

MINUTES

Meeting London Resilience Forum
Date Wednesday 26 June 2024
Time 2.00 pm
Place Committee Rooms 2 & 3, City Hall,
 Kamal Chunchie Way, London, E16
 1ZE; Microsoft Teams

Ref	Action	Owner
6.7	Local Authority Regional Resilience Board (LARRB) to consider writing to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry to inform them of the revised local authority regional resilience governance arrangements.	LARRB
6.8	LRU to share the slides on local authority governance arrangements with LRF members and the wider resilience partnership for information.	LRU
7.10	LRF members to ensure lessons for which their organisation or sector is the lead agency are progressed and closed in a timely manner.	All
7.16	LRU to provide a summary of learning from Exercise Helios at the next LRF meeting.	LRU
7.17	LRF members to share any initial headlines from their agency or sector in terms of learning from Exercise Urban Sub at the next LRF meeting.	All
8.5	LRU to work with local authorities as the lead organisation for the Cyber Response Framework to consider what further action is required to progress preparedness for a cyber emergency.	LRU
8.13	LRCG to consider what further work is required to embed the Emergency Alerts Protocol, including awareness raising for SCG Chairs and strategic commanders and representatives.	LRCG
8.14	DLUHC to share any available information on the proportion of people who have opted out of receiving Emergency Alerts.	DLUHC
9.3	LRF members to consider whether anyone from their communications teams would be a suitable candidate to Chair the London Resilience Communication Group.	All

Present:

David Bellamy, Chief of Staff, Greater London Authority (Chair)
 Pat Goulbourne, London Fire Brigade (Deputy Chair)
 Sean O'Callaghan, British Transport Police
 Don Randall, Business Sector Panel
 Claire Cresswell, City of London Police (via Teams)
 James Lunn, Department for Levelling Up, Housing & Communities
 Charlotte Wood, Environment Agency
 Luke Bruce, Greater London Authority
 Natasha Wills, London Ambulance Service
 Mark Sawyer, Local Authority Regional Resilience Board

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Robert Bell, London Communities Emergencies Partnership
Ruth Shulver, London Resilience Communication Group (via Teams)
Terry Leach, Maritime & Coastguard Agency
Mark Rogers, Met Office
Clair Haynes, Metropolitan Police Service (via Teams)
Brian Fahy, Military
Dawn Morris, MOPAC
Aaron Gracey, Network Rail
Chloe Sellwood, NHS England (London)
Julie Billett, Office for Health Improvement and Disparities
Cathryn Spain, Thames Resilience Panel (via Teams)
Christian Van Der Nest, Transport Sector Panel
Yvonne Young, UK Health Security Agency
Beth Reeves, Utilities Sector Panel

London Resilience Unit (LRU):

JP Graham, Head of City Operations (via Teams)
Toby Gould, Interim Head of London Resilience
Matt Hogan, Deputy Head of London Resilience
Jeremy Reynolds, Deputy Head of London Resilience
Katie Wood, London Resilience Manager

Secretariat:

Felicity Harris, Senior Board Officer (clerk)
Clare Kutona, Board Officer

Also in attendance:

Alysa Remtulla, Greater London Authority
Hannah Chivers, Welsh Government
Lori Frater, Welsh Government
Jack Bromley, London Ambulance Service
Paul Clarke, Metropolitan Police Service (via Teams)
David Robinson, NHS England (London)
Sam Walker, NHS England (London) (via Teams)
Sarah Garman, UK Health Security Agency (via Teams)

1 Chair's Opening Remarks

- 1.1 David Bellamy, Chair of the London Resilience Forum (LRF) and the Mayor's Chief of Staff, welcomed members to the 76th meeting of the Forum and introduced himself, noting how much he was looking forward to working with the partnership to help ensure London is as prepared and resilient as possible. The Chair expressed his thanks to his predecessor, Baroness Fiona Twycross, whose commitment to resilience and the partnership was renowned. Fiona had led the LRF through a series of challenges through the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as several major incidents including, though not limited to, the Grenfell Tower fire and the 2022 heatwave and wildfires. The Forum wished Fiona well for the future.
- 1.2 The Chair expressed his gratitude to all organisations in the partnership for their response efforts to a variety of incidents which had taken place since the Forum last met, noting that these incidents had all taken place while partners prepared for a traditionally busy summer period. The incidents referred to included ongoing pressure on policing and public services in response to protests related to the conflict in Israel and Gaza, a public health response to an outbreak of measles and a cyber-attack on NHS systems.
- 1.3 The London Resilience Group had now transitioned to the London Resilience Unit (LRU) of the GLA, which had brought arrangements for resilience into a single place. It was hoped that this would ensure a better connection between longer-term policy, prevention and adaptation, through to emergency preparedness, response and recovery to support London. Katherine Richardson was due to join the GLA as the Director of Resilience in July 2024 and it was noted that officers would continue in their current roles, while ensuring that stakeholders' views remained key to the work of the LRU. Partners were encouraged to contact the Interim Head of London Resilience or the Head of City Operations over the coming weeks if they wished to discuss the continued evolution of resilience arrangements.
- 1.4 The Chair noted that the Grenfell Phase 2 report was due to be published in September 2024. It had been agreed at the previous meeting of the Forum that relevant partners would convene shortly after publication to collectively approach reviewing, implementing and monitoring responses to the report. Relevant partners would be contacted with further details in due course.

2 Introductions and Apologies for Absence

- 2.1 The Chair led a round of introductions both of those in the room and those attending virtually.
- 2.2 Apologies were received from: Kim Wright, Local Authority Regional Resilience Board (Deputy Chair); Louise Puddefoot, MPS; Martin Machray, NHS England (London); Kevin Fenton, Office for Health Improvement and Disparities; Paul Hems, Health and Safety Executive; Jeremy Lamb, Military; Fiona Mair, Deputy Head of London Resilience; Tony Bray, Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities.

3 Minutes and Matters Arising from Previous Meetings

- 3.1 The Forum confirmed the minutes of the meeting of the Forum (76 01) held on 29 February 2024 as an accurate record.
- 3.2 With reference to actions outstanding, the Forum noted that:
- In reference to action 1.5, LRU officers were progressing plans to convene an extraordinary meeting of the LRF following the forthcoming publication of the Grenfell Phase 2 report on 4 September 2024. Officers were looking at tentative dates in mid-late September and would contact relevant agencies with further information as appropriate.
 - The updated Terms of Reference for the LRF and the London Resilience Programme Board had been included in the agenda for consideration and approval (action 5.10).
- 3.3 All other actions had been completed.
- 3.4 **DECISION:**
That the minutes of the previous meeting on 29 February 2024 be approved.

4 Current and Emerging Risks to London

a) Threats update

- 4.1 The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) representative, Clair Haynes, noted that demand on police resources in response to protest activity was far higher than usual, with protests related to events in Israel, Gaza and the wider Middle East expected to continue throughout the summer. The MPS was expecting further action to be carried out by Just Stop Oil, potentially at summer sporting events, including Wimbledon. There had been a rise in reports of antisemitic incidents, and it was noted that right-wing protests were possible around hotels being used to house migrants.
- 4.2 The national threat level remained substantial, which indicated that an attack was likely, while the threat level in both France and Germany had been categorised as severe.
- 4.3 The MPS would continue to support major ceremonial and sporting events throughout the summer and would continue monitoring other likely threats including power outages and cyber-attacks.
- 4.4 The Chair noted recent reports on prisons reaching capacity in the coming weeks and sought an update from the MPS on the implications this may have. The MPS acknowledged that the prison system was in a difficult place and noted that there were two operations in progress to help alleviate these challenges. Operation Early Dawn would see the opening of early custody suites, while Operation Brinker would transfer inmates around the country to free cells to ensure all spaces were utilised. There were ongoing concerns that the capacity issues would lead to greater disorder in prisons and work continued to ensure that the prison service, and staff in particular, were supported. The representative from the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC), James Lunn, confirmed that this matter was also being actively monitored by the department and while the current assessment was that

numbers were manageable, this could change. Communications from DLUHC to relevant agencies would continue and while it was not expected that LRFs would have any direct involvement, briefings to LRFs would be provided.

b) Met Office seasonal forecast: Hazards and issues update

4.5 The Met Office representative, Mark Rogers, noted that the UK had seen a wet and warm winter, while June had been largely dry and cool. Higher than average temperatures were expected in the months ahead, with an increased likelihood of hotter conditions through to September. With a hot and dry spell expected, the chance of wildfires was increased.

c) Infectious diseases (including measles)

4.6 The UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) representative, Yvonne Young, noted that London was in the midst of the biggest outbreak of measles since at least 2012. The UKHSA had been working closely with the NHS and local authorities to contain the outbreak, which had started in Northwest London and had spread outward. With the exception of Havering, all London boroughs had reported cases, with 75 per cent affecting those under the age of 18 years old. It was noted that 41 per cent of cases had led to hospital admissions and that the outbreak was having a considerable impact on both primary and secondary care. The Forum heard that there had been a slight downturn in recent weeks, but that under-vaccination meant that another post-summer surge through autumn and into the winter was likely. Partners were encouraged to continue promoting vaccination and supporting public messaging across their organisations.

4.7 In addition to the ongoing measles outbreak, the Forum heard that there was a considerable outbreak of whooping cough (pertussis), which it was thought was partly due to being in a post-pandemic period but also a reduction of children being appropriately immunised through vaccinations. There had been a notable fall in vaccination rates post-pandemic, despite three doses of the vaccination providing near total protection. Across London, reports of over 100 babies under three months old had been recorded, with deaths recorded in other parts of the country. The UKHSA remained focused on work to improve vaccination rates.

4.8 The Forum noted that the first yellow heat health alert of the year had been put in place that week and that more were expected over the summer months. Partners were encouraged to amplify heat health alerts in their public messaging wherever possible.

4.9 The Chair thanked the UKHSA representative for the update and invited Chloe Sellwood, NHS England (London), to provide an update on other health matters. The Forum noted that the recent cyber-attack on NHS systems had put considerable pressure on the service and that efforts to ensure emergency and complex time-critical care could still be delivered were ongoing. Considerable work had gone into ensuring appropriate messaging was shared with patients and NHS staff on disruptions and delays, while work continued to understand the nature of the leak and the implications. The Forum noted that this, in addition to industrial action by junior doctors and hot weather periods had led to increased pressure on the service.

- 4.10 The Utilities Sector Panel and Thames Water representative, Beth Reeves, noted that the response to recent incidents related to water quality and contamination in Surrey and south-west water areas continued.

d) Hazards update

- 4.11 James Lunn, DLUHC, noted a series of hazards officers were monitoring and responding to, including extreme weather, industrial action, chemical supply chains, prison capacity, protest activity, possible outbreaks of infectious diseases from animals and small boats crossing the Channel. A further update would be received and shared with partners in July.

e) Other agency updates by exception

- 4.12 There were no other updates.

5) Special Agenda Items

a) Stronger LRFs Programme (Paper 75 02)

- 5.1 The Chair introduced the item, noting the uncertainty around the future of the Stronger LRFs Programme in the run up to the general election on 4 July 2024. James Lunn, DLUHC, expressed his gratitude to partners for the work that had gone into the development of the programme plan and noted that the business case had been submitted to the Treasury. Officers had been due to report back to the pilot areas at the end of May or early June 2024, but work had been paused following the election announcement. The Chair echoed his thanks to those involved in putting the proposal together and was clear that there was a responsibility on all partners as resilience leaders to ensure that the work carried out to date remained useful. The principles developed on accountability, the leadership development pipeline and greater involvement of communities were vital, and it would be important to keep under consideration until the government confirmed next steps.

b) 999 Outage progress updates

- 5.2 The Chair invited James Lunn, DLUHC, to provide a progress update following the outage of the 999 service in June 2023. The Forum noted that the post-incident review had been published on 21 March 2024, the purpose of which had been to establish the key facts relating to the first significant disruption to the service in 90 years of operation. The review had not identified any cases of serious harm and deemed the impact to be lower than it could have been. While the review, led by the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, had identified a series of lessons which it was hoped would improve the system, it did not seek to find fault. Six recommendations had been included within the review, and the two more pressing recommendations – for BT to improve processes to avoid a future outage and for the establishment of a cross-system response procedure – had been completed as a matter of urgency. The remaining recommendations focused on improving government oversight, improved public advice and communications in the event of a future incident, exercising and testing. The Cabinet Office, in conjunction with other lead government departments, had formed a Task and Finish Group, which London partners had offered to join.

- 5.3 The Chair noted that in addition to the national review, the Blue Lights Panel had also reviewed the incident and would provide full details of progress against recommendations via the LRF lessons reporting process in due course. The MPS representative was invited to provide a high-level update on progress while reporting against the full debrief was awaited.
- 5.4 The MPS representative noted that some of the issues the Panel had discussed related to how information of the incident first reached DLUHC, the delays to LRFs and emergency services being informed, and the fact that a major incident was not declared. Patrick Goulbourne, Deputy Chair of the LRF and London Fire Brigade representative, noted the work carried out by the London Control Rooms Operating Group following the incident, most notably the establishment of a new outage notification process, which it was hoped would be useful across the partnership. The new process included the use of a downtime detector, a mechanism through which downtime across the service would be flagged. This would then trigger communications to partners.
- 5.5 The Chair thanked colleagues for their updates and looked forward to hearing about further progress in due course.

c) LRF Terms of Reference (Paper 76 03)

- 5.6 The Chair invited the Interim Head of London Resilience, Toby Gould, to provide a brief overview of the changes to the LRF Terms of Reference. The changes were largely administrative in nature and Toby noted changes both to the appointed Chair of the LRF and the transfer of the London Resilience Group to the London Resilience Unit at the GLA. The Forum also noted that the London Resilience Programme Board (LRPB) may in future be chaired by the new Director of London Resilience at the GLA.
- 5.7 **DECISION:**
That the updated London Resilience Forum Terms of Reference be approved.

d) Business Sector Panel Review (Paper 76 04)

- 5.8 The Chair introduced the item, noting both the value the business sector adds to emergency preparedness and response work and the need to do more to engage the business sector organisations in resilience. Moving forwards, it would be important to harness the business sector contribution to resilience and preparedness in order to reduce the impact of emergencies, enhance communication channels, and develop innovative solutions. The Chair noted that he had asked that a review of the Business Sector Panel (BSP) be conducted over the coming months, and he invited Deputy Head of London Resilience, Matt Hogan, to set out the process for the review.
- 5.9 The Forum heard that a series of conversations had taken place over the previous months about the purpose of the BSP, how best it could contribute to resilience, and whether there were any opportunities to broaden its role, remit and membership. Terms of Reference for the review had been developed, and it was noted that the review would consider the structure of the panel and the resource required to effectively support the panel. The review would be informed by ongoing research commissioned by the GLA to better understand business networks and how they provide support at a local level.

- 5.10 Don Randall, Chair, BSP, expressed his thanks to the London Resilience Unit for their support with the review and agreed that this presented an opportunity to look more holistically at how the business sector could contribute to resilience and emergency preparedness.
- 5.11 The Co-Chair of the London Communities Emergency Partnership (LCEP), Rob Bell, offered his support on sharing learning on how the LCEP was established and how best to mobilise disparate groups. It was agreed that this would be covered during the review.
- 5.12 **DECISION:**
That the Business Sector Panel Review Terms of Reference be approved.

6 Agency and Sector Updates

- 6.1 The Chair thanked those who had provided written updates for the paper (76 05) and invited Mark Sawyer, Local Authority Regional Resilience Board (LARRB), to provide a verbal update on changes to regional resilience arrangements for local government.
- 6.2 The Forum heard that an Emergency Planning College Review of Regional Resilience Arrangements had been published in 2022, which had established a set of key principles. The Local Authorities' Panel (LAP) subsequently commissioned a review designed to determine how best to turn those principles into an improvement programme with tangible outcomes. The LAP review aimed to address what London local authorities needed to support resilience arrangements, how and who best to deliver the support and at what cost. It was made clear that regional arrangements were supposed to be supportive in nature and would not assume local authorities' responsibilities as Civil Contingencies Act responders.
- 6.3 The LAP review established 50 recommendations for change, the most immediate of which was the rebranding of the Local Authorities' Panel, which had been reestablished as the Local Authorities' Regional Resilience Board. The benefits of pursuing the recommendations would include strengthened arrangements to increase ownership and strategic input across organisations, a broadened scope of conversation to ensure the right systems are in place, and the creation of a more seamless link between the Board and local authorities. It was hoped that the updated arrangements would be future-proof and underpinned by a medium-long term stable funding agreement.
- 6.4 The Forum reviewed the newly proposed London Local Authority Regional Resilience governance structure which it was hoped would provide a clear link from the LRF through to the 33 boroughs. The LARRB would be co-chaired by Kim Wright and Fiona Taylor, Chief Executive of Barking & Dagenham, and a series of five sub-regional resilience boards had been established to lead on capability development and implementation as required. The membership of the sub-regional boards comprised directors from every London borough, and a further four specialist and technical boards had been created to feed into both the LARRB and the sub-regional structures. The boundaries for the sub-regional representation were based on ICB boundaries, and it was expected that the sub-regional groups would offer a forum for more concentrated discussion and support to individual boroughs. It would also give partners an opportunity to engage with groups of boroughs rather than all 33 boroughs independently.

- 6.5 It was queried whether these changes would have a direct impact on existing relationships with various sector panels, to which it was noted that there remained local authority leads on relevant sector panels.
- 6.6 The Chair welcomed the update and noted that the changes would hopefully provide a mechanism through which to deliver recommendations from the Grenfell Phase 2 Inquiry report. The Chair suggested that the Inquiry team were made aware of the changes to local authority regional resilience governance arrangements.
- 6.7 **ACTION: Local Authority Regional Resilience Board (LARRB) to consider writing to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry to inform them of the revised local authority regional resilience governance arrangements.**
- 6.8 **ACTION: LRU to share the slides on local authority governance arrangements with LRF members and the wider resilience partnership for information.**
- 6.9 In terms of other agency and sector updates, the Chair noted that the MPS had recommended that partners consider sharing public messaging via the LRCG to amplify messages even if this would be for a single-agency incident in which London-wide strategic coordination had not been activated. It was agreed that this recommendation would be considered offline.
- 6.10 The Chair noted an update from NHS England and expressed the Forum's thanks to Dr Rachel Flowers, Director of Public Health, Croydon, who had previously chaired the London Local Health Resilience Partnership. Dr Flowers had moved onto a new role and the Forum wished her well.
- 6.11 **DECISION:**
That the updates be noted.

7 London Resilience Programme

a) Risk and planning assumptions (Paper 76 06)

- 7.1 In referring to the paper circulated with the agenda, the Deputy Head of London Resilience, Jeremy Reynolds, noted that the work of the London Risk Advisory Group (LRAG) continued, and he [REDACTED] all partners involved in bringing the London Risk Register (LLR) together in advance of the next publication in February 2025. It was noted that there were slightly more risks than would usually be expected, with a total of 89 risks, 76 of which were due to be reviewed this year.
- 7.2 On cyber risks, it was noted that a cyber risks sub-group had been established to consider how best to conduct reviews of the relevant risks on the LRR, and it was agreed that the scenario and scoring for each risk would mirror national assessments for the time being. Cyber experts would be invited to attend a sub-group meeting in order to support conversations around conducting more localised risk reviews during the next review cycle.
- 7.3 The Forum heard that the Cabinet Office would be taking a new approach to updating risks, and that a series of smaller tranches of updates to the risk database would be carried out, with a larger tranche expected in December. The updated LRR would be considered by the LRPB in January 2025, though risks from the December tranche were unlikely to be fully incorporated by that stage.

7.4 On planning assumptions, work continued to embed the planning assumptions process within the development of risk assessments and with partnership capability groups. The LRF had previously highlighted significant gaps to government where the ask was potentially unrealistic, and it was expected that further conversations would be held around London's and central government's capabilities in this regard.

7.5 **DECISION:**

That the recommendation to note the priorities and associated resource commitment for partnership organisations regarding ongoing risk and planning assumptions work be approved.

b) Learning and implementation update and historical lessons report (Paper 76 07)

7.6 In referring to the paper circulated with the agenda, the Deputy Head of London Resilience, Jeremy Reynolds, noted that, as previously agreed, a full lessons report was not included within this meeting's agenda and that the next full report would be presented to the LRF in November 2024. The historical lessons report shared with the agenda provided a breakdown of several lessons which had been open for a number of years. **[REDACTED]** The work to review these old lessons began in March 2024 when there were 43 recorded. Following some investigation and assessment, 32 lessons were closed relatively quickly, leaving 11 remaining open. The Forum was assured that significant work had been carried out relating to each open lesson and that they were all close to being fully actioned.

7.7 The next step would be to subsume the remaining lessons, with the exception of those relating to Grenfell, into the full lessons report. It was expected that the open Grenfell lessons would form part of the fuller report what would be developed following the publication of the Grenfell Phase 2 Inquiry Report in September 2024.

7.8 Patrick Goulbourne, Deputy Chair of the LRF and London Fire Brigade representative, noted that he had his first set of interviews with His Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) the day prior as part of their inspection of LFB, during which he was asked about how lessons were recorded, learned from and incorporated into standard processes. It would be important to provide assurance that all remaining lessons have been completed.

7.9 The Chair thanked all colleagues involved in collating this report and highlighted the need to ensure partners resolve and implement lessons as quickly as appropriate.

7.10 **ACTION: LRF members to ensure lessons for which their organisation or sector is the lead agency are progressed and closed in a timely manner.**

7.11 **DECISION:**

That:

- 1. the historical lessons report be approved**
- 2. the oldest lessons in the partnership database continue to be monitored within the full lessons reporting process, with the exception of those relating to the Grenfell Tower Fire, which would form a separate report in conjunction with those from the Phase 2 report.**

c) Partnership training and exercising (Paper 76 08)

- 7.12 In referring to the paper circulated with the agenda, the Deputy Head of London Resilience, Jeremy Reynolds, provided an update on partnership training and exercising.
- 7.13 The Forum heard that a two-day exercise, Exercise Urban Sun, was due to take place in early September 2024, a key focus of which would be to stress test the Strategic Coordinating Group's (SCG) response to a large-scale multi-agency incident where a number of sub-group involvement and associated resourcing would be required. Efforts to assess partners' training and exercising needs would be carried out after the event.
- 7.14 Exercise Fawkes, a Heathrow Airport reaccreditation exercise, would also take place on 25 September. A round of stadium-based exercises was also expected over the coming months focussing on marauding terrorist attacks. This would present an opportunity to exercise learning from the Manchester Arena bombing. It was yet to be confirmed whether this would form the annual counter-terrorism exercise for 2025. A pandemic exercise was also expected to take place in 2025, though further detail was awaited from the UKHSA on the scope of the exercise to be planned.
- 7.15 The Chair thanked Jeremy for the update and requested that a summary of key learnings from Exercises Helios and Urban Sun be shared in time for the next meeting in November 2024.
- 7.16 **ACTION: LRU to provide a summary of learning from Exercise Helios at the next LRF meeting.**
- 7.17 **ACTION: LRF members to share any initial headlines from their agency or sector in terms of learning from Exercise Urban Sub at the next LRF meeting.**
- 7.18 **DECISION:**
- That:**
- 1. the proposed partnership training and exercising activity over the next report period be approved**
 - 2. the proposal for a training and exercise needs request of capability groups and organisations following Exercise Urban Sun so partners could reflect on priorities and gaps highlighted by the exercise be approved**
 - 3. partners agree to continue to support the planning, delivery of, and learning from Exercises Helios, Urban Sun and Fawkes**
 - 4. partners agree to continue to highlight potential partnership exercising opportunities, particularly those with London-level strategic play elements, as early as possible.**

d) Partnership work programme (Paper 76 09)

- 7.19 Noting the impact the paused Stronger LRFs Programme had on the wider work programme, the Chair invited Matt Hogan, Deputy Head of London Resilience, to provide an overview of the paper circulated with the agenda.

- 7.20 The Forum noted the administrative updates to the work programme, notably the closure of workstreams previously having been identified as being behind target. An update on the telecoms framework would be presented at the next meeting.
- 7.21 Two areas of work had been significantly delayed: Identification of the Vulnerable Guidance and Mass Evacuation and Mass Shelter. LRU officers had discussed this with DLUHC and other relevant partners to understand the reason for the shortfall in capacity and whether any alternative approaches could be explored in order to make progress. It was expected that this may take some time to resolve.
- 7.22 The Forum noted that there were a number of amber updates where work was ongoing but were assured that there were no significant concerns to note.
- 7.23 It was noted that a review of the workplan would be carried out and that a new format would be presented at the next meeting of the LRPB. The workplan would become more structured towards programme management and would act as a prioritisation tool. LRPB members would be consulted during the development of the revised workplan.
- 7.24 **DECISION:**
That the LRF workplan be approved.

8 Documents recommended for approval

a) Cyber Incident Framework (Papers 76 10, 76 11 and 76 12)

- 8.1 The Chair invited Mark Sawyer, Local Authority Regional Resilience Board, to provide an overview of the proposed changes to the Cyber Incident Framework. The Forum noted that this was a routine update and that the changes attempt to clearly establish key principles and propose recommended solutions to cyber related challenges. It was made clear that the framework would not replace the requirement for individual agencies to plan and prepare for attacks, and that any activation of the framework would be complementary to and cognisant of the response from government.
- 8.2 Capability briefing sessions had been planned for the autumn and discussions on cyber risks would continue. It would also be worth exploring opportunities to exercise cyber concerns and response arrangements when appropriate. The Forum was asked to approve the current framework, noting that there was still work to be progressed.
- 8.3 The Chair thanked colleagues for their work to update the framework and particularly welcomed the identification of capability gaps, noting that there was clearly some work to do as a partnership to assess how the gaps would be addressed.
- 8.4 It was noted that the MPS would be running a small exercise related to cyber challenges, which would be focused on MPS response protocols. LRU officers would attend to observe the exercise and it was noted that there may be an opportunity for other interested partners to attend or be involved where appropriate.
- 8.5 **ACTION: LRU to work with local authorities as the lead organisation for the Cyber Response Framework to consider what further action is required to progress preparedness for a cyber emergency.**
- 8.6 **DECISION:**

That the Cyber Incident Response Framework be approved.

b) Emergency Alerts

- 8.7 The Chair invited Chair of the London Resilience Communication Group, Ruth Shulver, to provide an overview of the interim protocol for use of the Emergency Alerts system in London.
- 8.8 The Forum noted that, following a review of national processes, a simple activation process for London had been developed. The interim protocol laid out the process, which included a flowchart setting out the actions to be followed in the event of an emergency. Clarification on one point – whether or not an ‘all clear’ alert could be sent in some circumstances – was outstanding, though discussion with Cabinet Office communications officers continued. The Forum was asked to approve the interim Emergency Alerts Protocol, noting that this final query would be resolved before the document was finalised.
- 8.9 James Lunn, DLUHC, welcomed the update and felt that a simple document outlining the activation process would be critical in the event of an emergency. The Chair agreed and was keen to ensure that the document was made available to partners as soon as practical.
- 8.10 Patrick Goulbourne, Deputy Chair of the LRF and London Fire Brigade representative, agreed that simple guidance was vital, and he was clear that strategic gold commanders needed to be appropriately trained.
- 8.11 Following testing of the activation process by the London Fire Brigade, it was noted that it took longer than it should have done for alerts to be received. Further work would be required to reflect on the testing process, and it was acknowledged that there was potential for delay both at the local drafting and national clearance levels.
- 8.12 It was highlighted that the Emergency Alerts system was one individuals could opt out of if desired. It was queried whether there were any plans to assess how many people had chosen to opt out of the alerts and whether further promotion of the system might be required. James Lunn, DLUHC, agreed to seek further information from Cabinet Office colleagues.
- 8.13 **ACTION: LRCG to consider what further work is required to embed the Emergency Alerts Protocol, including awareness raising for SCG Chairs and strategic commanders and representatives.**
- 8.14 **ACTION: DLUHC to share any available information on the proportion of people who have opted out of receiving Emergency Alerts.**
- 8.15 **DECISION:**

That the Interim Emergency Alerts Protocol be approved.

9 Any Other Business

- 9.1 The Chair of the London Resilience Communication Group, Ruth Shulver, noted that she would be leaving the MPS and that a new Chair of the LRCG would be sought in

due course. Partners were asked to consider whether they knew of anyone who would be interested in the opportunity.

- 9.2 The Chair thanked Ruth for all the work she had done to lead the LRCG and noted the much improved connection between operational responses and communications. He said that Ruth had been instrumental in bringing the LRCG membership together quickly to share information during the recent knife attack in Hainault and the escaped military horses.
- 9.3 **ACTION: LRF members to consider whether anyone from their communications teams would be a suitable candidate to Chair the London Resilience Communication Group.**

10 Dates of Next and Future Meetings

- 10.1 The Chair noted the dates of the next meetings, as set out below, and encouraged lead representatives to attend in person wherever possible.
- Wednesday 6 November 2024, 2-4pm, City Hall, London
 - Thursday 27 February 2025, 2-4pm, City Hall, London.