revenue stream.
- 62 The aim of using net revenue stream is to identify the amounts to be met from government grants and taxpayers and hence excludes capital grants, contributions and donated assets. It is also net of contributions from (or to) reserves and balances.

Financing Costs to Net Revenue Stream

	Actual as at the 31 March 2016 %	TMSS Forecast to March 2017 %	Actual as at the 31 March 2017 %	2016-17 Variance between Forecast and Year End Actual %
Total	1.91	1.82	1.65	-0.17

63 Financing costs to net revenue stream are in line with expectations.

Incremental Impact of Capital Investment Decisions on the Council Tax

- 64 This indicator measures the changes in the council tax as a result of incremental changes in capital investment decisions.
- 65 It allows the effect of the totality of the Authority's plans to be considered at budget setting time and the achievement of these plans to be assessed at year end.

Incremental Impact	on	Council	Tax
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	Actual as at the 31 March 2016	Actual as at the 31 March 2017	
Council Tax Band D	± 1.51	1.30	

66 The Authority's capital investment decisions in 2016/17 have had an incremental decrease on Council Tax compared to 2015/16.

Treasury Management Prudential Indicator

- 67 The Treasury Management Prudential Indicator requires the adoption of the latest version of the CIPFA Code of Practice for Treasury Management in the Public Services.
- 68 The Authority has adopted the CIPFA Code of Practice for Treasury Management in the Public Services.

Treasury Management Limits on Activity

Fixed and Variable Rate Interest Rates Exposure

69 The following technical prudential indicators reflect the Authority's exposure to changing interest rates.

Fixed rate ratio:

(Fixed rate borrowing* less Fixed rate investments*) Total Borrowing less Total Investments

Variable rate ratio:

(Variable rate borrowing** less Variable rate investments**)

Total Borrowing less Total Investments

*Defined as greater than 1 year to run to maturity **Defined as less than 1 year to run to maturity

In consequence of the formulae above, the sum of the two indicators must be 100%

70 To achieve certainty over its borrowing costs in support of prudent long term planning, the Authority has only ever entered into fixed rate loans; however, concerns over liquidity and credit risk mean that in practice all the Authority's investments mature within one year so are categorised as variable rate. The fixed rate ratio as at 31 March 2017 is -112% and the variable rate ratio is therefore 212%. The positive variable rate ratio indicates that fluctuating rates could increase borrowing costs without being matched by increased investment income.

Limits for Maturity Structure of Borrowing

71 Local Authorities are exposed to the risk of having to refinance debt at a time in the future when interest rates may be volatile or uncertain. The maturity structure of borrowing indicator is designed to assist Authorities in avoiding large concentrations of fixed rate debt that has the same maturity structure and would therefore need to be replaced at the same time. For each maturity period an upper and lower limit is set. This indicator is calculated as the amount of projected borrowing that is fixed rate maturing in each period expressed as a percentage of total projected borrowing that is fixed rate. For the purposes of this indicator only, all borrowing is treated as fixed rate.

	TMSS Forecast to March 2017		Actual as at the 31st March 2016	Actual as at the 31st March 2017
	Upper Limit	Lower Limit		
	%	%	%	%
Inder 12 months	100	0	9.4	10.3
12 months and within 24 months	100	0	9.4	16.6
24 months and within 5 years	100	0	30.5	18.1
5 years and within 10 years	100	0	12.5	16.3
10 years and above	100	0	38.3	38.7

Limits for Maturity Structure of Borrowing

72 The above table shows that the Authority has a risk appropriate dispersion of debt over the years.

Limits for Principal Sums Invested for Periods Longer than 364 days

73 This indicator seeks to contain the risk inherent in the maturity structure of an Authority's investment portfolio, since investing too much for too long could:

- adversely impact on the Authorities liquidity and in turn its ability to meet its payment obligations and
- also lead to the loss of some of its principal if it is forced to seek early repayment or redemption of principal sums invested
- 74 Under this indicator the Local Authority is therefore required to set an upper limit for each financial year period for the maturing of its long term investments.
- 75 The Authority has set an upper limit of £0.00, although this limit does not apply to externally managed funds or to pooled monies within the GIS. However, whilst the pooled portfolio may contain instruments maturing in more than 364 days, the average maturity is restricted to 91 days, adding to the reduction of the risk this indicator is seeking to address.
- 76 Finally, to further protect the liquidity and principal sums of a Local Authority, two additional constraints are placed on Local Authorities
 - i. The Local Government Act 2003, section 15(1) requires an Authority to have regard to the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) Guidance on Local Government Investments 2010, which requires firstly the achievement of security (protecting the capital sum from loss), then liquidity (keeping the money readily available for expenditure when needed), and then lastly investment yield. This investment strategy is endorsed by the Prudential Code. The Authority complies with this Guidance by adopting a low risk appetite in its TMSS.
 - ii. The Prudential Code states that Authorities must not borrow more than or in advance of need purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. The Authority does not borrow more than or in advance of its need purely to profit from the investment of extra sums borrowed.

New Investments Maturing after 364 days taken between 01/04/16 and 31/03/17

77 No new investment maturing after 364 days was taken during 2016/17.

New Long Term Borrowing taken between 01/04/16 and 31/03/17

- 78 The Code requires that all long term borrowing is taken out with due consideration to affordability, prudence and sustainability. This is incorporated in the TMSS.
- 79 No new long term borrowing was taken during 2016/17.