

# **LONDON EMERGENCY SERVICES LIAISON PANEL (LESLP)**

## **OPERATIONAL COORDINATION PRINCIPLES**

## **London Resilience Partnership LESLP Operational Coordination Principles**

Lead Agency for LESLP: Metropolitan Police Service

Contributing organisations:

- British Transport Police (BTP)
- City of London Police (CoLP)
- Environment Agency (EA)
- Greater London Authority (GLA)
- His Majesty's Coastguard (HMCG)
- London Ambulance Service (LAS)
- London Fire Brigade (LFB)
- London Local Authorities
- London Resilience Unit (LRU)
- Metropolitan Police Service (MPS)
- Military, Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO)
- NHS England – London
- UK Health Security Agency (UK HSA)
- Transport for London (TfL)
- Voluntary Sector

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The London Resilience Unit is part of the Greater London Authority.  
We deliver and coordinate resilience services on behalf of the London Resilience Partnership and London Local Authorities.

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# 1 OVERVIEW

## 1.1 DEFINITION / PURPOSE OF DOCUMENT

This document provides general guidance for London responders on the London Resilience Partnership's approach to multi-agency incidents. Whilst mainly focused on on-scene working, this document also covers wider coordination which will take place prior to the activation of Partnership Frameworks such as the London Tactical Coordination Protocol and London Strategic Coordination Protocol.

The content of this document is designed to assist practitioners in the planning, training and exercising stages of preparing for emergencies, and to provide a reference document for use during incidents. The circumstances of each incident are different, and a flexible approach should be taken to the application of this guidance.

While this document refers to Major Incidents, the principles within it are applicable to all types of incident which require some form of multi-agency response.

### 1.1.1 Planning Assumptions

- This document conforms to the Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Principles (JESIP) Joint Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework version 3.1, April 2024. While reference is made to these principles, including direct references as applicable, LESLP is not intended to replace the JESIP Joint Doctrine, and it is assumed that all responders have a full understanding of and are appropriately trained in JESIP.
- All responder organisations maintain their own plans and operational procedures which utilise and complement the guidance contained within this document and fully embed JESIP.
- This document is to be used as a reference document for planning and training. Responders should understand and be fully trained in relation to the content before a response.

### 1.1.2 Audience

The primary audience for this document is on-scene responders. However, it also provides a useful reference guide for those who are involved at other levels of response, providing a base level understanding of roles at the operational level.

## 1.2 CORRECT USE OF TERMINOLOGY

Using terminology that has different meanings for different people, or is simply not understood across different responders, is a potential barrier to interoperability.

Using common, agreed terminology and plain language will aid effective communication and interoperability. If there is any doubt about what is meant by a specific term, individuals should check and confirm that a common understanding has been established.

All organisations should ensure the terminology used within their organisational plans reflects that which is used within this document.

The Lexicon of UK Civil Protection Terminology sets out definitions for common terminology, including terms in interoperability. There is also a set of common map symbols for civil protection. These symbols are used throughout this document.

## 1.3 MAJOR INCIDENTS

A major incident is defined in national JESIP doctrine as:

***“An event or situation with a range of serious consequences which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more of the emergency responder agencies.”***

An “emergency responder agency” applies to all Category 1 and 2 responders (**see Section 7**) as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and associated guidance.

A major incident is beyond the scope of business-as-usual operations and is likely to involve serious harm, damage, disruption or risk to human life or welfare, essential services, the environment, or national security.

It may involve only a single-agency response, but is likely to require a multi-agency response, even if that is in the form of multi-agency support to the lead responder.

### 1.3.1 Declaration of a Major Incident

A major incident may be declared by one or more responder agency if the above definition is met. Once an agency has declared a major incident, it must be communicated to other agencies by the appropriate mechanism in the M/ETHANE format (**see Section 2.2**). The M/ETHANE message must contain the time of declaration, details of the declaring agency and clear rationale for the declaration. Location information should also be as accurate as possible based on the information available at the time – it should be noted that errors in location information could lead to incorrect organisations being activated and / or the correct organisations not being notified. The process for sharing M/ETHANE messages is set out in London’s M/ETHANE Protocol, an annex of the Strategic Coordination Protocol.

In London, a declaration of a major incident for one agency does not necessarily mean that other partners will be required to implement special arrangements. Rather, each agency will review all declared major incidents and their potential consequences to provide an appropriate, proportionate and scalable response in accordance with their own procedures.

The decision to declare a major incident should ordinarily be made in a local and operational context. There is no precise threshold or trigger. In London, the decision to declare a major incident may also be made at a strategic or tactical level (e.g. for pan-London incidents or those without a specified incident ground).

In the event of a cross-border major incident, each emergency service should share M/ETHANE reports with counterparts outside of London making use of existing structures and communication channels.

### 1.3.2 Other response level terminology used by individual organisations

Even when a major incident is not declared there may still be a requirement for the deployment of specialist resources or a pre-determined attendance. Individual organisations may therefore use their own declarations to reflect this.



#### 1.3.2.1 Critical Incident - Police

This defines any incident where the effectiveness of the police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family and / or the community (College of Policing).

#### 1.3.2.2 Critical Incident – NHS

When disruption results in the temporary or permanent loss of critical service delivery. Patients and staff may be at risk of harm, or the environment is not safe, requiring special measures and support from other agencies.

#### 1.3.2.3 Significant Incident – London Ambulance Service

This refers to “any incident which, from initial intelligence, will require an attendance of a number of resources along with a management presence or will require a specialist or dedicated response”.

This incident type is specific to the LAS only, to allow an early proportionate response to a potential multiple casualty incident enabling rapid triaging, treatment and transportation of casualties, as well as sufficient Operational Commanders to manage the scene and a dedicated Tactical Commander to coordinate activities and resources.

#### 1.3.2.4 UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) response levels

For incidents which are UKHSA led, levels of response will be declared as Routine, Standard, Enhanced or Severe. These levels indicate at what level the incident is being managed and coordinated (whether regional or national), the level of stakeholder management required and how organisational resource is being managed.

## 1.4 LEVELS OF COMMAND

There are three levels of multi-agency command that may be established in response to a major incident as shown in the diagram below. This document focuses on the operational response however also provides information on how this links in with other response levels.




Figure 1: JESIP tiers of command

Agencies may set up their own internal command structures with differing terminology, but for an effective response, all agencies must work together at each level and participate in relevant coordinating groups.

Further information on the strategic and tactical levels can be found in the London Tactical and Strategic Coordination Protocols.

## 1.5 JESIP IN PRACTICE

This document sets out the response to incidents in London, in keeping with JESIP. These principles support the development of a true multi-agency response and should be used during all phases of an incident. The principles can be applied in any order as required by the incident. The below references where these principles are demonstrated within this document.

### CO-LOCATE

Co-locate with other responders as soon as practicably possible at a single, safe and easily identified location.

Demonstrated in **Sections 3.3** (for on-scene) and **9.1.1** (for control room)

### COMMUNICATE

Communicate using language which is clear, and free from technical jargon and abbreviations.

Demonstrated in **Sections 1.2 and 2.1**

### COORDINATE

Coordinate by agreeing the lead organisation. Identify priorities, resources, capabilities and limitations for an effective response, including the timing of further meetings.

Demonstrated in **Sections 2.3 and 3**.

### JOINTLY UNDERSTAND RISK

Jointly understand risk by sharing information about the likelihood and potential impacts of threats and hazards, to agree appropriate control measures.


Demonstrated in **Section 3.9**

### SHARED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

Establish shared situational awareness by using M/ETHANE and the Joint Decision Model.

Demonstrated in **Sections 2.2 and 3.9**

Alongside working to these principles, incident commanders should also utilise the Joint Decision Model (JDM) to bring together available information, reconcile potentially differing priorities and then make effective decisions. The JDM is shown below, further information about each of these stages is contained within the JESIP and on the JESIP app.



## 2 ACTIVATION AND NOTIFICATION


### 2.1 ACTIVATION OF RESPONSE ARRANGEMENTS AND NOTIFICATION PROCESS

Upon declaration of a Major Incident, the following must be adhered to:

- The declaring agency must communicate this to all other Category 1 and relevant / impacted Category 2 responders as soon as practicable.
- Clear lines of communication must be established between emergency service control rooms. A single point of contact should be designated within each control room to facilitate such communication.
- The declaring agency must share the M/ETHANE message as soon as possible.
- These arrangements must be maintained until there is a joint agreement that they are no longer required.

This information is then utilised to inform the level of coordination required. This is shown in the diagram on the following page.

The same principles of early information sharing between agencies should be used for any incident where it is considered that multi-agency coordination is, or may be, required, regardless of whether a Major Incident has been declared.



### 2.1.1 Emergency Services Inter-Control Room (ESICTRL) Talkgroup

The ESICTRL talkgroup is a multi-agency interoperability talkgroup, continuously monitored by the control rooms of British Transport Police (BTP), City of London Police (CoLP), Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), London Ambulance Service (LAS), London Fire Brigade (LFB) and HM Coastguard (HMCG). The talkgroup is intended to enable fast time information sharing (including safety critical information) between those agencies in certain conditions, including when any agency declares a Major Incident.

The declaration of, and information relating to, any Major Incident **must** include a M/ETHANE message.

The use of the ESICTRL talkgroup does not negate the need or use for the tri-service call.

### 2.1.2 Tri-Service Call

A tri-service call is an agreed method of communication between the control rooms of the MPS, LFB and LAS. It may be extended to BTP, CoLP and HM Coastguard if necessary.

It is instigated when certain conditions are met, including the declaration of a Major Incident. It provides an early joint operating picture and assists in the interoperability of the emergency services in attendance.

Any of the emergency services can initiate the tri-service call. When any service is notified of a major incident, they must inform the MPS control room of the incident and request initiation of the tri-service call.

The notification will initially be made on the ESICTRL talkgroup while the tri-service call is set up.

The MPS will be the default chair of the call and details of all attendees will be noted for recording purposes.

The call will continue until agencies agree it is no longer required, but the following conditions must be met:

- Shared situational awareness has been achieved.
- A relevant M/ETHANE message has been circulated and received.

### 2.1.3 Tripartite Call

The tripartite call is a strategic level call which enables the London Resilience Partnership to decide how an incident will be coordinated, including whether it is necessary to activate a Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) and / or a Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG). It takes place between the strategic leads for the declaring agency, the MPS and the London Resilience Unit (other agencies may be invited by exception).

It is separate to the tri-service call (mentioned above) and is further described in the Strategic Coordination Protocol.

### 2.1.4 Declaration by an Agency without Access to ESICTRL Talkgroup

If a Major Incident is declared by an agency that does not have access to the ESICTRL talkgroup, or tri-service process, they must notify the London Resilience Unit to discuss the appropriate partnership response.

The declaring agency can be assisted in cascading the declaration and associated M/ETHANE message via the ESICTRL talkgroup by an agency that does have access.

The Major Incident declaration and M/ETHANE report can also be cascaded by the London Resilience Unit (LRU) to members of the London Resilience Partnership. However, this is a supplementary means of cascade and does not replace the requirement for agencies to share the declaration and M/ETHANE report in fast time with other relevant Category 1 and Category 2 responders.

### 2.1.5 Notifying an Agency without Access to ESICTRL

Agencies that are required to respond who do not have access to the ESICTRL talkgroup should have their respective control rooms, or Duty Officer, notified via telephone as soon as possible by the declaring agency. Contacts are detailed within the London Resilience Partnership Contacts Directory.

Where a direct link between CAD (or On Call) and an agency's systems exists (e.g. Coastguard and EXP/MCA) they should be notified by an electronic message clearly stating that a Major Incident has been declared, provided with the remainder of the METHANE message and informed that the tri-service call is being established. This should be supplementary to, not instead of, direct verbal communication.

The London Local Authority, or Authorities, where the incident has occurred should be notified via the emergency contact number listed in the Borough Profiles, and a M/ETHANE message should be provided. This will facilitate the deployment of a Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO) to the scene where appropriate, and activate the local authority's emergency response arrangements.

Notification to the wider partnership of all Category 1 and 2 responders can be made by the LRU via a mass messaging system. Information and updates can then be shared via a secure web based multi-agency data sharing tool called the London Situational Awareness System (LSAS). This can also be used to generate a common operating picture (COP), however, LSAS is not continuously monitored and should not be used for operational communications.

### 2.1.6 Interoperability Talkgroups

A number of multi-agency interoperability talkgroups are accessible to all Airwave handsets and they can be used by incident commanders to share information to support decision making, reduce risk and increase safety.

If a talkgroup is required, it will need to be initiated via the following process:

- Following declaration of a Major Incident, an incident commander from one of the responding agencies can request an interoperability talkgroup be established. This request must be made via their own agency control room.
- The control room receiving the request will notify the MPS, who will select and staff an appropriate talkgroup (considering accessibility from responding agencies).
- The talkgroup information should then be shared with responding agencies as appropriate. Incident commanders or representatives should begin to monitor and utilise this channel.


If there is any doubt about the use of these talkgroups, responders should consult their Airwave Tactical Advisors.

These talkgroups are not subject to constant monitoring and do not replace the requirement for On-scene Coordinating Group (OCG) meetings (see **Section 3.9** and **Annexes A and B**).

## 2.2 M/ETHANE

The M/ETHANE mnemonic is an established format for responders and control rooms to share information related to a major incident.

A message in the M/ETHANE format must be sent from the scene to the control room, who should then share it with relevant responder organisations as soon as possible to ensure that joint situational awareness is quickly established. Each responder agency should submit their own M/ETHANE message to their control room to build shared situational awareness.





## 2.3 IDENTIFYING THE LEAD AGENCY

For effective coordination, one agency generally needs to take a lead role. Responding agencies, in consultation with each other, will assess the following factors:

- Type of incident
- Phase of the incident
- Requirement for specialist capabilities and investigation
- Demands on individual services or personnel, including what command structure is in place at the time

The decision on which agency will take the lead should then be made and documented. This responsibility may be transferred by agreement, and the lead agency may change as the incident and response develops. All changes must be recorded and documented with rationale.

## 3 ON-SCENE COORDINATION

### 3.1 SCENE SCHEMATIC

The diagram below shows the key locations at the scene of an incident, these are further described in this section.

The sharing of the RVP location should be via clear, unambiguous instructions – this should not only include road names but also details of relevant junctions for clarity. What3Words may also be utilised to provide more specific locations.




Figure 2: Scene Schematic - Taken from College of Policing guidance on Civil Emergencies - Response | College of Policing

## 3.2 CORDONS

**Lead Agency: Police\***

**Safety Lead: London Fire Brigade\***

There are three cordons that could be established around an incident scene:

- **Inner Cordon** (denoted by red and white “Do Not Cross” tape).
  - Established to secure the immediate scene and provide a measure of protection for personnel working in the area.
  - Accessed through the Scene Access Control Point (SACP). This is where the Police and Fire Service will log those entering and leaving the cordon area and may utilise arm bands to identify responders within this area.
  - The Fire Service is responsible for the safety management of all emergency service personnel and non-emergency service personnel deployed within the inner cordon.
  - The Fire Service will complete an analytical risk assessment (ARA) this is a written record of all significant hazards identified within the inner cordon. This will provide a risk/benefit analysis, control measures and support selection of safe systems of work.
  - Once the Fire Service is no longer safety lead at the incident, this responsibility will pass to the Police.
- **Outer Cordon** (denoted by blue and white “Do Not Cross” tape)
  - Established around the vicinity of an incident and encompassing the inner cordon.
  - Allows a safe area for emergency responders and partners to work and brief unimpeded by public or media.
  - Passage into the outer cordon is through the Access Control Point (ACP) where Police will log those accessing and leaving the outer cordon.
- **Traffic Cordon** (denoted by blue and white tape).
  - Supplementary to the outer cordon to control traffic access for emergency and other vehicles.
  - It is the responsibility of the police to establish but may be controlled by traffic management measures and equipment managed by Transport for London or Local Authorities.
  - It should, where possible, allow pedestrian access to homes, work and services.

*\*This is correct for incidents not on the Tidal River Thames. Other agencies may be incident and safety leads on the River Thames.*

### 3.3 FORWARD COMMAND POINT

#### Lead Agency: On-Scene Lead Agency

During a major incident, respective incident commanders and liaison officers from responding agencies should co-locate on-scene at a jointly agreed single, clearly defined area / venue. This area / venue will be designated as the FCP. When deciding the site of an FCP, the following criteria should be considered:



- It should be in a safe location – ascertaining all present and potential hazards.
- Ideally, it should be adjacent to the approach route from the marshalling areas with parking for other emergency services command and support vehicles.
- It should be close enough to the scene to maintain control but divorced from actual working teams.
- It should be prominently signed and easy to find (it is recommended that the only blue flashing lights illuminated are those of the emergency services command vehicles).
- It should be secure from the media and any possible terrorist or other criminal activity.
- It should provide suitable space for On-Scene Incident Commander meetings to take place.

For incidents involving fire, chemical or hazardous materials, LFB advice should be sought to ensure the location chosen is safe. For terrorist incidents, the police will conduct a search of an area to ensure it is safe before designating it an FCP and additional safety measures may be implemented to protect responders gathering at those areas.

Once an FCP has been nominated by the lead agency, this should be communicated to other responders via control rooms.

### 3.4 TABARDS

Commanders of each responder organisation should be easily identifiable at an incident. This is usually achieved by wearing role-specific tabards. There are exceptions, such as public order and public safety events, where coloured epaulettes and helmet markings are used.



*Fire – Incident Commander*



*Fire – Safety Officer*



*Police*



*Ambulance*



*HM Coastguard*



*Local Authority (LALO)*

### 3.5 RENDEZVOUS POINT



#### Lead Agency: On-Scene Lead Agency


This is separate from the FCP as requirements for an RVP differ. It is an area for resources at the scene to gather, when not directly deployed. This is where details of arriving resources should be logged, briefed, and deployed from. The RVP should be situated between the outer cordon and the traffic cordon.

When choosing a suitable RVP site, consideration should be given to the volume of vehicles (including size) and assets in attendance and the need for constant, unhindered access and egress to the scene and RVP. Similarly to an FCP, for terrorist incidents, the police may search an area before designating it as an RVP.

Where incidents take place on, or close to, the river, consideration should also be given for identifying a suitable RVP for vessels.

Should the location of the RVP need to be changed for any reason, the lead agency will notify each responding agency of the requirement and the new location.

### 3.6 MARSHALLING AREA



#### Lead Agency: On-Scene Lead Agency

A Marshalling Area (including Multi-Agency Marshalling Area, Strategic Holding Area [SHA] or Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Area [MASHA]) is an area where additional resources, primarily emergency services and support services, may be held. It may also be used as a rest and briefing area for responders. Like an RVP, it must be suitable for accommodating large numbers of vehicles and support staff where resources can rest or standby while awaiting deployment to the incident.

### 3.7 EMERGENCY SAFETY EVACUATIONS

In circumstances where unsafe conditions for responders are detected that necessitate an emergency evacuation and it is not practical to pass the information via the command structure, an emergency evacuation may be implemented: this will normally be by the London Fire Brigade. The

evacuation signal and withdrawal location will be detailed as part of the incident safety briefing. The evacuation signal will normally be short, sharp, repeated blasts on a whistle.

The LFB will appoint dedicated safety officers, identifiable by a yellow tabard with blue shoulders. Their role is to manage health, safety and welfare within a defined area.

Where the LFB are not in attendance, an evacuation signal should be confirmed by the lead agency and understood by all partners entering the inner cordon until LFB arrive and are able to take over.

Incidents on the River Thames may have different structures and associated leads.

## 3.8 HEALTH AND SAFETY

Responsibility for health and safety rests with each organisation. The London Fire Brigade will provide professional advice on matters of safety at incidents where they are in attendance. Consideration should be given to utilising expertise that may be available from industries directly involved in the incident e.g. Utility companies or transport providers. The Health and Safety Executive is also able to advise on safety matters.

## 3.9 ON-SCENE COORDINATING GROUP

### Lead Agency: On-Scene Lead Agency

Regular meetings should take place between on-scene incident commanders to ensure that any response is effectively coordinated. This will be mirrored at both Tactical and Strategic levels of command.

A template agenda is provided in **Annex B**.

### Composition

The lead agency at the scene will chair on-scene coordinating group meetings. The group should initially define and periodically review the composition and chair of the group. This is to ensure that the right partner organisations and expertise are represented throughout the lifecycle of the group.

Representatives attending the on-scene coordinating group meetings should have the level of knowledge, expertise and authority to identify and deploy the resources of their respective agency.

On-scene incident commanders may appoint multi-agency sub-groups of incident commanders assigned to coordinate specific functions, tasks, or geographical locations.

As a minimum, meetings should include incident commanders from responding agencies - an example composition can be found in **Annex B**. **This list is not prescriptive nor exhaustive, and invitations should be extended to all agencies involved in the operational response to the incident, including any specialists as required. Further information on the role and responsibilities of responders can be found in Section 8.**

## Frequency

The first meeting should take place at the earliest opportunity, with regular meetings scheduled accordingly thereafter. Meetings must be sufficiently far apart for organisations to discharge any actions arising at the previous meeting, but not too infrequent so as to cause a loss of shared situational awareness or joint understanding of risk. These meetings should continue until the response phase has concluded.

## Location

Initial meetings should take place at the FCP. However, the location may change so meetings can take place at an alternative, more suitable premises throughout the response.

London Fire Brigade have mobile Command Units which can become the FCP once in attendance. These Command Units have a range of functions: providing a private area for meetings and briefings, airwave radio capability and a suite of screens which can provide mapping, drone and helicopter downlink and other functions as required.

## Recording Meetings and Joint Action Tracker

For on-scene coordinating group meetings, **a written record must be taken**. Written records for meetings will, as a minimum, provide actions and decisions with rationale where stated in the meeting.

It will be the responsibility of the chairing agency to ensure adequate secretarial support is in place to support those functions. Incident Commanders should also appoint a loggist to track single agency decisions, actions and supporting rationale, but this does not negate having an appropriate joint record of on-scene coordination meetings.

Once completed, minutes and actions should be shared with those in attendance and any sitting TCG. Any recordings or decision logs generated must be retained in line with each organisations policy.

Best practice: where available, technology should be used to take a visual / audio recording of the meeting. Where recordings are taken, all attendees should be made aware.



# 4 SUPPORTING THOSE AFFECTED

## 4.1 OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

To ensure that those affected by an incident are fully supported, incident commanders should:

- Consider how different groups of people may be affected and how appropriate support can be provided. For example, those with physical barriers to evacuating who may require further assistance, those with cognitive impairments or those with specific communication needs (sensory impairment, those who do not speak English).
- Ensure, as far as possible, that the Public Sector Duty under the Equality Act 2010 is adhered to, and that due consideration is given to protected characteristics, individual needs, and reducing any disadvantages for those groups of people during the incident response.
- Identify any vulnerable or critical sites within the affected area, e.g. care homes, hospitals etc.
- Ensure any operational level warning and informing that is done utilises methods that will best reach the target audience.
- Consider use of Major Incident Public Portal (MIPP) see **Section 4.4**.

For further guidance on the identification of vulnerable people, see London Identification of the Vulnerable Guidance.

## 4.2 WARNING AND INFORMING THE PUBLIC

### **Lead Agency: Police (Supported by all agencies)**

Communicating with the public is a critical element of any response as a well-informed public is better able to respond to an emergency, whilst minimising the impact to the affected community. As such, agencies should start from a position of considering the risks and harm if they do not share information.

Accurate and up to date information is essential. A variety of methods may be used to communicate with the public including; mainstream and social media, local broadcast by emergency services public announcement systems, via frontline responders and through door-to-door communications. Consideration should be given to briefing responders with appropriate information/advice in case of questions from members of the public.

Consideration should also be given to the use of the Government Emergency Alerts System which can be utilised to cascade messages directly to mobile phones within a designated geographical area. The use must be requested via the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) if set up, or an incident Gold Commander and can only be used where:

- Lives are at risk;
- The risk covers a defined geographical area;
- Those receiving the message need to take action;



- There is some urgency to taking action.

Where there is a need for coordinated, multi-agency public communications, the London Resilience Communication Group (LRCG) can be activated. Whilst this forms part of London's strategic coordination arrangements, it can be stood up without an SCG having been activated.

### 4.3 CASUALTY BUREAU

#### Lead Agency: Police

Police may establish a Casualty Bureau where details on all deceased, casualties, survivors and evacuees will be collated. This could be by taking telephone or online enquiries from friends and relatives of people who are believed to be involved in the incident, or reviewing information submitted via the Major Incident Public Portal (MIPP) (**see Section 4.4**).

Casualty Bureau staff will then match details of persons involved with missing person reports. Where a match is made, casualty bureau will make appropriate contact with the enquirer.

The Casualty Bureau will not close until all the casualties have been identified, all next of kin have been informed and telephone enquiries have diminished to a level where they can be dealt with by the local police area.

### 4.4 MAJOR INCIDENT PUBLIC PORTAL (MIPP)

#### Lead Agency: Police

The MIPP website can be used to obtain information from both public and police sources in the event of a major investigation (e.g. Homicide) or major incident.

Where an incident requires the activation of Casualty Bureau, the public can use the MIPP to report the details of those they believe to be involved, and incident specific forms can be created to help capture information to assist the enquiry.

Passcode protected MIPP forms allow Police to submit information such as details of survivors first accounts and other information. This includes Investigative Triage Forms for completion at Hospitals or Survivor Reception Centres (SuRCs) (**see Section 4.7.1**). Where appropriate and necessary, partner agencies may assist members of the public in completing these forms as an alternative to being interviewed by a police officer.

### 4.5 BRONZE HOSPITAL COORDINATOR AND SUB-BRONZE HOSPITAL

#### Lead Agency: Police

As part of the response and investigation, police will deploy to hospitals receiving casualties. They will obtain casualty details to enable the information to be added to Casualty Bureau records, implement the set forensic strategy and prevent any public order issues that may arise.

The police officer overseeing the police resources at a hospital will be referred to as the Sub-Bronze Hospital. The attendance of local authority staff at acute hospital to support bereaved or anxious relatives should be negotiated with the Bronze Hospital and acute hospital managers.

During larger or complex incidents where casualties are admitted at multiple hospitals, the police may activate a Bronze Hospital Coordinator to manage all the individual Sub-Bronze Hospitals.

## 4.6 CASUALTY MANAGEMENT

### Lead Agency: London Ambulance Service

The main objective at any multiple casualty incident is to achieve the largest number of survivors. In order to do that, responders will carry out Life-Saving Interventions (LSIs) and triage of casualties as quickly as possible.

Previously Triage was limited to Ambulance personnel however the introduction of Ten Second Triage (**see Section 4.6.3**) means all trained responding agencies have the ability to provide triage and immediate lifesaving interventions in the event of a multiple casualty incident.

During a multiple casualty incident, all responders will undertake:

- Primary Triage – Delivery of Life-Saving Interventions and Ten Second Triage (TST).

Clinical care will be overseen by the London Ambulance Service, who will develop the overarching casualty management plan, which may include:

- Bridging Interventions – Delivery of additional clinical care and treatment to assist and improve extraction.
- Extraction – Provide direction for the appropriate movement of casualties from point of injury to the Casualty Clearing Station for transport to definitive care.

And if deemed necessary by the Ambulance Scene Commander (in consultation with the Medical Advisor) could implement:

- Secondary Triage – Further assessment and care using either Major Incident Triage Tool (MITT) or Senior Clinician led decision making.

### 4.6.1 Ambulance Service Specialist Capabilities

The LAS maintain National Interoperable Capabilities, which ensure the ambulance services can extend NHS paramedic standard care into hazardous or high-risk environments, including clinical assessment, decontamination and treatment of patients within the inner cordon of the incident. For example, those caught within a marauding terrorist attack (MTA), Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) environment or Hazardous Materials accidental release of chemicals or toxic substances.

The national interoperable capabilities are provided by specifically trained personnel working within the Hazardous Area Response Team (HART), Specialist Operational Response Team (SORT) and Tactical Response Unit (TRU). The deployment of these assets is at the discretion of the Ambulance Incident Commander, in conjunction with partner agencies.

Further information on the ambulance service specialist capabilities can be found at; <https://naru.org.uk/the-interoperable-capabilities/>.

### 4.6.2 Triage Priorities

Triage indicates the priority assigned to the casualty at the time the assessment is undertaken. The priority groups are as follows:

| Priority      | Description   | Colour of Triage Marker |
|---------------|---|-------------------------|
| Not Breathing | Only used in Ten Second Triage, requires urgent reassessment by a clinical responder.                   | Grey                    |
| P1            | Requires Immediate Treatment  | Red                     |
| P2            | Required Urgent treatment   | Yellow                  |
| P3            | Treatment can be delayed  | Green                   |
| Dead          | Dead  | Black                   |
| Not Injured   | Used to differentiate non injured persons accompanying other casualties to prevent repeat reassessment. | Purple                  |
| P1 Hold       | Only used by senior clinician   | Blue                    |

#### 4.6.3 Primary Triage – Ten Second Triage

In multiple casualty incidents, primary triage is used to identify the most severely injured casualties, prioritise those who need immediate Life-Saving Interventions (LSIs) and to help guide extraction decisions. Ten Second Triage is a non-physiological triage system, focused on life threatening injuries, in which all emergency services are trained. The same colour bands are used across all emergency services (other than Purple and Blue which are only used by LAS) however they may differ in style.

It provides a simple framework for an approach to a chaotic scene that will help all responders optimise their ability to move quickly and efficiently from one casualty to the next in order to save as many lives as possible.

Casualty priorities are indicated by coloured markers with a chequered pattern to denote Ten Second Triage has been used for the decision making. Ten Second Triage is not a once only assessment; casualties will require re-assessment as soon as resources allow.

As part of the Ten Second Triage process casualties may be assessed as 'Not Breathing' and marked with a silver grey marker. In the initial stages when resources are insufficient to allow for resuscitation this ensures responders can provide lifesaving interventions and Ten Second Triage to further casualties. If resources allow, i.e. if there are multiple responders or 'competent bystanders' available to safely perform resuscitation, while other responders continue to complete the Life Saving Interventions and triage process, resuscitative efforts should be commenced and / or encouraged.

All 'Not Breathing' casualties must be re-assessed by a clinician as soon as possible.

#### 4.6.4 Secondary Triage – MITT/Clinician Lead Intuitive Triage

On completion of Life Saving Interventions and Ten Second Triage for all accessible casualties, the Ambulance Scene Commander in consultation with the Tactical Advisor and On-Scene Medical Advisor will determine, if necessary, to commence Secondary Triage. Secondary Triage may be utilised when the number of casualties or types of presenting conditions require further categorisation to best support ongoing casualty care and transport decisions.

Secondary Triage could include either use of the Major Incident Triage Tool (MITT) or Clinician Lead Intuitive Triage. MITT is a physiological clinical triage tool allowing a more sensitive and accurate assessment of critically injured or unwell patients to be carried out. Casualty priorities are indicated by coloured markers with a solid colour to denote that Secondary Triage has been used for the decision making.

#### 4.6.5 Survivors (Uninjured)

Survivors who are uninjured but have been involved in the incident may not necessarily require medical attention. Once these people have been removed from any hazards and processed through triage, they must be directed towards the Police for collation of details and witness statements.

Police will need to collate their details for the benefit of the Casualty Bureau as well as the investigation. This can be conducted at the Survivor Reception Centre (SuRC).

Responders need to consider and attempt to collate witness details of those who refuse to attend a SuRC or who are attempting to leave the scene prior to supplying any information.

#### 4.6.6 Casualty Collection Point (CCP, Casualty Clearing Station (CCS) and Ambulance Loading Point (ALP)

Dependent on the size and nature of the incident, a number of stages may be involved in the delivery of effective ongoing care and the clearance of casualties from scene. This will include the single use, or combination of Casualty Collection Points, Casualty Clearing Station and an Ambulance Loading Points.

A Casualty Collection Point (CCP) is an area where casualties are grouped, and clinical care is provided. The location will need to be jointly agreed and reviewed regularly. The CCP may be some distance from the more heavily resourced Casualty Clearing Station (CCS) and associated Casualty Loading Point (CLP).

A Casualty Clearing Station (CCS) will be a temporary structure or building within the outer cordon. It is where casualties are further triaged. Enhanced assessment and treatment will take place to stabilise the casualty prior to transport. This area will have a designated Bronze Clearing Officer, who will oversee the arrangements for the Casualty Clearing Station. They will be supported by a Casualty Clearing Medical Lead. Police will send a Casualty Clearance officer to this location to ensure patient's non-clinical details are obtained, this is part of the identification process.

Upon the arrival of transporting resources, patients will be transferred to the Ambulance Loading Point where they will be assigned an ambulance to transport them to definitive care. An Ambulance Loading Officer may be assigned to facilitate the movement of casualties to definitive care.

#### 4.6.7 Labelling and Documentation

Documentation of patients must start as soon as possible. Triage labels must be attached to patients in the initial stages of the incident even if there is no opportunity to collect personal details. Details of each patient should be collected as soon as they enter the casualty clearing station/area.

In the early stages of an incident, it may not always be possible for ambulance crews to record the usual details of patients. However, on route to the hospital any details about the patient that can be obtained will be entered onto the electronic Patient Care Record (ePCR) so that a record of patient movement and patient care (however minimal) is recorded. Ambulances should not be delayed at the scene in order to obtain personal details of individual casualties, which will be obtained by the police at the receiving hospitals. In all circumstances, the triage label must be completed.

Any patient that has been assessed and discharged at scene will also have an ePCR completed.

Police service instructions refer to the attaching of nationally and recommended identification labels to deceased persons. Ambulance service personnel should note that these identity and evidential labels are NOT to be used in place of the medical triage labels.

Police officers will be deployed to the casualty departments of these hospitals to provide documentation teams, and assist with forensic issues and security advice.

#### 4.6.8 Management of the Deceased

Once a patient has been triaged as deceased by a clinician, a black 'DEAD' triage tag will be attached to the patient. The triage tag must have documented the time and date the patient was triaged as deceased, the clinician's initials and the location of the body. Should it be necessary to move a fatality to gain access or treat a live patient, the original location of the deceased will be recorded on the triage tag.

To ensure patient dignity, operational need, scene clearance and scenes of crime management in relation to the preservation of evidence the LAS will carry out the following:

- Where a deceased person is identified at the scene of an incident and **is not** in public view or that of the media, the deceased can be left uncovered to allow due attention for forensic processes;
- Where a deceased person is identified at the scene of an incident and **is** in public view or that of the media, the deceased should be covered, with the triage tag visible to allow due attention for forensic processes;
- Deceased patients should only be covered by the clinician recognising life extinct. They should not be covered by other on scene agencies and this should be made clear at multi agency meetings on scene

If a body is located at the scene of a Major Incident that has been covered but does not have a visible triage tag, therefore identifying the fact that a triage assessment may not have taken place, an immediate triage assessment should take place and the appropriate tag applied.

If local mortuary arrangements are insufficient to cope with the number of deceased victims, emergency arrangements must be activated. Some larger public mortuaries in London are Designated Disaster Mortuaries (DDMs). They can be enhanced or adapted to cope with an increased number of deceased victims and the associated investigative activity. The Coroner will make the final decision on the use, and location, of a DDM.

The official source of information relating to live casualty figures is NHS England. The Coroner leads on fatality figures (disseminated via/in conjunction with the lead police service for the incident).

Further information about the management of fatalities can be found in **Annex C** and the London Mass Fatality Framework.

## 4.7 EMERGENCY CENTRES

Humanitarian assistance is activity aimed at addressing the needs of people affected by emergencies; the provision of practical, psychological and social aftercare and support in the short, medium and long term.

In the response phase, providing immediate shelter and safety is a priority, enabling further support and assistance activities to follow.

Depending on the size and scale of the incident, it may be necessary to establish one or more of the centres detailed below to assist those impacted directly or indirectly as a result.

It should be noted that the community may have already opened doors to local buildings (e.g. community halls, religious buildings) and started providing ad-hoc support before formal response structures have been set up. This should be taken into consideration when making decisions about opening centres.

Whilst the below assistance centres focus on needs in the immediate response, a Community Assistance Centre (CAC) or Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC) may be set up to provide support beyond that – further information on these centres is contained in **Annex D**.

An Emergency Centres Guidance document is currently under review (as of Jan 2025) – once finalised this will be available on ResilienceDirect.

### 4.7.1 Survivor Reception Centre (SuRC)



#### Lead Agency: Police (supported by Local Authority)

A SuRC is a secure area (between the inner and outer cordon), set up in the immediate aftermath of a large scale incident, where survivors (who are not requiring acute hospital treatment) can be taken or directed for support, short-term shelter and to receive first aid. The police lead, to enable information and evidence to be gathered from the survivors in respect to the incident.

The local authority may assist in finding a suitable venue and can be present at the SuRC to provide care and practical assistance to survivors. They **must** be informed as soon as possible once the decision to establish a SuRC has been made. The Victims Commission should also be notified.

Biggin Hill Airport, City Airport & Heathrow Airports have designated SuRCs, which can be stood up if required to support with an airside incident.

### 4.7.2 Rest Centre



#### Lead Agency: Local Authority

A Rest Centre serves as a place of shelter and safety for those who have been evacuated from their home, work or other place and are unable to return, but are uninjured and not directly affected by the incident.

Attendees will be provided practical and wellbeing support by the local authority and supporting agencies until able to return home or be provided with alternative accommodation.

Police will attend official Rest Centres, to gather information from survivors and witnesses.

Some unofficial Rest Centres may be set up (for example by local communities or charities) outside of the incident response structure. Agencies should work together to identify the existence and location of all Rest Centres/places of shelter ensuring appropriate support and coordination amongst them.

Police may also attend unofficial Rest Centres to gather information about survivors and witnesses.

#### 4.7.3 Family and Friends Reception Centre (FFRC)



##### **Lead Agency: Police (supported by Local Authority)**

Where demand warrants, consideration should be given to establishing a secure and comfortable area where friends and relatives of casualties and missing persons can obtain information and gather away from media attention or those less impacted by the emergency (i.e. in the Rest Centre).

It should be located outside the outer cordon. They may also be set up outside hospitals to provide a focal point for families to attend.

Biggin Hill, City and Heathrow Airports have designated FFRCs which can be stood up if required to support an airside incident. They may also set up a FFRC for an incident involving an aircraft which departed or was due to land at those locations.

Agencies whose advice and assistance may be required (voluntary sector or local authorities) should be in attendance to provide access to practical and emotional support.

Police can record missing person enquiries and gather information that may assist enquires as well as reuniting friends and families with loved ones.

## 5 STAND DOWN AND HANDOVER TO RECOVERY

Prior to stand down or handover following a Major Incident, the on-scene incident commanders should satisfy themselves that:

- The emergency is contained and there is no significant risk of resurgence.
- Public safety measures are in place and working effectively.
- If required, a handover of any ongoing actions or issues has been undertaken with the relevant local authority or other agency.

A joint decision to stand down a major incident declaration should then be made at the highest level of multi-agency coordination in place at that time (i.e. at the Forward Command Point, the Tactical Coordinating Group, or the Strategic Coordinating Group). The major incident stand down decision,

and supporting rationale, should be recorded and passed to control rooms to cascade to all organisations notified of the initial major incident declaration.

Following the conclusion of the emergency response phase, formal handover to the Recovery Coordinating Group should take place (if one is required or has been established). For further information on the process, see the LRP Recovery Coordination Framework.



# 6 OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

## 6.1 WELFARE OF RESPONDERS

### Lead Agency: All

The welfare of responders should be an ongoing consideration both during and after an incident. It is for each individual agency to ensure that their responders have access to any potential support required. Organisations will have their own processes for providing support to responders and individuals should ensure that they are familiar with these.

## 6.2 RECORD KEEPING

### Lead Agency: All

Each agency should have processes in place to ensure appropriate records are kept during incidents and that these records are collated and stored appropriately, in case they are required for any subsequent investigations, inquests or inquiries.

## 6.3 DEBRIEFING

### Lead Agency: Incident Lead

It is important to capture lessons while events are fresh in the minds of those involved. For this reason, a joint “hot debrief” should be held by Incident Commanders as soon as practicable after the incident.

Formal multi-agency debriefs, arranged by the lead agency and undertaken by trained and impartial debriefers, may be held later, good practice states within four weeks – if this is not achievable this should be carried out as soon as practicable. They should involve a full range of responders and control room staff to ensure lessons are identified and captured from every aspect of the response. This may be replicated across all levels of coordination as appropriate.

All debriefs will be subject to disclosure rules and any investigations may dictate timings of debriefing procedures. In London, multi-agency debriefs must be held with good practice and recommendations for learning shared with relevant agencies and Joint Organisational Learning.

Further information about debriefing can be found in the London Resilience Partnership Debriefing Policy.

# 7 RESPONDER ORGANISATIONS

Civil resilience in the UK is underpinned by the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) (CCA). Part 1 sets out the local arrangements for civil protection, and Part 2 the emergency powers. In Part 1 of the Act, local responder organisations are divided into two categories, these are Category 1 responders and Category 2 responders.

Category 1 responders include the emergency services, local authorities and NHS bodies. Category 2 responders include the Health & Safety Executive, utility and transport companies. The relevant Category 1 Responders in London are listed below. More general groupings are provided for London's Category 2 Responders – the specific organisations can be found in the London Resilience Partnership Contact's Directory.

To note, the CCA is periodically reviewed and, as such, the list is subject change. While every effort is made to keep this list up to date, the official legislative list can be found [here](#).

## 7.1 CATEGORY 1 RESPONDERS

- British Transport Police - BTP
- City of London Police - CoLP
- Environment Agency - EA
- Greater London Authority - GLA
- Hospital Trusts with Accident and Emergency functions
- London Ambulance Service - LAS
- London Fire Brigade - LFB
- Local Authorities - LA
- London Port Health Authority - LPHA
- Maritime and Coastguard Agency - MCA (HM Coastguard)
- Metropolitan Police Service - MPS
- NHS England – London
- NHS Integrated Care Boards
- NHS Trusts with an Emergency Department
- UK Health Security Agency – UKHSA

## 7.2 CATEGORY 2 RESPONDERS

- Electricity distributors and transmitters
- Gas distributors
- Telephone service providers (fixed and mobile)
- Water and sewerage undertakers
- Airport operators

- Harbour authorities
- Met Office
- National Highways (formerly Highways England)
- Network Rail
- Train operating companies (passenger and freight)
- Transport for London (including London Underground) - TfL
- Health and Safety Executive – HSE

## 7.3 OTHER RESPONDERS

In addition to Category 1 and 2 responders, voluntary organisations often provide a significant role in the response to a major incident. **See Annex O** for further information.

The military may also assist the civil authorities in responding to a major incident operating under Military Aid to Civil Authorities policy and procedures. See **Annex K** for further information.

# 8 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

## 8.1 LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

| Primary areas of responsibility  |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Saving of life through search and rescue</li> <li>• Firefighting and fire prevention</li> <li>• Rendering humanitarian services</li> <li>• Detection, identification, monitoring and management of hazardous materials and protecting the environment</li> <li>• Provision of qualified scientific advice in relation to HAZMAT (hazardous materials) incidents via their scientific advisors</li> <li>• Salvage and damage control</li> <li>• Safety management within the inner cordon</li> <li>• To maintain emergency service cover throughout the LFB area and return to a state of normality at the earliest time</li> <li>• To provide community engagement and reassurance</li> </ul> |
| Specialist roles   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Interagency Liaison Officer</li> <li>• Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Adviser</li> <li>• Hazardous materials and environmental protection officer</li> <li>• Bulk Media Advisor</li> <li>• Technical Rescue Advisor (line, water, technical)</li> </ul>  |

- Fire safety officer
- Fire investigation
- Flood rescue advisors
- Operational communications tactical advisor
- Waste fire advisor
- Wildfire tactical advisor

#### Resources available

Command Unit, drones, swift water rescue and flood response line rescue, heavy lifting equipment, Urban Search and Rescue for collapsed structures, aerial appliances up to 64 metres, bulk foam, marine firefighting capability, high volume pumping for removal or supply of water, CBRN(E) rapid response unit, animal rescue, major lighting unit, motorised rescue trolley for LUL, National Resilience capability.

## 8.2 POLICE SERVICES

### 8.2.1 Metropolitan Police Service

#### Primary areas of responsibility

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) is the territorial police force responsible for law enforcement and crime prevention within Greater London. In addition, it is responsible for specialist tasks throughout the United Kingdom, such as dealing with counter-terrorism throughout the UK, and the protection of certain individuals, including the monarch, royal family and government officials and other designated figures.

- The saving of life together with the other emergency services
- The coordination of the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations responding to an incident
- To secure, protect and preserve the scene and control sightseers and traffic through the use of cordons
- The investigation of the incident and obtaining and securing evidence in conjunction with other investigative bodies where applicable
- The collection of casualty information such as names, dates of birth, addresses, next of kin and hospital conveyed if appropriate, in conjunction with other services
- The identification of the dead on behalf of His Majesty's (HM) Coroner
- The prevention of crime
- Family liaison
- Short-term measures to restore normality after all necessary actions have been taken

#### Specialist roles

- Commanders for MTA, CBRN, Public Order, Firearms
- Tactical Advisors (Public Order, Firearms, CBRN, EOD, Major Incident, airwaves)

- National Search Officers
- Specialist Crime (DVI)
- Counter Terrorism
- Data and Digital
- Specialist Response Units (Marine, Mounted, Dogs, Firearms, EOD, Protection, NPAS)

*\*This is not an exhaustive list*

#### Resources available

*Sufficient resources will be stood up to support the roles listed above.*

## 8.2.2 City of London Police

#### Primary areas of responsibility

City police are the territorial police force responsible for law enforcement within the City of London, England, including the middle and inner temples.

- The saving of life together with the other emergency services
- The coordination of the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations responding to an incident
- To secure, protect and preserve the scene and control sightseers and traffic through the use of cordons
- The investigation of the incident and obtaining and securing evidence in conjunction with other investigative bodies where applicable
- The collection and distribution of casualty information
- The identification of the dead on behalf of His Majesty's (HM) Coroner
- The prevention of crime
- Family liaison
- Short-term measures to restore normality after all necessary actions have been taken

#### Specialist roles

- Tactical Advisors

#### Resources available

- Specialist Response Unit

## 8.2.3 British Transport Police

#### Primary areas of responsibility

BTP have responsibility for all matters within our jurisdiction, as determined by the Railways and Transport Safety Act 2003 (excluding Terrorism); including major incident management. BTP are

the specialist police force for the Railways, with jurisdiction over the national rail network including railway stations, the London Underground, Croydon tram network and depots amongst other supporting railway infrastructure.

The primary areas of responsibility are to:

- Promote the saving of life together with the other emergency services
- Ensure coordination of the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations responding to an incident
- To secure, protect and preserve the scene and control sightseers and traffic through the use of cordons
- Undertake an investigation of the incident by obtaining and securing evidence in conjunction with other investigative bodies where applicable, including the Rail Accident Investigation Branch with which BTP has a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
- The collection and distribution of casualty information in conjunction with other services
- The identification of the dead on behalf of His Majesty's (HM) Coroner
- Undertake family liaison and offer support to the victims and those bereaved by public tragedy
- Promote and engage in measures to recover and return to stability at an appropriate time following the incident
- Ensure business continuity is maintained and resourcing is appropriate to support the incident as well as policing critical activities

### Specialist roles

BTP has a number of specialist roles and capabilities to support major incident management, including:

- National Interagency Liaison Officers
- Tactical Advisors for Firearms, Public Order, CBRN, and Airwave

### Resources available

BTP has a number of specialist resources which may be utilised in the response to major incidents, including:

- Specialist Response Unit for hazardous material incidents,
- Policing at Heights capability for ropes access, supporting persons in crisis, and protester removal
- Search Trained Officers and Police Search Advisors
- Dogs, including explosive search dogs, firearms support dogs and general purpose dogs
- Disaster Victim Identification trained officers and staff, including coordination and management
- Drones, drone pilots and Civil Aviation Authority liaison
- Emergency Response Unit, Emergency Intervention Unit and Network Incident Response Teams in partnership with Transport for London and the rail industry

## 8.3 LONDON AMBULANCE SERVICE

### Primary areas of responsibility

- To save life together with the other emergency services
- To provide immediate life-saving intervention, treatment, stabilisation and care of casualties at the scene
- To treat those involved as individuals and respond to their needs as such
- To provide appropriate transport, medical staff, equipment and resources
- To establish an effective triage system to determine the priority and evacuation needs of those injured and to establish a safe location for immediate life-saving interventions and casualty care
- To provide a focal point at the incident for all National Health Service (NHS) and other medical resources
- To provide communication facilities for NHS resources at the scene
- To nominate and alert the receiving hospitals including major trauma centres
- To coordinate the transportation of those injured to definitive care
- To maintain emergency cover throughout the LAS area and return to a state of normality at the earliest time
- To act as a portal into the wider health services including UK Health Security Agency

### Specialist roles

- Incident Response Officer
- National Interagency Liaison Officer
- Hazardous Area Response Team
- Specialist Operational Response Team
- Tactical Response Unit
- Enhanced Care Teams

### Resources available

- Command Support Vehicle
- Equipment Support Vehicle
- Mass Casualty Equipment Vehicles

## 8.4 HM COASTGUARD

### Primary areas of responsibility

HM Coastguard is responsible for initiation and coordination of Civil Maritime Search & Rescue within the UK Search & Rescue region. This includes mobilisation, organisation and tasking of

adequate resources to respond to persons either in distress at sea or to persons at risk of injury or death on the cliffs or shoreline of the UK.

HM Coastguard's area of responsibility includes the Tidal River Thames (below Teddington Lock), HM Coastguard is the lead agency for Civil Maritime Search & Rescue. HM Coastguard will work with other agencies and organisations using best endeavours to deliver their response capability.

The primary areas of responsibility are to:

- Save life
- Initiate and coordinate assets
- Identify appropriate Casualty Landing Points

#### Specialist roles

- Maritime Search & Rescue
- Aviation support – helicopters, fixed wing, UAV.

#### Resources available

- National Network of Rescue Coordination Centres
- Aviation Assets

## 8.5 LOCAL AUTHORITIES

#### Primary areas of responsibility

Local authorities can be contacted 24/7 to support the response to a major incident. Local authorities have access to a wide range of specialist and technical services and contractors to support the response. Regardless of the scale of the emergency, the response always starts with the response of a single local authority, if required support may be provided by additional local authorities or regional partners.

Local authority support available during a major incident may include:

- Social care and psychosocial support
- Provision of emergency centres
- Rehousing and accommodation needs
- Welfare and financial support
- Technical and engineering advice (e.g. structural engineering and building control)
- Highways and transport services
- Public health and environmental services
- Recovery Management

#### Specialist roles



- Local Authority liaison Officer (LALO) - Representative of the Local Authority at the scene of the incident, able to liaise with emergency services, residents and businesses. The LALO feeds back information to Local Authority decision makers.
- Humanitarian Assistance Lead Officer (HALO) – Appointed by LLAG, The HALO brings together partners including Health, Police, and voluntary and faith sectors to oversee the humanitarian assistance effort.
- Borough Emergency Control Centre (BECC) - Coordination hub set up by the Local Authority in response to an incident. The BECC coordinates council departments and contractors responses to the incident, liaises with responding agencies and maintains situational awareness for the Local Authority.
- Resilience Advisor – Emergency planning professional with a wide knowledge of the Local Authority's and London's emergency response and recovery arrangements.

#### Resources available

- Emergency Centres
- Rehousing
- Dangerous Structures Engineers
- Highways
- Environmental Health
- Public Health
- Health & Safety Officers
- Adult Social Care
- Children's Social Care
- Transport
- Warning and Informing

## 8.6 LONDON LOCAL AUTHORITY GOLD (LLAG)

#### Primary areas of responsibility

London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) provides one strategic local authority representative for pan-London incidents, or incidents which have a wider impact than the area in which they occur. They will represent the collective interests of London local authorities at a Strategic Coordinating Group meeting, alongside direct representation by the strategic representative of the directly affected borough or boroughs where applicable.

A London Local Authority Chief Executive is pre-nominated as London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) providing 24/7 cover.

|  |
|--|
| <p>London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) is empowered to represent and give undertaking(s) on behalf of London's 32 Boroughs and the City of London Corporation.</p> <p>Where LLAG is activated in response to an incident, the London Local Authority Coordination Centre (LLACC) is established to provide coordination between LLAG and the 33 Borough Emergency Control Centres (BECC).</p> |
| <b>Specialist roles</b>  |
| N/A  |
| <b>Resources available</b>   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>London Local Authority Coordination Centre (LLACC) – for collation of information providing an overview across all London Local Authorities.</li> </ul>   |

## 8.7 UK HEALTH SECURITY AGENCY (UKHSA)

|   |
|---|
| <b>Primary areas of responsibility</b>  |
| <p>UKHSA works to protect the public against a wide range of health threats, taking an 'all hazards' approach to 'Prepare, Respond and Build' as the overall strategic objectives. UKHSA is an executive agency of the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) and fulfils the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care's duty as a Category 1 responder under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. UKHSA is responsible for protecting every member of every community from the impact of infectious diseases, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents and other health security threats.</p> <p>UKHSA provides intellectual, scientific, and operational leadership at national, regional and local level. UKHSA London Region provides 24-hour, 365 days a year health protection, CBRNe and EPRR expertise, working in collaboration with Local Health system partners and emergency responders within the LRF.</p> <p>UKHSA London EPRR team will:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordinate the UKHSA London region response to incidents (internal and external) and all multi-agency activity within the LRF.</li> <li>Attend incident TCGs to ensure good situational awareness of incidents and provide a link to the specialist advice required from wider UKHSA specialist teams.</li> <li>Support the UKHSA London Region Deputy Director or Consultant in Health Protection who will represent UKHSA in London Strategic Coordinating Groups and activate STAC if required.</li> <li>Liaise with specialist teams to support the coordination of technical response to incidents; Health Protection Teams, Radiation and Environmental Hazards and Emergencies, Extreme Events, Communications and Field Services</li> <li>Ensure early escalation of risks, threats and incident intelligence to UKHSA specialist teams and UKHSA National Response Centre (NRC) colleagues and the wider partnership, where appropriate.</li> </ul> <p>In fulfilling these responsibilities, UKHSA will provide leadership and coordination for the public health system response to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>undertake public health and exposure risk assessments for all hazards incidents</li> </ul> |


- manage multi-agency Incident Management Team meetings to coordinate complex and high consequence infectious disease outbreaks
- when appropriate, convene a Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)
- when appropriate, UKHSA and the Environment Agency will convene an Air Quality Cell (AQC)

## Regions Directorate: Our divisions, functions and locations

### Regions Directorate Divisions

- East Midlands
- East of England
- London
- North East
- North West
- South East
- South West
- West Midlands
- Yorkshire & the Humber
- Field Services
- Specialists Services - Border Health
- Specialists Services - Programmed Delivery Unit
- Engagement
- Regions Directorate Office

### Regional Functions



### Specialist roles

UKHSA Health Protection Teams provide specialist public health advice on infectious disease control. We work closely with other NHS, local authorities and other agencies to help reduce the spread of infectious diseases. As of April 2024, there are two London Health Protection Teams covering North and South London. [Contacts: UKHSA health protection teams - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk)

UKHSA Field Services - provide epidemiological, microbiological, infectious diseases and data science capacity and expertise to deliver high quality surveillance, outbreak investigations and operational research.

UKHSA Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards (RCE) Team - providing expert advice on the health security risks of chemicals in the environment, as part of UKHSA's emergency preparedness and response.

Extreme Events and Health Protection Team - responsible for the national UKHSA Adverse Weather and Health Plan (AWHP) and associated guidance and evidence, and for managing the national weather and health, early warning system, in conjunction with the Met Office.

### Resources available

N/A

## 8.8 NHS ENGLAND – LONDON

| Primary areas of responsibility  |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The NHS will be responsible for the continuing treatment of casualties transferred or presented into its care.</li><li>• NHS England – London will provide the strategic (executive management) and tactical direction of the health service response to an incident.</li><li>• Seek to maintain the provision of health services to London.</li><li>• Cooperate with partner organisations in the development of a response strategy and will ensure the effective and coordinated response of the London health community.</li><li>• Represent all non-ambulance NHS organisations in London at regional Strategic Coordinating groups, providing strategic leadership and will liaise with NHS England National and other regions as required.</li><li>• Provide information regarding the total number of casualties from an incident receiving treatment at NHS provider organisations.</li></ul> |
| Specialist roles   |
| N/A  |
| Resources available  |
| N/A  |

## 8.9 NHS INTEGRATED CARE BOARDS

| Primary areas of responsibility  |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Provide strategic and tactical leadership in their system by supporting the management and coordination of the system.</li><li>• Represent all non-ambulance NHS organisations within their Integrated Care System at local Tactical Coordinating Groups and Strategic Coordinating Groups (with the incident occurring within one ICB geography), providing strategic leadership and liaise with NHS England - London.</li><li>• Support NHS England - London in discharging their duties and functions to manage the incident.</li></ul> |
| Specialist roles   |
| N/A  |
| Resources available  |
| N/A  |

## 8.10 ENVIRONMENT AGENCY

| Primary areas of responsibility   |
|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• To protect the environment</li><li>• Mitigate against impacts on the environment e.g. pollution incidents</li></ul> |

- Reduce the impact of flooding on people's lives and properties
- Strategic lead for flood risk
- Lead on fluvial and tidal flooding
- Responsible for operating, monitoring, and inspecting flood defences
- Responsible for issuing flood alerts and warnings for fluvial, tidal and in some cases groundwater flooding
- Responsible for managing and implementing reservoir safety regulations, and for enforcing safety requirements if needed

#### Specialist roles

- Flood warning capability
- Mapping capability
- STAC representation for environmental incidents
- Air quality monitoring and modelling
- GIS datasets of environmental receptors
- Water, soil and waste sampling

#### Resources available

- Operational staff
- Community information officers
- Pumps and hoses
- Sandbags, vehicles
- High volume pumps, drones
- Pollution alleviation equipment

*Not all resources are available immediately, and may come from national stock*

## 8.11 TRANSPORT FOR LONDON

#### Primary areas of responsibility

- Strategic overview of TfL non-rail modes coordinating response to service impacting incidents; delivered through the TfL Surface Control Centre (SCC)
- Command and Control of the London Bus Network including diverting bus services to minimise the knock-on impact of an incident, supporting the life of the community and their ability to access transportation to essential services
- Highway Authority for the Transport for London Road Network (TLRN) or Red Route and the ability to provide physical traffic management to assist the safe management of the road space on the TLRN
- Responsibility for the efficient movement of all road users including public transport and private vehicles pan-London via control of the traffic signals – reducing congestion to support London's economy, protect the environment and enable the provision of essential services in the Capital
- Operation, optimisation, restoration and recovery of all TfL services in London to minimise the impact of incidents on London and Londoners

- Strategic overview of TfL rail modes (London Underground, London Overground, Elizabeth line and Docklands Light Railway) coordinating industry response to service impacting incidents, supporting a return to normality and the safe rail movement of London and beyond; delivered through the TfL Rail Control Centre (RCC)
- Each TfL rail service maintains its own Command and Control structure serving their respective rail mode – working collaboratively with several infrastructure management models / 3<sup>rd</sup> parties who retain responsibility for site safety.
- Network Rail is the lead authority for rail incidents on all mainline railways including those where London Overground (LO) and Elizabeth Line trains (outside the Central Operating Section) operate and will provide liaison and assistance at the scene through its Rail Incident Officer (RIO).

### Specialist roles

The TfL on-site representative(s) will act the liaison point for TfL and its contractors. The bronze(s) will provide the link between the incident and the relevant control centre(s) so that any requests for assistance are communicated and that incident appropriate on-site TfL resources are provided and coordinated.

- Network Traffic Controllers - plan and implement diversions for buses
- Asset Operations Area Manager – advice and supporting activity associated with TfL non-rail assets
- Network Incident Response Manager – fast-response tactical on-site lead for LU incidents
- Incident Response Manager (for Elizabeth line incidents within the COS)
- Rail Incident Officer – on-scene liaison on Network Rail Infrastructure

### Resources available

Traffic management on the TLRN, advice and technical support in relation to our services and infrastructure.

## 8.12 GREATER LONDON AUTHORITY

### Primary areas of responsibility

- To be closely engaged in high-level discussions and decisions relating to the management of emergencies in London.
- To play a key role in warning and informing the public during an emergency in London.
- To support the operational response to an emergency in London.
- Responsibility for civil protection issues in connection with the management of Parliament and Trafalgar Squares.

### Specialist roles

- Public Communication
- Community Resilience

#### Resources available

- London Situational Awareness Team (LSAT)
- Intelligence and Analysis Team
- London Community Emergencies Partnership (LCEP)
- Public Communications
- GLA Squares Team and Heritage Wardens
- Policy Teams

## 8.13 LONDON RESILIENCE UNIT (LRU)

#### Primary areas of responsibility

The London Resilience Unit supports the work of the London Resilience Partnership in preparing for, and responding to emergencies. The role of London Resilience Unit in response to an emergency is:

- To support effective Partnership strategic coordination arrangements:
  - To facilitate shared situational awareness through the production of a Common Operating Picture (COP)
  - To provide the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) secretariat function in conjunction with the lead responder agency
  - To provide strategic advice about London Resilience Partnership response capabilities to the Strategic Coordinating Group
- To support effective coordination of the London Local Authority Gold (LLAG) arrangements:
  - To facilitate shared situational awareness across LLAG and the 33 local authorities
  - To deliver the London Local Authority Coordination Centre (LLACC) function in support of LLAG and the 33 local authorities
  - To provide strategic advice to LLAG

#### Specialist roles

N/A

#### Resources available

- Secretariat support (jointly with the lead agency) for Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCGs):
  - Information gathering, sharing, and the production of the Common Operating Picture (COP) via the London Situational Awareness System (LSAS)

- Notification and alerts to the London Resilience Partnership
- Administrative arrangements for meetings and teleconferences (e.g. invitations, preparation of paperwork, record of actions, decisions and minutes)
- London Situational Awareness Team (LSAT) – 24/7 monitoring and situational awareness function

## 8.14 INTER-AGENCY RESOURCES

Any service may request the temporary assistance of personnel and equipment of another. In these circumstances, while the supporting service will relinquish the immediate control of those resources to the other service for the duration of the task, it will nevertheless keep overall command of its personnel and equipment at all times.

Visits made by VIPs to the scene and to injured survivors may place additional strain on the operation in terms of security, public order, increased media attention and interruption to normal rescue functions. The Police Strategic Commander will be responsible for planning and liaison relating to these visits.

## 8.15 LIAISON OFFICERS

National Inter-Agency Liaison Officers (NILOs) are security vetted, trained and identifiable emergency responders from the LFB, LAS, HM Coastguard and British Transport Police, who may operate in either a command, tactical advisor or service specific role. They can support pre-planned or spontaneous operations at strategic, tactical and operational levels including facilitating interoperable working with partner agencies.

Local authorities are able to deploy a Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO) to act as the local authority point of contact at the scene of a major incident. The LALO will liaise with the other responding agencies and attend on scene coordination meetings to represent the local authority. The LALO will pass information and requests from other responding agencies to the local authority incident response structure, the local authority tactical officer or BECC if activated. The LALO will also coordinate local authority activities at the scene (**see Section 8.5**).

# 9 CONTROL ROOMS

All contact details for organisational control rooms and duty officers can be found in the London Resilience Partnership Contacts Directory.

## 9.1 POLICE

Initial command and control will be via individual emergency service control rooms, monitored by the respective control room processes. In the event of an escalation of the incident requiring a more



coordinated approach, the MPS Special Operations Room (SOR) is available to be activated to support the Police response to major/significant incident.

### 9.1.1 Special Operations Room (SOR)

The Special Operations Room (SOR) provides command and control for major incidents, terrorist incidents, disorder and demonstrations. The room has consoles for use by LAS, LFB, BTP and CoLP liaison officers through which they have access to all the radio and their own electronic call/despatch systems. Additional consoles are available for other agencies (e.g. local authorities, military). UKHSA may deploy the STAC and its members, to Lambeth SOR on request of the Gold Commander, if a co-location response model is required. Whilst there is no 24/7 co-location by default, co-location does take place for preplanned events and specific significant incidents.

The National Police Air Service helicopter can provide live and recorded video of an incident anywhere in London which may be downloaded if required.

## 9.2 FIRE

LFB Control, at the London Operations Centre (LOC), is responsible for the taking and management of emergency calls from the public and partner agencies. They are also responsible for mobilising appropriate resources and are part of the Command process for incidents. The LOC has a number of specialist resources, both locally and nationally, at their disposal which can be mobilised to incidents as part of a pre-determined attendance or at the request of Incident Commanders in order to bring an incident to a safe conclusion.

The LOC holds the responsibility for notifying and mobilising all LFB assets and senior officers to incidents, it is a vital communications hub, requesting the services of other Category 1 and 2 responders when appropriate. LOC can also request assets and officers from the National Resilience Fire Control (NRFC) with specialist capabilities when additional resources are required.

LOC Commanders will monitor multi agency sharing channel 24/7 alongside colleagues from the LAS and MPS to be able to share real time information in the event a major incident is declared, or a significant incident is taking place. The LOC will also mobilise the officer cadre and support staff when the Brigade Coordination Centre (BCC) is set up for all Fire major incidents that will remotely support an incident but also ensure business as usual response across the LFB.

## 9.3 AMBULANCE

LAS 999 Emergency Operations Centres (EOC) are an integral part of any major incident management system. The initial call will be received by EOC, who will dispatch appropriate LAS resources. The early identification of significant incidents or potential major incidents is of paramount importance.

### 9.3.1 Ambulance Specialist Operations Centre (SOC)

The SOC is the dedicated incident management facility within EOC which supports and manages the command function during incidents and other operations. The SOC is responsible for:

- Providing a central coordination of incident activity.

- Providing a liaison function for the tactical commander & tactical advisor.
- Deployment of resources to the incident.
- Nomination and declaration of receiving hospitals.
- Allocating ambulances their destination hospital ensuring even distribution.
- Communication with hospitals and external organisations.
- Primary logging duties.
- Paging instruction procedures.
- Management of Airwave talk groups and communication.
- Facilitating requests of additional resources, equipment and personnel to scene.
- Access to TfL CCTV for situational awareness.

Whilst the LAS and MPS are able to send and receive electronic messages from each other's CAD systems, they are unable to interrogate the other's system.

## 9.4 LOCAL AUTHORITY COORDINATION

### 9.4.1 Borough Emergency Control Centre(s)

At the local level, the Borough Emergency Control Centre (BECC) is the hub of the local authority response, from which a local authority will monitor or coordinate a borough's incident response. Following the notification of a major incident, and dependent on scale, the responding borough, neighbouring borough, or all London boroughs depending on the scale or impact of the incident may set up a BECC. The LALO is the local authorities representative and point of contact at the scene of a (major) incident. The LALO will pass information and requests from other responding agencies to the BECC. All LA BECCs have access to Airwave radios and shared multi agency talkgroups.

A BECC may respond at one of three levels:

1. Monitoring.
2. Information sharing and communications.
3. Incident response and coordination.

A BECC will deliver three primary functions when operational:

- Operational coordination of the council's response.
- Situational awareness of the incident overall.
- Management and administration of the BECC.

## 9.5 HM COASTGUARD

HM Coastguard have a control room in London. This is one of a network across the UK and coordinates all civil maritime search and rescue for the tidal River Thames. It is supported by the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC), which can provide network assistance in response to an incident. JRCC has the capability to take overall control of HM Coastguard coordination if

necessary. HM Coastguard has a CAD link to the MPS and also uses Airwave and VHF radio systems.

## 9.6 TRANSPORT

There are multiple transport control rooms in London.

The Network Rail National Operations Centre (NOC) maintains an overview of the management of rail incidents across each individually managed Route.

Some TfL services are directly operated and others are contracted out. TfL maintains oversight of its entire operation via the Surface Control Centre (SCC) which delivers strategic oversight, command and leadership of the TfL non-rail (Surface) network and the Rail Control Centre (RCC) which delivers strategic oversight, command and leadership of TfL's rail network.

The SCC is co-located with representatives of the Roads and Transport Policing Command from the MPS and the RCC is co-located with the BTP & Network Rail NOC

Please see **Annex G**.

# 10 RADIO COMMUNICATIONS

## 10.1 AIRWAVE NETWORK

All London emergency services and many other agencies, including London local authorities have Airwave radios with a joint communications capability. In addition, Airwave is used nationally by BTP, and the system extends into London Underground stations.

Should additional Airwave capacity be required in the event of an emergency underground the MPS Radio Operations Team can invoke Operation Tunnel Sound – the utilisation of ERVs (Emergency Response Vehicles) to provide additional capability.

These radio talkgroups are intended for command use only by the respective service for liaison purposes or to pass critical information in a life-threatening situation and not for general inter-service use. Their use needs to be specifically requested by tactical commanders through the MPS Communications Command (MO12) utilising Operation Cavern.

The Airwave system is a digitally encrypted radio system that has a very high level of security. However, other systems (fax, mobile telephony, or unencrypted radio transmissions etc.) may be vulnerable to interception and this should be borne in mind when wording transmissions, including cellular telephone conversations containing sensitive information.

The Airwave network is also highly resilient and operates on different frequencies to mobile phones. In busy times the mobile phone network can become congested and emergency services devices have no prioritisation over the general public. Use of Airwave for critical voice communication is recommended however, capacity on the Airwave network is finite and can become congested if not properly managed.

For any issues with Airwave, individuals should engage with their Tactical Advisors at the earliest opportunity.

## **10.2 LFB GROUND RADIOS**

In addition to Airwave radios carried on appliances and by officers, all LFB operational staff are issued with incident ground radios that operate on UHF. They are compatible with 'leaky feeder' systems installed in London Underground stations and other designated locations. The range of incident ground radios can be extended by the use of radio repeaters, supplied and laid by LFB.

## **10.3 COMMUNICATIONS TACTICAL ADVISORS**

Local Airwave networks only have a finite capacity, and during major incidents or events with deployment of high numbers of responders, there can be added pressure on local sites making that part of the network less effective.

A Communications Tactical Advisor acts as a strategic, tactical or operational resource to be deployed at pre-planned or spontaneous events and incidents and is responsible for the provision of appropriate, valid and reasonable advice in relation to radio communications.

They are able to provide support and advice to commanders and control rooms on matters of Airwave capacity, capability and contingency planning for possible outages.

# 11 OTHER USEFUL DOCUMENTS AND PROCEDURES

The full suite of London Resilience Partnership Frameworks is available on ResilienceDirect. Alongside the generic Strategic Coordination and Tactical Coordination arrangements, there are a range of specific capability and risk-based frameworks to support the response to a range of incidents in London. To maintain accuracy and currency of this document, a full list of these Frameworks is not noted here.

Responders should also ensure they are familiar with the JESIP Joint Doctrine as well as their own individual organisation plans and procedures.

# ANNEXES

## ANNEX A: ON-SCENE COORDINATING GROUP AGENDA

This agenda is intended as a guide for on-scene coordinating group meetings and should be adapted to the specific incident and circumstances presented. It supports the use of JESIP principles and incorporates the JDM.

### AGENDA

1. Introductions (by exception and only where deemed necessary)
2. Any urgent business
  - a. Confirmation of decisions on urgent business
  - b. Adjourn as necessary to action urgent business
3. Gather information and intelligence  
*(The order of sub-points a-d may vary depending on the stage of the incident)*
  - a. METHANE report – briefing by lead response organisation
  - b. Additional updates / new information from those present
  - c. Identification of vulnerable groups, protected characteristics and / or any specific community considerations
  - d. Updates on previous actions and from any sub-groups
4. Assess threats and risks (from METHANE / any additional raised by those present)
5. Develop a working strategy
  - a. Consider powers, policies and procedures
  - b. Identify and evaluate options and contingencies
  - c. Confirm priorities, decisions, and agree actions to be taken
6. Information and advice to members of the public (at / around the incident scene)
7. Agree next meeting time and if any additional representatives are required

## ANNEX B: ON-SCENE COORDINATING GROUP ATTENDEES

| Organisation                        | Representatives  |
|-------------------------------------|--|
| <b>On-Scene Lead Agency (chair)</b> | Chair<br>Secretariat (Minutes and Actions)   |
| <b>Police</b>                       | Police Incident Commander<br>Specialist Advisor  |
| <b>Fire</b>                         | Fire Incident Commander<br>Specialist advisors as required by the incident   |
| <b>Ambulance</b>                    | Ambulance Incident Commander<br>Specialist advisors as required by the incident  |
| <b>HM Coastguard</b>                | Tactical Commander for Maritime Search & Rescue on the River Thames<br>Maritime NILO   |
| <b>Local Authorities</b>            | Local Authority Liaison Officer (LALO)<br>Technical Officers as requested  |
| <b>Transport Sector</b>             | Appropriate Operations Manager or Designated Tactical Lead<br>Technical Officers as requested  |
| <b>Other</b>                        | <b>The above list is not prescriptive nor exhaustive, and invitations should be extended to all agencies involved in the operational response to the incident.</b><br><br><b>A full list of responders can be found in Section 8 – Roles and Responsibilities.</b> |

# ANNEX C: DEALING WITH FATALITIES

## Deceased and Human Remains

As part of the triage sieve the London Ambulance Service (LAS) clinicians will assess and carry out the verification of death process (the process formally known as recognition of life extinct (ROLE)) as required. These patients will then be appropriately triage tagged and left in situ to ensure continuity of the forensic process. More information about managing mass fatalities is available in the London Resilience Mass Fatalities Framework.

If it is essential to move a deceased person to gain access/treat a live patient, the original location of the deceased will be recorded on their triage tag.

Doctors from London Air Ambulance (LAA) will be able to pronounce life extinct.

## The Coroner

His Majesty's Coroner is responsible for establishing who has died as well as how, when and where they died. Where multiple deaths occur, the police will investigate and report to HM Coroner, this is in addition to police responsibilities regarding any criminal investigation. There are eight coronial districts within the Greater London area; these are made up of clusters of London boroughs with the exception of the City of London which stands alone. Jurisdiction will normally sit with the coronial district 'where the body lies'.

Jurisdiction may, by agreement, be transferred between coroners in some circumstances. For a large incident that affects more than one coronial district, it may be agreed to appoint a Lead Coroner. This would require agreement between the coroners concerned as well as funding support from the London boroughs concerned.

It is important that HM Coroner's Office is consulted and included in the decision-making around the response to an incident involving fatalities. HM Coroner may want to assess the disaster scene along with other nominated persons such as a Pathologist.

## Police Senior Identification Manager

Police commanders will appoint a senior investigator as the Senior Identification Manager (SIM), this manager will hold a nationally recognised qualification in management of the investigation regarding disaster victim identification (DVI). The SIM will liaise with HM Coroner and be responsible for disaster victim identification investigation at the scene; investigation within the mortuary; investigation at Casualty Bureau and Family Liaison investigation. The SIM will work closely with the Senior Investigating Officer appointed to manage any criminal investigation.

## Scene Investigation

Police commanders will deploy a suitably skilled Disaster Scene Coordinator to coordinate disaster victim recovery, forensic, search and other related investigative activity at the disaster scene. The title Scene Evidence Recovery Manager (SERM) is used for this role in existing national guidance. Bomb Scene Manager or Counter Terrorism Scene Manager are titles used in counter terrorism. The SERM will be a police manager who has passed the national SERM course to safely manage



specialist activity and the ability to work closely with other agencies. Other agencies would include the London Fire Brigade and statutory investigative bodies, such as the Health and Safety Executive and Rail, Marine or Air Accident Investigation Branch.

## **Mortuaries**

If local arrangements are insufficient to cope with the number of deceased victims, emergency arrangements must be activated. Some of the larger public mortuaries in London have been identified as Designated Disaster Mortuaries. These mortuaries can be enhanced or adapted to cope with an increased number of deceased victims and the associated investigative activity. The Coroner will make the final decision on the use, and location, of a DDM.

Temporary structures may be used to enhance existing mortuaries or to build a stand-alone temporary mortuary. A temporary mortuary may be utilised for storage or, if assessed as necessary, be capable of hosting investigative post-mortem autopsy examinations. Sites where a large temporary mortuary could be constructed have been identified and are regularly reviewed.

## **Disaster Victim Identification**

London has a cadre of police officers and forensic practitioners who have received additional training in disaster victim identification (DVI). London contributes to a national DVI cadre coordinated by the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC–UK DVI). Mutual aid can be provided to London through the UK DVI Coordinator, based within the Police National Information Coordination Centre (PNICC).

Personnel are trained in disaster victim recovery, using the Disaster Victim Recovery Booklet to assign a unique number to the deceased victim or to a body part recovered. The booklet also records initial evidence such as the location that the deceased victim was found; forensic issues; whether the body appears to be complete; plus, relevant times for continuity. Disaster Victim Recovery Booklets are held by Metropolitan, City of London and British Transport Police. An emergency online version is also available to download from the INTERPOL website. Disaster victim recovery operations may require support from London Fire Brigade, with regard to safety and specialist equipment to aid access to deceased victims.

The DVI cadre are also trained in mortuary procedures to recover post-mortem data and exhibits. Mortuary investigation involves the use of the INTERPOL DVI Post Mortem Forms which are also available via the INTERPOL website. These forms which should always be printed on pink paper are used to record post-mortem data such as physical features; clothing and jewellery etc.

A Police Mortuary Operations Coordinator will be appointed to manage police investigative activity at the mortuary, working closely with the Local Authority Mortuary Manager.

There must be lines of communication from the scene and mortuary with Casualty Bureau, where details of missing persons and casualties are collated.

## **Forensic Investigation**

A Home Office approved Pathologist will be appointed as a key contributor to the investigation and to provide evidence to HM Coroner regarding the cause of death. If the deaths are as a result of a

criminal act or negligence a Forensic Pathologist will be appointed. Sections of the INTERPOL DVI Post Mortem Forms are specific to pathology. Pathologists will be assisted by Anatomical Pathology Technicians. Other forensic specialists that may be utilised in the mortuary are: Forensic Odontologists; Forensic Anthropologists; Police Crime Scene Managers and Fingerprint Practitioners. There are sections of the INTERPOL DVI Post Mortem Forms specific to odontology (dental information); fingerprints and DNA.

### **Family Liaison Investigation**

Ante-mortem data is information relating to the missing person provided by next of kin etc. This information is collected by Family Liaison Officers who have received specific training in investigation which results in the completion of the INTERPOL DVI Ante Mortem Forms, which should always be printed on yellow paper. These forms are virtually identical to the INTERPOL DVI Post Mortem Forms, with sections for clothing, jewellery, pathology, odontology, fingerprints and DNA etc.

The Family Liaison Officer may require support from forensic specialists in order to recover or check ante mortem data such as dental records, fingerprints or DNA for comparison.

Family Liaison Officers are tasked by a Family Liaison Coordinator working from Casualty Bureau, where details of missing persons and casualties are collated.

### **Reconciliation Investigation**

Post-mortem data is compared to ante-mortem data in order to establish identification. Deceased disaster victims will normally be identified using the United Kingdom and INTERPOL Disaster Victim Identification Primary Identification Standards. This means that where possible and subject to the approval of HM Coroner, deceased victims should be identified by primary identifiers such as comparison of dental information; DNA or fingerprints. In some circumstances a unique medical or physical feature may provide reliable evidence of identity, such as a uniquely numbered medical implant. This information should be supported by Secondary Identifiers such as marks, scars or tattoos, plus supporting information such as clothing, jewellery or where appropriate circumstantial evidence. The DVI cadre includes Reconciliation Investigators who with the support of forensic specialists will prepare a detailed report for HM Coroner regarding evidence of identity. This evidence will be presented at an inquest or a specially arranged Identification Commission chaired by HM Coroner.

# ANNEX D: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Also see the London Humanitarian Assistance Framework.

People need timely, practical support with a sympathetic and understanding approach to enable them to recover both practically and psychologically. Their needs are individual and varied and change significantly over time. The road to recovery is both personal and individual, but also collective and shared by communities.

Humanitarian assistance coordination and delivery can vary in size and scale. People's needs change as time goes on and therefore the response will need to adapt. There is no single answer as to what should be provided; there are a variety of options and decisions will need to be made at the time of the incident, based on the circumstances.

In larger incidents, it is likely that a Humanitarian Assistance Lead Officer (HALO) will be appointed via the local authority to lead the humanitarian assistance response. A multi-agency Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG) may also be established to plan and deliver the humanitarian assistance activities.

## **Evacuations and Displaced People**

Some emergencies may require the evacuation of a large surrounding area because of the danger to life from environmental or structural hazards. Further details can be found in the London Mass Evacuation and Shelter Framework. Care must be taken to ensure that evacuation does not place those concerned in greater danger.

Evacuation is usually undertaken on the advice of the LFB tactical commander. In some circumstances, personnel from all services may have to assist in carrying it out. A suitable evacuation assembly point will need to be established and emergency centres established. For further information please see the Humanitarian Assistance Framework.

Personnel from the local authority and voluntary agencies can help staff emergency centres and provide practical assistance.

In all centres, it is important that attendees are registered and documented, with basic details passed to the casualty bureau when appropriate.

## **Survivor Reception Centre (SuRC): Lead Agency - Police**

The function of a SuRC is to immediately provide survivors who do not require hospital treatment a place they can be met by responding agencies to obtain information and support and provide evidence and accounts of the incident to Police. In some incidents it may not be practicable to establish a SuRC immediately because of other more pressing activities such as lifesaving or removing the public from danger.

The SuRC should be situated between the inner and outer cordon to ensure security for the survivors.

The purpose of a Survivor Reception Centre is:

- To collect information relevant to the investigation.

- To provide immediate shelter for persons who have been directly involved in an emergency.
- To allow documentation of the survivors.
- To enable the identification of potential witnesses by the police.
- To provide first aid to those in need of it and not requiring hospitalisation.
- To provide initial care and welfare support to survivors.
- To organise onward travel where appropriate.
- To provide information to survivors.

It is highly desirable that welfare staff from the local authority or voluntary organisations should be present to support the police in the provision of care and practical assistance to survivors in the SuRC.

Within the SuRC persons should be provided with whatever psychological first aid is appropriate to the situation. This is likely to include providing calm and reassurance alongside practical support such as access to telephones to inform loved ones that they are safe and well and help with onward travel arrangements.

The SuRC, although police activated, may be required for a protracted period, and should this occur, it could be handed over to the local authority to manage as a Rest Centre once police involvement has concluded.

### **Family and Friends Reception Centre (FFRC): Lead Agency - Police**

Past emergencies have shown that in the immediate aftermath of an incident, many people will travel to the scene in order to find family and friends that they believe to be involved.

If large numbers of people are converging on the scene, the police may decide that it is necessary to have a separate area where family and friends can gather to receive information as it becomes available.

The FFRC should be set up outside the outer cordon.

The purpose of a Family and Friends Reception Centre (FFRC) is:

- To help reunite friends and relatives with survivors.
- To provide a place for the Police to record missing persons' enquiries and to collect information that may aid their investigation.
- To provide friends and relatives with a safe area to gather, away from media attention.
- To provide friends and relatives with up-to-date and accurate information on the response arrangements that have been put in place.
- To provide access to practical and emotional support to those friends and relatives affected.

Local authorities and the voluntary sector will have a key role in the providing for the immediate practical and emotional needs for friends and family members.

In the event of an aviation incident, airlines may set up a “Friends and Relatives Reception Centre” (FRRRC) which serves a similar purpose. It will be staffed and supported by the airline industry with police support.

### **Rest Centre (RC): Lead Agency - Local Authority**

A Rest Centre serves as a place of safety for those who are uninjured and not directly affected by the incident but who have been evacuated from their home, work or other place or who are unable to return to that place after being away.

The purpose of a Rest Centre is:

- To provide immediate shelter for persons who have been evacuated from an area or are otherwise in need of emergency accommodation following an incident.
- To provide initial light refreshments for evacuees.
- To enable details of evacuees to be maintained in the centre for reference.
- To provide for the wellbeing of the evacuees and to offer support services and information on a wide range of welfare related subjects.
- To provide evacuees and survivors with updated information about the incident and its possible effects upon them directly.

A Rest Centre is likely to be established further away from the incident site than a SuRC, in a building such as a sports centre, and may take up to 2-3 hours to set up. Local authorities maintain a list of suitable buildings to be used as Rest Centres although these may not always be available or be the most suitable building to use at the time of the emergency. In prolonged incidents, it is possible that evacuees will need to sleep overnight in the Rest Centre if they are unable to find alternative accommodation such as hotels or make their own arrangements to stay with family and friends.

### **Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC): Lead Agency - Local Authority**

A HAC differs from Rest Centres or FRRRCs in the respect that a HAC provides broader support over a longer period for all those affected whilst investigation and recovery operations are taking place. The HAC should remain open for as long its services are required. This is likely to be a number of weeks or possibly months.

A Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC) would be set up with the following objectives:

- Act as a focal point for humanitarian assistance to bereaved individuals and families, survivors and impacted communities.
- Enable individuals and families to gain as much information as is currently available about family members and friends involved in the incident.
- Enable the gathering of mass forensic samples in a timely manner, to enhance the ability to identify loved ones quickly.
- Offer access to a range of facilities that will allow individuals, families and survivors to make informed choices according to their needs.

- Provide a coherent multi-agency approach to humanitarian assistance in emergencies that will minimise duplication.

The local authority is responsible for setting up and operating a HAC, following a request from the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) or Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG). This will include a HAC Management Group, whereby a range of other organisations (e.g. police, voluntary agencies, NHS, and private sector organisations) can coordinate the provision of information and support for survivors and their relatives in the HAC.

More details can be found in the London Humanitarian Assistance Framework.

### **Community Assistance Centre (CAC): Lead Agency - Local Authority**

The purpose of a Community Assistance Centre (CAC) is to provide advice and support to people affected by a major incident, and to support the recovery of the community in a local setting.

CACs may be considered particularly where a Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC) has not been activated. It may be appropriate particularly when:

- When the impact is concentrated in a particular area, if a number of areas are affected several such centres may be considered.
- People are affected significantly, and need advice and support, but the intensity of the impact is of a lower order (for example, there are not mass fatalities) and/or the number of people affected is smaller than would trigger an HAC.

Caution should be exercised before triggering both CACs and a HAC because of the potential for dilution of resources.

Establishing a CAC is a local authority responsibility, accessing such support as is needed from other responding organisations.

A CAC should be located in an appropriate publicly accessible building within easy reach of the affected people. It may be appropriate to transition from Rest Centres or SuRCs directly, as the response develops; or it may be sensible to identify an alternative building.

Besides the local authority, there are a number of agencies who may be appropriate to attend, depending on circumstances:

- NHS staff, if health monitoring is needed.
- Voluntary agencies and faith responders may need to attend to provide emotional support and care.
- Insurance companies.
- Benefits agency.
- Registered social landlords, if social housing stock has been affected.
- The Police if investigations are still ongoing.

### **Casualty Bureau: Lead Agency - Police**

Police may establish a Casualty Bureau. The objective of Casualty Bureau (CB) is to be an initial point of contact for the receiving and assessing of information relating to persons believed to be involved in a major emergency.

In brief CB receives information from two sources:

- The public who make a telephone or online report with details of persons they are unable to contact who may be involved in the incident.
- Police documentation teams at hospitals and reception centres where those involved are present, sends details of those persons to CB

CB staff will then match details of persons involved with enquiries. Where a match is made, appropriate contact with the enquirer will be made.

Where injuries are fatal or serious, CB will inform the Senior Identification Manager for consideration of a Family Liaison Officer (FLO) deployment.

The CB will not close until all enquiries have ended in regard to casualties, survivors and missing persons and telephone enquiries have diminished to a level where they can be dealt with by the local police area.

It should be noted that CB is not a means for the public to find information about loved ones, it is a source for collecting information to inform identification of those involved.

### **Rail Incident Care Teams (RICTs)**

Both the main line Train Operating Companies and London Underground maintain Rail Incident Care Teams (RICT). These teams are comprised of specially selected volunteers who have been trained in how to respond in the hours and days immediately following a major rail incident to the needs of those directly involved, their friends/family and those bereaved. RICTs are deployed to the various emergency reception centres, hospitals, etc. to which those in need of support would be taken or directed where they would form part of the multi-agency humanitarian response, working in partnership with police, health services and local authority teams.

# ANNEX E: TERRORIST INCIDENTS

## **Lead Authority: Police**

In terrorist or suspected terrorist incidents it is a criminal offence to contravene a prohibition or restriction imposed under the Terrorism Act 2000. This includes the crossing of a police cordon.

For all known or suspected terrorist incidents all personnel should be aware of the possibility of secondary devices. Police will be responsible for checking rendezvous points (RVP), marshalling areas, Forward Command Points (FCP) and cordon points for suspicious objects.

## **Victims of Terrorism Unit (VTU)**

The VTU has been established to coordinate, at a HM Government level, support to citizens affected by terrorist attacks affecting British Citizens at home or overseas. The VTU web pages on GOV.UK contain information on where to seek advice and assistance following a terrorist attack. It also provides details of official helplines and support services available to victims, survivors, witnesses, family members, and all those affected.

Where the VTU responds to an incident, it is necessary for the work of the VTU to be closely coordinated with the work of the Humanitarian Assistance Steering Group (HASG).



# ANNEX F: CBRN(E)

**Lead Authority: Police supported by LFB, LAS and UKHSA (as lead agency for Scientific and Technical Advice)**

## Introduction

An attack may involve the use of explosives to disperse the hazardous material (denoted by 'e' in 'CBRN(e)'). Terrorists may try to obtain toxic industrial chemicals or materials, such as pesticides - to use in a chemical device.

The impact of a CBRN device is significant, not only as a result of its activation, but also in the fear and panic that would be created within the public and media, and the considerable resources that would be required in the decontamination and restoration to normality following such an attack.

**C – Chemical** - Some form of chemical agent and a method of disseminating the material. The effects could range from: respiratory distress, blistering to the skin and in the worst case, death.

**B – Biological** - May involve the dispersal of bacteria, virus or toxins by a variety of methods including the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), a mechanical sprayer or the contamination of foodstuffs or environment. Effects of biological attacks may not be immediately apparent.

**R – Radiological** - An Improvised Explosive Device containing a quantity of radioactive material known as a "Dirty Bomb". The radioactive material is dispersed rendering the contaminated area potentially hazardous to health until a decontaminated. Alternatively, an unshielded radioactive source may be left in a public place potentially causing radiation sickness and the increased probability of developing cancer in later life.

**N – Nuclear** - The difficulty in obtaining nuclear material and the considerable scientific and engineering expertise required to create an improvised nuclear device, make this the least likely mode of attack. However, terrorists could potentially obtain a device from existing nuclear stockpiles.

**(E) – Explosive** – This denotes the use of explosives to disperse hazardous materials at this type of event.

## Response

A LESLP response in line with the procedure laid out in this document will be required for both pre and post activation of a suspected CBRN device. Police, Fire and Ambulance services, have personnel who have been trained and equipped to deal with the specialist response that is required for such an incident. UKHSA also have the scientific expertise to assist with provision of advice and guidance to responders and the public, for multi hazard CBRN incidents. UKHSA have a lead agency role in activating STAC to support the coordination and delivery of scientific and technical advice to the SCG, in response to a CBRN incident in London.

The main functions of emergency services and other agencies at a CBRN(e) incident are the same as those laid out in the Roles and Responsibilities section (**see Section 8**) of the document.

## **Substance Identification & Decontamination**

Specific detail on the response from the Police, Fire and Ambulance services, which includes substance identification and casualty decontamination, can be found in the London CBRN(e) Response Framework and the [JESIP CBRN\(e\) Joint Operating Principles](#).

## **Fire Brigade Scientific Advisor**

The role of the London Fire Brigade's Scientific Advisor is to provide relevant scientific and technical help to the fire brigade that will allow them (and the other emergency services) to resolve CBRN and Hazmat incidents in a rapid and safe manner with minimal risk to their personnel, the public, or the environment.

Further information can be found in the national guidance [Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents: clinical management and health protection](#).

# ANNEX G: MAINLINE RAIL AND TFL SERVICES

## Services operating under the TfL Roundel

| Surface Control Centre (SCC)  | Rail Control Centre (RCC)   |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• London Bus Network</li><li>• Transport for London Road Network (Red Route) and associated tunnels and structures</li><li>• Trams</li><li>• Dial -a - Ride</li><li>• Victoria Coach Station (and liaison with timetabled coaches in London)</li><li>• TfL Cycle Hire &amp; E-Scooters</li><li>• Taxi &amp; Private Hire Trades</li><li>• Woolwich Ferry</li><li>• TfL owned and operated piers</li><li>• Cable Car</li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• London Underground</li><li>• London Overground</li><li>• Elizabeth line</li><li>• DLR</li></ul> |

### Track Access

#### Lead Authority: Police through British Transport Police

The emergency services all have policies and procedures for dealing with railway incidents. These should be followed by their personnel at each incident on or near the railway. Reference should also be made to the 'Rail Incidents: Guidance to the Emergency Services for Access to the Railway Infrastructure' (Available on ResilienceDirect – Network Rail File Store).

Emergency service personnel should not go on or near the track unless accompanied by appropriately qualified staff from the rail infrastructure manager or operator.

The number of personnel working on or near the track should be kept to a minimum and all doing so must wear high-visibility clothing.

If people on the track are in direct and immediate danger and urgent action is required to preserve human life, emergency services personnel may go on to the track, but only as a last resort and after checking it is safe to do so - personnel must conduct a dynamic risk assessment. Be aware of the operation of automatic trains (Docklands Light Railway and some London Underground lines) in the area of the incident.

Emergency service personnel must not, under any circumstances, enter running tunnels unless it has been confirmed that trains are stopped, and power is off.

The relevant control centre must be informed immediately that personnel are on the line and the reasons for doing so.

Any request for 'power off' should also include 'trains stopped' and include the area/location to be isolated. Merely having the power switched off may not stop all trains. Electrically powered trains

may seek to 'coast' to the nearest station and diesel-powered trains often run on the same track as electrically powered trains.

The request should be passed either from the emergency services' control rooms to the respective rail infrastructure control, or in person to an appropriately qualified staff on site. This same control or person will confirm that the request has been carried out and that it is safe to access the track.

## **Investigation**

British Transport Police will lead in railway incidents other than Terrorism.

The Office of Rail and Road and the Rail Accident Investigation Branch have statutory responsibilities to investigate incidents occurring on the rail and tram network. Their staff carry formal identification and must be allowed access through cordons. In addition, some evidence at railway incidents is perishable and access for technical staff to capture this must be facilitated. This will be managed through the BTP senior officer present at the site.

## **Mainline Railways**

Network Rail is the lead authority for rail incidents on all mainline railways including those where London Overground (LO) and Elizabeth Line trains (outside the Central Operating Section – see below) operate and will provide liaison and assistance at the scene through its Rail Incident Officer (RIO).

The RIO is responsible for site safety and will maintain close liaison with the emergency services during an incident to ensure a safe system of work has been established and maintained.

Tactical and strategic management of the incident will be managed through the relevant Route Control (ROC).

## **Elizabeth Line Central Operating Section**

The Elizabeth Line Central Operating Section (COS) runs from Westbourne Park sidings in the west, to Pudding Mill Lane tunnel portal and Abbey Wood sidings in the east and Rail for London Infrastructure (RFLI) is the lead authority for incidents that occur within this area.

The RFLI tactical response to an incident within the COS will be led by the Incident Response Manager (IRM) who will wear a RIO tabard to make themselves readily identifiable to other agencies and operate within the JESIP principles to set up a safe system of work. Strategic management will be provided by the Rail Incident Commander at the RFLI Romford Route Control Centre (RCC).

All requests for track access, for trains to be stopped and for the overhead power lines to be switched off must be made to the RFLI Romford RCC or via a member of staff on site. This same control or person will confirm that the request has been carried out and that it is safe to access the track.

## **London Underground and other Light Rail Systems**

The request for emergency service personnel to access the track should be passed in person to an appropriately qualified staff on site or in their absence from the emergency services' control rooms

to the London Underground (LU), DLR or Tram control room. This same person or control will confirm that the request has been carried out and that it is safe to access the track.

Trams are an open access system so staff can go onto the track in an emergency, once they have ensured it is safe to do so.

The LU, DLR or Tram operator is responsible for site safety and will maintain close liaison with the emergency services during an incident to ensure a safe system of work has been established and maintained.

LU trains and infrastructure are operated completely separately to that of the mainline railways. All requests for trains to be stopped and/or power to be switched off must be made directly to London Underground following the existing agreed protocols.

The LU tactical response to an incident on their network will be led by the Network Incident Response Manager (NIRM). They are accompanied by a BTP medic officer and are transported in a police vehicle with a blue light capability. They will wear a Silver tabard to make themselves readily identifiable to other agencies and operate within the JESIP principles. They will assist the other commanders in achieving full situational awareness and a joint understanding of the specific risks involved in working on the underground network.

LU operates a dedicated Emergency Response Unit (ERU), staffed 24/7 and based at strategic locations across London. ERU teams are trained in all aspects of railway safety, infrastructure, rolling stock and casualty extraction and body recovery duties. They are primarily a London Underground asset but may attend other railway related incidents, following an appropriate request to the RCC. ERU can also respond to trams incidents.

LU also operates an Emergency Control Unit, which may be deployed to a major incident to support LU and other TfL businesses in incident management and subsequent site recovery.

### **TfL rail modes on Network Rail infrastructure**

Several TfL rail modes operate in part / in totality across Network Rail managed infrastructure. This includes Elizabeth line services outside of the COS, Overground services (all) as well as some London Underground services - Bakerloo line (Queen's Park to Harrow & Wealdstone) and District line services (Turnham Green to Richmond and Putney Bridge to Wimbledon).

Site safety including track access will be managed by Network Rail, following their established protocols in these areas.

### **Humanitarian response – Rail Incident Care Teams (RICTs)**

Both the main line Train Operating Companies and London Underground maintain Rail Incident Care Teams (RICT). These teams are comprised of specially selected volunteers who have been trained in how to respond in the hours and days immediately following a major rail incident to the needs of those directly involved, their friends/family and those bereaved. RICTs are deployed to the various emergency reception centres, hospitals, etc. to which those in need of support would be taken or directed where they would form part of the multi-agency humanitarian response, working in partnership with police, health services and local authority teams.

# ANNEX H: AIR INCIDENT CIVIL / MILITARY

## Specific site hazards

A major air accident may produce a toxic environment at the scene and all services responding should be aware of the potential hazards and consider the protection of their staff. A crashed aircraft should be approached from an upwind direction whether there is a fire or not, due to the potential spread of toxic substances.

The London Fire Brigade, RAF Centre for Aviation Medicine and the Institute of Naval Medicine or civilian Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) are all able to advise on potential hazards from crashed aircraft and the materials present in specific aircraft types. Additionally, the G-INFO page on the CAA website will also provide information on whether a civilian aircraft has an emergency ballistic device fitted.

The Joint Aircraft Recovery and Transportation Squadron (JARTS) can provide the relevant health and safety information for military aircraft.

The RAF Centre for Aviation Medicine and the Institute of Naval Medicine can provide scientific advice and deploy an Environmental Health Technician if required.

This information can also be obtained via the Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre at the National Marine Operations Centre (NMOC). They can fax hazard information to any emergency service on request. The data hazard sheets for all aircraft types are also available via ResilienceDirect.

## Police helicopters

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has access to the National Police Air Service fully role-equipped helicopters available 24/7 over the Greater London area. Their aircraft have the following equipment:

- Comprehensive radio communications, visual and thermal imaging - effective day and night.
- Some aircraft have a searchlight ('nitesun') capability to illuminate a wide area.
- Public address system ('skyshout') capable of broadcasting messages at a lower operating height; (Not routinely carried).
- Encrypted video transmission to MPS and London Fire Brigade (LFB) control rooms and command vehicles. The MPS also hold a small number of mobile devices that are capable of receiving the transmission.
- Digital stills camera.

## Military helicopters

RAF support helicopters could be used to respond to civilian incidents if required.

Potential uses include; the evacuation of larger numbers of personnel including casualties, the transport of personnel where other methods of transportation are unsuitable due to weather or terrain, or movement of large objects including aircraft wreckage.

The use of support helicopters would be subject to MACA procedures and would depend on the availability of these helicopters.

The response to major incidents involving aircraft is the same whether within or outwith airfield boundaries whereby police have the responsibility to provide security for the accident site but the air investigation will be either led by AAIB or Defence Accident Investigation Branch (DAIB) depending on ownership and operation / registration of the aircraft.

### **London Air Ambulance (LAA) – Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS)**

LAA is available to land at a predetermined location and provide at least one doctor and trained paramedic to the scene. The helicopter may be used to ferry additional doctors and resources to the scene. It is unlikely that the aircraft would be used for the conveyance of patients.

The decision to mobilise air ambulance assistance will be made by the LAS in conjunction with the other emergency services to ensure a coordinated approach to all local air traffic including other emergency services and/or military services. Any requests for the air ambulance should be directed to the ambulance tactical commander.

LAA doctors are an integral part in the mass casualty scenario and will support even without the helicopter.

### **HM Coastguard Search and Rescue helicopters**

HM Coastguard SAR helicopters may also be called upon to assist in marine or land based Search & Rescue incidents in the London area as well as patient transfer and movement of armed Police assets. Coastguard helicopters are equipped to winch people from the water or from vessels and can carry seated and stretcher casualties. They are fitted with infrared equipment to assist location of casualties in the water in poor visibility and at night.

HM Coastguard helicopters are tasked by HM Coastguard through the UK Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre (ARCC), which is part of HM Coastguard and located within their Joint Rescue Coordination Centre. Any of the emergency services may request a helicopter asset through ARCC. In London any police request will be made by NPAS.

### **Temporary helipads**

Temporary helipads might need to be identified with consideration for:

- safety of crew and aircraft from obstructions such as wires, unit masts and unsuitable terrain;
- safety from harmful chemical release, fire/smoke;
- access to vehicle;
- damage from downwash created by the rotor blades.

### **Emergency flying restrictions**

The police tactical commander may request the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), to impose temporary flying restrictions over the scene. This may be required when the safety of those in the air or on the

ground would be otherwise compromised. The National Police Air Service (NPAS) is available 24/7 for advice and guidance. This request could also be used to limit disturbance from unauthorised drone activity over the site.

### **Military Aircraft Crashes**

To provide additional security to the site in the event of a military aircraft crash, a Designated Cordon Area can be applied for by MPS (a recent measure following the implementation of the National Security Act 2023). This maintains the integrity of the site where necessary, providing an additional security measure, as entry by anyone other than authorised personnel is legally prohibited.



# ANNEX I: RIVER THAMES INCIDENTS

**Lead Authority: HM Coastguard**

## Introduction

Any incident on the River Thames could see an impact on more than one local authority on either side of the river.

This is a fast flowing environment, where the scene of incident can change and move up or down river quite quickly. This could inevitably take the incident into neighbouring local authority areas.

HM Coastguard, Port of London Authority, RNLI, Metropolitan Police Marine Policing Unit, London Fire Brigade, and Environment Agency have individual statutory responsibilities or functions on the river.

The River itself will affect the response to any river incident and people unfamiliar with a maritime environment may not appreciate its power and danger.

- The Thames has a tidal rise and fall of about 7 metres twice a day,
- Regularly flows at a speed of 6 MPH.
- Strong currents and underflows exist along the river, especially under bridges, where casualties can get drawn underwater and resurface some distance away.
- Water temperature, underwater hazards, moving platforms and unstable footing are additional risks, frequently underestimated.

Appropriate Casualty Landing Points (CLPs) will be nominated by HM Coastguard (HMCG) after discussion with other relevant organisations.

## Tidal River Thames (Canvey Island to Teddington Lock)

The Port of London Authority is the authority with responsibility for the River Thames.

Responsible for; River Navigation and Safety, Planning Consultation and Technical Expertise, Promoting the River and Environmental Stewardship.

Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) Control Centres operate at Woolwich and Gravesend.

## Non-tidal River Thames (above Teddington Lock)

Statutory Authority responsible for river and daily operations: The Environment Agency (EA)

## Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) incidents on the Thames

### HM Coastguard

Communications on the Tidal Thames will be on both Airwave and VHF (for navigation and safety).

HM Coastguard are located in a joint Control Centre with the Port of London Authority (PLA).

HMCG deploy and coordinate RNLI, HMCG Helicopters, RNLI lifeboats, Marine Policing Unit, LFB vessels, other craft or vessels as appropriate. For mud or cliff rescues, HMCG deploy their own

Coastal Rescue Teams (CRT) around the coast, but within London this function is carried out by London Fire Brigade.

HMCG London is part of a national network of Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres and is supported by the Joint Rescue Coordination at Fareham.

### **RNLI Lifeboats – deployed by HM Coastguard**

The RNLI have four stations covering London; three permanently staffed and available 24/7 at Gravesend, Tower and Chiswick; with the fourth station at Teddington operated by volunteers on a call out basis.

The volunteer lifeboat at Teddington may be suitable for deployment to incidents above Teddington Lock (non-tidal Thames). The RNLI can only be deployed by HMCG.

### **Metropolitan Police Marine Policing Unit**

The Marine Police Unit (MPU) is based at Wapping providing 24/7 capability equipped with a variety of craft for deployment on tidal and non-tidal River Thames and other waterways and bodies of water. The MPU also has an underwater search team.

### **London Fire Brigade**

The London Fire Brigade (LFB) operates two modern fireboats, also known as fire-rescue vessels these boats are based at Lambeth Pier providing a 24/7 capability. This Maritime Response Capability is equipped with high pressure water jets a craft suitable for fire-fighting on vessels and riverside structures. The fire-rescue vessel can rescue individuals from the water and can support larger scale rescue operations such as flooding and other water related incidents, including: vessel collisions and groundings and hazardous material spills in the water. It has the capability to reach speeds of up to 30 knots and rescue up to 50 people during emergencies and is integral to the Thames Emergency Framework, regularly working alongside the Port of London Authority, The MPS Marine unit, Coastguard and the RNLI. The LFB fire-rescue vessel can also serve as a command post for coordinating a multi-agency response and has the ability to deploy the LFB drone to provide more advanced support to operations.

All front line appliances are equipped with water rescue equipment including throw lines and hose inflation kits, with staff trained to coordinate a bankside rescue. In addition, LFB has a number of Fire Rescue Units strategically located across London, equipped with Emergency Rescue Boats (ERB), mud paths, and specialist mud lances to release people stuck in mud. These vessels are crewed by specialist swift water rescue technicians who can provide a response to incidents on other waterways or bodies of water, including the non-tidal River Thames.

### **General**

#### **Rendezvous Point (RVP)**

A river based incident may require RVPs on both sides of the river due to difficulty of access or lack of river crossings.

## **Cordons**

A river based cordon is difficult to implement, but the PLA are able to create river closures and support them by the presence of PLA workboats and safety broadcasts over the VHF radio.

A land based cordon may be implemented to support a function e.g. close a bridge overlooking an incident, close a riverbank to secure access, close a riverside area to facilitate safe landing of casualties.

## **On-Scene Coordinator (OSC)**

HMCG have legal authority to appoint an appropriate person to take on this role on their behalf. Even though the appointed OSC may be from another organisation they will carry out this responsibility under the directions of HMCG. The Port of London Authority can, if required, provide a liaison officer from their Harbour Masters Department who will have the knowledge of the different organisations and their roles on the river.

## **Risk Assessment**

Whilst HMCG coordinate all Maritime SAR, each organisation retains responsibility for the Health and Safety and working practices of their own personnel.

## **Assistance to other vessels**

Under Maritime Law the master of a vessel has a duty to respond and assist any vessel or person in distress – this obligation must be considered when taking decisions.

# ANNEX J: FLOODING

**Lead: Local Authority or Environment Agency**

## Introduction

Flooding is becoming an increasingly common event. It could be localised or occur simultaneously at locations across London, to amount to a series of major incidents, which may be short term or protracted.

The Flood rescue concept of operations sets out the framework for enhancing the capability and national coordination of flood rescue in England.

## Types of Flooding

There are several distinct types of flooding that all impact London:

- **Fluvial Flooding:** Flooding from a main river or ordinary watercourse. This typically occurs due to a rise in the water level, blockage or overtopping of a defence which overflows onto surrounding land.
- Rivers are classified by the Environment Agency as either main rivers or ordinary watercourses. The Environment Agency is responsible for the flood prevention measures on main rivers. Ordinary watercourses are the responsibility of various bodies such as local authorities and other landowners.
- **Tidal Flooding:** Tidal flooding results from an incoming tide coming from the sea, raising river levels above the level of defences or from a breach in defences. The river Thames in London is tidal.
- **Surface Water Flooding:** Surface water flooding occurs where rainfall exceeds natural and highway drainage capacity and therefore lies or flows over the ground instead. Surface water flooding can occur very quickly with little or no warning.
- **Ground Water Flooding:** Flooding caused by a rise in the water table. Water may rise up through the ground from within the rock or soil. South East London, due to its geology, is more vulnerable to this type of flooding.
- **Other types of Flooding:** Flooding may also occur from man-made sources such as water main bursts or from reservoir failure.

## Flood Forecasting

The Environment Agency is responsible for issuing flood alerts and warnings for fluvial, tidal and in some cases groundwater flooding.

|   |                             |                |  |
|---|-----------------------------|----------------|--|
|  | <b>FLOOD ALERT</b>          | <b>PREPARE</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prepare a bag that includes medicines and insurance documents</li> <li>• Visit <a href="https://flood-warning-information.service.gov.uk">flood-warning-information.service.gov.uk</a></li> </ul> |
|  | <b>FLOOD WARNING</b>        | <b>ACT</b>     | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Turn off gas, water and electricity</li> <li>• Move things upstairs or to safety</li> <li>• Move family, pets and car to safety</li> </ul>  |
|  | <b>SEVERE FLOOD WARNING</b> | <b>SURVIVE</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Call 999 if in immediate danger</li> <li>• Follow advice from emergency services</li> <li>• Keep yourself and your family safe</li> </ul>   |

Further information can be obtained by calling Floodline on 0845 988 1188 or checking the live flood warning map <https://flood-warning-information.service.gov.uk/warnings>

The **Met Office** issues warnings of severe weather, which give warning of the possibility of flooding from other sources.

The Flood Forecasting Centre issues Flood Guidance Statements which present an overview of flood risk for across five days identifying possible severe weather, which could cause flooding and significant disruption. The below matrix is used to indicate forecast information. **Significant** or **severe** impact forecasts triggers preparation and or response actions as indicated in London's Strategic Flood Response Framework.

|            |          |         |       |             |        |
|------------|----------|---------|-------|-------------|--------|
| Likelihood | High     |         |       |             |        |
|            | Medium   |         |       |             |        |
|            | Low      |         |       |             |        |
|            | Very Low |         |       |             |        |
|            |          | Minimal | Minor | Significant | Severe |
|            |          | Impact  |       |             |        |

Due to the nature of London's flood risk it is imperative that preparation actions such as clearing trash screens or gullies to minimise the impact of blockages are taken on forecast information and are impact driven even if the likelihood of flooding is low.

## Roles and responsibilities

The following are in addition to the generic roles and responsibilities mentioned throughout this document:

## **Police**

In the event of the agreed procedures for warning and informing communities at risk not being effective, then, where practicable, assistance will be given.

## **London Fire Brigade**

The LFB will be lead agency with rescue from flooded environments. Providing assistance with pumping operations, flood mitigation, warning and informing communities at risk, with partner agencies.

The LFB hold a range of flood capabilities including rescue boats, pumps including high volume pumping and specialist flood mitigation equipment such as Boxwall - a modular flood defence barrier system, Versadock pontoons, tactical advisors and swift water rescue technicians.

## **London Ambulance Service**

The LAS may assist with the evacuation of vulnerable persons and supporting the local authority on a clinical needs basis. Whilst the LAS does not possess any boats, they have a number of water rescue sleds and staff trained to work on boats and in water environments.

## **Local Authority**

Local Authorities lead for local flood risks as defined by the Flood and Water Management Act. These include surface water and groundwater.

Operating, monitoring and inspecting Local Authority owned assets within watercourses, including ensuring trash screens are clear to minimise the risk of potential blockages.

Provision of general advice and information in support of the Environment Agency to the public on flood prevention measures and environmental health issues, including encouraging those at potential risk of flooding to sign up to the Environment Agency's flood alert scheme.

Local authorities may also provide further assistance to the public if resources permit, e.g. drying-out facilities or potential provision of flooding mitigation measures.

Coordination of the recovery phase following a flooding incident.

## **Environment Agency (EA)**

The EA will lead the response to fluvial (river) and tidal (Thames) flooding. If resources allow the EA will support local authorities and others in the response to surface water, ground water and other types flooding as well.

Provide a flood warning service for fluvial, tidal and in some areas ground water flooding.

Operating, monitoring and inspecting flood defences, including ensuring trash screens on main rivers are clear to minimise blockages.

Helping partners to pump flood water away from flooded areas where resources allow.

Alongside the Met Office helps to escalate the partnership multi-agency preparation and response by triggering teleconferences on certain forecasts.

## **UKHSA**

UKHSA Extreme Events and Health Protection team have developed advice and guidance specifically for protecting responders and the public's health during, and after a flood event. UKHSA London region can be contacted to assist with provision of such advice and guidance on request.

# ANNEX K: MILITARY AID TO THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES (MACA)

**Lead Authority:** The Military will support the emergency service or organisation they are assisting. For example, in the event of:

- Flooding - Local Authority
- Casualty evacuation - Ambulance Service
- Building collapse - Fire and Rescue Service
- Cordon maintenance - Police Service

## References

- Joint Doctrine Publication 02, UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience. Fourth Edition, November 2021.
- London Strategic Coordination Protocol.

## Definition

Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA): Military operations conducted in the UK and Crown Dependencies involving the employment of Defence resources as requested by a government department or civil authority. This is subject to Defence ministerial approval, either prior to, or at the time of an event.

## Policy

The UK Government has developed, and significantly improved, the nation's civil response capability following a series of challenging resilience events during the early 21st Century.

Civil Authorities routinely take the lead in planning for, and responding to, emergencies. Under MACA, Defence plays a supporting role by providing specialist capabilities and more generalist personnel support when: the civil authorities' capacity/capability is overwhelmed by an incident; directed to do so; or preparing for major national events.

Military support cannot be guaranteed and will be considered against defence commitments.

Recent significant MACA events include:

- Providing widespread and general support during flooding events across the UK on a number of occasions over the last decade.
- Providing security for large-scale, pre-planned events of international and national significance, including the London Olympic Games (2012), the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow (2014), the G7 Summit in Cornwall (2021), the Commonwealth Games in Birmingham (2022) and the Coronation (2023).



- Providing support during periods of Industrial Action (Border Force 2023, London Ambulance Service 2023).
- Support in response to events not necessarily defined as a risk in the National Risk Assessment, but where military support is appropriate, such as providing specialist assistance following the collapse of Didcot Power Station in 2016 and the Grenfell Tower fire in 2017.
- Support to NHS England and NHS Improvement (London) (now NHS England), London Ambulance Service, London Resilience Group (now London Resilience Unit), Local Authorities, and Other Government Departments during COVID-19 (2020-2021).

### **Four policy criteria guide the provision of MACA**

MACA may be provided where:

- There is a definite need to act and the tasks the Armed Forces are being asked to perform are clear;
- Other options, including mutual aid, commercial alternatives and the voluntary sector have been discounted; and either
- The civil authority lacks the necessary capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one; or
- The civil authority has all or some capability or capacity, but it may not be available immediately, or to the required scale, and the urgency of the task requires rapid external support from the MOD.

Under exceptional circumstances Defence ministers can choose to temporarily waive these criteria. This may happen when there are major events of national and international importance, or an event that is catastrophic, or potentially so, in nature.

### **Authority to deploy**

Military resources are not specifically set aside for assisting in an emergency, so any assistance will depend on what assets are available at the time. Involvement by the military chain-of-command and Defence Ministerial approval is necessary for assets to be deployed.

Armed Forces support must always be at the specific request of the Civil Authorities and in almost all circumstances requires the specific authorisation of Defence Ministers. The General Officer Commanding London District has the authority to deploy personnel under his command immediately without reference to higher command if they can be immediately helpful in alleviating distress and saving lives and property.

### **Reaction to an 'Immediate Impact' Emergency**

For an 'immediate impact' event, HQ London District at Horse Guards, Whitehall, will task one of the Joint Regional Liaison Officers (JRLOs) to attend the Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC), if formed, and will provide a single point of contact for Military Aid requests (except Special Forces). All requests should be made through the Chair of the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG).

Some niche capabilities, such as engineers, aviation, and explosive ordnance disposal, are already used and their tasking and capabilities are well understood by the Metropolitan Police Service and do not require Ministerial Approval.

## **General Capabilities**

Able to provide the military command, control and communications based on HQ LONDIST enabling a 24/7 capability, in order to supervise and carry out tasks in support of and in coordination with the Emergency Services and Local Authorities.

Able to be logistically self-supporting.

Able to be flexible and responsive but operate only within own capabilities.

Personnel for unarmed general duties might be made through HQ LONDIST for the crisis and consequence management phases of a major 'immediate impact' emergency.

These tasks might include:

- Reconnaissance. Deployment of small command teams to assist the Emergency Services in determining the extent of, and monitoring, an incident.
- Public Control. Assistance to MPS in controlling access and crowd management, but short of involvement in maintenance of 'public order' which remains a police responsibility.
- Evacuation. Assist the police in the control or channelling of large numbers of public in the incident area.
- Route Guidance. Identification and securing of safe routes around the incident area.
- Cordons. Provision of personnel for cordons. A police presence would be expected perhaps on a ratio of 1:5 soldiers.
- Access Control. Assisting police control at RV/access points. Provide marshals to control or channel large numbers of people in particular at RVs and access points.
- Media Handling. Assist in handling the media and other non-governmental agencies.
- Stores Protection and Distribution. Assist in protecting and transporting stores and supplies including medicines.
- Key Installations. Supporting the police to prevent looting and theft, particularly if key installations are directly affected by the incident.
- Mass Casualties. Personnel may be required to give limited emergency first aid, stretcher evacuation, aid to walking wounded, locating, securing and marking bodies or body parts and support to the medical services to enable access and evacuation.
- Engineering Tasks. The civil and local authorities will retain the lead on any civil engineering tasks but may be supported by Royal Engineer assets if available. Troops may be tasked to provide assistance with site search and safety checks, provision of flood or water defences and the use of boats and assistance with the removal of debris from areas where people might be trapped or where key facilities are buried.

- Temporary Accommodation. Secure, organise, and control emergency or temporary accommodation.
- Water and Feeding Points. In addition to integral catering and water, support troops may be asked to man and control both feeding points and water points at the site and assist with supply of food to areas of the incident.
- Rest Centres. Assist Local Authorities manage premises designated for temporary accommodation for evacuees.
- The provision of a Military Assessment Team – MAT. A team of 1 - 4 specialists specific to the task required. Provided at no cost for a period of usually 1-3 days. Dependant on the urgency of the request, a MAT can be provided at very short notice if necessary.
- Planning capacity, endurance and C2 and operational management are key capabilities that we can provide to other agencies.

Troops will always deploy as a self-contained formed body under command of an Officer or Non-Commissioned-Officer (NCO) throughout the period of military involvement. They will initially report to and work under the direction of the emergency services' Operational Commander. A Military Liaison Officer (MLO) will also deploy as the military point of contact at Operational, Tactical and Strategic levels.

After the immediate response to an incident, it is less likely that the military would be made available during the Consequence and Recovery phase of an emergency. However, the same caveats would apply should the Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG) seek support.

## Reaction to a 'Rising Tide' Emergency

On the outset of a 'rising tide' emergency, military advice should be sought from HQ London District through the JRLOs. While informal discussion and contingency planning may take place at a local level, the Civil Authority must submit a formal request, through the Home Office to the MOD for military aid before the chain-of-command will act.

Requests for MACA support should be submitted in good time and should articulate clearly not only the effect required, but also why military resources are needed to achieve it.

## Costs

HM Treasury rules direct that government departments must charge for services that do not form part of their funded tasks and that departments must not profit from activity carried out on behalf of another department. With a few exceptions, MACA activity is not funded within the MOD budget and is conducted on a repayment basis.

There are 3 charging levels. These are:

**Full costs.** Full costs cover both direct and indirect expenditure incurred in providing the assistance, including basic pay, allowances of the personnel involved and marginal costs expenditure. Full costs are likely to be recovered in the following circumstances.

- When there are extended or repeated calls for the same MOD support; regular use of the same MOD resources is likely to attract full costs, even if they are being used by different civil authorities.
- Where the civil authorities can make alternative arrangements (for example, mutual aid) but have not done so.
- Where the civil authority charges for the service they are providing (through Defence) or have an additional budget allocation for the overall task.
- Where support is non-emergency, planned or routine support, unless it is judged there is a Defence benefit to Defence which offsets the cost.

**Marginal costs.** Marginal costs are costs for military activity that would not otherwise have been incurred by the MOD. This includes: travel; subsistence; fuel; the cancellation of contracts as a result of Defence conducting MACA tasks; mobilisation bounty for Reserve Forces; and any similar expenditure. Marginal costs may be applied when:

- a task is undertaken on behalf of the civil authorities and has a direct benefit to the MOD;
- a task can be combined with an action that the MOD would undertake on its own behalf (for example, when a MACA task provides Defence-related training for our Armed Forces); and
- responding to an emergency, the strategic coordinating group has been established.

**Zero cost.** Costs may be waived when:

- there is an imminent threat to life;
- there is a need to alleviate distress;
- there is a need to protect significant property;
- Defence deploys a military liaison capability and/or a military assessment team; or
- there are other exceptional circumstances.

In all other circumstances, the decision to waive costs is taken by ministers.

The charging policy may change during a MACA operation. Marginal costs are likely to be applied in the early, dynamic stages of a response to a disruptive challenge, increasing to full costs levied during the recovery phase due to protracted Defence involvement and the resulting impact on MOD primary output. When it is in the national interest, Defence ministers may agree to reduce or waive costs.

# ANNEX L: SAFETY

In the event of a major incident, a wide range of both physical, psychological and safety hazards may be faced by both the public and the blue light service responders; all of which need to be managed appropriately if the safety of staff and the public is not to be put at unacceptable risk.

All agencies responding to an incident need to quickly identify and manage hazards during the initial incident response and subsequent investigation and recovery stages. Where an agency identifies a risk that could impact other responders, this should be shared as appropriate.

The responsibility for health and safety of staff at a major incident rests with each agency respectively but, should be coordinated through the strategic commander.

An initial scene assessment (dynamic risk assessment as part of the Joint Decision Model) will need to be undertaken in an attempt to identify any immediate potential hazards to staff that may be expected to work at the scene/s.

Where LFB are in attendance they will appoint an officer to manage overall safety using an analytical risk assessment (ARA) this is a written record of all significant hazards identified. This will provide a risk/benefit analysis, control measures and selection of safe systems of work.

The LFB can provide Urban Search and Rescue advisors who can advise on building structure safety. LFB can also provide tactical advice on hazardous materials and any other specialist capabilities carried out by LFB.

## **Incident Safety Advisory Cell**

The incident safety advisory cell should comprise relevant multi-agency operational practitioners, health, safety and medical professionals, and scientific advisers. The purpose of this group is to ensure the continuity of hazard identification and manage risk control measures across agencies. Professional collaboration ensures the effective use of safety and health expertise and resources.

The incident safety advisory cell should:

- Set the strategy for safety.
- Inform the tactical decision-making process, providing timely and consistent safety-critical strategy, information and instruction to all those affected or dealing with the incident.
- Implement the operational plan and support the development of safety options to support informed interagency operational decision-making.
- Coordinate an oversight of safety and health advice/support.
- Advise on the incident hazard profile, assess/monitor hazards and activity, and support the recovery and clean-up. This includes:
  - hazard-profiling of the scene
  - supporting the development of incident risk assessments and management of hazards including safe systems of work
  - pragmatic safety advice for what can often be a dynamic changing scenario and environment
  - post-event debriefing of staff and structured organisational learning

# ANNEX M: INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS

## Factories and other industrial sites

Some locations, such as factories and other industrial sites, have a range of potential hazards including substances that are flammable, reactive, explosive, environmentally hazardous or toxic. Sometimes the hazards are multiple (e.g. flammable and toxic) and may involve corrosive or radioactive materials. It has also been identified that modern autonomous packaging processes can create additional hazards and risks, when involved in fire incidents.

## Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) sites

For some industrial sites specific emergency plans are maintained under the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) Regulations 2015. The Regulations apply mainly to the chemical and petrochemical industries, fuel storage and distribution, and businesses that:

- Store fuels, including natural gas and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG).
- Have large warehouses or distribution facilities.
- Manufacture and store toxic, flammable, or explosive materials.

In the context of COMAH incidents, the term 'Major Accident' is used by those agencies involved and should not be confused with the term 'Major Incident'.

A '**Major Accident**' means an occurrence such as a fire, or explosion resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation of any establishment to which the COMAH Regulations apply, and leading to serious danger to human health or the environment (whether immediate or delayed) inside or outside the establishment, and involving one or more dangerous substances.

For upper tier (as designated by the regulations) COMAH establishments in London, a specific External Emergency Plan is maintained for each establishment by a multi-agency Safety Liaison Group. Relevant emergency response organisations also maintain their own plans for responding to COMAH Major Accidents.

In the event of a Major Accident the relevant COMAH External Emergency Plan should be activated. Copies of COMAH External Emergency Plans are kept by relevant responding organisations. The Plans are maintained by the London Fire Brigade and available on the ResilienceDirect extranet.

Main hazards vary depending upon the COMAH establishment but may include:

- Toxic release (public health and environmental hazards)
- Flammable release including unignited major spillage, bund pool fire, flash fire, explosion, Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE), with potential for thermal radiation effects from fire/explosion in a wide area around the site
- Blast damage including damage to property
- Contamination of the environment (ground, water, air) including a Major Accident to the Environment (MATTE) as a result of spillage / toxic release and/or fire water run-off

- Public health and environmental effects from a smoke plume

The COMAH Regulations are enforced by competent authorities. The competent authorities for sites in London are the Health and Safety Executive and Environment Agency. The HSE and EA will need access to such locations following Major Accidents and may need to gather evidence.

### **Major Accident Hazard Pipelines (MAHP) (gas pipelines):**

There are approximately 350 km of Major Accident Hazard Pipelines (MAHP) in London operating at between 7 bar to 70 bar pressure. They all carry odourised and unodourised natural gas.

These high-pressure pipelines are subject to the [Pipelines Safety Regulations \(PSR 1996\)](#). Under the PSR Regulations a specific London Major Accident Hazards Pipelines (MAHP) Emergency Plan is maintained by a multi-agency Safety Liaison Group. Copies of the PSR MAHP Emergency Plan are kept by relevant responding organisations. The Plan is maintained by the London Fire Brigade and available on the ResilienceDirect extranet.

The MAHP Emergency Plan will be activated when it becomes known that a gas operator's pipeline has failed, or is likely to fail to a degree that warrants the activation and implementation of the relevant operators emergency plan for Major Accident Hazard Pipelines.

A major incident that requires the implementation of the MAHP Emergency Plan is likely to:

- Affect a large number of people.
- Cause significant public disruption.
- Result in many injuries.
- Cause major environmental damage.
- Require a significant response from many agencies.

Safety Advice for First Responders:

- Must approach location upwind with caution.
- Implement a minimum of a 750m cordon, unless or until advised otherwise by the pipeline operator and a dynamic risk assessment has undertaken.
- Gather incident information from pipeline operatives/ representatives if present.
- Obtain and share other responders the latest weather forecast.
- Responders should implement a restricted/hazard zone and cover the surrounding risks if any of the following indicators are present or reported:
  - Visible indicators: Fire and/or explosion, debris
  - Audible indicators: Hissing/roaring, explosion
- If the smell is coming from a pipeline, there is the potential for ignition/explosion. However, the smell is detectable at low concentrations and is not on its own a good indicator of the nature of incident.



**Warning:** Escaping gas may produce harmful noise levels. Responders must be made aware that standard issue hearing protection may not afford adequate protection.

- Contact the Duty Manager on the National Gas Emergency Line immediately on 0800 111 999
- Network operator attendance can be accelerated via police escort. This can be done via Operation Bunsen which sets out procedures for transporting critical staff and equipment to an incident. Network Operators can contact the MPS via a dedicated Op Bunsen line to request assistance, or it may be activated by the MetGrip Chief who will decide if the relevant thresholds have been met.

The PSR pipelines in London are owned and operated by:

- National Gas
- Southern Gas Network
- Enfield Energy
- Barking Power Ltd
- Cadent Gas

### **Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPIR) 2019:**

REPPIR 2019 are concerned with preparedness for radiation emergencies. The Regulations concern premises where work with ionising radiation is carried out e.g. licensed nuclear sites, hospitals, universities, ports, airports, factories. The Regulations do not apply to transport by road, rail, air, sea or inland waterway.

The Regulations establish a framework of preparedness measures to ensure that arrangements are in place to effectively respond to that emergency, both on the site of the emergency situation and off-site where members of the public might be affected. The Regulations ensure that members of the public are provided with information, both before and during an emergency, so that they are properly informed and prepared, in advance, about what they need to do in the unlikely event of a radiation emergency occurring.

The Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) is the regulator for Licensed Nuclear Sites, authorised defence sites, nuclear new build sites and nuclear warship sites. As of 25 November 2024 there are none of these located in Greater London and there were no known arrangements for nuclear powered vessels to berth in London. Should any such powered vessel berth in London in the future, responsibility for any radiation emergency will be undertaken by the Ministry of Defence.

Under the REPPIR Regulations a specific London REPPIR Framework is maintained by a multi-agency Safety Liaison Group. Copies of the REPPIR Framework are kept by relevant responding organisations. The Framework is maintained by the London Fire Brigade and available on the ResilienceDirect extranet.

The London REPPIR Framework sets out the arrangements for the production, agreement and dissemination of public information. It does not detail the operational response to manage the wider consequences of a radiation emergency.



The London Resilience Communication Group Framework should be read and used in conjunction with the REPPIR Framework to assist with identifying the audience and what their needs are with regards to communications about the incident.

The UK Health Security Agency have also produced guidance on [Recovery from Radiation Incidents](#).

# ANNEX O: FURTHER ASSISTANCE

## Voluntary Sector

The London Voluntary Sector are able to provide both general and specialist support to the emergency services, local authorities, health and other organisations as well as the public in a number of generic areas.

These elements of support may be requested as required by more than one agency at any time. It is anticipated that at times of particularly high demand, the London Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) may seek to determine priorities. However, this does not imply that the emergency services or other agencies should not make enquiries of any part of Voluntary Sector for appropriate resources as required.

The London Resilience Partnership, Voluntary Sector Capabilities Document is the core document that indicates which Voluntary Organisations may be able to provide assistance at the scene of a Major Incident, close by (i.e. Rest Centre, Survivor Reception Centre or Friends and Relatives Reception Centre) or elsewhere. This document lists various specialist services that are available from voluntary organisations, described generically as:

- Welfare
- Psychosocial Aftercare
- Spiritual care & religious services
- Medical Support
- Search & Rescue
- Transport & Escort
- Communications
- Documentation/Administration
- Financial services; and
- Equipment & resources available

Whilst it is anticipated that the emergency services and other organisations will seek assistance from the Voluntary Sector, it should not assume that the response will necessarily be provided free of charge. Organisations should be aware of the funding arrangements for each organisation. These can be found in the London Resilience Partnership Voluntary Sector Capabilities Document.

## Utility companies

The utility companies can be mobilised by any of the emergency services and will normally be coordinated by police in the first instance.

They are able to control gas, water and electrical supplies. They can also provide communications facilities.

Further guidance on Major Accident Hazard Pipelines (MAHP) (gas pipelines) and Op Bunsen can be found in **Annex M**.

# **LONDON** RESILIENCE

## **LONDON RESILIENCE UNIT**

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The London Resilience Unit is part of the Greater London Authority.  
We deliver and coordinate resilience services on behalf of the London  
Resilience Partnership and London Local Authorities.

[www.london.gov.uk](http://www.london.gov.uk)