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Our ref:  
18th April 2013

Dear Mrs McCartney

I am the Assistant Commissioner with overall responsibility for Taser within the Metropolitan Police Service and have been asked to respond to your letter to the Commissioner dated 2nd April 2013 and the associated requests for information regarding governance structures and monitoring systems for Taser.

The information I can provide is as follows;

**What is the MPS' policy on seeking support from the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime for the introduction of less-lethal weapons and the expanded use of current weaponry?**

As you are aware, before less lethal weapons can be brought in to use by the Police Service, they must be authorised by the Home Secretary. Any decision to introduce new less lethal options would require a thorough analysis of its efficacy, the financial implications and community impact. This would always involve discussions with MOPAC. However, once licensed by the Home Secretary, the equipment provided to officers is fundamentally an operational issue to be determined by the Commissioner based on evidence and judgement in its value in protecting the public and fighting crime. You will of course be aware that the Commissioner did discuss the extension of the roll out of Taser with the Deputy Mayor for Policing, Kit Malthouse and the Mayor.

**How important do you view the support of MOPAC on the use of less-lethal weaponry?**

An effective and close working relationship with MOPAC is vital to the effective policing of London. We would always wish to have the support of MOPAC on these issues.

**A copy of the relevant section(s) of the MPS' Strategic Risk and Threat Assessment – at our meeting on 14 March, DCC Simon Chesterman (ACPO lead on Taser) told the Taser Working Group that evidence justifying an expansion of Taser would be included in this Assessment.**

The document referred to by DCC Chesterman is the Firearms Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment that is completed annually. Whilst this has some relevance, it does not have direct read across in to the need for Taser. For that reason a specific review was conducted and the findings were set out in the paper presented to the MPS Management Board on 29th February 2012. Please refer to Appendix A for the relevant sections from the review.

**In making the case for expanding the availability of Taser is there other evidence available that demonstrates an increased risk of violence to front line officers?**

Appendix A contains an excerpt from a paper to Management Board dated the 29th February 2012. This data shows an increase of over 50% in police generated requests for urgent assistance over 3 years (between 2009 - 2012).

**(v) The review you referred to at the Metropolitan Police Authority meeting in November 2011 into the use of Taser and the trial expansion in several boroughs.**

The review referred to was the first review, presented to Management Board on the 15th December 2011 - Proposal for the extension of Taser in the MPS.

**(vi) Any research demonstrating a link between the availability of Taser and reduced instances of violence for (i) responding officers, (ii) suspects and (iii) members of the public.**

An overall reduction of police generated requests for urgent assistance since 2012 is highlighted in appendix B.

**(vii) The number of times Taser has been used by the MPS in FY 2010/2011, 2011/2012 and 2012/13 and breakdown of each year's figures by borough, the type of usage (ie sighting, arcing, discharge, 'drive stun').**

The data requested can be found in tabular form in appendix C.

**(viii) The ethnicity and age range of those Tasered and the percentage of those who were defined as emotionally or mentally distressed.**

The data requested can be found in tabular form in appendix D

**(ix) Timeline for the current expansion, from the initial announcement to the present.**

The complete timeline can be found in appendix E however, in summary:

The initial trial of Taser concluded on the 31st March 2004. In July 2007 the Home Secretary approved a year long trial of 10 forces to extend the use to "specially trained units" (STUs). The MPS was one of these forces. Its use was initially restricted to SCO20 (TSG) officers. In February 2012 Management Board supported the extension of Taser to other STUs including those on Boroughs. The rollout to Borough Officers is set to conclude in June 2013.

Yours sincerely,

## **Appendix A - Redacted sections of Management Board Paper of 29th February 2012**

Pages 1-4<sup>1</sup>

1. In the context of an increase in violence toward police officers and ensuring protection of the public, this paper provides an overview of current MPS Taser capability to support front line officers and staff in making London safer. It further provides a comparison of MPS Taser usage against other urban police forces and considers the risks associated with increased Taser deployments across London.
2. Taser has been used as a less lethal use of force and conflict resolution tool in the MPS since 2003 and it's increased availability has enabled faster resolution to violent incidents, whilst maintaining both public and officer safety. The presence of a Taser at an incident allows officers both time and distance to avoid injury, whilst enabling the restraint of violent individuals safely and efficiently. Analysis confirms that just drawing a Taser is often sufficient to prevent escalation. During 2011, 83.7% of CO20 Taser incidents did not escalate to a discharge. Additionally, there are no recorded deaths in the UK, which have been directly attributed to the use of Taser.
3. Existing MPS tactics utilised for violent individuals require a disproportionate number of officers and have resulted in serious injuries to both subjects and to officers.
4. The highest percentages of assaults on police (44.9% over the period Nov 2009 - May 2011) occur at the point of arrest where officers have to engage physically with a suspect.
5. Calls for Police requiring urgent assistance have also shown a marked increase. Table 1 provides a breakdown showing the increase in urgent assistance calls. This increase remains even if the data for August 2011 during the London disorder is set aside.

**Table 1**

<b>Volume of Police-Generated Urgent Assistance Calls</b>					
<b>Month</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>	<b>2012</b>	<b>Volume</b>
Jan	332	358	715	605	2,756
Feb	294	370	718		2,072

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<sup>1</sup> Retrieved from Page 1 to Page 4 of the Management Board Paper of 29th February 2012 - Proposal for the extension of Taser within the MPS. Report by Assistant Commissioner Specialist Crime and Operations.

Mar	304	378	718		2,136
Apr	292	388	789		2,201
May	328	481	771		2,392
Jun	344	480	733		2,329
Jul	314	632	724		2,497
Aug	369	692	1,205		2,919
Sep	352	816	856		2,617
Oct	397	934	775		2,810
Nov	341	789	547		2,345
Dec	298	606	543		2,079
<b>MPS Total Volume</b>	<b>3,965</b>	<b>6,924</b>	<b>9,094</b>	<b>605</b>	<b>29,153</b>

6. Analysis of calls for Police assistance show that the number of 'violence against the person' calls from the public have increased year on year between 2007 and 2010, with a decrease in 2011. Tackling robbery, gang related and knife enabled crime continues to remain a priority for the organisation. Table 2 shows the CAD data detailing public calls to incidents of violence.

**Table 2**

<b>Volume of Public Calls: - Violence Against The Person</b>	
	<b>Volume</b>
<b>2007</b>	295,731
<b>2008</b>	345,395
<b>2009</b>	346,514
<b>2010</b>	362,723
<b>2011</b>	350,078
<b>Jan-12</b>	26,123

7. The debilitating effects of Taser are less physically impactful and have a shorter recovery time than other officer safety equipment (Asp & CS). Any drawing of Taser is recorded centrally on Form 6624 and all discharges are subject to a full Post Incident Procedure (PIP).

#### **The Use of Taser within the MPS**

8. Taser was first introduced into the Specialist Firearms OCU (CO19) in 2003 and was extended in 2007 to 'Specially Trained Units' (STU). Management Board restricted use to CO20 Commissioners Reserve (CR).

9. In line with ACPO Guidance, the MPS deploys Taser in pairs, to counter a situation where one Taser spontaneously fails.
10. Due to distinct roles of CO19 and CO20 officers, the use of Taser is inherently different. For the purposes of this paper, consideration is given only to its use as a conflict resolution tool by STU's.
11. Analysis of STU Taser deployment data confirms that since 2008, only 4 out of every 25 Taser deployments result in a Taser being discharged. The psychological effect of using the red 'laser' dot and 'arcing' has shown good results in preventing the escalation of conflict. The red dot has been particularly effective and has been utilised in half of the Taser deployments since 2008.

**Table 3: CO20 STU Taser Deployments**

Deployment/Year	2008	%	2009	%	2010	%	(Jan-Aug) 2011	%
Draw	51	20.0%	27	18.4%	46	29.8%	31	26.3%
Aim	20	7.8%	7	4.8%	9	5.8%	10	8.5%
Red Dot	123	48.2%	81	55.1%	66	42.9%	63	53.4%
Arc	15	5.8%	3	2.0%	6	3.9%	2	1.7%
Drive Stun	5	2.0%	2	1.4%	0	0%	2	1.7%
Discharge	41	16.1%	27	18.4%	27	17.5%	10	8.5%
<b>Total</b>	<b>255</b>		<b>147</b>		<b>154</b>		<b>118</b>	

12. Data provided by the NPIA of usage between March 2008 and May 2010, shows MPS officers discharge Taser on 30% of occasions when deployed. This is against the national average 22.6%. The data in Table 4 below relates to all MPS Armed Commands.

**Table 4: National Comparison of Taser use**

	National Average	MPS (AFO & STU)
Red Dot	53.9%	42.3%
Drive Stun	3.8%	4.3%
Discharged	22.6%	30.0%
Aimed	4.3%	4.4%
Drawn	12.4%	16.4%
Arced	3.1%	2.5%

#### **Current MPS Taser Capability**

13. The MPS has 1140 Tasers. These are currently deployed overtly by CO19 and CO20, who have 116 and 300 Tasers respectively. Over a 24 hours period, the number of deployable Tasers, pan

London ranges between a minimum of 16 and a maximum of 46. The remaining Tasers are allocated to Training Sites, SO6, SO18, SO14, SCD7, SCD11 & SO1.

14. CO20 Commissioner's Reserve are the only CO20 units who use Taser.

### **Taser Capability in Other Police Forces**

15. Specially Trained Unit's (STU's) are currently used in 38 Forces<sup>2</sup> and there is no consistent deployment method i.e. Roads Policing, Front Line Responders, Dog Handlers, etc.

16. Of the 38 forces who utilise STU's, the average percentage of Full Time Equivalent (FTE) Officers trained is 7.8%. The MPS is currently at 1.3% and CoLP at 3.6%.The table below provides a comparison of only the surrounding and larger urban forces: -

**Table 4: Comparison of STU Numbers & Percentage of Force FTE**

<b>Force</b>	<b>FTE</b>	<b>STU &amp; % Force FTE</b>
City of London	837	30 (3.6%)
Essex	3484	0 (0%)
GMP	7581	380 (5%)
Kent	3608	193 (5.3%)
Merseyside	4233	389 (9.2%)
MPS	31311	400 (1.3%)
Northumbria	3835	286 (7.7%)
Surrey	1944	174 (9%)
TVP	4300	0 (0%)
West Midlands	8058	400 (5%)

17. Despite the challenges of policing London, the MPS currently have significantly fewer STU's at 1.3% compared against forces with similar operational challenges; Merseyside with 9.2%, Northumbria 7.7% and both GMP and West Midlands Police with 5%.

### **Legal Implications<sup>3</sup>**

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<sup>2</sup> Data obtained from ACPO Armed Policing Secretariat – January 2012

12. This report recommends options 1 and 2 as set out at Section A and paras. 18 to 26 of Section B. The provision and deployment of Tasers is an operational decision for the Commissioner and not a decision of the police authority, JR1's Application 2011 NIQB 5.
13. **Reasonable Force.** Section 3(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1967 provides "a person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or persons unlawfully at large". Under s.117 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 reasonable force may be used in the exercise of PACE powers.
14. **Force as is absolutely necessary under Article 2(2) ECHR.** Case law (JR1's 2011 NIQB 5) held that Article 2 (right to life) ECHR applied to the use of a Taser as Article 2(2) provided that "deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of Article 2 when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) In defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) In order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) In action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection". It was held that Article 2 applied because Article 2(2) did not primarily define instances where it was permitted intentionally to kill but describes situations where it was permitted to use force which may result, as an unintended outcome, in the loss of life. The use of force in such circumstances must be absolutely necessary. The use of the term "absolutely necessary" indicates that the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of the aims set out in Article 2(2)(a),(b) and (c). The court upheld operational guidelines which provided "the use of Taser will be justified where the officer honestly and reasonably believes that it is necessary in order to prevent a risk of death or serious injury". DLS should in due course be requested to advise as to whether the test said in previous reports to Management Board to be applied namely: "an additional means of dealing with violence or threats of violence of such severity that it is likely that they will need to use force in order to protect the public, themselves and/or the subject(s)" is appropriate and consistent with the test applied in JR1's (2011) NIQB 5.
15. **Training and Reasonable Force.** Para 34 of the report indicates that officers receive nationally accredited training. This includes the use of reasonable force, the ACPO conflict management model, the relevant protocols and the capabilities of the Taser, which include to deter further violence by using it to warn or as a show of strength. Appendix F covers officer selection and Appendix D the training implications.
16. **Duty of Care.** The Commissioner has at both common law and under the Health and Safety at Work Act a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure the safety of his officers and additionally owes such a duty of care to the public (both the person threatened with and the subject of a Taser and others potentially affected by violence). Para. 2 supports the contention that appropriate deployment and use of the Taser protects both the public and officers, and Appendix H confirms the communications message will emphasise public safety.
17. The training received by officers and the monitoring of incidents is essential to the discharge by the Commissioner of his duty of care. Units deploying Tasers must have in place a clear system for monitoring performance data. Appendix A of the report confirms that the use of force and recording protocols have been established to ensure that there is a robust structure to audit all weapons and incidents. Further that the movement and deployment of weapons are overseen by TSG supervisors. DPS has been tasked to provide an independent and consistent process for

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<sup>3</sup> Retrieved from Page 10 to Page 11 of the Management Board Paper of 29th February 2012 - Proposal for the extension of Taser within the MPS. Report by Assistant Commissioner Specialist Crime and Operations.

monitoring complaints, injuries and civil claims across business groups. Civil actions may of course relate to both the use and deployment and failure to use or deploy Tasers.

18. This report sets out two recommendations namely: Recommendation 1 (**Extend Taser Deployment from TSG Commissioners Reserve to all TSG operational duties**); and Recommendation 2 (**Taser deployments are extended to TP BOCU Officers, training sufficient officers to deploy on two response cars on a 24/7 basis**). Subject to para. 5 of the legal implications (*legal test for use of Taser*) DLS supports the recommendations.

### **Environmental Implications**

19. There are no environmental implications associated with this paper.

### **Risk (including Health and Safety) Implications**

20. The use of Taser is well established and embedded in the MPS and is compliance with national policy and guidance. This paper does not alter the current risk assessment for use of Taser, with the exception of an increased number of Taser users. With an appropriate and robust selection process, established training and development of effective front line Taser supervision, any risks will be well managed and mitigated. In terms of providing protection to the public and to police officers, the use of Taser will mitigate associated risks and better ensure safety in a proportionate and measured way.



## Appendix B

### Volume of Police-Generated Urgent Assistance Calls

Month	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Volume
Jan	332	358	715	605	592	2,756
Feb	294	370	718	548	616	2,072
Mar	304	378	718	674		2,136
Apr	292	388	789	547		2,201
May	328	481	771	683		2,392
Jun	344	480	733	716		2,329
Jul	314	632	724	747		2,497
Aug	369	692	1,205	658		2,919
Sep	352	816	856	562		2,617
Oct	397	934	775	634		2,810
Nov	341	789	547	547		2,345
Dec	298	606	543	593		2,079
<b>MPS Total Volume</b>	<b>3,965</b>	<b>6,924</b>	<b>9,094</b>	<b>7514</b>	<b>1208</b>	<b>29,153</b>

### Volume of Public Calls: - Violence Against The Person

	Volume
<b>2007</b>	295,731
<b>2008</b>	345,395
<b>2009</b>	346,514
<b>2010</b>	362,723
<b>2011</b>	350,078
<b>2012</b>	354,749
<b>Jan-13</b>	26,333
<b>Feb-13</b>	24,372

**Appendix C - Taser use by the MPS in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 to date.**

<b>Taser Deployment by Non AFO Officers and AFO Extended Use (not including pre-planned Firearms Operations) 2010*</b>	<b>Fired</b>	<b>Drive Stun</b>	<b>Red Dot</b>	<b>Drawn</b>	<b>Aimed</b>	<b>Arced</b>	<b>Total</b>
Barking & Dagenham	0	0	2	6	0	0	8
Barnet	3	0	6	1	0	0	10
Bexley	1	0	0	2	0	0	3
Brent	2	0	4	2	0	0	8
Bromley	0	0	3	1	0	0	4
Camden	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
City of Westminster	1	0	3	1	2	0	7
Croydon	2	0	0	4	0	0	6
Ealing	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
Enfield	6	0	4	2	0	0	12
Greenwich	2	0	2	0	1	0	5
Hackney	3	0	4	1	0	0	8
Hammersmith & Fulham	2	0	3	0	0	0	5
Haringey	2	0	7	3	0	0	12
Harrow	1	0	9	4	0	2	16
Havering	0	0	1	1	0	0	2
Heathrow	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
Hillingdon	0	1	2	2	0	0	5
Hounslow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Islington	2	0	5	3	0	0	10
Kensington & Chelsea	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Kingston-on-Thames	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Lambeth	6	0	19	9	3	1	38
Lewisham	2	0	4	0	1	0	7
Merton	0	0	0	1	0	2	3
Newham	2	0	13	6	1	0	22
Redbridge	2	0	3	2	0	0	7

Richmond-upon-Thames	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Southwark	4	0	0	0	0	0	4
Sutton	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tower Hamlets	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Watham Forest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wandsworth	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Outside MPD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Totals</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>212</b>

\* Recording of Taser use in 2010 included AFO (Authorised Firearms Officers) and non-AFO use.

<b>Taser Deployment by Non AFO Officers and AFO Extended Use (not including pre-planned Firearms Operations) 2011*</b>	Fired	Drive Stun	Red Dot	Drawn	Aimed	Arced	Total
Barking & Dagenham		1	2	1	1		5
Barnet			1		1		2
Bexley			2	1		1	4
Brent			5	2			7
Bromley			1	3			4
Camden			3	3		2	8
City of Westminster	3	1	15	2	1		22
Croydon		1	9	11			21
Ealing	3		7	3			13
Enfield	1		7	4			12
Greenwich	5	1					6
Hackney	2			1	2		5
Hammersmith & Fulham			4		2		6
Haringey	4		2	4	1		11
Harrow	2		3				5
Havering							
Heathrow							
Hillingdon	3		6	3	2		14
Hounslow			2	1		1	4
Islington	1		9	5			15
Kensington & Chelsea			3		1		4
Kingston-on-Thames			2				2
Lambeth	7	3	15	10	1	1	37
Lewisham	4		10	10			24
Merton							
Newham	1		3				4
Redbridge	4		5	3	2		14
Richmond-upon-Thames							

Southwark	4	1	13		1	2	21
Sutton			2	1	1		4
Tower Hamlets	1	1	3	1	1		7
Watham Forest	3		4	4			11
Wandsworth	1		4	1	2		8
Outside MPD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Totals</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>300</b>

\* Recording of Taser use in 2011 included AFO (Authorised Firearms Officers) and non-AFO use.

<b>Taser Deployment by Non AFO Officers (TSG &amp; BOCU) 2012*</b>	Fired	Drive Stun	Red Dot	Drawn	Aimed	Arced	Total
Barking & Dagenham	3	0	24	8	4		39
Barnet		0	3	3		1	7
Bexley	3	0	12	5			20
Brent		0	8	7			15
Bromley	2	0	7	7	3		19
Camden	2	0	2	3		1	8
City of Westminster	2	0	10	15		3	30
Croydon	1	0	13	11	3		28
Ealing		0	3				3
Enfield	12	0	53	9			74
Greenwich		0		1			1
Hackney	1	0	4	10		1	16
Hammersmith & Fulham		0		2	1		3
Haringey	3	0	8	13	1	1	26
Harrow	4	0	15	11	2		32
Havering		0					0
Heathrow		0					0
Hillingdon	1	0	5	1		1	8
Hounslow	2	0	1	14	1		18
Islington	2	0	3	1	1		7
Kensington & Chelsea	1	0	1				2
Kingston-on-Thames	2	0	18	9	3		32
Lambeth	1	0	16	18	5		40
Lewisham	5	0	18	7		1	31
Merton		0	8	6		2	16
Newham		0	11	6	2	2	21
Redbridge	2	0	8	10			20
Richmond-upon- Thames		0					0
Southwark	2	0	7	17	1		27
Sutton	1	0	4	8	1		14
Tower Hamlets	2	0	2	7	3		14
Waltham Forest	2	0	6	1	1		10
Wandsworth		0	8	2			10
Outside MPD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Totals</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>278</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>591</b>

\* Recording of Taser use from 2012 separated AFO and non-AFO use.

<b>Taser Deployment by Non AFO Officers (TSG &amp; BOCU) 2013</b>	Fired	Drive Stun	Red Dot	Drawn	Aimed	Arced	Total
Barking & Dagenham	1	0	9	5	0	0	15
Barnet	0	0	0	4	0	0	4
Bexley	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brent	0	0	0	3	2	0	5
Bromley	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Camden	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
City of Westminster	2	0	1	3	0	1	7
Croydon	0	0	0	10	0	0	10
Ealing	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Enfield	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Greenwich	0	0	0	7	0	0	7
Hackney	2	0	7	3	0	0	12
Hammersmith & Fulham	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
Haringey	0	0	4	10	0	0	14
Harrow	0	0	0	7	0	0	7
Havering	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
Heathrow	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hillingdon	0	0	0	2	0	0	2
Hounslow	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
Islington	0	0	5	0	0	0	5
Kensington & Chelsea	0	0	1	3	0	0	4
Kingston-on-Thames	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lambeth	0	0	2	3	2	1	8
Lewisham	0	1	1	1	0	0	3
Merton	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Newham	0	0	4	0	0	0	4
Redbridge	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Richmond-upon- Thames	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
Southwark	0	0	7	3	1	0	11
Sutton	0	0	0	3	0	0	3
Tower Hamlets	0	0	0	14	0	0	14
Waltham Forest	0	0	0	6	0	0	6
Wandsworth	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Outside MPD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Totals</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>160</b>

## Appendix D - Ethnicity and Age range data 2010 to present

Ethnic Data for Tasers Fired by Specially Trained Units	
January to December 2010	
Self Defined Ethnicity	Number
White British	6
Caribbean	4
African	1
Asian Indian	0
Asian Pakistani	0
Asian Bangladeshi	0
Any other Asian Background	0
Any other Black Background	4
Any other White Background	3
Chinese	0
White and Black Caribbean	1
White and Black African	0
Any other Mixed Background	0
Not stated	0
White Irish	2
<b>Total Draws</b>	227
<b>Total Firings</b>	31
<b>Total EMD</b>	8 (38.1%)
Age Range of Subject Fired	
16-24 years	7
25-35 years	4
36-45 years	7
46-55 years	2
Over 55 years	0

Ethnic Data for Tasers Fired by Specially Trained Units	
January to December 2011	
Self Defined Ethnicity	Number
White British	9
Caribbean	5
African	3
Asian Indian	1
Asian Pakistani	0
Asian Bangladeshi	0
Any other Asian Background	1
Any other Black Background	3
Any other White Background	0
Chinese	1
White and Black Caribbean	0
White and Black African	0
Any other Mixed Background	0
Not stated	0
White Irish	1
<b>Total Draws</b>	255
<b>Total Firings</b>	29
<b>Total EMD</b>	10 (41.6%)
Age Range of Subject Fired	
16-24 years	10
25-35 years	8
36-45 years	3
46-55 years	1
Over 55 years	2



**Ethnic Data for Tasers Fired by  
Specially Trained Units TSG (+  
BOCU from July 2012)**

**January to December 2012**

<b>Self Defined Ethnicity</b>	<b>Number</b>
White British	12
Caribbean	5
African	2
Asian Indian	1
Asian Pakistani	0
Asian Bangladeshi	0
Any other Asian Background	2
Any other Black Background	4
Any other White Background	9
Chinese	1
White and Black Caribbean	2
White and Black African	0
Any other Mixed Background	0
Not stated	2
White Irish	1
Animal	2
Any other Ethnic Group	1
<b>Total Draws</b>	<b>415</b>
<b>Total Firings</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>Total EMD</b>	<b>26 (59.1%)</b>
<b>Age Range of Subject Fired</b>	
16-24 years	9
25-35 years	17
36-45 years	11
46-55 years	3
Over 55 years	1

Ethnic Data for Tasers Fired by Specially Trained Units (TSG plus BOCU)	
January 2013 to date	
Self Defined Ethnicity	Number
White British	12
Caribbean	3
African	2
Asian Indian	0
Asian Pakistani	0
Asian	0
Bangladeshi	0
Any other Asian Background	1
Any other Black Background	2
Any other White Background	2
Chinese	0
White and Black Caribbean	1
White and Black African	0
Any other Mixed Background	0
Not stated	3
White Irish	0
<b>Total Draws</b>	283
<b>Total Firings</b>	29
<b>Total EMD</b>	10 (38.5%)
<b>Age Range of Subject Fired</b>	
16-24 years	7
25-35 years	7
36-45 years	4
46-55 years	3
Over 55 years	0

## **Appendix E - Chronology of Taser in the MPS**

In February 2003 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP was commissioned by ACPO to undertake an independent evaluation of the operational trial of the Taser device. The trial concluded on 31st March 2004.

Taser is an item of conflict management technology that works by delivering an electrical current that interferes with the body's neuromuscular system, temporarily incapacitating a subject. The Taser is laser-sighted and uses cartridges attached to the end of the barrel. The cartridges project a pair of barbs, which attach to the skin or clothing and deliver an electrical charge. The maximum range is 21 feet. The effect of a Taser discharge is instant and only lasts as long as the charge is applied. Every time the Taser is fired, it stores the time and date when it was fired. The Taser trial police forces used the American-made M26 Advanced Taser. The power output from this version of Taser is 26 watts.<sup>4</sup>

Taser has been available to all Authorised Firearms Officers (AFO's) since September 2004 as a less lethal alternative for use in situations where a firearms authority has been granted in accordance with criteria laid down by the ACPO Manual Guidance on Police Use of Firearms.

At first, deployment was restricted to authorised firearms officers (AFO's) but in July 2007, the Home Secretary approved a one-year trial by 10 police forces, (Avon and Somerset, Devon and Cornwall, Gwent, Lincolnshire, Merseyside, Metropolitan, Northamptonshire, Northumbria, North Wales and West Yorkshire) which extended the deployment of Tasers, subject to training, to officers known as 'specially trained units' (STU's).

A primary responsibility of the Police is to ensure the protection of the public. The increased availability of Taser has enabled faster resolution to violent incidents, whilst maintaining both public and officer safety. The presence of a Taser at an incident allows officers both time and distance to avoid injury, whilst enabling the restraint of violent individuals safely and efficiently

In 2007 Taser use was extended to STU's and was initially restricted to SCO20, Commissioner's Reserve.

In February 2012 Management Board supported the extension of Taser to other STUs (Specially Trained Units) and TP BOCU officers;

"The Board strongly supported the extension of Taser by October 2012 within the MPS to (i) all TSG operational deployments on a 24/7 basis and (ii) TP BOCU Officers, training sufficient officers to deploy on two response cars on a 24/7 basis."<sup>5</sup>

Management Board requested further information prior to the commencement of roll out to BOCUs which was provided in the March meeting<sup>6</sup>. The follow decision was made;

"Agreed to AC SCO's proposal to select five outer-London BOCUs for full training and support before the Olympics, with remaining BOCUs to be trained after the Games."

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<sup>4</sup> The Association of Chief Police Officers: Independent Evaluation of the Operational Trial of Taser (Final Report, May 2004)

<sup>5</sup> Management Board minutes 29/02/2012 v5 final

<sup>6</sup> Management Board minutes 21/03/2012